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EDITOR · OWEN LATTIMORE

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BOOKS REVIEWED IN THIS ISSUE

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New Books of Importance to Members of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

China and Japan Information Dept Paper of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Oxford, London and New York, 1938 2s 6d 75¢) New edition of this excellent handbook covering the political and economic factors in the present Far Eastern War summarizing diplomatic and military events from 1860 to the end of 1937

Japan the Hungry Guest, by G C Allen (London, 1938, 10s 6d) Deals with the great trusts and cartels of Japan and with the importance of groups and cliques, as opposed to individuals in the structure of society

The Japanese Canadians, by Charles H Young, H R Y Reid and W A Carothers Edited by H A Innis Published under the auspices of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene in Canada and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (University of Toronto 1938 Can $2 25 plus 15¢ postage) An account of the difficulties of the Oriental in British Columbia, including a study of Oriental standards of living in that province

Canada Today by F R Scott (London, Toronto and New York) Prepared for the British Commonwealth Relations Conference of 1938

Contemporary New Zealand A Survey of Domestic and Foreign Policy Preface by the Hon Wm Downie Stewart (Whitcombe and Tombs, Ltd, Oxford, London, 1938) A symposium, containing the results of research carried out by members of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, dealing with social and economic life in New Zealand, with some account of the country's relations to the rest of the British Commonwealth

The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, by A Whitney Griswold (New York, 1938 $3 75) A most important review of the past 40 years and of opposing American tendencies toward isolationism and toward participation in international affairs

Land Utilization in China by J Lossing Buck (Commercial Press, Shanghai; Oxford London U of Chicago Press 1938 Set, $15 00, Vols I and II, $5 00 each, Vol III $[illegible])

Agrarian China Selected Source Material from Chinese Authors, compiled and translated by the Research staff of the Secretariat, I P R Introduction by R H Tawney (Oxford London, 1938, 8s Chicago, 1938, $2 00) A report in the International Research Series of the I P R

American Far Eastern Policy and the Sino Japanese War, edited by Miriam S Farley (American Council I P R, New York and San Francisco, 1938, 50¢) First of a new series of *Studies of the Pacific* to be issued by the American Council, this is a record of discussion in seven regional conferences held under the auspices of the American Council in the spring of 1938

Bolshoi Sovetskii Atlas Mira (Great Soviet World Atlas), Vol I Editors A F Gorkin O Y Shmidt, V E Motylev, M V Nikitin, B M Shaposhnikov (Scientific Publication Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas, Moscow, 1937, R 200, $40 00) This, the first of three volumes contains over 65 maps of the world, 40 maps of the Soviet Union, and a wealth of material on current developments in the U.S.S.R. largely based on data hitherto unavailable

Vestnik dalnevostochnogo filiala Akademii Nauk SSSR (Bulletin of the Far Eastern Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.) No 30 (3) This number (published in Vladivostok), contains an important series of articles on iron and coal deposits, forest resources, soil, agriculture, fisheries, etc, in the Soviet Far East.

THE YEN AND THE SWORD

GUENTHER STEIN

CURRENCY has proved to be one of the decisive weapons in the present war between Japan and China. Much though its importance is underrated by many close observers of the great conflict, the two participants have long been well aware of this fact. More than two years before military hostilities actually started, the Sino-Japanese currency war was already in full swing. The Japanese took the offensive when they attempted, early in 1935, to link North China's currency with that of the "Yen Bloc."

It was hoped that by this means the five big northern provinces could be severed from China and virtually conquered by Japan, without any expenditure of blood and ammunition. It was not only by Japan's diplomatic and military pressure, coupled with a great variety of subversive political activities in North China, that this scheme was to be forced on the unwilling country. China's old and obsolete silver currency being in a precarious state at that time, the Japanese realized the chances of direct, aggressive action in the monetary field itself. This took the form of an attempt at denuding China, and especially the Northern provinces, of silver, the legal tender.

Under the careful direction of the Japanese authorities on the spot, therefore, very large quantities of silver coins and bars were bought up by Japanese agents in the North, at the abnormally low prices, measured in terms of foreign exchange, which then prevailed in China. In spite of the Chinese Government's ban on silver exports, it was smuggled out to Japan, where its arrival was not shown in the official import returns. But the re-shipping of the silver to Britain was done quite openly, Japan's official foreign trade statistics giving a total of more than Yen 275,000,000 of such silver exports for the years from 1934 to 1936. The Chinese origin of the metal was obvious enough, for Japan is not itself a producer of

silver. In London, eventually, the metal was sold with huge profit at the high world market price which was maintained by the silver purchase policy of the United States. But these profits were no more than incidental. The real motive of the maneuver was the desire to rob North China of its old-established currency basis, to make its monetary position untenable, and thus to force it into the clutches of the paper-yen-bloc. Gradually, China as a whole was to be dealt with in a similar manner.

Much damage though the attack did to China, it failed in its main objective. For the Chinese Government was thus driven to the sudden currency reform of November 3, 1935, which had long been overdue. All silver was nationalized, ceased to be legal tender, and was not allowed to circulate any more. Its place was taken by notes of the Government banks. In other words, China evaded the Japanese blow by adopting a "managed" currency, as almost all other states had done some time before. But by collecting all the silver that still remained in the country, or at least some $1,000 million (Chinese), on which the Government could lay its hands, China stole a march on Japan. For this silver was thus made available not only for use as a metallic basis for the new paper currency, in time of peace, but also as a potential emergency fund at the free disposal of the Government for armament purchases abroad, in case of war.

It was especially this latter aspect of China's logical countermove in the undeclared currency war which gave rise to great uneasiness in Japan and caused an immediate stiffening in its political attitude toward China as well as toward Great Britain, which was alleged to have been instrumental in this Chinese action. As to the purely economic aspect of the Chinese currency reform, the Japanese were quite confident at first that it would fail within a short time. The Chinese Government, so they thought, would be neither powerful nor honest and able enough to make a success of a modern, national "managed currency," in a country which was backward, only half unified, and unmanageable; the Chinese people, having been used to silver for many centuries, would never gain any confidence in paper notes which could not be converted into silver, even though foreign exchange might be

bought with them; and a currency dilemma even worse than the one which had just been averted would soon give unforeseen opportunities of expansion to the Yen Bloc.

But when the Chinese reform proved to be a very great success indeed, resulting in general economic progress at a speed which China had not seen before, and when it obviously became an instrument with which both the political unification of the state and China's credit abroad were rapidly being enhanced, the alarm in certain Japanese circles grew steadily.

It would be an exaggeration to say that all these implications of China's successful currency reform were the only cause which made Japan decide for armed aggression, but history will probably prove it to have been a major one; just as the desire for the incorporation of wide areas of China into the Yen Bloc, although certainly not Japan's only objective in China, always loomed larger in Japan's plans for the future than is generally supposed.

Eventually, Japan's huge military machine went into large-scale action in China. But the currency weapon, although of course decidedly secondary now, did not remain unused for long. It is characteristic of the persistency with which the original aims were kept in mind that the first two measures which Japan caused the new "puppet" regime in Peiping to take, were devised to lay the foundations for expanding the Yen Bloc in the conquered territories: the creation of the "Federal Reserve Bank of China," the notes of which were made dependent on the yen; and the issuance of a new tariff with lower import duties, to facilitate Japanese trade expansion within the yen's new domain.

China, too, relied heavily on the fighting value of its newly-forged currency arm. The war fund which was a by-product of the nationalization of silver, undertaken for purely monetary and defensive reasons, has been fully utilized. The concentration, in the hands of the Government, of a bullion reserve equivalent to at least half of the gold stocks in the Bank of Japan became a main factor in China's surprising ability to prolong resistance against the invader. But China learned also to fence, and to fence exceedingly well, with the currency weapon itself. Wherever the regular Chinese army had to withdraw before the better-equipped Japanese forces,

there remained, besides the guerillas, an even more cumbersome adversary behind the lines of the victors: the Chinese national dollar, a mere paper note, which upset Japanese plans for incorporating the occupied areas into the Yen Bloc; for forcing the Chinese people into cooperation, for exploiting their economic resources to the limit, and for thus deriving fresh industrial and financial strength from military conquest

This great effectiveness of the Chinese currency as a force of resistance against Japan's attempt at wholesale penetration in the occupied territories was by no means accidental. Two years of able currency management" in time of peace had gained for the new notes a public confidence on which it was possible for the Chinese Government to base a positive policy, effective even in areas under Japanese rule Its main objective was to retain for the Chinese national dollar an intrinsic value higher than that of the yen or of any new yen dependent currencies which the Japanese introduced at the point of the bayonet, into the occupied territories. This meant that the national dollars had to remain freely convertible into foreign exchange, an important facility which neither the yen nor its new satellite notes can offer to their holders. And convertible the Chinese paper dollar remained, even though a good deal of China's foreign exchange reserves, derived from the sale abroad of nationalized silver, had at first to be sacrificed for the sake of adherence to this sound principle The general drain on these reserves, (in great part due to bearish speculation), gradually forced the Chinese dollar down to about half of its original parity, during a year and a half of costly warfare, but as it depreciated, it pulled the Yen Block currencies in China down with it, to the same extent. And popular preference for the Chinese dollar remained just as strong, as general, and as well-founded on its infinitely greater intrinsic value, as before

The end of the year 1938 found the Sino-Japanese currency war in a state of stalemate China, thanks to a clever and persistent policy, had already succeeded for a number of months in reducing to almost zero the drain on its vastly diminished foreign exchange reserves In spite of the fall of Canton and Wuhan, and without financial assistance from abroad, China had once more established

an even balance between its income and its obligations in foreign exchange. China is able, therefore, to go on almost indefinitely with the maintenance of a stable Chinese dollar, upsetting the Yen Bloc's far-reaching projects—at least so long as Japan devises no effective offensive. Japan, on the other hand, has been marking time and remaining on the defensive; certainly not because of any lack of enthusiasm for its old ambitions; but rather because of the great difficulties it has encountered, which so far have proved impossible to overcome.

Meanwhile, the Yen Bloc itself, originally comprising Japan, its colonies of Korea and Formosa, and its dependency Manchukuo, with the Leased Territory of Kwantung, has been extended in a vague way to North China; in still vaguer manner to the occupied territories of Central China; and, most faintly, to South China. No actual program or statutes for its working have ever been made known, but it is possible roughly to analyze its two main motives, together with their present state of development:

First, to facilitate the expansion of Japan's exports to the areas of its military conquest; and second, to enable Japan to import freely from these areas, without any outlay of foreign exchange. This involved the appropriation by Japan itself, to the detriment of the subject and invaded territories, of whatever foreign exchange can be procured by the sale abroad of the surplus products of these territories. Full Japanese currency control over these areas is required, not only in order to achieve these two aims, but also as a powerful lever for directing their general economic development in a way which corresponds with the desires of the Japanese military and with the needs, as well as the tabus, of Japan's own economy.

JAPAN must continuously expand its export sales. This need arises from Japan's two contradictory domestic policies of restricting, rather than elevating, the purchasing power of its own people, and of increasing the productive capacity of its manufacturing industries to the utmost extent of its technical ability.

It is true that the volume of Japan's export trade, recently, has shown sensational growth. It increased by fully 100 per cent during

the five-year period from 1931, the time of the "Manchurian Incident," to 1936, the year before the outbreak of the present war on China. But even this huge expansion of sales abroad—which, partly at least, had been made possible by great national sacrifices in cutting selling prices—would not have been sufficient to fill the ever widening gap between Japan's domestic purchasing power and the volume of goods which its industries are designed to produce, if war preparation had not absorbed an increasing share of Japan's industrial output.

But war preparation, military as well as industrial, has also the purpose of paving the way for further expansion of exports, and the problem will become still more acute in the future if the present war against China should not have the expected result of allowing solution within an expanded Yen Bloc. It will be seen from the following that Japan's chances of overcoming, or even considerably relieving its export problem by the conquest of the China market are very slim indeed. This unfavorable aspect, however, is only additional reason for Japan to enslave China's economy in the Yen Bloc, in order to exploit whatever trading opportunities there may be to the fullest possible extent.

The volume of Japan's export sales to China, before the present war, was very unsatisfactory. In 1936, the last year of peace, the land of "400 million customers" took only 4.4 per cent of the total exports which then left Japan for foreign and colonial countries; and these Chinese purchases from Japan constituted no more than 16.3 per cent of China's total purchases from abroad. How different were conditions for Japan's exporters in the countries which were already firmly under Japanese rule, where no foreign currency intervened, where the yen rules supreme! Every single one of Japan's dependencies, infinitely smaller though they are in area and population than China, was a far better customer of Japan, in 1936, than the most populous country in the world, with which Japan has always professed to be so eager to "cooperate."

Formosa, Japan's oldest colony, with little more than five million inhabitants, took 6.8 per cent of all the exports of Japan proper. That means, it bought from the "mother country" 83.3 per cent and from other Japanese dependencies 9.1 per cent of all its outside re-

quirements, having to take only 7.6 per cent of them from non-Japanese countries.

Korea, second among Japan's great colonial acquisitions, with its 22 million people, was responsible for as much as 18.5 per cent of all the exports of Japan proper. These purchases constituted 85.1 per cent of Korea's total imports. A further 8.7 per cent came from other Japanese possessions, so that only 6.2 per cent of what Korea required had to be purchased from foreign countries.

Manchukuo, having been under Japanese rule only for a short time, had not quite reached this ideal state of "cooperative" dependence on the "big brother." But much progress was being made in this direction. Its 30 million people, who had not taken more than 6.4 per cent of Japan proper's total exports in 1930, the last year before the "Manchurian Incident," bought 14.8 per cent of Japan's much increased total exports in 1936. And the share of Japanese Empire goods in Manchuria's total purchases from outside, which had amounted to 39.3 per cent in 1930, went up to 75.1 per cent in 1936. But this still left a remainder of 22.8 per cent to sellers of foreign goods—mainly such goods as were required, directly or indirectly, for the Kwantung Army's military preparations in Manchukuo.

Altogether, Japan's three main dependencies were taking 40.1 per cent of its total exports in 1936. China took 4.4 per cent, while countries entirely outside Japan's sphere of political influence bought 55.5 per cent of Japan's total exports.

Judging from the analogy of Formosa, Korea, and Manchukuo, a few years of Yen Bloc rule over occupied or subjected parts of China would allow the Japanese Empire, theoretically at least, to provide about 70 to 80 per cent of Chinese import requirements. Even then, however, the total Chinese purchases of Japanese goods—calculated on the pre-war basis of 1936—would hardly amount to 20 per cent of Japan's total exports. In other words, the 400 million Chinese, for whose subjection such tremendous efforts are still being made, would yield Japanese exporters no more profits than the 27 million Formosans and Koreans did in 1936. Even then, a full 40 per cent of all the exports of Japan would have to be sold in foreign markets outside the Yen Bloc, which means that the

main factor for a steady further expansion of Japanese exports as a whole would still be the willingness of foreign countries to buy more and more Japanese goods.

The complete and effective incorporation of China into the Yen Bloc, however, would give Japan a good chance of gradually reducing China's present comparatively high economic self-sufficiency. It would enable Japan to make China much more dependent on increasing supplies from Japan—just as Formosa, Korea, and to a certain extent even Manchukuo are being "managed" by Japan with this aim in mind. But this is an aspect of the more distant future

Meanwhile, the incorporation into the Yen Bloc of most of the occupied areas of China has already been started, although only in a superficial way Japanese trade with them is now officially designated as "Yen Block trade," on a par with trade with Formosa, Korea, or Manchukuo According to the regulations of the Japanese Army authorities in North China, the notes of the newly established "Federal Reserve Bank" are now the legal tender over wide areas. They are convertible into Japanese yen, at par, and the Bank's monetary policy is in Japanese hands Apart from these "F.R.B." notes, original Japanese and Korean yen, as well as Manchukuo yuan notes, all at the same enforced value, are in circulation in North China But their combined total is very much smaller than that of the Chinese national dollars which are still being widely used and by no means only in the interior districts beyond the reach of the Japanese They are still predominant, in spite of the ruthless punishment which is meted out to anybody who is found dealing in the "old" currency notes in any other way than by exchanging them, at a 10 per cent discount, against "F R.B." notes.

The new conditions in North China have duly caused a rush of Japanese exports into this welcome market. According to Japan's official trade returns, average monthly exports to North China, during the first eight months of 1938, were more than three times as high as they had been before the war, in 1936. Even if indirect exports to North China, via the Kwantung Leased Territory, be taken into account—because a good deal of smuggled Japanese goods went that way before the outbreak of hostilities and were still doing

so until very recently—their total would seem to be considerably more than twice as high today as two years ago. And this in spite of a considerable reduction in the total purchases from abroad of war-ridden North China.

In Central China, where the Yen Bloc, so far, is represented only by a comparatively large and steadily expanding circulation of Japanese "Military Yen," issued by the Army not only for military but also for commercial needs, Japanese exporters were also quick to exploit their chances. The rise in the monthly average of Japanese exports to those areas, during the same period, was bound to be small, so far, because of the utter destruction of purchasing power and economic organization in those areas; but Japan's share in the total imports of Central China has already increased by something like four times. Similar developments are expected in the newly occupied areas of South China, where Japanese "Military Yen" are beginning to do their pioneer work.

All these advances have been made at the expense both of third-party countries and of domestic Chinese producers. But, just because of these circumstances, the first objective of the intended full incorporation of conquered China into the Yen Bloc—the increase of Japanese export sales against all odds—would appear to be well on the way to realization if it were not for the alarming failure of the Yen Bloc, so far, in regard to its second objective, which has now to be dealt with.

JAPAN proper is also in chronic need of importing a great volume of goods, especially raw materials, which it cannot produce itself. This means a need for foreign exchange with which to buy such goods in the richly stocked world market. Japan's import requirements are growing with the increase in its armaments and with the expansion of its industrial equipment. Japan's urgent desire to become more independent of foreign countries by gaining control over new sources of raw materials as well as of foreign exchange revenue, therefore, is another motive for the war against China, and also another reason for the attempt to extend the Yen Bloc to the conquered territories. It will be seen that success or failure in this regard is a main conditioning factor in the eventual success or

failure of Japan's efforts to use the Yen Bloc for the expansion of its exports.

As far as supplies of import goods are concerned, Japan's Empire has been giving less favorable results than it has in providing export markets. Of the total imports of Japan proper, before the present war, the following shares were derived from the three main dependencies: 9.8 per cent from Formosa, 14.2 per cent from Korea, and 6.3 per cent from Manchukuo—a total of 30.3 per cent. As these three supply Japan with whatever it needs in the way of imported foodstuffs (for foodstuffs actually constitute the greatest part of their sales to the "mother country"—their share in Japan's total imports of industrially important raw material and other supplies is very much smaller than the above figures would indicate.

China, however, before the present war, provided no more than 4.2 per cent of the total purchases of Japan proper from outside. The opportunities of importing more from China, now that its commercially most important districts have been brought into the Yen Bloc, are being exploited as much as possible. But the result is disappointing—in spite of Japan's ability to lay its hands on everything in the occupied territories of China that may seem worthwhile, and to oust foreign buyers of Chinese products from the field (which is being done), in spite of the fact that Japan no longer requires foreign exchange for its purchases in China; and in spite of the cheap method of outright or virtual confiscation which Japan practices in so many cases.

It is true that Japan's average monthly imports from North China, during the first eight months of 1938, were already three-and-a-half times larger than they had been in 1936. Imports from Central China, where military disturbances were still so great during this period that Japan's imports from that area fell to a mere one-fifth of what they had been, may be expected to rise similarly, once conditions become about the same as in the North. Eventually, South China's resources will be tapped in similar ways. But with all the possible promises resulting from Japanese development schemes, the conqueror is well aware that even the greatest imaginable success will not enable China to reduce very much Japan's dependence on supplies from other foreign countries.

This, again, is one more reason for Japan to take the most complete advantage of the incorporation of China into the Yen Bloc; not only in order to squeeze out of the country every ounce of materials which Japan may be able to use, but also to make China yield as much foreign exchange as possible for the payment of Japan's continued heavy purchases in the world market.

The main problem which faces Japan's Greater Yen Bloc, therefore, is that of foreign exchange. It is in this regard that the pre-war Empire proved least satisfactory. Going back to 1936 once more, it appears that both Korea and Formosa are suffering from the same complaint as Japan proper: their purchases from foreign, that is from non-Japanese countries, small though they had been, were still considerably larger than their sales to such countries. Their combined import surplus, payable in foreign exchange by Japan, amounted to Yen 57,300,000 in 1936.

During the same year, Japan itself, according to the official foreign trade returns, had an import surplus of Yen 70,800,000. But the greatest part of the total import surplus (for which Japan had to pay so heavily in 1936 that it exhausted all its free reserves of foreign exchange and was forced to start selling great amounts of gold when the war began in 1937), arose in connection with Manchukuo and its entrepot at Dairen, in the Kwantung Leased Territory. Those two Japanese dependencies, initial members of the Yen Bloc, had an import surplus of Yen 258,700,000. It is true that this deficit in their trade balance originated entirely from their transactions with Japan proper, because their purchases from the "mother country" far exceeded their sales to it. But as both sides of this trade between Japan proper and Manchukuo-Kwantung are wrongly listed in Japan's so-called "foreign" trade returns, and as they minimize Japan's import surplus accordingly, this deficit should be registered separately, as the biggest of the three items which made up the Japanese Empire's total adverse trade balance in intercourse with the outside world. It must not be overlooked that this total deficit would have been even larger, by considerably more than Yen 100,000,000, if Manchukuo's incorporation in the Yen Bloc had not made it possible for Japan to appropriate the surplus in foreign exchange income which high-pressure bean sales

had accounted for in Manchukuo's trade with non-Japanese countries.

Meanwhile, Japan's foreign exchange problem becomes ever more acute. The first year of the Sino-Japanese war has cost Japan 50 per cent of its gold reserves, which had to be sold abroad in order to cover the deficit balance in the Empire's foreign trade. That one year of hostilities, furthermore, saw very heavy inroads into Japan's accumulated stocks of foreign raw materials, (of which only cotton, wool and American lumber are statistically accounted for). These stocks were depleted 80, 70 and 60 per cent. This entailed a drastic reduction of Japan's current raw material imports, to an extent which cannot long be maintained, if only because it has already dangerously throttled the export of all those Japanese manufactures, like cotton cloth, which consist of foreign raw materials.

The more the foreign exchange problem has thus forced itself on the mind of Japan's leaders, the more skeptical they have become about the blessings of the steadily expanding export trade to the Yen Bloc areas, an export trade which so largely consists of goods containing raw materials which Japan has to buy in the world market and to pay for in foreign exchange. For this growth of Japanese exports to Yen Bloc areas was not accompanied by anything like an equal expansion in the return flow of imports from these territories, nor by equivalent opportunities for Japan to appropriate such foreign exchange as its dependencies receive from their own exports to foreign countries.

Japan's increasingly unfavorable trade balance with its newest dependencies is made clear by the following figures: Japanese exports to the non-colonial parts of the Yen Bloc amounted to a monthly average of Yen 41,500,000 in 1936, but to an average of Yen 89,600,000 during the first eight months of 1938. (While these exports were more than doubled, Japan's exports to foreign countries were almost exactly halved during the same period.) But monthly imports from the non-colonial subsidiaries of the Yen Bloc were only Yen 19,900,000 in 1936, and Yen 49,000,000 in 1938.

Nor did Japan continue to receive much foreign exchange from these newly acquired countries, in other ways. Manchukuo's net revenue in foreign exchange, derived from the export surplus in

its trade with countries other than those of the Yen Bloc, and thus available as a kind of gift to Japan, had been at a monthly rate of Yen 13,300,000 in 1936. During the first six months of 1938, however, this gave way to a monthly deficit, in Manchukuo's trade with foreign countries, of Yen 2,000,000, which Japan had to cover. A moderate amount of foreign exchange may continue to be received by Japan from North and Central China, where Japanese agents are trying so hard, with the strenuous support of armed force, to acquire Chinese national dollar notes in exchange against "F.R.B." or yen notes and against Japanese export goods. But the extent to which Japan is thus enabled to profit from the Chinese Government's policy of maintaining the convertibility of its notes into foreign exchange is certainly not very substantial. The survival of the Chinese dollar as the predominating currency in most of the occupied areas, and the reluctance on the part of the population to let them go into Japanese hands, is indeed the main obstacle which the Yen Bloc encounters in these districts.

If one considers the unfavorable balance of Japan's trade with the new territories of the Yen Bloc, it becomes easily understandable that Japan should actually be discouraging exports to Yen Bloc countries; at least the export of all manufactures which contain foreign raw materials or which it might be possible to sell against foreign currencies in the world market. To the great embarrassment not only of Japanese exporters, but also of the military enthusiasts of Sino-Japanese "cooperation," these new territories are now being treated only too much as part and parcel of Japan's domestic market—in the negative sense that all kinds of trade restrictions are being devised, on the continent as in Japan, to prevent the sale of goods to second-rate customers who cannot pay in anything but yen or yen-dependent paper currencies. Japan is realizing, therefore, that the fullest possible control of China's exports to third countries, and confiscation of the resulting foreign exchange revenue for the Yen Bloc, would be the only way to derive from the budding currency union the benefits to Japanese trade which are to be the prize of victory.

There is one more highly important reason why Japan's way in China is now blocked, at least for the time being, by the inability

to control China's foreign exchange revenue from exports to third countries. Japan's new North China currency, being nothing but paper, which is exchangeable only into another kind of paper, the inconvertible Japanese yen, has proved a failure; so much so that Japan still hesitates to follow its original plan of introducing a similar currency into Central China and withdrawing the "Military Yen" which cannot even pretend to be the legal tender of a "new, liberated China," and has no appeal to the confidence of any Chinese beyond the actual reach of Japanese bayonets. Only a new currency backed by part at least of China's current foreign exchange revenue could have something like an equal chance of fighting and gradually superseding the Chinese national dollar, which remains convertible into foreign currencies.

There is thus a vicious circle which the Japanese will have to break, if they can and if they want to be successful, economically, in their China campaign. They cannot get control over China's export trade to third countries, because they are not the masters of the country's currency, which makes export goods move. They cannot gain control over, or destroy, China's "old" currency, because its intrinsic value is infinitely higher than that of their own substitutes. They cannot introduce a better substitute, because the only apparent way of doing so, as long as the Chinese national dollar has not entirely broken down and vanished, is to give to such a currency of their own creation the backing of free convertibility into Gold Dollars, or Sterling, which in the present situation can only be procured against the export of Chinese products to foreign countries. And Japanese bayonets, so far, have failed, when applied to this task, to be effective in anything but decreasing the outflow of Chinese products to the world market, instead of fostering it.

The establishment of the Yen Bloc in China, therefore, is far from completion. Whatever closer economic and financial relations there are now between Japan and its firmly controlled dependencies on the one hand, and the occupied areas of China, on the other, are still entirely based on the brute force of Japanese arms. The subtler but much more compelling force of a close currency union has not really come into play, so far. Nor is it to be expected that the conclusion of some kind of peace between the two countries,

even if such a peace should grant Japan the desired domination over China, would necessarily bring about a rapid change in these conditions.

Meanwhile, Japan is trying at least to lay, by means of armed force, the foundations of those economic policies which, it is hoped, the currency mechanism of the Yen Bloc will eventually carry on smoothly, efficiently, almost automatically, and without too open a show of violation of Chinese or third-party interests. Modern devices of foreign exchange control, applied by subordinate Chinese officials, in the name of a "New China," are being prepared to take the place of the present harsh interference with trade and property, as practised by Japanese Army and Navy officers. An elaborately discriminatory bureaucratic system of licenses, quotas, restrictions, tax and tariff manipulation, credit regulations, etc., such as Japan has developed out of its own most accomplished recent feudalism, both at home and in its dependencies—together with the wide powers which have already been given to Japan's two monopoly enterprises, the North and Central China Development Companies—are quietly to achieve what Japan wants. This is nothing less than the making over of China into an integral part of the Yen Bloc, like Formosa, Korea, and Manchukuo; the development of all the branches of Chinese production which may be useful to Japan; the stifling of all others which are, or might become, competitive with Japanese industries; the transformation of China's far-reaching and growing pre-war self-sufficiency into utter dependence on Japan; and the reduction of China's economic intercourse with the world outside the Yen Bloc to dimensions which would be in harmony with Japan's own needs.

But Japan still has a long way to go toward such an economic victory over China and the old-established Western interests which are so closely connected with China's modern progress as a fairly independent national unit. And even if Japan should eventually achieve that victory, because Western resistance may not uphold China's own resistance over a sufficiently long period, the solution of Japan's economic problems within the Greater Yen Bloc would seem by no means assured.

Hongkong, December 1938

THE GOOD IRON OF THE NEW CHINESE ARMY

Olga Lang

When the machine guns opened fire at Lukouch'iao China had no united army or unified command. The Red Army (Eighth Route Army), the only one which in the course of the war has consistently gained and held new territory and inflicted more casualties than it has suffered, had already made peace with the Central Government and volunteered for war against Japan, but was not yet coordinated with the central command. The Kuangsi forces of Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen, also of high quality, had also made peace with Nanking not long before. Nanking's own armies, especially the German-trained divisions, were well equipped and prepared, but most troops in the South, North, Northeast and West, though nominally under central command, were in practice more or less independent.[1]

This was inevitable, because China had to continue and complete political unification during the war.[2] The new unity implies much more than the mechanical linking together of all the old armies under one high command. Nor do better technical equipment, better artillery and much more efficient aviation, important though they are, represent the main achievement in nearly two years of fighting. Organic changes have been going on. The old mercenary soldier has given way to conscripts and volunteers who are fighting for ideas which they know and understand. For a time the Government and its high command were still reluctant to mobilize the whole people, in unison with the army;[3] but now the Govern-

[1] For a clear statement of relations between the different armies and the Central Government just before the Japanese attack, see F. V. Field, "The Chinese Armies: Political Composition and Geographical Distribution," *Amerasia*, Vol. I, No. 6, August 1937.

[2] For the trend of unification, political and military, just before and after the Japanese invasion, see "China's Advance from Defeat to Strength," by "Asiaticus," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. X, No. 3, September 1937.

[3] See the "Letter from a Chinese Soldier," and editorial comments, translated in *China Today*, December 1937, from the original in the *Ta Kung Pao* ("the *Manchester Guardian* of China").

ment is appealing to the whole people to organize guerilla warfare, and is getting a wide response. As a result, the people no longer consider the army to be something apart.

The manpower of the new Chinese Army is drawn mainly from old regular soldiers of the Central Government and warlord armies; the Red Army; and new men who have taken service during the war, together with guerillas. Of these, the old professional rank-and-file never had a uniform professional standard. The Central Government troops were better in equipment and political training than the provincial soldiers, but all were recruited, drilled, taught and treated in much the same general way. The Red Army, according to all who have seen it, is an entirely new phenomenon in Chinese life. It is militarily efficient, but has no militaristic outlook or tradition. The guerillas are the people itself, the common, anonymous people, in arms and aroused.

Both the old and the new type of soldier must be looked at against the background of China's agricultural society, in which a powerful centralized bureaucracy reduced the military class to a very low standing.[4] Only in exceptional periods of internal disruption, or during the great cycles of war against invading barbarians, could the soldier rise to dominant importance Even in such periods, the civil officials were so indispensable that neither triumphant Chinese generals nor conquering barbarians were able to rule for long without them. The men whose power was expressed through the writing brush and the mastery of difficult texts repeatedly regained control from the crude men of the sword.[5]

The scholar-bureaucracy, as was to be expected, evolved a philosophy and outlook of their own, which they largely imposed on the rest of the country, in the form of Confucianism. It rated the soldierly virtues very low, exalting instead an extreme devotion to the family which in itself was a handicap to courage in war. Such

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[4] See K A Wittfogel, "The Theory of Oriental Society," in *Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung*, Paris, Vol VII, No 1-2, 1938, also his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas*, Leipzig, 1931, and "Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History," *Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung*, Vol IV, No 1, 1935.

[5] See Wang Kung-chi, *History of the Chinese Army*, Shanghai, 1932, p 3 (in Chinese)

novels and short stories as it accepted, and especially the essays and highly pacifist poetry which established the national standard of "good taste," created an ideal "perfect gentleman" who was not a chivalrous knight, as in Europe, but a learned official.

It is true that beside this cultivated tradition there was another, cruder one, influenced by the memory of turbulent wars and nomad conquests, in which the warrior was a popular hero. The stronghold of this tradition was in the vernacular literature, despised by Confucian scholars but cherished by the common people, whose access to it was often through the recitals of storytellers and through the theater. Many famous Chinese novels belong to this swashbuckling tradition. Some are of great literary merit, like the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*[6] and *All Men Are Brothers*,[7] and all celebrate bravery, strength, swordsmanship, boxing, and horsemanship. Since it was never cordially accepted by the great and powerful, however, this tradition could not in itself create a moral code sufficient to sustain an army.[8] The famous saying that "good iron is not hammered into nails, and a good man does not become a soldier" expressed the national attitude.

Under Li Hung-chang and Tseng Kuo-fan in the nineteenth century military organization and equipment were improved; but at the same time defeat, in foreign wars, and disorder, in civil wars, became the accepted standard, while the social position of the soldier was not improved. Not until the nationalist movement of 1924-27 was there a real change. This movement had a tremendous appeal to the common people, whose genuine sympathy and help it won—chiefly because it laid as great stress on political and moral education as on military training. But this whole revolutionary movement broke down halfway. Neither military nor political unification was completed. Part of the army went over to the Communists, to form the Red Army, with recruits from among workers and peasants.[9] The majority remained in the service of the Nanking

[6] See English translation by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor, Shanghai, 2 vols., 1929.

[7] Translated under this title by Pearl Buck (New York, 2 vols., 1934), from the *Shui-hu Chuan*.

[8] See A. Kotenev, *The Chinese Soldier*, Shanghai, 1937, pp. 30, 39, 41, for discussion of such partial military codes in the works of Ssu-ma Fa and Kuan-tze, and in the "Sacred Edict" of Kanghsi.

[9] Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, New York, 1937, p. 149.

Government, and in the next ten years gradually established ascendancy over the warlord and provincial armies.

Technically, the Central Army made important advances, especially after an extensive reorganization in 1936;[10] but political education of the rank and file continued to be neglected, although officers were politically trained in military academies and later, under the New Life Movement, in "Officers' Moral Endeavor Societies." In the provincial armies conditions were much worse, except in Kuangsi, where general military training was enforced. These armies supplied the majority of China's estimated 2,379,-970[11] soldiers at the beginning of the war. In spite of heavy losses, they still constitute the main source of recruitment for the new army.

To understand the extraordinary heroism and increasing efficiency of the reintegrated army, it is important to know something of this human material. Who are the men? Where did they come from? Why did they enlist? What sort of life have they had in the army? What was their standing in society, as soldiers? How did it happen that from this "bad iron" it became possible so suddenly to hammer "good nails"?

While gathering material for a study (directed by Dr. K. A. Wittfogel), of problems of the family in Chinese society, I worked on records of the social service department of a hospital in North China. Here, for the years 1934-37, I found records of 345 soldiers and nearly 250 officers. This is not enough to establish statistical conclusions. The information tabulated is not systematic; nor are there answers to all the questions that would have been significant. Nevertheless the material provides many details of the origin, life and state of mind of Chinese soldiers just before the war, which in their way are of unique value.

The records deal with men from 25 different armies stationed in North China or passing through it. The majority were from such typical warlord troops as the 29th Army of Sung Che-yuan; followed by the 32nd Army of Shang Chen, the 17th Army of Yang

[10] See Colonel T. T Popov, "The Chinese Army," in *Pravda*, Moscow, April 25, 1938 (in Russian).

[11] *China Yearbook*, ed. H. G. W. Woodhead, Shanghai, 1936.

Hu-chen (of Sian fame), and the 53rd Army of Wan Fu-lir (originally from North Manchuria). The men were mostly North erners, the largest group (about 25 per cent) coming from Honan Hupei follows closely, and then Shantung and the Manchuriar provinces A considerable number came from Central Chin: (Anhui, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Hupei, Hunan), and som from as far away as Ssuchuan, Yunnan and Kueichou. The kind: of families from which they came can be seen from the following table

FAMILY ORIGIN OF 345 CHINESE SOLDIERS

Head of Family	Number	Per Cent	Head of Family	Number	Per Cen
Farmers	179	51.9	Shopowners, merchants	17	4.9
Farm laborers	33	9.6	Landlords, house-owners	15	4.4
Artisans, workers	8	2.4	Teachers	6	1.7
Servants, sewing women	7	2.0	Officials	2	.5
Soldiers	4	1.2	No indication	52	15.0
Beggar	1	.3		345	100.0
Policeman	1	.3			
Pedlars	10	2.9			
Clerks	6	1.7			
Sundry (carter, actor, sailor)	4	1.2			

These figures bear out the well known fact that the great majority of Chinese soldiers come from the poorest families (left-hand column of the table) The picture would be still clearer if the farmer group could be analyzed more precisely. Unfortunately the records list only *mu* of land owned (at about 6 *mu* to the acre), but even this makes possible the following classification.

LAND HELD BY FAMILIES OF 179 CHINESE SOLDIERS

Quantity of Land	Number of Families	Quantity of Land	Number of Families
No land at all	20	21 to 30 *mu*	29
Less than 5 *mu*	19	31 to 40 *mu*	11
6 to 10 *mu*	39	41 *mu* or more	2
11 to 20 *mu*	38	No indication	25

In North China, roughly speaking, a farmer cannot be considered well to do unless he has more than 20 *mu*, so that the majority of these men can be considered sons of poor farmers. Nor can the families listed as "shopowners, landlords, teachers, officials" necessarily be considered prosperous. Two of the shopowners or mer-

chants were listed as "ruined"; two were noted as "ex-merchants." One of the officials was a police officer in Manchuria; the son had lost touch with him soon after the Japanese occupation. Among the landowners, one family had been ruined by floods and one by plague. Two sons of landlords were from Manchuria, and had heard that their families had lost their land.

Not all of the men stated why they had joined the army. The most frequent explanation, when given, was poverty. "Joined the army because of financial difficulties at home" (son of a farmer with 4 *mu* of land). "Went to the army because of bad financial conditions" (son of a tenant). "Grandfather lost his land. Father rented some land and cultivated vegetables Son assisted father. After 1930 he joined the 29th Army." In two nearly identical cases the sons of landless widows joined the army, leaving at home two brothers working as farm laborers, unmarried because of poverty. "Youngest of 8 sons of a landless family. Father dead. Went to school from 7 to 10; then no money to continue school. Joined army at 11." In several further cases enlistment was after the soldier's family had been ruined by fire, drought or flood. In the same way some of the apprentices and artisans enlisted after the shops employing them had closed up. Other apprentices had run away because "they thought it better to be a soldier than an apprentice."

It may be noted that 65 per cent of the soldiers over 21 were unmarried In contemporary China only two groups of men do not marry, or marry late: a small group of modern intellectuals, Westernized officials and business men, who have broken with traditional ideas and forms of marriage; and a large group of poor farmers, artisans, coolies and workers, who consider early marriage proper, but cannot afford it. In rural China, not to be married at a certain age marks a man as a pauper.

Family tragedies also led to enlistment. Most of the sons of well to do families listed in these records joined the army after quarreling with their relatives. There was also a high proportion of orphans. Out of 135 who listed their families in full, 28 had neither father nor mother, 20 had no mother and 37 no father. Many had quarreled with parents, brothers, uncles or stepmothers. "Son of a merchant, from Kiangsi. Left home 4 years ago, after quarreling

with father, who wrote, asking him to come back; but he refused, and burned the letter." Considering what filial piety means in China, there is a depth of family tragedy in this record. "Disabled soldier, 23 years old. Cannot get money from rich uncle, the head of the family, because some years ago his mother had a terrible quarrel with the uncle about the family property." "Son of a clerk, from Shansi. Father had 17 dollars a month, for a family of 4 (which is by no means utter poverty in China). Ran away because of quarrel with his mother." "Farmer's son. Inherited 45 *mu* of land after father's death. Left home after quarrel with uncle."

For another group the army was the only way out of some other kind of trouble. Two had run away after taking money from their relatives. One, a boy of 18, had struck a neighbor in anger and then run away without ever knowing what had happened to the man. Another, an ex-merchant of 34, had had an unpleasant experience at home, had been ruined, and had "lost face." The total of only four cases indicates that this class is not as large as is commonly supposed, but it is also possible that others, who should have been in this group, did not give the full facts.

Generally speaking, it is also plain that there is a process of natural selection in the enlistment of soldiers. Men enlist for various economic and psychological reasons; but they all tend to be relatively energetic, healthy and aggressive young men. The weaker ones stay home. Many who enlist could have done something else, if they had been sensitive to the prevailing Chinese opinion that soldiers are the basest class of society.

In this respect there is a difference (not brought out in the statistical figures), between the older generation, especially in the villages, and the younger generation, influenced strongly by the tradition of the "popular" fighting heroes of romance, folk-literature and the stage. This is true not only of young farmers but of young workers who read, or hear recited, tales which in adventure, color and romance are excitingly different from the monotonous poverty of the village and the semi-slavery of the workshop. Edgar Snow, in *Red Star Over China*, especially in his account of Mao Tze-tung, cites the influence of this literature in developing and forming the ideas of young revolutionaries. The Red Army, for those who

wanted to fight for the poor against the rich, and any other army, for those who simply wanted to do great and exciting deeds, took the place of the mighty but generous robbers or generals of legend, and their roving bands of comrades.

Others frankly considered an army career, in the disunited and insecure China of their time, the only way in which a poor young man could hope to reach wealth and honor. Some stated this with laconic clearness. A farmer's son from Shantung, an orphan, joined the army at 17, "thinking he would probably become a great military official." The son of a Shantung landowner, with a property of 100 *mu,* entered the army "because he wanted to become a great man." An orphan, 17 years old, left home because "he liked the idea of being a soldier." A Hopei man, son of well to do parents with 150 *mu* of land and three hired laborers, disliked the mutton business his father wanted him to enter, quarreled, and ran away to be a soldier Later he was reconciled with his family, but remained in the army.

Patriotic motives are notably not stated in the records, though sometimes hinted at, as when soldiers from Manchuria said they had joined the army "because of the Japanese invasion." This lack of information may be due in part to lack of political development among soldiers in the North, as compared with the South, but is probably due even more to the fear that hospital social workers might ask dangerous political questions and make incriminating notes; for this part of China, at the time in question (1934-37), was practically controlled by the Japanese.

THE records also contain much information about life in the army. This I shall supplement from a symposium called *One Day in China,* edited by the famous writer Mao Tun and published, in Chinese, in 1936. Life in the army had many disappointments. It is true that even in the North conditions had improved in the years just before the outbreak of the present war. There were no more murdering and looting warlord armies. In one record there is an interesting complaint. The soldier, son of a Honan shopowner, said that his illness was caused by anger. His commanding officer was too strict. He did not allow soldiers to take money even from

bandits. Whenever they returned from a battle, their pockets were examined For taking as little as a pair of torn stockings, a soldier would be first punished and then discharged. He resented this, because bandit money "must have been stolen in the first place." The records also indicated a more human attitude on the part of officers toward the soldiers In several cases officers paid hospital fees for soldiers, they often visited their soldiers in hospital, and the men wrote to them about their needs.

The records give no information about educational work, except for a note by one social worker, to the effect that "in some armies the men are taught some reading and writing The petty officers act as teachers" Several of the officers, however, are listed as having attended military schools in Central China. Descriptions of life in military schools, in *One Day in China*, are full of reports on political lectures, the aims of the Chinese Army, and the dignity of soldiers Developments during the course of the war show that officers have put their political training to use.

Army life was not easy. There were complaints about hard drill and long marches, and corporal punishment was mentioned once in the records and several times in *One Day in China*. The *China Yearbook*, 1936, gives the pay of privates as from $6 to $8 per month, in Chinese money According to the hospital records, however, 3rd class soldiers got from less than $1 to $3; 2nd class soldiers from less than $1 up to $5; and 1st class soldiers from $2 to $9. The rate varied in different armies. There was even more discontent over irregular payment than over rate of pay. Very often soldiers, and also officers, distinguished between nominal pay and actual pay In the stories of several soldiers and policemen in *One Day in China*, receipt of pay is described as an unusual and happy event Army food was better than that of the poorest people, but was not very abundant. One soldier described his diet as "Cabbage, with a little oil, carrots, bean shoots. Meat only twice a month and only in small quantities." (These items must be in addition to the staple North China diet of flour.)

It was not easy for the soldier to become "a great hero," or even "a high military officer" Of the officers in the hospital records, two thirds were sons of landlords, farmers with more than 50 *mu* of

land, merchants, and so forth. Among officers of the rank of *Lien-chang* (commanding about 120 men), drawing $30 to $35 a month, and higher officers, not more than 10 per cent came from families owning less than 30 *mu*, and there was not a single son of a farm laborer or a farmer owning less than 10 *mu*. Few of the officers had risen from the ranks. Many came from military schools; and I understand that the proportion of trained, career officers is higher in the more Westernized and better organized Central Army.

Whatever his romantic ideas before joining the army, the Chinese soldier was bound to realize that in his own country and his own time the soldier was despised. A story in *One Day in China* vividly describes the feelings of a soldier going to a cinema. The cashier would not believe that he wanted a first-class ticket, and finally sold it to him very reluctantly:

> I angrily go inside . . . I remember that since coming to Nanking I have already, many times, been in a similar situation. Once it was when I was buying a fountain pen, once when buying a suitcase; once when buying toothpowder. The proud, haughty faces of shop assistants remain before my eyes. I stiffen under the shabby, ill-fitting uniform. I realize that it is because of the uniform that I suffer contempt and humiliation. Suddenly the light goes out and darkness comes. I feel relief and deep pleasure, as if the million poisoned eyes fixed on me were also extinguished in the darkness.

Yet few soldiers, according to their hospital records, wanted to go home. In fact, many had no home, or had lost touch with it. The professional Chinese soldier was a man without family, in the classic country of familism. Most of the soldiers listed were not married. Of those who were married, less than a third had children. In several cases the wife did not stay with the husband's family but—which is rather abnormal in China—had returned to her parents or lived alone. Very few of the men wrote home, or visited their relatives. Some had not heard from home for three, five or even ten years. A farmer's son from Shantung, aged 24, said that he was now "a sort of stranger in his own home." Often all the attempts of hospital social workers to restore connections between soldiers and their homes did not succeed. The records were full of remarks about soldiers who said that they had not been successful

and therefore "had no face" to go home. There were also other reasons. Often friends made in the army had come to take the place of the family (The same kind of thing is true of other groups of men without family in China, such as the poorest workers, coolies and artisans) The soldiers appreciated the comradeship of the barracks, and also the opportunity to travel.

THEN Japan struck, and the despised soldiers of China began to show how they could fight. Even in the North, the "unpolitical" soldiers of the 29th and 32nd Armies fought gallantly, though left largely leaderless by generals who had sold out. So did the Shan'tung provincial troops. There are prophetic hints of this in the hospital data of 1934-36. Many of these men had already been wounded in action against the Japanese. They were veterans, also, of bandit campaigns and civil wars. Yet there were no complaints about war or wounds None of the men wanted to be demobilized for fear of war Many were eager to be cured in order to get back into service

The weakness of the old Chinese armies was not in fighting spirit, but in poor equipment, aggravated by the industrial weakness of the country, in poor command and above all in lack of an idea to fight for With something to fight for, the Chinese have always been good soldiers The T'ai-p'ing rebels of the mid-nineteenth century were magnificent fighters so long as they had a righteous cause, and until their leaders became corrupt.[12] Many foreign observers recorded the bravery of the Boxers of 1900, who although "untrained, ill paid, ill fed and badly armed, put up a wonderful fight."[13] This record was vindicated by the heroic 19th Route Army at Shanghai, in 1932. The Red Army, both in civil war and when organized as the Eighth Route Army to resist Japan, has also shown magnificently what Chinese troops can do when inspired by an idea.

And who are the soldiers of the Red Army? In 1934, according

[12] Lo Erh kang, *T'ai p'ing T'ien kuo Shih-kang*. Shanghai, 1937 (in Chinese); also G. E. Taylor, "The Taiping Rebellion: Its Economic Backgrounds and Social Theory," *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, Vol XVI, No 4, 1932-33; also A. Kotenev *op cit*, pp 59 62

[13] H C Thompson, *The Case for China*, London, 1933, p. 70.

to their own statistics, they were drawn 30 per cent from workers, 68 per cent from farmers, 1 per cent from officials and 1 per cent from other classes.[14] These proportions are not fully comparable to those of the 345 Chinese soldiers in the hospital records just cited, but assuming that the hospital records are more or less representative of North China armies, interesting rough comparisons are suggested. The Red Army had more workers, and in the Communist Party within the Red Army the proportion was still higher, reaching 40 per cent. The Red Army percentage of middle and upper class recruits was negligible; but the main group in the Red Army, as in every Chinese army, consisted of farmers.

How were these farmers transformed into such remarkable soldiers? Undoubtedly the influence of the larger group of workers, especially the industrial workers, was important. There is also the moral difference between youths joining an army in order to eat or get away from trouble at home, or looking for adventure, and the volunteers of the Red Army, many of whom enlisted "because the Red Army was a revolutionary army fighting landlords and imperialism."[15] The main thing was that the Red Army, and every man in it, knew what they were fighting for. They still do. Schools, libraries, Lenin rooms, lectures, slogans, explain to the soldiers that they are fighting for the freedom of their country and a better life for their families and fellows—the poor. Education has been promoted, with the aid of new devices for learning to read and write quickly. Comradeship and fellowship as between officers and soldiers help to maintain a good spirit. There is no beating and no bad treatment. Hardship and hunger are easier to endure when soldiers know that what they have to wear and to eat are as good as what their officers have.

A new kind of relationship between soldiers and population is equally important. The Eighth Route Army is carrying on the Red Army tradition of taking pains to be on good terms with the people. Once these good relations are established, soldiers cannot feel like outcasts or be ashamed of their uniforms, for they are honored

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[14] Quoted by Li Kuan in *The Chinese New Army*, p. 279 (published in Chinese in the U.S.S.R.)

[15] Edgar Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

members of society, morally backed by the population.[16] As a correspondent of the London *Times* has stated, "for centuries the Chinese farmers have looked on any army as a plague of locusts, and here they seem at last convinced that the Eighth Route Army has their welfare at heart."[17] Superior political training goes far to make up for deficiency in arms. Soldiers trained to think for themselves, act independently, and win the sympathy of the population, easily adapt themselves to the mobile partisan warfare which is now so important in the defense of China.[18]

A Chinese writer has pointed out that the country people of China have, to begin with, great bravery and power of endurance. Only a few years ago they filled the ranks of many secret societies, some of which were organized for the defense of the poor. They only awaited the day of being taught how to fight against a foreign invader.[19] Others had received militia training in various bodies raised by landlords and rural authorities to prevent peasant risings.[20] These partly drilled men proved of great value when Japan's invasion united the whole country and forced landlord and peasant to fight side by side instead of against each other.

Military training of the whole population is now spreading to province after province, and to large areas behind the Japanese lines. Men are prepared both for service with the regular army and for partisan warfare. There are many difficulties to be overcome, and the old Chinese inefficiency and sabotage are still a handicap, but progress can be very clearly seen. Instructors from the Eighth Route Army have had a large share in this, but even more important has been the general borrowing of Eighth Route Army methods and precepts, simply because they are effective. Many of

[16] See the article by 'A British Observer' in December number of PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

[17] Quoted in *New York Times*, August 7, 1938.

[18] For details compare the books by Li Kuan and Edgar Snow, already cited, and *China's Red Army Marches* and *China Fights Back*, by Agnes Smedley, also Anna Louise Strong, "The Army That's Defeating Japan," *New Masses*, April 19, 1938; John Gunther's report from Hankow in *New York Times*, May 4, 1938, James Bertram, "With the Chinese Guerillas," in *Asia*, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos. 6 and 7, 1938, and many other magazine and newspaper articles.

[19] Ju Chun-pa, in *Village Reconstruction*, Cho-ping, Shantung, August 18, 1935 (in Chinese).

[20] These militia organizations are really a separate subject. For a general discussion of them, see Wen Chun-tien, *The Chinese Pao-chia System* (in Chinese).

the political propagandists are students, who had begun even before the war to repudiate the old "scholar-gentleman's" contempt for the soldier. They no longer believe that they can "let the coolies defend their country for them," and numbers of them are serving at the front. In the first five months of the war, student casualties amounted to more than 300 killed and 5,200 wounded.[21]

Political education, propaganda, patriotic enthusiasm and new methods of recruiting are creating a new Chinese Army. The old feeling of inferiority, the old tradition of defeat, have gone. Months of stubborn resistance, actual victories and successful partisan war have strengthened the new fighting spirit. The soldier has earned, and is receiving, a new respect and honor,[22] which are military but not militaristic. He is the champion of the people. Even his uniform is differently regarded; the fashionable girls of Hankow were admonished recently not to wear uniform just to be smart, because the right to wear it is an honor that has to be earned.[23] This importance of the soldier is responsible for great efforts to improve and increase the army medical service, in which scandalous conditions, at the beginning of the war, were an inheritance from the old indifference toward the sufferings of the despised soldier. All of this does not mean that the Chinese Army is already perfect. Far from it. Much remains to be done: but what is important is that the way to victory has been found.

New York, October 1938

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[21] *Transpacific News Service*, March 12, 1938

[22] Correspondence from the unconquered regions in Hopei, London *Times*, July 1 and 2, 1938

[23] *Fu-nu Kung-ming*, Vol 7, No 5, 1938 (in Chinese)

THE "WAR POTENTIAL" OF THE SOVIET UNION

EDITORIAL NOTE *The author of this article is a citizen of a Central European country who once worked in the Soviet Union as an agrarian economist His name will be given in a later issue of* PACIFIC AFFAIRS

This article has been translated from the author's German original, which was written for experts with a knowledge of the Soviet Union and of socialist economic theories. For this reason we have modified and simplified it somewhat for the readers of PACIFIC AFFAIRS *As we have been unable to refer these changes to the author for his approval, the responsibility rests entirely on us.*

THE basic facts of the economic organization of the U.S.S.R. govern its "war potential"—the resources it could command in time of war Within the Soviet Union the working of the planned economy means an important elimination of the conflict in aims and outlook between different social groups, which in all other countries tends to impede the prosecution of a war. Differences of opinion about the standard of state-regulated food prices may arise, it is true—for instance between, on one side, workers in factories and farmers on collective farms producing such crops as cotton, and on the other side the peasants on food-producing collective farms It is obvious, however, that this cannot be compared with similar differences of opinion in any capitalist country, where conflict of interest between those who produce food and those who consume it is aggravated by the fact that the consumers are mostly wage earners, while the producers are small commodity sellers, employers, etc. There are also other causes of opposition between capitalists and workers which simply do not exist in the Soviet Union.

On the other hand a socialist organization of economy makes it possible to coordinate differently developed parts of the country in a way that cannot be compared with even the most progressive colonial empires, in which colonies are allowed a maximum

degree of autonomy. This is an important consideration. The dimensions of the Soviet Union and the number of different nationalities it includes make it comparable only to a continent or to the British Empire. Even in the United States, where nationalities are more fused together and their cultural development on a more even level than in the Soviet Union, such national hostilities as that engendered by the Negro problem are much stronger than in the Soviet Union. Coordination without subordination allows the Soviet Union to solve its nationality problems in such a way that it can employ for the advantage of the country all the energy which under the Tsars was wasted in the struggle of nationality against nationality.

Differences of opinion do exist in the Soviet Union, and so do conflicts of interest between the city and the rural communities, and between industry and those who produce raw material. Even so, mechanization of the collectives and state farms has brought industry and agriculture closer to each other than in any capitalist country. The Soviet Union has also been able to industrialize its raw material producing areas and bring their political structure nearer to that of the "mother country" than is possible in the colonial politics of capitalist countries, which are forced by the logic of their own structure to keep their raw material producing colonies forcibly at their "natural" level.

The significance of what the Soviet Union has accomplished in this respect is not diminished by the fact that this process of drawing industry and raw material together engenders its own forms of opposition. Even though the resistance of the old ruling classes was broken, successive forms of opposition were offered by the well-to-do peasants, and by those strata in the "colonial" areas which were interested in the economy of private profit. For instance, anti-Soviet movements can be traced to the shift, in Central Asia, from food production to cotton production, which involved drawing the majority of the population into industry. The emancipation of women through this process, especially Moslem women, was another source of opposition. These phenomena can be traced in the records of the political trials and also in the "pan-Asiatic" literature, which is published mostly in Germany for circu-

lation in the Soviet Union. Such resistance has tended to hold back the areas affected at a "colonial level," which in turn means the danger that as the result of a foreign war the cotton surplus of these areas and those of the native inhabitants who would like to control it might be at the mercy of a conqueror. There has even been resistance among workers when any particular groups have felt that their privileged position was being threatened by the general levelling of social conditions. Yet, in spite of all this, the main fact is the inevitable increase in political uniformity and consequently in the "war potential" of social unity, as phase after phase of the opposition generated by progress is overcome by the further advance of progress

So much for the inner functioning of the Soviet Union. In its relations with the outside world, the Soviet Union has acquired by virtue of the socialist state it has created—the first of its kind in the world—a wide sympathy among workers in all countries, and also among the colonial peoples, whose military and political weight can hardly be estimated This is important for the intellectual to realize, because in working on these problems he may become personally interested in the cultural achievements of the Soviet Union, or be repelled by one development or another in what Marx calls the political or cultural "superstructure" of the country What the intellectual does not always realize is that the broad masses of the people, in any country, think about these things in quite a different way; and they have an overwhelming importance in the great decisions of our time.

What is important in the attitude toward the Soviet Union of the masses in all countries is not so likely to depend on phenomena of the "superstructure" as on questions that are really basic. Is there capitalist exploitation in the Soviet Union? Does it rule oppressed colonial peoples? Because the answer to these questions is clear, the attitude of probably the absolute majority of humanity, in any war in which the Soviet Union might be involved, is also clear. This deep-cutting division between detached theoretical interest and the social interest of the classes most affected by socialism has a bearing on the numerous secessions from the Communist Party in various countries. If the traditional ideology of Commu-

nism be accepted as absolute, many of the seceding groups had, in pure theory, a strong position. The majority of the well known leaders joined one or another of them. Individuals of all these groups broke down politically; the masses have always followed the Soviet Union, even when they have had to sacrifice some of their ideology, and even when this ideology had earlier been impressed on them with the backing and through the authority of the Soviet Union. So long as the Soviet Union remains the only socialist state in the world, the masses will be more attracted to it than toward any possible changes in political theory.

This fact in itself reinforced the political potentialities of the Soviet Union to a degree that cannot be exactly estimated. A further and even more important reinforcement comes from the fact that the social structure of the Soviet Union is in itself capable of representing certain modern tendencies in international law with a special consistency, even when they are not peculiar to the Soviet Union. The tendency, consistently upheld by the Soviet Union, to condemn aggressive war is bound to retain the sympathies of the masses, who abhor the terror of modern war.

WHILE all of this is plain in principle, there is a question which occupies the public opinion of the world and must be faced. How are the obvious and serious political shocks within the leadership of the Soviet Union to be explained, and to what degree do they possibly weaken the war potential of the U.S.S.R.? The question can only be approached by determining the way in which the attitude of the masses, the bulk of the people, has developed in succeeding phases. It is beyond dispute that conditions for the people as a whole have improved since 1934, when bread cards were cancelled, marking the end of the 1932-33 period of extreme difficulty in establishing collectivization. This in turn has had two results: the attitude of the people toward the Soviet regime has become more approving and simultaneously more critical, because improvement has created increasing demands which have not yet been satisfied.

A survey of the course of development since the end of the civil war in 1921, the devastation of which was not repaired until 1925,

will make this plain. After this initial recovery, the common people judged the achievements of the Revolution by what it had done in distributing national wealth and revenue more fairly. The farmers were glad to be able to eat all they wanted of the grain which formerly had been exported in order to pay the interest on foreign loans. The factory workers felt themselves masters of their own fate. Not every worker could spend a vacation in a castle expropriated from one of the former rulers of the country; but the working class as a whole felt that they had now become "the masters," even though their triumph was largely no more than symbolical. This may be called a period of static satisfaction, affecting far more people than had actively taken part in the Revolution. Workers and peasants had attained their immediate objectives. They had enough to eat according to their traditional standard of life, and in this respect were better off than immediately before the Revolution. The working class, then still a small minority, the elite of the people, saw the prospect of a future which, though not yet clear, promised to be better than the past. Their confidence was shared by the more progressive peasants.

With the support of this satisfaction the Communist Party got past a difficult crisis, when foreign intervention was over but economic stringency within the country enforced the New Economic Policy, which created new private property groups, especially in the rural communities. The situation was roughly, though only roughly, similar to that which had led to the failure of the Jacobin dictatorship in the French Revolution. If the Kronstadt Opposition of 1921 had triumphed, there would have been something like the Thermidor phase in France, and a victory for Trotsky in 1927 would have led to something very like a Napoleonic phase.

Success in getting through this difficult period was accompanied by disputes within the Party, which were very vehement but still did not lead to splitting up of the Party or to attempts at open civil war on the part of the defeated minority groups. It might have been possible to carry the Revolution no further than bourgeois democracy, combined with state ownership of large-scale enterprise, if the Communist Party had been willing to give up the socialist program of the October Revolution and to put up with

the military weakness of the old Russia; but this weakness would probably have brought the Revolution to a collapse. For Tsarist Russia, though larger than the Soviet Union because it included Poland and other territories, was not a genuine great power. This was made clear between 1914 and 1917 by the complete dependence of the Tsarist Government on the support of the Western Powers. The aid extended by these powers led them to feel that they had a kind of mortgage on Russia. Accordingly the Russian Revolution, even had it aimed at no more than bourgeois democracy, would have lost foreign support the moment it repudiated foreign loans. Even if it had substituted German support for the support of France and England, its position would have been shaky, as can be seen from the nature and degree of the support which the Soviet Government actually received from Germany for a few years. All in all, therefore, the Soviet Union was right in assuming that it could best guard what had been won in the first stages of the Revolution by defending itself unaided against the challenge of intervention by a coalition of powers.

Instead of halting the Revolution half way and accepting the weakness which had handicapped the old Russia, the Communist Party set out boldly on a policy of industrialization and collective agriculture which would set up a framework of socialist conditions for the whole economy of the country. In order to do this, heavy sacrifices were demanded from the population, in order to stimulate the rate of accumulation of capital and to make up for immediate disturbances in agricultural production, arising from initial opposition such as the widespread slaughter of cattle by peasants suspicious of collectivization.

By following a drastic policy of socialist reconstruction during the first Five-Year Plan, after the temporary compromises of the New Economic Policy, the Soviet Government undoubtedly won the support of far larger numbers of people, in both town and country, than had taken part in the civil war. It is perfectly true that the majority grumbled about the sacrifices imposed on them, but it is equally true that many millions were roused to enthusiasm by the tangible success of socialized construction. These were successes of a kind much more easily and clearly understood than

the victories of the civil war. The growing factories spoke a language even more unmistakable than that of the military success in the civil war.

It is true also that the new mass support represented as yet only a minority of the population, though it was an important minority. There was in addition another minority group, perhaps equally large, which was hostile to the whole activity of the Government; but this minority, consisting mainly of one section of the peasants, was unorganized It included expropriated rich peasants, or Kulaks, and peasants influenced by them. Their opposition arose partly from the expropriation of their land and partly from the fact that they did not understand the meaning of the sacrifices imposed on them. The period as a whole, moreover, was one in which Party policy was handled very rigidly, with the result that dissident groups within the Party went so far in their opposition as to approach the danger of open riot and continuous conspiracy.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these dissident groups were created by the policy of the time. Most of them can be traced in the history of the Communist Party back to the World War, and even earlier The activities of some of them in 1917-18 nearly brought on an armed fight for power. Later again the same opposition minorities and their derivatives developed in 1936-37 an outlook which included psychological acceptance of terroristic methods, and sometimes actual terrorism By this time it was too late for the machinations of small and isolated opposition detachments, looking for opportunities to arrest or shoot individual leaders of the Party, to develop into civil war; but civil war might easily have developed out of successes at the beginning of a rebellion, led by these detachments, so long as there were still social strata in the country willing to be led by them.

It was the clever maneuvering of Party policy between 1931 and 1934 which prevented such a catastrophe, at a time when the war industry was not yet ready and the collective farms had only just been established The consequences would have been incalculable. Perhaps the skepticism prevailing in the West in connection with the trials of the last few years will not accept even so cautious a characterization of the period as this. Nevertheless the trials as a

whole proved that more trouble was averted than actually came to a head. That serious trouble really existed is proved by the mere fact of the trials, whatever one may think of their details, for the holding of the trials was so detrimental to the repute abroad of the Soviet Union that it can hardly be assumed that they were "trumped up"; they must have been forced upon the Government by real and persistent conspiracies. Even those who doubt one detail or another of the various confessions must face the fact that a whole series of such confessions cannot be explained without recourse to mysticism, except on the assumption that the defendants actually acknowledged themselves to be detected conspirators.

And once it is admitted that the conspiracies were real conspiracies, it must be admitted also that success in stamping them out must have done more to strengthen than to weaken the Government. In fact the clearing away of this aftermath of doubt and opposition brought the Soviet Union to a point where it could begin to harvest the rewards of its endeavors and sacrifices. Many millions of Soviet citizens now enjoy a range of security and even luxury which they could not even dream of before, or which was considered the unattainable privilege of a hated minority, such as the profiteers of the N.E.P. Comfort and enjoyment had not been considered practical objects of hope by the great majority of the population until after 1934 This does not mean that the hopes and wants, and even demands, that have arisen since 1935 can always be immediately satisfied. On the contrary there is a very dramatic race between the growing productive capacity of the country and the growing requirements of the masses, which can be traced in the ups and downs of the prices of industrial products. The importance of what this means is illustrated by the fact that the yearly increase of consumer products is at the rate of from 20 to 35 per cent.

Moreover the importance of this aspect of Soviet life has been obscured by attempts to apply to the new Soviet standard of living foreign standards of comparison which are totally unreal. Russian collective farmers (and still more the inhabitants of the Asiatic regions) are fully justified, by comparison with the standards of

the Russian peasant in the past, in considering themselves well off when they can own sewing machines, bicycles, radios and gramophones. Or take, say, the case of an unskilled industrial woman worker. Only five years ago she was content with a shapeless overall, a kerchief and heavy brogues as a normal costume. Now when she is able to buy well-designed modern clothes for herself every year (even if they are generally made of cotton or rayon), and nice shoes (even if only a single pair of pumps for "special occasions"), she feels that she has won to the beginning of an unexpectedly happy life. In the same way all peasants and unskilled workers feel themselves well off if they are able to add some cakes or fruit, cheese or sausage, two or three times a week to the traditional Russian diet. The skilled industrial workers have of course more exacting demands.

These are achievements which may seem unimportant by comparison with the standards of American or British workers who are not on the unemployed lists, but their significance is not to be measured by this comparison but by comparison with the misery of the village and factory population in Tsarist Russia. A truer comparison would be to say that the advances already won in the Soviet Union mean to the Russian something like what a suburban home, a Buick, caviar every day and vacations in California or Florida would mean to the average American worker. They mean that the worker who enjoys them is not only loyal to the world in which he lives but satisfied with it; and the quicker the present rate of development unfolds the greater is his satisfaction. This is a kind of satisfaction which is not diminished but emphasized by the fact that the progress in which he takes part gives him new wants and provokes him to criticism when these wants are not satisfied quickly. Present criticism of the lack of consumer goods, in other words, does not in the least mean popular dissatisfaction with the Government or a feeling that it is "weak." The Government itself proved this in a very impressive way by allowing the use of secret ballots at the election of party and trade union officials in the spring of 1937—at the very time when it had been compelled to shoot scores of generals in the Red Army.

The secret ballot was more than even the opposition within the Party would have dared to ask for in 1926-27, because the situation in the trade unions was then so strained that it was by no means certain that any group within the Communist Party would have won the elections.

Critics of the standard of living of the Soviet worker should ponder the fact that workers in capitalist countries have not progressed as far or fast by their own standards as the Soviet Union has by the old Russian standards; and at the same time they should consider whether the crises within the leadership of the Soviet Union have really been deep-going enough to affect the whole population. Recent dispatches make it clear that criticism in the shops and factories has been encouraged to such an extent that it has actually affected production. If the conspirators among the leaders of the Communist Party had really had a mass following, such a move would certainly have been suicidal for the regime. The leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, however, were of the opinion (and they have proved to be right) that they had more reason to be afraid of politically disaffected directors, who resorted to sabotage and bureaucratically suppressed criticism of their methods of management by the workers. They have proved at the same time that they had no need to be afraid of the workers, who criticized these directors and the loss of wages for which they were responsible. The encouragement of criticism in the factories and collective farms can be significantly compared with the prevailing tendency in political elections to avoid allowing issues to be "fought out"; by settling inevitable rivalry in what are known as "discussions before the elections." From this it may be concluded that there is more danger of political opposition of a petty bourgeois kind (especially opposition associated with the church) than there is of wavering among the masses of the workers and peasants.

What I have here said of the rise in the standard of living of the masses may seem to contradict the often asserted fact that real wages are now lower than they were at the time of the New Economic Policy. The essential point is that in the last few years prices have risen faster than wages, as compared with the N.E.P., be-

cause of the need for financing new construction, partly by means of inflation The real improvement achieved can therefore only be defined by comparison with the most difficult years of construction under the Five-Year Plans; and this is a method which does not reveal the real reasons which have convinced the masses and won their loyal support Nor does it apply to the peasants, among whom those who were formerly middle and poor peasants had less bread before the collectivization program, even under the N.E.P., than they have now

The fact that is really significant is that in industry as well as on the collective farms the professional position of the average worker is constantly improving This, perhaps naturally, has never been sufficiently appreciated by foreign journalists, who are inevitably influenced by the fact that their natural contacts and acquaintanceships are chiefly among intellectuals, and especially among intellectuals holding political positions, among whom professional disasters and personal tragedies have been disproportionately numerous. It must be remembered that in a total population of 170 million very few—only a fraction even of the intelligentsia—belong to the group thus affected.

The way in which to estimate the condition of workers is to take, for example, a second-grade locksmith—in other words not a highly skilled worker. It is quite possible that the real wages of such a worker are lower than they were 12 years ago. This is only another way of saying that 12 years ago the industrial workers were a relatively small group, able to afford a standard of living distinctly higher than that of the peasants and therefore constituting something like a privileged class; whereas now, such workers form part of the greatly enlarged industrial proportion of a country in which industrial and agricultural standards of living have in many ways come closer to each other. On collective farms, where the yearly surplus is divided between members, the rise has been greater than in Government factories and on Government farms, where rates of wages are officially fixed On collective farms, again, the management is elected (even though the elections are influenced to a certain extent by the Government machine and tractor stations which are associated with the collective farms); while in factories

and on Government farms the management is appointed by the Government.

Nevertheless, all things considered, the differences that now exist are very small compared with the wide gaps that there were formerly between the individual peasant and the worker in state-owned industry. Furthermore, the man who is a second-grade locksmith today is rarely the same man as the second-grade locksmith of 1926, who has by now usually become an engineer, military officer or Government official, drawing the salary of an intellectual, which is now higher than the wages of factory workers. In the Soviet Union today a man who came from the village to the factory three years ago is considered a veteran worker. If a man has remained in the factory for 12 years he has probably risen to the ranks of the most skilled workers, whose wages are many times more than the average and whose children go to high school and the university. Twelve years ago, the man who is a second-grade locksmith today was probably an illiterate agricultural laborer, with an income about one tenth of what he now earns. Industrialization has been so wide and rapid that every member of the factory working class who has any initiative and ambition is able to improve his professional qualifications steadily.

For this reason the partisans of the "pure daily wages policy" (those who believe that the most able workers should get what they can, regardless of raising the general level of the working class), have become isolated from the really living forces of the country, as have those members of the "right opposition" who were followers of Tomsky, the former leader of the trade unions of the U.S.S.R., who committed suicide in 1936. The skilled and professionally most talented workers, who in other countries are likely to be unrevolutionary and the backbone of reformism, do not follow this individualistic line of development in the Soviet Union. They are in a position to profit much more by the rapid progress of construction as a whole than by artificially preserving a higher standard of wages for themselves, through keeping down the efficiency of labor in general. The less professionally skilled masses of labor do not approve of the "rightist" point of view either, because they can see for themselves that unless the country is indus-

trialized they are bound to continue a life not much different from that of the poorest and least cultured peasants.

Factory labor in the U.S.S.R. has always been and still is closely connected with the villages, and as the villages have obviously been going forward with the progress of collectivization, which has definitely won for the regime the support of the economically active peasants, factory labor was bound to go forward with the peasants. Formerly it was the most active peasants who naturally and by necessity developed into Kulaks, and became enemies of the regime and had to be liquidated, though the Government was then as interested as it is now in the increase of agricultural production. Now, however, these progressive individuals among the peasants have become most active in a way that serves the interests of the state.

This was partly what Bukharin meant by his famous "get rich" appeal to the peasants—an appeal which showed the self-deception of his point of view at that time, when he believed in the compatibility of socialization with private accumulation by the peasants. With industrialization forming a bridge between town and country, it is now the most progressive peasants who form the advance guard in the management of collective farms and the specialized use of tractors and combines. Under the new conditions the ambitious peasant can make more in this way than even a Kulak could earn in the old days, and at the same time these new activities strengthen the socialist economy. The rightists therefore can no longer make any use of this group. Nor can they, or the priests, start even a rebellion, much less a counter-revolution, with the lazy peasant who grumbles because he doesn't get his ration of grain unless he works. ("Sympathizers" with this type of peasant forget that even when he owned land of his own the grain did not grow by itself.)

IT MAY seem that I have been trying to prove too much. If it is true that every stratum of the population that could be made serviceable to the regime has been steadily won to greater confidence in it, and that opposition is limited to the useful function of criticizing such abuses and defects as continue to impede prog-

ress, then what is to be said of the shocks that have affected the higher leadership of the Soviet Union? The official explanation is that the Soviet Union is a socialist state, encircled by capitalist states; but there are many who will not be satisfied by this. There remains the fact that many of the highest officials of the state, men intimately connected with the past history of the Revolution, have been convicted of counter-revolutionary association with capitalist countries. This implies that internal conflict in the Soviet Union must have reached an acute point, and an explanation is needed.

The explanation is to be sought partly in the past. During the most difficult period in carrying out industrialization and collectivization there were politicians who inclined to be pessimistic. Past habit prompted them to excessive criticism of the leadership of the Communist Party. They exaggerated the practical difficulties which they faced to the stature of a dangerous crisis in the revolution. At that time trained revolutionaries who were inclined to try violent methods of "solving the crisis" could still gather a certain number of partisan followers, especially among the rich peasants and in regions inhabited by nationalities other than the Great Russians. Since the country was still a peasants' country the natural way for a rebel to act, especially a rebel conditioned by the whole history of the Communist Party and the logic of the development of events in the Soviet Union, was to form a group and get into conspiratorial touch with other groups, in order to work up a military coup d'état.

Since the Five-Year Plans were obviously an attack on the traditional peasant economy, and at the same time demanded sacrifices from some of the factory workers, these groups could find disaffected individuals to recruit. Once they had started out on this method, there was no way out. Any rebellious group had to follow the course on which it had started, and once these groups had lost all possibility of support from the majority within the country they could only accept help from outside. Such help, in such cases, is always ready to hand. Further development then depended on the political psychology of those who had been members of different opposition groups within the Communist Party. Some intended to use their connection with foreign countries only in order

to support their plans within the Soviet Union, with the idea of eventually cheating their allies of the price of victory. Others fell so low that they degenerated into mere agents of foreign powers.

The development of this kind of conspiratorial activity has a fatal logic of its own. Once the military conspiracy of 1932-34 had been launched, it inevitably developed to the point of contact with nations hostile to the U.S.S.R. The fact that this military conspiracy really existed can only be doubted if it be assumed that the Soviet Government was wantonly willing to endanger its international prestige by depriving the army of many of its leaders, at a moment of acute war danger, simply for the sake of personal enmities. This would imply that one man after another, who had been guilty of no more than a difference of opinion within the Party, had gone to the extreme length of self-accusation revealed by the trials. This is humanly unreasonable, because the very idea of extorting false confessions on such a scale would have been enough to rouse every normal human being against those responsible. The truth seems to be that while the crime of treacherous collusion with foreign countries was naturally stressed during the trials, for the sake of political propaganda, this kind of connection was a logically inevitable result of domestic conspiracy within the army and various political organs.

This would be true even when the political situation within the Soviet Union had become such that the conspirators could no longer justify themselves, even in their own eyes. The accused, during the trials, did not attempt to justify themselves by reference to current conditions in the U.S.S.R. Neither did the public prosecutor go into this aspect. Nevertheless those who are familiar with the history of the Communist Party, and who followed the attacks, in *Pravda*, on *Izvestiya* as edited by Bukharin, know that the opposition did originally base its activities on ideological grounds.

Moreover there are certain reasonable premises for the origins of conspiratorial activity. These can be traced to the negative side of the processes by which the mass support of the Soviet system grew in strength and numbers. The raising of the economic level of the population increased its political consciousness and its demands for still further progress. Socialist agriculture, in particular,

acquired by collectivization and mechanization a place in the life of the country different from the backward position of a pre-socialist, atomized, individualistic agriculture of private profit. There is even a difference in this—and a very great one—as between collective farms and state farms.

The standards of living of peasants and factory workers were brought closer to each other by the increase of agricultural productivity. At the same time the decreasing difference of outlook between factory worker and collective farmer resulted in an increase in the number of sons of peasant families chosen for service in the army. In practice, all of this meant that the profit-sharing income of collective farms was rising more rapidly than the wages of industrial workers. One device in the drive to bring the last individual peasants into the collective farms was a series of legislative measures controlling prices and lowering taxes in such a way as to favor the collective farms. The proportion of collective farm income levied as a contribution to capital accumulation was cut down by transferring this obligation to state organs and machine and tractor stations, in order to increase the profits to be distributed to collective farmers. These methods might well be considered, by theoretical partisans of a one-sided and exclusive "workers' policy," as an attack on sacred principles. In practice, however, it can hardly be imagined that the Russian industrial worker, who is still in close touch with the country, would resent the fact that the standard of living of his country relatives, which had always been lower than his own, was beginning to rise faster than his own. He would be especially unlikely to resent this when his own wages were also steadily rising, though no longer so fast as the income of the collective farms.

THESE complex changes have been accompanied by an even more far-reaching change in ideology or outlook. Until the advances which brought about a general advance in the standard of living of the masses, Soviet ideology was on the whole a matter of concern to a minority, which though it numbered several million people was still relatively small. Once the peasants, and the more backward workers who were still under peasant influence, had begun to be-

come more active, the Soviet ideology or outlook became at least potentially a matter which concerned the whole people. This in itself urged an adjustment of the ideology to suit the wants and understanding of the whole people, inasmuch as the nation still faced decisive struggles in which it needed the unity of a common outlook.

For the outside observer, some of the ideological reconstruction that has been going on appears to be simple and obvious progress; an abandonment of prejudices which were a nuisance to the socialist movement. Among changes of this kind were the condemnation of excessively mechanical concepts of the materialistic philosophy of history, and of various extravagances in art and other cultural activities, condemnation of the prejudice (which had become serious) against large families; and condemnation of the equally serious tendency to consider that abortion is not an evil that is sometimes necessary, but a "socialist achievement."

Other recent changes or trends may appear to be simply new expressions of the tendency, often observed among Russians, especially Russian intellectuals, to exaggerate first a good idea and then the criticism of that idea, swinging from one extreme to another. The Russian, when roused to criticism of some ultramodern theory that has been declared to be socialistic, is all too apt to dig up equally inadequate theories that have long been out of date, or to fall back on outworn phraseology. The old "specialist" is of course especially prone to go back to the phraseology which he once used in the past; but even the new generation often finds it easier to imitate old forms than to develop new ones.

On the whole, however, the majority of the changes that have taken place and are still going on can be described as merely a necessary detour resulting from the fact that the broad masses in the Soviet Union are not adopting, as premises for the future to which they look forward, things which are taken as a matter of course in more developed nations. The level of development is still unequal in many parts of the Soviet Union. This in itself means that the centralized control of cultural policy is forced to emphasize those aspects or elements of progress which are essential for the decisive masses of the people. "Progress," in other words, is as much

a matter of practical execution as it is of theoretical concepts, and that which constitutes progress in the Soviet Union today is not necessarily the kind of thing that would be a necessary part of the program in a future socialist Europe or America, for instance.

As far as regards the particular problem of the quality of Soviet strength in a war, and its total war potential, the main point is that the form which progress has taken in the Soviet Union is one that has resulted in increased strength. For the preservation of the Soviet Union as a socialist state, and for the possible application of its fighting power, this is what is essential. It is important to stress this point, because undoubtedly there are those who diverge from this pragmatic point in order to maintain intact the particular ideology, theories and phrases which for them have become absolute values. The "freezing" of a man's articles of faith in this manner can transform them into principles which he regards as so sacred that he considers any change in them as treason. This accounts for the desperate way in which some have kept up their fight against the Government in the Soviet Union, especially those who had already been in opposition so long that they had entangled themselves in a way that did not allow them to get back into the actual trend of evolution of the country. Such problems have their personal implications. For oppositionists who had reached or gone beyond a certain point the creative changes which tended to eliminate, at least politically, groups which had formerly been in the main stream of development, and the concurrent changes which drew closer to the Revolution groups like the old technical specialists, who had formerly stood aside—changes which were accentuated by the rise of a new proletarian generation interpenetrating and inevitably more and more replacing the older generation—actually appear to be "counter-revolutionary."

All of these are considerations which will, I hope, serve to make clear the fact that severe crises in the upper superstructure of the Soviet Union have been more than offset, and simultaneously offset, by an immense accretion of strength at the mass foundation of the structure. This is what must be emphasized in a realistic estimate of the war potential of the Soviet Union. If I am right in the concepts which I have been trying to explain, it must follow that the

symptoms of crisis, however sensational, are no more than negative aspects made conspicuous and indeed partly created by the strength and healthy growth of the country as a whole; a growth which has nurtured exactly the kind of strength that is needed in war.

There are two main processes to be taken into account: the way in which the broad masses of the population, with the peasants in the forefront, have become actively loyal and enthusiastic to a degree not achieved in any previous phase; and the way in which the organizational and ideological structure of the country has been adapted so as to allow this mass majority to express its approval and enthusiasm in action. The triumph of these processes has been scarred but not diminished by the crises of recent years. Many of the conflicts which resulted in these crises need never have become acute, and might have been avoided, had it not been for the fact that the Soviet Union has had to make its epochal decisions under the shadow of a constant danger of war. Had it not been for this, even the conspiracies inherited from the past could perhaps have been dealt with in a more lenient way. Things being as they were, however, it was tragically clear that even the most painful suppression of dissident minorities in the leadership of the country (minorities which, it should be noted, were largely identified with a particular generation, whose outlook had become fixed and hardened) was better than the chronic danger of rebellion at a time when the danger of attack from the outside was menacing.

What the majority leadership within the party had to accept and defend was the inexorable fact that under the conditions of a modern war the solid and massive support of the majority of the people is a positive requirement, while even severe shocks in the superstructure, involving the necessity of training new and less experienced leaders, and even the continuance of sabotage by conspirators as yet undiscovered, are only negative disadvantages which can be set right in due course.

There remains to be considered the possibility that the action and reaction developing out of the conditions revealed by the recent trials may lead eventually to still more crises within the leadership, and perhaps even to a successful rebellion. This possibility is so remote that I think it can be discounted as more than improbable.

Even the better organized conspiracies, like the one headed by Tukhachevsky, were lacking in mass support. It was this which brought them to a head prematurely, because those who led the conspiracies broke down at the last moment in such a way that the Secret Service succeeded in penetrating into the heart of the groups responsible. Moreover, speculation on possible political rebellion in the Soviet Union is irrelevant. What is there that a successful rebellion could accomplish now? Nothing but a change in the personal composition of the leading group That is all. The policy of that group would have to remain unchanged. Even the slightest attempt to achieve political changes would provoke a tremendous reaction, which would probably be effective before hostile foreign countries had time to make use of the disturbance. In short, it is the people of the Soviet Union who now determine the course which the political leaders of the country must follow. It is this overwhelmingly important fact, making the highest leader ship in the country responsible to a massive majority, which has accepted and adopted as its own the basic achievements of the Revolution, that makes the Soviet Union so potent a factor in the final decisions of our time.

POLICY AND STRATEGY OF THE NEW ZEALAND LABOR PARTY

D. R. JENKINS

THE election of 1911 is a convenient point of departure for the modern history of New Zealand Labor. In that year the "Reform" (Conservative) Party began a term of office that lasted 20 years. The election was fought mainly on land tenure in agriculture. Prior to 1911 a large proportion of farm land belonged to the State and was held by farmers on perpetual leases at almost nominal rates, on the condition that they occupied and continued to improve the land. In this way the Seddon government had provided for a great many settlers who had little or no capital. At the same time the Liberals had introduced social and factory legislation that included universal pensions, the forty-four hour week, Arbitration Courts and recognition of unionism, together with a degree of State Socialism through Government ownership of railways, coal-mines, communications, and domination of banking, insurance and lending to settlers.

The land policy proved to be the political weakness of the Liberals. Their opponents were able to swing the 1911 elections by bribing the numerous Crown tenants with the offer of freehold. This maneuver was made easy by the "country quota," which put the farmer in a dominating position at the elections because the rural electorates were smaller than the urban by 28 per cent. The immediate effect of freehold was a great increase in farm indebtedness. Farmers were now able to mortgage the land which had formerly belonged to the State. The long-term effect was to pass State property over to private capitalists, though the immediate effect, in the 10 years following 1911, was great prosperity for the farmers. The period coincided with the boom years for New Zealand exports. Farmers were able to speculate with their land on a large scale, and were tempted to capitalize far beyond limits set by subsequent price levels for land. Mortgages, from 1840 to 1911,

had reached only 90 million pounds; after 1911, when the land system was smashed by the Reform Party, they rose to 240 million pounds. Also, the interest rates paid to private capitalists were higher than those charged by the Government under the State Advances to Settlers Act.

Labor did not fail to protest, as the great struggles of 1912 and 1913 show. The parliamentary Labor Party was young and weak but the unions showed a militancy that has rarely been equaled since. Massey, the Reform Prime Minister, put down strikes with severity, and many of the labor leaders were imprisoned for sedition. Calling the Governor General "a gilded popinjay" was classed as seditious utterance at that time. Massey used the Maritime Strike of 1913 to drive deeper the wedge between town and country, and so make his regime secure. For 20 years this division, rural versus urban, was the basis of the power of the Reform Party.

The following table makes clear the relative strength of the parties over the last 37 years.

PERCENTAGES OF VOTES CAST IN NEW ZEALAND ELECTIONS[1]

Year	Reform	Liberal	Labor	Others
1911	36	48	3	3
1914	46	42	11	1
1919	37	27	27	9
1922	43	30	23	4
1925	47	20	28	5
1928	36	30	27	7
1931	32	23	33	12
1935	33	—	46	11
1938	40	—	56	4

This helps to solve the mystery of the increased State intervention in industry which took place when conservatives were in power. The regime was dependent on "liberal" acquiescence. Thus the extension of mild social legislation and experiments in State Socialism, begun by Seddon, was forced on the Reform Party by a kind of parliamentary blackmail. Over a long period the liberals were content with this arrangement and showed no will to power. But bedding with the Tories had its fatal effect—they lost votes. Worse, they began to look like Tories themselves. In 1931 both parties discarded their labels in the coalition of the depression years, and in 1935 they presented themselves at the polls as one—the "National Party."

[1] *Standard*, October 20, 1938.

In this period the Labor Party grew steadily in strength, as will be seen from the table, at the same time undergoing considerable change in policy and political direction. During these early stages the Labor Party was very much to the left of its present position. "Socialization of the means of production, distribution and exchange" stood at the head of its program and provided the topic for countless fiery street corner meetings. Some of the leaders had drawn sentences for opposing conscription and refusing to bear arms, and the rank and file of the trade unions had been dubbed "red feds" because of their participation in the red Federation of Labor. However, in the middle twenties there was a decrease in militancy, and the parliamentary representation grew. The leader of the party, Harry Holland, a veteran of strike struggles and an inveterate pamphleteer on dialectical materialism and similar subjects, was getting old. After his death in 1934 (he was buried to the accompaniment of "The Internationale" and "Rock of Ages") the socialization plank was dropped from the platform. Michael Savage was elected leader, with a small majority over Peter Fraser. Conciliation of farmers and dissatisfied liberals now became the keynote of policy, and the party entered on its present victorious phase.

It might be well to say something here about the experiences of New Zealand in the depression. When the crash in export prices began to be felt and it was clear that a great deal of legislation would be needed, the suggestion was canvassed that the three parliamentary parties, then about equal in strength, should combine in an emergency regime. But the Labor Party could not possibly agree to wage-cutting and curtailment of social services, so the Coalition was formed of the other two parties. The "National" Government, paralleling action taken in England, introduced a drastic program of economy. From its nature it was unable to adopt any constructive measures.

It is difficult to convey an idea of the suffering in New Zealand during the depression years of 1932 and 1933. New Zealand has the highest per capita export trade in the world, and so is very much dependent on the world prices of primary products. It has

only three exports of any account—wool, dairy products and meat, world prices for which slumped badly. Added to this was the high mortgage indebtedness on farms. The Coalition Government was obliged, against its policy, to pass legislation scaling down mortgage interest and principal, and fixing the exchange rate, but its main faith was in drastic wage-cutting and reduction of public works, education, social services, with the intention of preserving the balanced budget—a course that was prompted, no doubt, by the private banks and larger capitalist interests.

Unemployment rose rapidly, but the Coalition set its face against adequate relief, until it was forced to move by two substantial riots, in Wellington and in Auckland. The Wellington riot of 1932 was on a scale large enough to jolt the whole country. Ten thousand unemployed gathered at Parliament House to present a deputation. The Minister of Finance, the Hon. J. G. Coates, kept them waiting in the rain for four hours, then refused to see the representatives. The mob turned back toward the city and smashed almost all windows in the downtown business section. Order was restored in a few hours by armed special constables, and the unemployed, ineffectively organized, were obliged to accept a small increase in relief rates The Communists took no action and condemned anything in the nature of adventurism.

The Labor Party vigorously attacked the Coalition on every possible occasion. Large groups, even farmers, began to go over to the Labor side, in spite of the fact that the entire press was in reactionary hands Criticism was directed not only at the inadequacy but also at the inefficiency of relief arrangements. There were incidents such as that in which Semple, M. P., took into the House a blanket of the kind distributed to the unemployed and demonstrated its shoddy quality by ripping it from corner to corner before the session of Parliament. It was becoming clear that the Coalition, in spite of its parliamentary majority, was everywhere on the defensive.

A factor in the 1935 swing to Labor was the extension of the life of Parliament to four years. Early in 1934, with the prospect of an election in November, the Coalition enacted the extension of its own life by one year. This aroused a storm of opposition and

gave point to the Labor Party's accusation of fascism. There is no doubt that the act contributed to the Labor victory and subsequent success. If the election had been held at the appointed time, November 1934, Labor would probably have won, but not so devastatingly as in 1935. That year was most valuable to Labor, for there was time to frame policy and to plan legislation with the assurance of victory within a few months.

The Coalition had pinned its faith on a sudden economic recovery; as the year wore on and nothing happened, it resigned itself to fate. It had no fight left. Weeks before election campaigning had begun, the Ministerial files were burned, so that no traces of the 23 years of tory government would be left for the incoming regime.

It is not necessary to give a detailed account of the 1935 campaign, except to list the points of the Labor program and mention the tremendous popular enthusiasm, during the election and after, that greeted the end of the Coalition Government. The Labor Cabinet posts were assigned, and the first legislative acts drafted and ready for the printer, almost before the results had begun to come in. Even the Manufacturers' Association and the Farmers' Union, formerly pillars of reaction, hailed the Labor victory with relief. It will be noted that contrary to common practice, the Labor program was based on immediate legislative proposals instead of general principles.

NEW ZEALAND LABOR PARTY PROGRAM, 1935

1. Assume control of the central credit system.
2. Guarantee prices to farmers.
3. Restore cuts in wages.
4. Legislate a minimum wage.
5. Reorganize the education system.
6. Institute a national health insurance service.
7. Provide a superannuation and pension system for all.
8. Maintain the Public Service superannuation systems.
9. Organize productive development employment through public works and local authorities, and by fostering secondary institutions.
10. Restore the State Advances department.
11. Support the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The program of the Coalition (now "National Party") is not worthy of mention except to say that it was compiled by borrowing from the Labor program. The "Nationals" stood on their record, which was very bad.

ELECTION RESULTS, NOVEMBER 1935

Labor	53 members
National	17 "
Independents	4 "
Country Party	2 "
Maoris	4 "

(Two of the Maori members joined the Labor Party after the election.)

When Labor took over, export prices had begun to rise. The quick enactment of legislation on wages, relief and guaranteed prices spread the benefit of the rise with great rapidity, so that the change appeared to be almost magical. Popular approval and a steady rise in export prices enabled the extension of the measures distributing the national income more widely. This brought about a complete reversal of the depression trend towards concentration of wealth. Between 1935 and 1936 all prices rose 3 per cent but all wages rose 10 per cent. In the two following years there was a further improvement in the relation between prices and wages (see *New Zealand Official Yearbook*, 1938).

The entire election program was carried into effect during the term of office, mostly in the first year. Labor had everything ready, the Opposition was disorganized and half-hearted, and the Legislative Council was not in a position to obstruct. (The Legislative Council was originally intended as an equivalent to the British House of Lords, but it is now little more than a stable for retired party hacks. Appointments are made by the Governor-General on the advice of the Government of the day, and the number is kept well below the constitutional limit so that the Council can be quickly filled by Government appointees if it offers protracted opposition to any measure. It will be seen, therefore, that the Labor Government has none of the constitutional problems that might face a Labor Government in England.)

One important event since Labor gained power has been the unification of the trade union movement. Prior to April 1937 there had been two national organizations—the Alliance of Labor and the Trade and Labor Council. The former was of the "vertical" industrial union type, the latter a "horizontal" organization of self-conscious, semi independent craft unions, many of them small and highly skilled The Alliance of Labor was composed of three large semi skilled unions Watersiders, New Zealand Workers (public works and general laborers) and the New Zealand Railwaymen. At the Conference in 1937 both national organizations agreed to form a single new body--the Federation of Labor.

The parliamentary party heartily approved this unification, though it revived the charge that the country is run by a trade union bureaucracy It is true that many prominent parliamentarians are former trade union secretaries and that most of the election funds come from trade union dues, but there is no evidence that the Federation of Labor is a policy-making body, except perhaps in industrial legislation On the other hand there are charges (coming notably from the Trotskyists) that the parliamentary party has strangled organized labor by forbidding strikes. That some strikes have been discouraged is true, but the Government has placed the powers of the State behind all reasonable claims. The fact is that of the small number of strikes in 1935-38, some were provoked by employers, in order to influence the vote at the 1938 General Election

One case early in 1938 illustrates this. The watersiders struck on a small ship at Auckland. They had a legitimate grievance. Shipowners immediately called a lock-out throughout the port, and publicized it in the provincial papers as "General strike on the waterfront!" It took great self-control on the part of the unions to prevent a spontaneous and complete strike in the face of such provocation. In this case the Communists cooperated with the union officials.

The peculiar significance of waterside strikes is worthy of note, for some of the consequences have been disastrous to labor. Since New Zealand depends very much on the export of wool and dairy produce, farmers are easily aroused to anger by delays in shipping

their produce to the London market. Under Labor's guaranteed price scheme of 1936, they are paid by the Government when the produce reaches the wharf, but they still take great interest in labor disputes on the waterfront. During the Maritime Strike of 1913, large bands of armed and mounted farmers entered the capital, took charge of the loading of wool and defeated the watersiders at a moment when victory seemed assured. The hostility between these two groups ("cockies" and "wharfies" as they call each other) has become deeply set, because former conservative governments have had every interest in dividing workers from farmers.

The hostility of the press forced the Government to use the radio as a means of reaching the people. This was easy, because the broadcasting stations were already State property. The method is eminently fair—every important sitting of Parliament is broadcast so that Government and Opposition have a more or less equal opportunity to put a case to the whole country, which becomes an extension of the public gallery. This has probably speeded up the legislative process, for electors are inclined to be impatient with their member if he obstructs business by stonewalling. Every member knows that when he speaks, more than half his electorate listens, and if he is dull or ineffective he will probably hear from them. Many people, especially farmers, have come to have favorite speakers to whom they listen throughout the session. One member, Ormond Wilson (an Oxford man and Labor M. P.), has become noted for his long though rare speeches on social topics. He had been prominent on the parliamentary committee that directed the new Social Science Research Bureau of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and he had access to facts that were not easily available in other ways.

An interesting change has been made in Cabinet organization. Each Minister has the power to co-opt another member of parliament to assist in conducting some special branch of the department, in this way making use of technical knowledge in the Party. For example, Dr. MacMillan assists the Minister of Health and Education with the health insurance legislation, and J. A. Lee has charge of the rehousing scheme. Cabinet salaries are pooled and a proportion set aside for these co-opted members.

A great many important measures have been passed by the Labor Government and three will be mentioned here: Guaranteed Prices, Social Security and the Education Amendment.

Farmers, especially dairy farmers, suffered insecurity as a result of the violent fluctuations of world prices, over-capitalization being only one of the bad consequences. Under the guaranteed price scheme the Government takes over produce at a fixed price, based partly on the returns of the last 10 years, partly on an investigation into costs and living standards in agriculture. The produce is then sold by the Government on the world market, and any surplus is put in a reserve fund and paid out in bad years or when the Government thinks fit—for example, just before an election. Results show that the scheme benefits small farmers, but is unpopular in districts where larger units predominate. This is probably due to the nature of the allowances made in fixing the price

The Education Amendment Bill is an effort to relax the grip of the central department on curriculum and methods, and to restore a measure of local initiative by combining the local controlling boards in regional units with real powers. A novel feature is trade union and teacher representation on these local bodies. In framing the amendment, opinions expressed by overseas delegates to the Conference of 1937 were given serious consideration. The measure was not passed in all its stages during the pre-election session of 1938. The official reason was insufficiency of time, but it is possible that opposition from the existing college boards of governors and similar bodies that were menaced by the democratic provisions of the Bill, was feared as an influence at the election Labor was probably wise in holding the measure over until the next session, because it was important above all to win this election Further, the educational prestige of those opposing the bill will have disappeared after it goes into effect in 1939, so they will not sway any votes at subsequent elections It should be noted that the expenditure on education has been almost doubled in the three years of Labor administration

The Social Security Act is an attempt to extend greatly and also consolidate the benefits given under earlier acts, some of them dating back to the 1890's. Administration will be under a single

separate department. Sub-titles of the Act include Universal Superannuation, Invalids', Widows', Orphans', Family, Miners', Sickness, Unemployment, Maori War, Emergency, Health, Medical, Pharmaceutical, Hospital, Maternity, Supplementary, War Pensions. The most notable extension is the superannuation (single, £2.10.0; married £4.0.0 a week) for all over 60. Income of less than £1 a week from other sources, and property occupied by the superannuitant, is permitted without reduction of benefit. The Act is financed by a flat levy on all income, first imposed in 1933 as an emergency tax for unemployment relief. Since unemployment has virtually disappeared, there are very considerable reserves in the fund. It seems a pity to take the tax off, so reserves and current receipts are being turned over to social security.

It might be desirable to mention by name other important acts affecting wages, compulsory unionism, Arbitration Court, forty-hour week, mortgages, Reserve Bank, State Advances, finance, State steel mills, etc. However, the general effect of these is fairly well known, and it will be more useful to devote the remaining space to the election of 1938 and the present policy of the Party.

The main issue at the 1938 election was whether the electorate approved the measures taken. Nothing comparable to the election platform of 1935 was put forward, the Party merely pledging itself to extension and consolidation. In particular it stood on the guaranteed price, social security and the re-housing scheme. Of these, two had been in successful operation for some time. The National Party had no policy of note. It spoke vaguely of a "compensated price" instead of a guaranteed price, but most of the electorate failed to understand the difference, and the Nationals did not appear anxious to make it clear. There was also the inevitable promise of lower taxes, but curiously enough this does not seem to have the appeal that it has in other countries. Possibly New Zealanders are relatively well satisfied with what they get for their taxes, possibly the long tradition of State activity has made them less tax-conscious than laissez-faire countries such as the United States.

The National Party used such methods as unsigned and libellous

pamphlets delivered at night,[2] a press barrage, insinuation against the security of the Savings Bank, and a "whispering" campaign against the health and morals of Labor leaders. It even accepted large sums from Australian capitalists, as post-election revelations show. The *Standard* had an editorial on this, entitled "The Final Infamy," in which it said "Had these facts been known before the recent polls there is no doubt that the people of this country would have manifested their resentment by completely annihilating the Nationalists."

COMPARISON OF ELECTION RESULTS

(Party vote aggregates in parentheses)

1935 Party	Seats	1938 Party	Seats
Labor	53 (392,972)	Labor	53 (530,810)
National	17 (280,152)	National	25 (381,093)
Others	10 (179,455)	Others	2 (34,515)

It should be noted that the Labor aggregate is the largest party vote ever recorded in New Zealand, and that 15 minority seats gained by Labor in 1935 became majority seats in 1938. Of the 22 country seats won by the National Party, 8 were on majorities ranging from 48 to 772 votes. It can be inferred that, even with the "country quota" continuing in the law, there are not more than 15 safe seats left to the Nationalists. Dividing electorates into three categories city, town, and country—on the basis of the 1938 *Year-book* figures of population distribution, we get the following analysis of the aggregates

ANALYSIS OF VOTES, 1938 ELECTION

Large cities	
Labor	216,936
National	121,063
Secondary Towns	
Labor	88,939
National	62,961
Country	
Labor	176,129
National	181,736
Maori	
Labor	12,025
National	10,903

[2] The National Party disavowed authorship of these pamphlets.

Policy and Strategy of the New Zealand Labor Party

The Labor Party, flushed with victory, should not overlook the strength and importance of the farmers. Though the rural-urban contrast is not nearly so sharp as the *New York Times* claimed, reporting the election in what proved to be a masterpiece of understatement,[8] there is a real danger here. The Maritime Strike of 1913 should never be forgotten by the labor movement in New Zealand; and every possible effort, even sacrifice, should be made to win the whole-hearted support of the farmers.

There is an interesting question now being discussed in New Zealand: to what extent was the election a vote for socialism? The leadership of the Labor Party disavowed the aim of "Socialism in our time" when the election campaign was on, but some members of the party, like J. A. Lee in his book *Socialism in New Zealand*, made it a matter of immediate decision. Now the Labor press speaks of "driving on to Socialism," while the Tory press reprints Savage's speech disavowing socialism, a speech that was completely ignored by the dailies in the pre-election period. There is, no doubt, considerable disagreement within the Labor Party on this matter. Mr. James Roberts, President of the New Zealand Labor Party, at a rally of 80,000 in Auckland Domain, said "The great question of today is that of Socialism. I admit the soft impeachment of being a Socialist . . . I would be ashamed to be anything else than a Socialist today!" (*Standard*, October 13, 1938). In the same issue the editorial says: "Of course Socialism is a fictitious issue. . . . The only live issue that remains is the degree of social progress and advancement for which the opposing forces stand."

Drastic action is not likely in the near future unless some world change, such as a serious depression, affects export prices. The country is enjoying record levels in real wages and is not revolutionary in feeling. There is no doubt that the Labor Party is ready to face with confidence and determination any violent action taken against it by fascist groups which may arise. With the largest vote in history, the army purged of reactionary officers, the police force unionized, there is little to fear. So far, opposition has been puny and disorganized.

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[8] *New York Times*, October 16, 1938.

Labor appears to suppose at the present stage that the extension of State Socialism will ultimately merge into true socialism. There has not been sufficient thought on the fundamentally capitalist nature of State Socialism as it exists, though Labor is no doubt right in assuming that the high living standard of New Zealand (for rural areas the highest in the world) is mainly due to State Socialism. This is a question on which a definite answer must be given in the not very-distant future.

New York, January 1939

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TRIBAL BOUNDARIES OF THE BURMA-YÜNNAN FRONTIER

MARTIN R. NORIN

BETWEEN 1934 and 1937 the British and Chinese Governments were attempting to settle a dispute more than 50 years old over part of the frontier between Burma and Yunnan. The territory is inhabited by tribes which have been, partly as a result o the dispute, more or less autonomous. A border incident in 193 led to investigation by a mixed boundary commission. In 1937 when this work had been completed, final negotiations might have been expected. Then the Japanese war on China began; and as a result, negotiations have been in abeyance.

The territory is that of the Wa States, which the Chinese cal Ch'ia Wa Ti,[1] on the southern part of the modern frontier betweer Yünnan Province and Burma. It extends from the 22nd to the 23rc parallel of latitude (north) and is traversed by the 99th meridian of longitude (east), reaching roughly from north to south along the Salween River for about 100 miles and eastward for about 50 miles toward the Mekong River. The terrain is mountainous, insalubrious and largely inaccessible. Most of the inhabitants belong to the Wa tribes, which are relatively primitive in culture, some of them being headhunters.[2] A Chinese account of 1933, which divides them into "wild" and "domesticated" tribes, asserts that in recent years they have done less raiding and that merchants have been traversing the country.[3] Since the early years of the century, however neither Chinese nor British have done much in penetrating the

[1] The term *ch'ia* appears to be a phonetic rendering of the Kachin word *hk*... "river" The term *wa*, commonly written with the character for "title," may be Chinese rendering of a native tribal name The term *ti* means "land."

[2] Sir G Scott, *Burma A Handbook of Practical Information*, Edinburgh (?) 1906; also G E Mitton (Lady Scott), ed, *Scott of the Shan Hills: Orders and Impressions*, London, 1936, with bibliography of the writings of her husband.

[3] J. Siguret, *Territoires et populations des confins du Yünnan*, Peiping, 193... a translation of *Yün-nan Pien-ti Wen-t'i Yen-chiu*, the prefaces of which are date March, 1933.

NOTES ON THE MAP OF THE WA REGION

MAIN SOURCES Map No 40 in Ting Wen-chiang (V. K. Ting) and collaborators, *Chung-hua Min-kuo Hsin Ti-t'u (New Atlas of the Chinese Republic)*, Shanghai, 1934; Hua Ch'i-yun (see p 69, note 5, above), p. 20, with additional sources indicated below

PLACE NAMES INDICATED BY NUMBERS

(1) Kunglung (Chinese text, Treaty of 1897), rendered as Kunlong in British text
(2) Kengma (V K. Ting, Map 40); rendered as Keng Ma, British text, 1897 Treaty
(3) Mengtung (Hua Ch'i-yun, V K Ting).
(4) Mengchiao (same references), rendered as Mengko, British text, 1897 Treaty
(5) Chenpien (V K Ting), Chen-pien T'ing in British text; now called Lants'ang (V K Ting, Hua Ch'i yün)
(6) Panlung (Siguret's Chinese source, see p 67, note 3, above, also Hua Ch'i-yun), appears to be the Pang long of the "Map of Yunnan" compiled by Maj H R Davies, attached to *Yunnan, the Link Between India and the Yangtze*, Cambridge, 1909
(7) Panhung (same Chinese references), Pang hung (same British reference)
(8) Pank'uang (Siguret's Chinese source, Hua Ch'i yün), apparently the Pang hkwan of Davies' map
(9) Yungpan (tentatively identified with the Yawng pang of Davies' map)
(10) Kengmai (tentatively identified from Davies' map, Chinese usage uncertain)
(11) K'unma (Siguret's Chinese source, Hua Ch'i-yun)

OTHER PLACE NAMES

Menglien (Chinese text, 1897 Treaty, Hua Ch'i-yun), Munglem in British text and on map attached to treaty in *Hertslet's China Treaties*
Menglun (Chinese text), rendered Manglun in British text and map
Mengting (Chinese text), rendered Mêng Ting, British text and map
Somai (Chinese text), rendered as Somu, British text and map

MOUNTAINS.

Kuangk'an Shan (Hua Ch'i-yun)
Kungming Shan (Hua Ch'i yun), presumably identical with Kungming Shan of Chinese text, 1897, and Kong Ming-Shan of British text and map
K'ungming Shan (Hua Ch'i-yun), possibly either confused with or identical with Kong-Ming-Shan of British 1897 text and map
Menglin Shan (Hua Ch'i-yün).

RIVERS.

Lants'ang Chiang (V K Ting), Mekong River on Davies' map
Lungch'uan Chiang (V K Ting), flows into the Shweli.
Manlu Ho (V K Ting)
Nana Ho (V K Ting).
Nanch'ia Chiang (V. K Ting, Hua Ch'i-yün), Nam Hka River of Davies' map; Namka River of British 1897 text.
Nanha Ho (V K Ting)
Nanlei Ho (Chinese 1897 text, V K Ting), Namlam River of British text.
Nanma Ho (Hua Ch'i-yün).
Nanp'a Ho (Hua Ch'i-yün)
Nanting Ho (V. K. Ting; Hua Ch'i-yün, with variant ways of writing the *ting*); Nam Ting River on Davies' map
Nu Chiang (Salween River)
Ta Nankun Ho (Hua Ch'i-yün).

region. In 1935, indeed, the British asserted that any frontier marks that might have been set up would have been destroyed by the tribesmen.[4]

Attempts at delimiting the entire Burma-China frontier date from the annexation of Upper Burma by Great Britain in 1886.[5] The last formal agreement, of February 4, 1897, left part of the boundary for future settlement.[6] Rather vague definitions of details led to misunderstandings, thwarting the efforts of a joint commission, under Sir J. G. Scott and General Liu, which operated from November 1897 to May 1900.[7] A British consular officer, G. J. L. Litton, subsequently examined the region and in November 1903 submitted a report, in which a boundary was defined,[8] which appears to have been approved by the British and notified to the Chinese.[9] However, the Chinese Government had deputed Shih Hung-shao to accompany Litton, on the understanding that examination should not necessarily imply delimitation.[10] In any case the Chinese have never recognized the boundary suggested by Litton.[11] Partly because of the undemarcated frontire, the Wa tribes have tended to consider themselves autonomous.[12]

The difficulty in settling a frontier is partly accounted for by

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[4] *Report of the Administration of Burma for the Year 1931-32*, Rangoon, 1933, p. 19. Also the same, for 1933-34, published 1935, p. 1.

[5] *Ibid.*; also Hua Chi-yun, "*Chung k'an Tien Mien nan-tuan-chieh wu-ti jen-shih*," or "Recognition of the Importance of the Question of the Southern Section of the Yunnan-Burma Frontier," in *Tung-fang Tsa-chih* (*Eastern Miscellany*), XXXII, No. 11, Shanghai, June 1, 1935.

[6] Inspector General of Customs, *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between China and Foreign States*, 2nd ed., Shanghai, 1917, I, 532-38, in Chinese and English; also J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919*, New York, 1921, I, 94-8; also Hertslet's *China Treaties*: *Treaties, etc., Between Great Britain and China, and Between China and Foreign Powers*, etc., 3rd. ed., London, 1908, I, 113-19.

[7] Mitton, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-82; also *Report on Burma*, *loc. cit.*; also statement by Mr. J. Clague, in *North-China Herald*, Shanghai, June 3, 1936. Scott had succeeded H. T. White, the original British Commissioner.

[8] *Report by Acting Consul Litton on a Journey in North-West Yünnan*, noted on February 2, 1904, presented on November 14, 1903. See *129 House of Commons Debates*, 45, p. 61.

[9] *Report on Burma, 1931-32*, *loc. cit.*

[10] J. Siguret, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102, giving the date 1904, apparently in error for 1903.

[11] Hua, *op. cit.*, Report on Burma, 1931-32, *loc. cit.*

[12] Siguret, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

uncertainty as to the territory of the different Wa tribes, which extends even to nomenclature. Popularly, the Wa country is known to the Chinese as the Hulu Kingdom. There is a distinction between Upper Hulu, with a ruler at Panhung, and Lower Hulu, with a ruler at Pank'uang. Of late years, five principal tribal "capitals" have been recognized—Panhung, Panlung, Pank'uang, Yungpan and K'unma. Even more complicated subdivisions are also described.[13] Chinese assert that the nineteenth century treaties allotted Pank'uang and Panlung to Britain and Panhung to China;[14] but these place names are not mentioned in either the English or the Chinese texts of the Agreements of 1894 and 1897. Nor is it sure just how these three tribal domains fit politically and geographically into the territorial divisions of the 1890's.

There are also topographical problems. At present, the determining statement as to the boundary passing through the Wa States is in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 3 of the Agreement of 1897:

> The frontier shall then follow the course of the river forming the boundary between Somu, which belongs to Great Britain, and Mêng Ting, which belongs to China. It shall still continue to follow the frontier between those two districts, which is locally well known, to where it leaves the aforesaid river and ascends the hills, and shall then follow the line of water-parting between the tributaries of the Salween and the Mekong Rivers, from about longitude 99° east of Greenwich (17° 30′ west of Peking), and latitude 23° 20′, to a point about 99° 40′ east of Greenwich (16° 50′ west of Peking) and latitude 23°, leaving to China the Tsawbwaships of Kêng Ma, Mengtung, and Mengko.
>
> At the last named point of longitude and latitude the line strikes a very lofty mountain range, called Kong-Ming-Shan, which it shall follow in a southerly direction to about Longitude 99° 30′ east of Greenwich (17° west of Peking), and latitude 22° 30′, leaving to China the district of Chen-pien T'ing. Then, descending the western slope of the hills to the Namka River, it will follow the course of that river for about 10 minutes of latitude, leaving Munglem to China and Manglün to Great Britain.[15]

The difficulty is that the hills are not "locally well known."

[13] *Ibid.*; also Hua, *op. cit.*; also Mitton, *op. cit.*, especially map on p. 178.

[14] Siguret, *op. cit.*, pp. 202, 209, also Hua, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

[15] Customs, *Treaties*, I, 533-34.

This has led to at least five major interpretations. According to what Chinese call the "five-colored boundary map," two lines (yellow and blue) were drawn by the Chinese delegates Liu and Ch'ên. Another (purple) has been called an "officially proclaimed" line. A fourth (green) is a British line drawn by Sir J. G. Scott; it was over this that early negotiations broke down. The fifth (red) is another British line, drawn by Scott on his own responsibility. According to Hua Ch'i-yun, the yellow "Liu-Ch'ên" line represents the maximum Chinese claim, while the red "Scott" line marks the maximum British claim.[16]

The debatable sector begins near the "Kunglung Circle" and the junction of the Nanp'a with the Nanting River. From here the yellow line follows the Mênglin range south to about the Ta Nankun River, then turns east along the Kuangk'an range, which it follows southeastward until it meets what Hua Ch'i-yun calls the Kungming range, at about 99° 15',[17] and turns along it to the south. The red line also begins by following the Mênglin range, but about 25 miles north of where the Ta Nankun River leaves that range, it turns abruptly east along a series of ranges to about 99° 40' longitude and 23° latitude. Here it meets what Hua calls the K'ungming range, which it follows to the south. Both lines then converge on the Nanch'ia River, but reach it at points about 20 miles apart, and follow it to where the boundary has been satisfactorily demarcated. Two important differences may be noted. The yellow line allots Panhung to China, while the red line gives it to Burma. Also, the sponsors of the yellow line place the "Kong-Ming-Shan" of the 1897 Agreement in the west of the Wa territory, while the sponsors of the red line place it farther to the east. Evidently the earlier Anglo-Chinese understanding as to Panhung was not explicitly enough drawn. It has been discovered that the area is rich in silver, and neither Government is willing to relinquish claim. The vein is believed to extend from the Salween and the neighborhood of Panlung to Panhung, Mêngting and

[16] Hua, *op. cit.* pp. 18-20.

[17] Statements of latitude and longitude here given must be taken as rough and subject to error. Though I have consulted many maps in Chinese, English and French, I cannot find any which both accurately delineate the Wa area and the British and Chinese claims, and also give both the Chinese and English nomenclature.

Kêngma, ending in definitely Chinese territory. For some time British and Chinese have been fencing with each other and with the tribal chiefs for the right of working these mines, which in the west are called Lufang and in the east Chiaoshan. Those of Lufang are jointly owned by three of the Wa States, those of Chiaoshan by Panhung.[18] Recently, according to a Chinese source, not only the inhabitants of the disputed Panhung, but even those of Panlung have wanted the exploitation of the mines to be taken over by the Chinese in preference to the British, who are already interested in the Lufang mines and are alleged to be coveting those of Chiaoshan.[19] Chinese attempts in 1922-23 to work the Panhung deposits were obstructed by British pressure at Peking.[20]

The second topographical problem is that of the "Kong-Ming-Shan" of the British text of the 1897 Agreement. The Chinese text says "Kungming Shan." Neither text mentions a "K'ung-ming-Shan." (The *kung* and *k'ung* are quite differently written in Chinese.) Since the British rendering in the 1897 Agreement gives no clue to the difference between *kung* and *k'ung*, which a "standard" transliteration would have established, the "Kungming Shan" of the Chinese text is presumably more authoritative. This is important, because there may be two ranges in the territory, a Kungming Shan and a K'ungming Shan. According to Hua Ch'i-yun's rough map, the red line claimed by the British is at fault because it follows the K'ungming Shan, not the Kungming Shan. On the other hand, the treaty which uses the expression "Kong-Ming-Shan" also specifies that the boundary strikes the mountains "about 99° 40' east of Greenwich . . . and latitude 23°." This is approximately where Hua indicates that the red line meets the K'ungming Shan, which therefore in this respect corresponds with the "Kong-Ming-Shan" of the British text and "Kungming Shan" of the Chinese text.

Moreover, according to Hua, the range now commonly known as Kungming Shan stands at about longitude 99° 15', not 99° 30'. If it were to be taken as the frontier the red line would have to be

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[18] Siguret, *op cit*, pp 207-208, also Scott, *op cit*, p 54

[19] Siguret, *op cit*, pp 206-209

[20] *Ibid.*, p 208.

moved back, ceding to the Chinese about 25 minutes of longitude. As none of the maps offered by the British mention any K'ungming Shan, the British case, apparently, must rest either on the claim that the correct longitude is 99° 40', not 99° 15', or on the claim that Kungming Shan and K'ungming Shan are merely different parts of the same range, or different names for the same range. A difference of this kind might originate in the use, by the Chinese, of more than one adaptation of a native tribal name. In view of the prolonged dispute over so small a territory it may be mentioned that there have long been rumors of "sacred" Wa gold mines in this area.[21]

To sum up: the key points in dispute are the disposition of Panhung and the location of the Kungming Shan. In practice, the uncertainty of the frontier to a certain extent deterred both parties, until recently, from opening up the territory. In 1934, however, the whole question became more acute, as the result of new Chinese advances toward the southwest, combined with signs of new British activity in the "backward tracts" of Burma.

IN THE closing years of the Manchu dynasty there was a Chinese "forward policy" on this frontier, partly accounted for by the fact that as the Chinese gave way to foreign pressure and penetration from the coast, they tended to look for new compensating activities in the far hinterland. Disunity and civil war, however, made this kind of expansion only sporadic until extreme Japanese pressure accelerated Chinese unification, while the loss of Manchuria led to a search for compensating Chinese fields of expansion elsewhere. On the Yunnan frontier, Mr. Ch'en Yü-k'o became a prominent leader. In 1931 he was chief of the Bureau of Propaganda of the Yunnan Kuomintang Executive Committee. With him were associated Mr. Jao Chi-ch'ang and Mr. Chang Chia-pin. The latter, on October 29, 1931 published an article on the "British danger" and advocated a program for attracting the allegiance of the Wa tribes. In 1932 Mr. Ch'en, as director of the Bureau of Public Education, collated a detailed *Study of the Yünnan Frontier Question*, the first volume being issued in 1933, under the patronage of the

[21] Mitton, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-230, 235, 244-46.

present Governor of Yünnan. It warned against the British "threat" and called for an active advance to regain the "rightful" frontiers of China.[22]

In the face of this growing Chinese movement Sir. H. L. Stephenson, Governor of Burma, announced on January 8, 1934, that the Triangle had been taken under regular British administration.[23] The Triangle, lying between Tibet, Assam, Burma and Yünnan, is like the Wa States an undemarcated sector of the Burma-Yünnan frontier to which the Chinese have not relinquished claim. The Chinese appropriately call it Chianghsinp'o, the Hills Between the Rivers. It is enclosed by the rivers Mailich'ia (Mali Hka) and Enmaich'ia (Nmai Hka), but is perhaps better known to the natives as Lima (Rima).[24] There is good authority for the view that after 1909 it was ceded to China by the British;[25] but in 1911 the Abor Expedition was dispatched to the area, which subsequently came under British control. Although the Chinese have never relinquished their claim, it has since been under the surveillance of the Governor of Burma as a "backward tract,"[26] though not brought under regular administration until 1934.

The British "forward policy" which this appeared to indicate was confirmed, in Chinese eyes, by the increased British interest in the tribal instability of the Wa States. Quarrels between the tribes were undoubtedly made more serious by the unsettled question of British or Chinese overlordship and the undefined status of tribal autonomy. One of the *sawbwas* permitted British entry into his territory. This was taken by other tribal chiefs as a betrayal of Wa autonomy, and led to a threat of inter-tribal war. An official Burma statement declared that "these bickerings will continue till the administration of the Wa States is taken in hand."[27]

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[22] Siguret, *op cit.*

[23] *Report on Burma*, 1933-34, Rangoon, 1935, p iv

[24] Hua, *op cit.*, pp 15-19, also Lin Ch'ao, "*Tien Mien Pei-tuan wei-ting-chieh pien-ching-chih ti-li chi cheng-chih wen-t'i*," or "Geographical and Political Problems of the Undelimited Northern Section of the Yünnan-Burma Frontier," in *Ti-li-hsüeh Chi-k'an (Quarterly Journal of Geography)*, I, No 2, 1-23, Canton, June, 1933; also Siguret, *op. cit.*, pp 94-97

[25] Perceval Landon, "Tibet, China, and India," *Fortnightly Review*, new series, DL, 657-687, London, 1912, also Lin Ch'ao, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3, 14-15.

[26] *Report on Burma*, 1931-32, p. 21.

[27] *Report on Burma*, 1933-34, pp. ii, 7.

Under these conditions the Burma government, in 1934, cooperating with the Burma Corporation, Ltd., dispatched a survey party and a force of Burma Police to investigate mineral resources. The party had instructions not to enter the disputed part of the Wa territory, and according to official reports did not do so.[28] The assurance, in view of the conflicting claims already discussed, is open to question. The official report states that the party entered "the area known generally as Panglong, lying in the Wa States west of . . . the westernmost limit of Chinese territorial claim."[29] This apparently refers to Panlung, where the inhabitants had already indicated that they preferred the mines to be opened up by the Chinese.[30] Moreover, in view of the recent British annexation of the Triangle, any move by a British armed force in any part of the area was bound to alarm both Chinese and Wa tribesmen.

The result, as might have been expected, was an armed clash. British accounts assert that "Chinese forces, supported by bandits and tribesmen, entered the disputed zone and even crossed the further limit claimed by the Chinese." There were a "few skirmishes" and British troops were called out, some of them remaining in the field "throughout the whole of the monsoon." There were "many casualties," which turned out not to be on the British side, and several Chinese were reported wounded.[31] A Reuter dispatch from Simla on June 27, 1934 attributed the incident to penetration of "undisputed British territory" by a local chief, and added that the rains had stopped further fighting.[32] On November 26 Sir John Simon, then Foreign Secretary, declared that the Chinese forces were understood to have withdrawn.[33] An exchange of notes followed between Sir Alexander Cadogan, then British Minister to China, and Mr. Wang Ching-wei, then Foreign Minister and concurrently President of the Executive Yuan, on April 9, 1935.[34]

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[28] *Ibid.*, also 287 *House of Commons Debates*, 5s, p. 1996, and 292 *H. C. Deb.*, 5s, p. 4.

[29] *Report on Burma*, 1933-34, p. iii.

[30] See p. 73, above.

[31] *Report on Burma*, 1933-34, pp. iii, 8, 292 *H. C. Deb.* 5s, p. 4, 295 *H. C. Deb.* 5s, p. 481.

[32] *North-China Herald*, Shanghai, July 4, 1934.

[33] 295 *H. C. Deb.* 5s, p. 481.

[34] *Cd.* 4884 *Treaty Series No. 15 (1935) Exchange of Notes, April 9, 1935.*

These established "Terms of Reference" for demarcating the boundary in the Wa area, through a joint commission with two members appointed by each side and a neutral chairman appointed by the President of the Council of the League of Nations. The commission was to "ascertain and determine on the ground and fix on the map the line prescribed in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 3 of the Agreement of 1897 so far as they relate to the undemarcated portion of the frontier," and to report to both Governments where it believed local adjustments would be called for, on the basis of mutual concession. The report was to allow for negotiation of a new agreement "in the light of such topographical, historical or political factors as may appear relevant." If necessary, there was to be a conference at Nanking, with representatives of both Governments and also of Burma and Yunnan. In the meantime, both Governments would reserve their claims, whatever the findings of the report.

On June 8, accordingly, Colonel Frédéric Iselin (Swiss) was appointed neutral chairman.[35] He was well qualified by having served recently in investigating the frontier between Iraq and Syria.[36] On July 12 the full commission was announced.[37] The British members were Mr. J. Clague, Commissioner of the Federated Shan States, and Mr. F. S. Grose, Deputy Commissioner of the Burma Frontier Service. On the Chinese side were Mr. Liang Yu-kao, Counsellor to the Ministry of Railways, and Mr. Yin Ming-te, Advisor to the Treaty Commission of the Foreign Office.[38]

Field work began on December 1, 1935. Starting from an agreed boundary mark on the Nanting River, over four months were spent in examining about half of the undemarcated territory. In over 67 conferences local chiefs and other witnesses were heard and cross-examined, and documentary and other evidence appraised. Innumerable excursions were made. The topographical difficulties

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[35] *Essential Facts About the League of Nations*, 6th ed, rev, Geneva, 1936, p 144.

[36] *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations*, XV, No 6, 147, Geneva, June, 1935

[37] *North-China Herald*, July 17, 1935, also 307 H C. Deb 5s, p 1770.

[38] Mr. W Stark Toller, British Consul at Tengyüeh, was advisor to the British commissioners; Mr W A. Prestre (Swiss), accompanied Col Iselin. Mr. Yin was later replaced as Chinese commissioner. *North-China Herald*, June 3 and September 30, 1936.

were great, as almost inaccessible regions had to be explored. The Chinese commissioners were accompanied by about 500 men, including experts and soldiers. The British were accompanied by about the same number.[39] The commission was later joined by an expedition sent to Yunnan by the Academia Sinica for geological, anthropological and ethnological research, which thoroughly investigated the principal mineral areas. There were glowing reports of the riches discovered.[40] Progress was delayed several times by the tribesmen, but work was not suspended until April 8, 1936, at the approach of the rainy season.[41]

Field operations were resumed on January 2, 1937, and on April 2 the survey of the undemarcated area was completed, reports being ready on April 23.[42] Difficulties with the natives were more serious than in the previous year. Between January 20 and 24 particularly extensive operations against thousands of tribesmen were necessary. Despite this, 50 or more meetings were held.[43] By April 30 reports had been signed and submitted, together with a map.[44] In a press interview on June 29, Mr. Liang of the Chinese commission was quoted as praising the friendly spirit of the investigation, and as stating that the reports would "doubtless be published by both Governments in due course.[45] Less than two weeks later came the beginning of Japan's war on China; since then there has been no public mention of these frontier difficulties or the work of the commission.

Publication of the reports is not mandatory under the Terms of Reference, and accordingly there is no way of knowing whether the commission succeeded in identifying the "Kong-Ming-Shan" satisfactorily, or whether it recommended allocation of Panhung to China or Burma. The whole question of the Wa States, however, cannot remain permanently in abeyance. It is not likely that the mines of Lufang and Chiaoshan will remain disregarded simply

[39] *North China Herald*, June 3, 1936.
[40] *Ibid*., November 18, 1936
[41] *Ibid*., June 3, 1936.
[42] *Ibid*., July 7, 1937; *Times* London, April 2, 1937
[43] *North China Herald*, February 10 and July 7, 1937
[44] *Times*, London, April 30, 1937.
[45] *North-China Herald*, July 7, 1937.

for lack of an agreed frontier; and working of the mines is bound to affect, in practice, the relative but vague autonomy of the local tribes. The new Burma-Yünnan route from Lashio to K'unming (Yünnanfu), [48] passing about 80 miles to the north, will also create a wartime trade prosperity affecting the tribal peoples. Most important of all, the urgent need for developing the whole Tibeto-Burman hinterland of Southwest China, in order to keep up the fight against conquest by Japan, has brought these distant marches much closer to the modern "China Proper" than ever before.

Berkeley, October 1938

[48] A Chinese dispatch in the *Chinese Times*, San Francisco, July 7, 1938, takes it for granted that this route will be used for war material reaching Myitkyina by rail from Rangoon However, I hear on good private authority that the new road ends at Lashio. See *Times*, London, Mav 17, 18 and 19, 1938, also F B Leach, "Burma and China Commerce," in *North-China Herald*, July 21, 1937; *New York Times*, January 21 and May 2, 1938

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

ARMAMENT IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS:

SIR:

The article on "The Arming of Australia and New Zealand" by Donald Cowie, which you published in your September issue, needs a supplement since the Peace of Munich. Australia and New Zealand, the most remote and unprotected of the British Dominions, now feel more defenseless than ever. They must rely more and more on themselves. In some future European crisis Britain might be unable to aid them on a large scale. Even if aid were attempted, the increasing danger of the route through the Mediterranean and Red Sea might bring a British fleet to an end as disastrous as that of Admiral Rojdestvenski's squadron in the Russo-Japanese War. Britain's naval strength beyond Singapore is now negligible compared with that of Japan. Indeed there is as yet no indication that a powerful British battle squadron will be permanently based on Singapore for possible action in the Pacific.

Orthodox maritime strategy is still based on the theory of the "big ship." Without a single British battleship operating beyond Singapore it cannot be claimed that Britain commands even the fringe of the Pacific. Japan has nine or ten battleships in these waters and could, therefore, secure naval command at any moment. Britain has 15 modern or modernized battleships, five more being built and two projected, a total of 22 for the next four or five years. Only then will it be seen whether Britain will feel strong enough in the West to detach a battle squadron for permanent service in the East, based on Singapore and strong enough to prevent an attack on Australia and New Zealand. This is rather too distant and indefinite a future to reassure Australia and New Zealand, which are pressingly concerned with 1939 and 1940—the "dangerous interval" as it has been termed.

The British Navy List of August 1938 shows the following total British strength in Eastern waters. The Fifth Cruiser Squadron in China Waters (four 8-inch gun cruisers); the Eighth Destroyer Flotilla (8 vessels), the Fourth Submarine Flotilla (14 vessels). In addition there is the Australian Cruiser Squadron of three ships, plus two New Zealand cruisers. The total combined strength is quite inadequate for serious resistance to the Japanese Navy. All of the cruisers would be

obliged to seek safety in flight and the destroyer and submarine flotillas would be overwhelmed. For the present and immediate future Japan commands the Eastern seas. Attack on Australia and New Zealand could either take the form of military invasion on a large scale, or the more restricted form of an attack on trade routes and shipping, blockade, and the bombing and bombardment of ports.

Invasion in force may, I think, be discounted. It would necessitate a gigantic armada of transports, troop ships and "train." The line of communications would be long, the effort great and protracted, almost the entire Japanese merchant fleet would have to be employed, the strain on Japanese resources and national fabric would be intolerable, and there would be no guarantee of ultimate success The other form of hostile action would be more favorable for Japan, which already holds the command of the sea in these regions. A portion of its great fleet would be enough to isolate Australia, particularly if one or more battleships form the spearhead of the attack, supported by cruiser, destroyer and submarine screens. For the oil fuel supply that would be vital it is reliably stated that Japan has built a number of 18 knot tankers. In addition there would be the probable capture of oil tankers on their way to Australia.

The Japanese would first have to clear the seas of British cruisers, whose commanders could not hope to oppose the Japanese battleships successfully and would therefore be obliged to evade action. Japan could thus cut the Australian trade routes at will, tie up all shipping and blockade the "nodal points" where overseas and coastal shipping converge The complete stoppage of oil imports into Australia would be a serious deprivation, and in addition Newcastle, Sydney, Melbourne and other cities would be exposed to bombing and bombardment.

The sea-borne export and import trade of Australia, with an average annual value of $800 million, would be suddenly interrupted. Australia depends on exports of wool, wheat, meat, metals, and other products, on which the whole structure of the Commonwealth is based. Australia could still survive, however. It could not be starved or forced into submission within a few months or even a few years. Except for oil, its economy could be made self-sufficient. In a prolonged blockade the strain on Japan would gradually become more serious than on Australia, because the Japanese vessels, cruisers and supplies would have to be maintained at war level in all weathers on the high seas, at great distances from home bases. Even if Britain or some other Power were not ultimately able to intervene, the result would probably be negative,

with Australia suffering but not subdued, ruined but not destroyed.

Australian spirit and morale might be stiffened and strengthened by the experience, although on the other hand the devastating effects on the national structure, especially if Britain were long prevented from intervening, might be sufficiently depressing to lead to negotiations between Australia and Japan. In that case what demands would Japan make? Although it has never seriously pressed them, Japan has complaints against Australia both in the matter of trade and in the matter of immigration. Trade relations have been both friendly and unfriendly. Japanese bidding at the annual Australian wool sales helps to keep up the price of wool. Japan has always bought more from Australia than Australia from Japan. On the other hand the Australian tariff on Japanese rayon, cotton, and other goods is high. Finally, Australia hopes for an increasing future market in Japan, the "New China," and other eastern areas for its export surplus, the principal Australian export market in Britain having reached the saturation point. Japan might therefore demand a lower tariff and improved markets for Japanese goods in Australia, or even an exclusive market in the Commonwealth. There remains the fundamental question of Japanese immigration and settlement in Australia, which might even involve a demand for the cession of territory. On this fundamental issue there is no indication that Australia is likely to yield. "White Australia" is the foundation of Australian policy. Not unless utterly defeated would Australia agree to a breach in that inviolable law. It is at least conceivable, however, that a naval blockade might so ruin the economic fabric and political structure of Australia that it would be unable to prevent the landing and settlement of large numbers of Japanese, and Asiatic subjects of Japan, particularly in the Northern Territory.

GEOFFREY RAWSON
Commander, Royal Indian Navy (Retired)
Melbourne, October 1938

[Evidently in Australia, as elsewhere, one way of shelving the issue of "what to do about Japan," is to use the scare of "defenselessness," in order to justify armaments that might be used against Japan in some indefinite future. Commander Rawson does not even discuss the point that a navy can make no conquests without an army. Japan could not possibly send an army to Australia while entangled in the present hopeless attempt to conquer China. This is not simply a question of manpower. Even if Japan had the men to spare, it is not industrially equipped to arm and maintain them.

The fact of the matter is that Australia and New Zealand have no need to be frightened by their own "defenselessness." They are in a good position to join in international pressure on Japan, while Japan is in no real position to intimidate them.

We invite further correspondence representative of Australian and New Zealand opinion on this matter. EDITOR.]

PRO AND ANTI

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS:

SIR:

I have read with interest and some astonishment the criticism of Mr. McWilliams as to the way in which PACIFIC AFFAIRS presents the respective claims of China and Japan Looking back through my files of PACIFIC AFFAIRS I can see no grounds for your correspondent's complaint that there has been undue bias shown against Japan On the contrary, now that Japanese acts and official statements have proclaimed both the methods and the aims of those in control of Japanese policy, it is possible to see how consistently these have been foreshadowed in PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

HARRISON BROWN
Hornby Island, British Columbia, January 1939

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS:

SIR:

I notice that you have been suffering from the "pro" and "anti" neurosis, and that you are required by a correspondent to be impartial, to give a fair presentation of both sides of a subject, and so on. Alas! there are many people who conceive of Justice as a lady with a nicely balanced pair of scales which must at all costs be kept even, so that we never come to any decision at all except that "there is a good deal to be said on both sides." And when an author starts out by declaring that he is neither "pro" nor "anti," but judges each case entirely on its merits, I regard him with the gravest suspicion, and generally find that he is hopelessly and even venally biased. His object is generally to make us come down heavily on the side he favors and at the same time to think that the scales are as even as ever. There is always a temptation to take the side of a successful aggressor, and it is very easy to remember that his victim was far from faultless. My own experience, which is by no means short, is that this balancing business, which

passes for impartiality, is either futile or mischievous, and that in international affairs it is no use balancing faults against faults, virtues against virtues, without any means of knowing the real weight of either It is essential to judge of acts by the principles involved in those acts. "Impartiality" as practiced by the scribes and the Pharisees is the unforgivable sin.

A MORGAN YOUNG
Former Editor, *Japan Chronicle*
Oxford, December 1938

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS·

SIR·

Referring to the December number of PACIFIC AFFAIRS I think it is a great mistake, in some of the articles, to state as facts adverse to England matters which at present are at most only opinions For instance, on page 432 "Bearing in mind the British willingness to yield to aggression, all over the world." On page 449 'As for Britain's prestige . . this has been completely shattered by the conscious and apparently planned sacrifice of Czechoslovakia" Page 452 "The official British interpretation of Chamberlain's activities," etc

A very great strength for the Democratic countries could come from cooperation and increased friendship between the United States and Great Britain Certainly this number of PACIFIC AFFAIRS is the reverse of helpful in this most desirable direction, and I believe, particularly at present, better discrimination should be exercised in the choice of articles printed The wish for greater cooperation and friendship between the United States and Great Britain is not entirely selfish on the part of the British Empire, which when fully organized need not fear a combination of any two possible opponents, because it has been noticed that Japan's reply to President Roosevelt's note was not fully satisfactory, and whether the United States will yield to aggression in this case remains to be seen

Certainly as a subscriber to your magazine I do not like to see it in any way used to encourage anti-British propaganda.

GEOFFREY STEAD
Saint John, New Brunswick
December 1938

WANG AN-SHIH, A CHINESE STATESMAN AND EDUCATIONALIST OF THE SUNG DYNASTY. *By H. R. Williamson. Vol. II. London Arthur Probsthain.* 1937. *pp.* 424.

DR. WILLIAMSON has worthily completed his important study of the great Sung reformer's life, work, and achievement Like the first volume,[1] the second is poorly arranged but, like the first volume, it contains excellently documented material, most of which has been translated from the Chinese for the first time. Chapters 1 to 15 deal with Wang An-shih's reform policy, its later development, its historical background, and the criticism which it encountered Similar attempts under other dynasties are noted Two chapters, 6 and 15, furnish additional data about Wang's character and family. The second half of the book is devoted to Wang's literary activities, chapters 16 and 17 give a general survey of his poetry, prose, and classical exposition, while the very rich last chapter consists of the translation of a collection of Wang's essays disclosing different sides of this powerful man's manifold interests and talents. Several chronological lists and biographical tables concerning Wang's epoch and his life and policy constitute a very handy and useful appendix.

The data of Dr Williamson's study, his translation of Chinese sources and the discussions evaluating them, are scattered like the notes of a scholarly diary This form, very dear to the heart of old-fashioned Chinese literati, unfortunately does not suit the demands of modern social science, which requires a systematic approach In China itself the younger generation of scholars eagerly responds to this modern request. The problem which we are faced with is not primarily a formal one Systematization does not only mean a more coherent arrangement of the different parts of a study, but a different kind of approach toward the study itself. In chapter 6 there is a clear description of the emergency which the Tatar aggression in the North created for the Sung empire. "Wang An-shih's policy aimed at increasing the military and economic resources of the empire, with a view to stemming the northern invasion, while at the same time seeking to relieve the economic distress of the poor." (II, p. 72.) This is the crucial point from which scientific investigation should start. But unfortunately Dr. Williamson's analysis ends where it ought to begin. Why was the country weakened to such a degree that the "barbarian" aggression became a real danger? Has this phenomenon something to do

[1] See PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Vol. X, No. 2, 1937, pp 212ff.

with the other fact which Dr. Williamson mentions, the accumulated distress of the poor and the accumulated wealth of the rich and powerful in Sung society? The understanding of an economic trend which steadily reduced public revenue from peasant landowners who paid their land tax to the Government, while simultaneously increasing the private revenue of landlords who drew rent from their tenants but paid less and less tax to the Government, might have enabled Dr. Williamson to carry his analysis beyond the statement of a factional quarrel between "radicals" and "conservatives" Perhaps the "radical" Wang merely represented the centripetal, centralistic elements within China's contemporary ruling class. Perhaps his fervent interest in the administrative and political bible of China's "oriental" absolutism, the *Chou Kuan* or *Chou Li*, was only the theoretical expression of his practical political interest and position? An analysis of this kind would have meant not only a different arrangement of the material, but a different choice of part of the material as such. If Wang Hsing-jui was able to find many more data about Wang An-shih's policy of constructing irrigation works,[2] if Wang Yu-ch'uan could present a much fuller picture of the Sung reformer's policy of establishing large scale water-works, and also find concrete proof for the working of the vicious cycle which I have just summarized[3]—then obviously the facts become richer and more significant when the method of approach is stronger and more productive.

The same principle holds true in the literary field. Dr Williamson himself discovered the intense interest of Wang An-shih in the *Chou Li*. Of his several new interpretations of the classics, the book on the *Chou Li* "is the sole work of Wang An-shih himself" (II, p. 297, cf also p. 302) Wang's later critic, Wu Ts'ung yao, commenting on this, said: "He had special reasons for giving his time and thought to the production of such a work. The motive behind it was that Wang An-shih . . . in starting out to make his unrighteous proposals for the financial and military rehabilitation of the empire, attributed his ideas to the ancients . . . so he produced this work with the object of forcing all men of all time to accept his particular point of view." (II, p. 302.)

The *Chou Li* probably being the most compact canon of China's "oriental" absolutism, with its emphasis on centralized power and the importance of the public interest in agriculture and finance, Wang

[2] Wang Hsing-jui, "Wang An-shih's Political Reform and His Policy of Water-Benefit." *Shih Huo* Vol II, No. 2, 1935 In Chinese pp 91 ff

[3] Wang Yü-ch'üan, *Wang An-shih's Reform Policy* Nankai Economic Institute 1937 In Chinese pp 98 ff Also "Social Economics and Policy of Northern Sung." *Shih Huo*. III, Nos. 11 and 12. 1936 pp. 577 ff

An-shih's vital interest in just this classic becomes extremely significant. He who tried in vain to halt the vicious cycle of his society's inner antagonisms can perhaps best be understood as a politician, as a historical figure, and as a thinker, by his interpretation of the *Chou Li*. It is therefore most regrettable that Dr. Williamson, who spent so much time in reading and translating other writings of his hero, should give this pivotal production of Wang An-shih's only "a cursory reading." (II, p. 304.) The problem touched upon is by no means purely "historical." As long as China's society still contains basic elements of its old "oriental" agrarian order, the question of the character of its inner antagonisms and cyclical crises is of a thoroughly practical nature. These critical remarks by no means imply that Dr. Williamson's study is incurably weak. They are made simply because it is a rich and strong work which could be made still richer and stronger. A deeper analysis may be possible, and other facts of equal or even higher value may be available; but there is nothing in Dr. Williamson's two volumes that is of no value. No serious student of Sung history (and of Chinese history as a whole) will be able to do without a careful reading of this important contribution. In Dr. Williamson's eyes the Chinese state or empire cannot be conceived apart from the life and sorrows of the people. To him the state in being means something much more than a handful of rulers, empresses, harem-ladies, eunuchs; all of whom, as a matter of fact, play a very insignificant part in his picture. I do not know if sinology considers a scholar like Dr. Williamson as an insider or an outsider. My own opinion is that it is an honor for the real science of China to have in its ranks a man like the author of this work on Wang An-shih.

KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL
New York, September 1938

CHINA'S FIRST UNIFIER. A STUDY OF THE CH'IN DYNASTY AS SEEN IN THE LIFE OF LI SSŬ (280?-208 B.C.) *By Derk Bodde. Sinica leidensia. Edidit Institutum Sinologicum Lugduno-Batavum. Leiden: E. J. Brill.* 1938. *pp.* viii + 270.

THIS well-reasoned, carefully compiled book makes full use of the Chinese source material, handled with judgment and keen critical insight. Nothing in China's long history offers so much of interest and significance as its unification under the king of the feudal state of

Ch'in, who eventually became "First Emperor" of the entire country. The event marked an epoch of surpassing importance in the social and political development of the Far East, and resulted in a system of government destined to endure longer than any other ever devised by man; for it persisted, with little or no change in essentials, during more than 2000 years (221 B.C.-1911 A.D.). The book is not a general history of its period, but specifically a study of the great statesman Li Ssŭ and his part in the founding of the Chinese empire. A brief but informative preface is followed by 12 chapters of text, an appendix, a bibliography, and an index. There are no maps

The opening chapter provides a concise historical sketch of Ch'in, particularly during the two or three centuries after it had entered fully into the Chinese political orbit. This it had been unable to do until it had first consolidated its power by subduing the Jung tribes to the west of it The author might well have said more here of this centuries long preliminary struggle and its significance, for it was this conquest of the Jung that marked the turning point in the history of Ch'in, and so ultimately in that of China as a whole.

The following three chapters discuss Li Ssŭ himself His exceptional intelligence, ability, and determination appear clearly, but we see him also as cold blooded, calculating, ruthless, and utterly unscrupulous He thus inevitably reminds us of Machiavelli or, perhaps even more, of that other great statesman Kautilya, who was so closely associated with the founding of the Maurya empire, scarcely a century before the period of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti.

Li Ssŭ, Dr. Bodde points out, adhered consistently throughout life to the tenets of what is commonly called the "School of Law," which relied entirely on force for the attainment of its political ideals, and advocated a system of authoritarianism whose logical conclusion could only be the compulsory unification of China and the creation of a single autocratic rule This theory was the principal force, he says, that motivated Li Ssŭ during his long and (save for its tragic close) successful career.

The fifth chapter discusses some of the influences that shaped the character of the "First Emperor," and also the nature of the long relationship between him and his great minister. Though the matter is mainly one of personal opinion, or perhaps rather of interpretation, it is in the evaluation of the relative importance of the parts played by these two remarkable men that I find myself unable wholly to see eye to eye with Dr. Bodde. He believes that many of the great deeds usually ascribed to the ruler's own initiative owed their inspiration in reality

to his astute adviser. That such was true is certain—perhaps in many—instances, we cannot doubt. Yet the entire career of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti seems to me to prove him anything but a puppet, under the influence of a stronger personality. He constantly showed himself quite capable of thinking for himself and choosing for his service men of the highest ability. Among them, Li Ssŭ was undoubtedly foremost; but even so, he was only one of several whom the "First Emperor" selected to aid in his task of unification. Ch'in Shih Huang Ti was of course the product of his age, but in shaping and moulding that age according to his own ideas, he showed a genius equalled by few of the men who have left their mark on history We should, moreover, make full allowance for the fact that practically all that we are told about him comes from hostile sources.

The sixth chapter, "The Concept of Empire," tells how there gradually took form in China the idea of a single, centralized, and bureaucratic empire It is impossible not to wonder just why such an ideal of government should have appeared in so many adjacent regions of Asia in the brief space of less than 300 years. For the concept appears first in Persia, toward the close of the sixth century before our era; then, scarcely 200 years later, in India; and, about a century still later, among the Hsiung-nu and the Chinese. There must be some explanation of this striking coincidence; but what that explanation is, neither Dr. Bodde nor anyone else has so far attempted to tell us

In his seventh chapter, "The Abolition of Feudalism," the author shows how the downfall of the older Chinese social and political system was not the result of any sudden catastrophe, but of a gradual process of change which began long before the time of Li Ssŭ. Dr Bodde enumerates some of the contributory causes; among them the introduction of cavalry, with which the archaic chariot forces of the Chinese feudal nobles could not cope. He has not, however, mentioned another cause which in my opinion contributed much toward the disintegration of the ancient system—the slow rise during Eastern Chou times of a money economy which permitted the acquisition of wealth, and therefore of power, in forms other than that ownership of land which formed the very basis of feudalism.

Chapter VIII treats of Li Ssŭ's extending over the whole empire the use of a uniform script. This, Dr. Bodde declares, has been the factor responsible above any other for the extraordinary way in which the essential unity of the Chinese civilization has been able to maintain and even extend itself through all subsequent ages.

The three following chapters treat of various aspects of the career of Li Ssû, and describe his philosophic background and his manner of reasoning, which as Dr. Bodde shows was characteristically and typically Chinese. The final chapter gives us a brief summary of the great statesman's career and its significance. Dr. Bodde makes it quite clear in this connection that without the forcible unification of China under the great Ch'in emperor, the work of the Han and other later Chinese dynasties would have been wholly impossible.

CARL WHITING BISHOP
Washington, D. C., August 1938

CHINA FIGHTS BACK. *By Agnes Smedley. Introduction by Anna Louise Strong. New York: Vanguard Press.* 1938. *pp.* xxii + 282. *Illus.* $2.50.

SOME years ago Lin Yu t'ang recommended Agnes Smedley to his fellow Chinese writers as a real reporter, praising her willingness to undergo hardship in search of information. Once again Agnes Smedley has shown her passion for first hand information. Some may even feel that she was foolhardy in risking her life to get the material in these edited letters, sent from the mobile headquarters of various units of the Eighth Route Army, "her" army. Not only did she march with an army whose conquests of physical obstacles are almost legendary, and which was subject to constant attack from Japanese forces; but she herself suffered continuously from a painful back injury.

The motivating influence in Miss Smedley's life is a crusade against injustice. It is in many ways comparable to a missionary complex, her desire to help bring about a more just civilization. Her feeling toward the Chinese among whom she has been living is well stated in her own words:

> I did not want to die. Nor do I now. But since one must die, I am at peace here, and here I would rather die, if need be, than in any other place on the earth. I hope this will not be, and I do not like the thought. There is much to be done, and I wish to live long and see a free China and a new human society free from exploitation.

Miss Smedley's earlier writing seemed to me at times to employ rather extravagant language. Not that her facts were ever falsified, on the contrary they were essentially accurate; but she often colored, in order to make them stand out, facts which stated simply would have been vivid

enough. She has also been accused of partiality. To this she answers, "Of course I am not impartial and make no such pretense. Yet I do not lie, do not distort, do not misrepresent. I merely tell what I see with my own eyes and experience day by day. This is the truth." The sincerity and simplicity of these letters is self-evident.

About the activities of the Eighth Route Army, the former "Communist" Army, Agnes Smedley has much of interest to contribute. The reception of this army by the people, as she describes it in several passages, is in contrast to the general reception of Chinese Armies. "News spreads like wildfire amongst the people that the Eighth Route Army has come. And the people picked up their bundles, or loaded their donkeys and returned to their homes. Tonight a delegation of townspeople went to our military headquarters and thanked them for coming." Can this be China?

The phenomenal rapidity of this Army has been confirmed again and again. Miss Smedley tells of a unit rushing to the front.

> When I say 'rush,' I mean 'rush.' They marched in units of about a thousand men. They came swiftly as if it were early morning and they had just arisen from bed. Yet they had marched most of the night. . . . One wave of a thousand would pass, as we halted to give them the right of way, then we would go on for a few minutes and stand aside for another column. . . . When they came down the hills they broke into a run. The rest of the time they marched with remarkable swiftness.

She tells of how one unit marched so rapidly that they crossed before the advancing Japanese and took up positions on their opposite flank.

The volume lacks organization, and there is much repetition; but the difficulties under which it was compiled call for appreciation that the material was printed at all. Though written in haste, the letters are full of interesting and vital information. It is to be hoped that more will be forthcoming, telling more of "her" army, of China, and of the Chinese people, in whose service Agnes Smedley is working.

NORMAN D. HANWELL.
New York, September 1938

SOUTH SEAS CHINESE AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN FUKIEN AND KWANGTUNG. *By Ta Chen Changsha: The Commercial Press.* 1938. *pp.* 305. *(In Chinese.)* $1.80.

OF THE nearly seven million Chinese outside of China, no less than four million are in the South Seas, which is a popular Chinese

term covering British Malaya, Netherlands India, the Philippines, Siam and Indochina. More than 90 per cent of the Chinese in the South Seas come from the two southernmost provinces of Fukien and Kuangtung. In Fukien the center of emigration consists of six districts near Amoy, and in Kuangtung it comprises four districts north and west of Swatow. Professor Ta Chen of the Sociological Department of Tsing Hua University, at the request of the China Institute of Pacific Relations, traveled with his assistants in these 10 districts in 1934 in order to make sociological and economic observations. Later, three places were designated for specific investigation: one was immediately northeast and another not far northwest of Amoy, and the third was northeast of Swatow. At each place four to seven investigators spent four to ten weeks collecting general data from a total of 1,348 families who were either returned from or had some of their members still in the South Seas. In addition there was a family budget investigation from October 1934 to February 1936 among 100 families in the third place mentioned above, and also among another 100 families in a vicinity from which there has been very little emigration. The statistical results of field investigations, profusely seasoned with travel notes as well as records embodied in the Chinese local chronicles, constitute the present report, the English edition of which, edited by Mr. Bruno Lasker, will be published in 1939, under the auspices of the China I. P. R.

The first 60 pages deal with the traditional mode of life and recent tendencies of change in districts closely connected with the South Seas. Thanks to that all-inclusive and wonderful sociological term—the mode of living—the author has given a well-nigh encyclopedic exposition of the geographical, sociological, religious and psychological settings, including the average weight and height of the people in Fukien and Kuangtung, both male and female. Modernization in China and emigration to the South Seas are considered as the chief factors in the change of the mode. It should be noticed, however, that of the 905 emigrant families investigated, 70 per cent were motivated by economic pressure, either individual or of the family, and only 20 per cent were attracted by their relatives or friends already abroad. Again, no less than 20 per cent of all the emigrants have had to become shopkeepers of no particular skill.

Effect of emigration is a theme to which the rest of this report is devoted. There are chapters describing the vocations and remittances of the emigrants, and living conditions, education, hygiene, and religion, as well as attitudes toward marriage, family and business in

what may be called emigration districts. But just how emigration has affected the community in general has yet to be made clear and definite. One reads that the overseas Chinese have invested nearly 10 million Chinese dollars in real estate at Amoy, 70 per cent of this having come from four individuals; and that the marriage fees and wedding expenditures have been almost trebled in these districts. One still wishes to know more concretely whether or not the emigrants and the returned emigrants have raised the standard of living of the entire district. The investigation directed by Professor Ta Chen has nevertheless ascertained the higher standard of living of the emigrant or returned emigrant family as compared with the family which is in no way connected with emigration In 1934-36 the average monthly expenditure of the former was 65 Chinese dollars, whereas that of the latter was only a little over 20 dollars. While house rent of the former constituted 16 per cent of the total expenditure, that of the latter was only 8 per cent. Taking the item of miscellaneous expenses alone, the emigrant family spent 14 per cent for education and hygiene, as compared with 8 per cent in the case of the non emigrant family There can be no doubt that in the centers of emigration, either because of overseas remittances or because of returned emigrants, or both, the cost of living of the locality has gone up considerably. Whether the total production and income of the entire community can cope with this rise of living costs is open to question.

CHEN HAN-SENG
New York, December 1938

HATTEN NIPPON NO MOKUHYŌ AJIA TAISEI E NO MICHI. (THE GOAL OF JAPANESE EXPANSION THE ROAD TO ASIATIC ORGANIZATION.) *By Tatsuo Kawai. Tokyo Chuo Koron-sha.* 1938. *pp.* 156 ¥1 00

ONE thing is now certain: There are not two Japanese "cases," one for foreign and one for domestic consumption. Mr. Kawai, Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, addresses himself in this book solely to the Japanese people. He treats the conflict in China in truly Japanese terms, uncolored by any effort to lay a case before foreign readers. It is all the more interesting to find that his arguments are almost identical with those usually offered to the outside world in justification of Japan's Far Eastern policy. There can be no charge of duplicity against Mr. Kawai in presenting one explanation to

the Japanese public while another explanation is used for outside consumption.

There are two principal problems which Mr. Kawai undertakes to analyze: the cultural, spiritual, economic and political reasons for Japan's expansion, and the significance of Japan's national movement for China, the Far East and the whole world. He is convinced that Japan's remarkable cultural and racial continuity are as important as the growth of population and political and economic power in explaining Japan's momentum, although he fails to define exactly the "goal" of Japanese expansion. The situation in which Japan finds itself is too fluctuating. Nevertheless, Mr Kawai does present some evidence that is tangible and significant At the close of what is still called the "Manchurian Incident," Japan reached an important, though perhaps temporary stage in its expansion It attained what Mr. Kawai calls *zahyō-jiku*, using the Japanese mathematical term for "axes of coordination." One axis is the *keizai kisen*, the economic base line which extends from the northern extremity of the Chishima archipelago, just south of Kamchatka, to Kwashoto, a tiny island just to the south of Taiwan or Formosa This axis passes through the city of Osaka The other axis is the *kokubō kisen* or national defense base line, extending from Manchuli, on the Manchukuo-Soviet frontier to Jaluit in the Japanese Mandated Islands. This axis crosses the economic axis at right angles at the city of Osaka, making it the vital center of the Japanese Empire.

Through these "axes of coordination" Japan is in a position to control the destiny of the northeastern corner of Asia. Japan's policy of the past six years has accordingly been directed toward the realization of this possibility. As Mr. Kawai puts it, the unity of China, Manchukuo and Japan must be the permanent basis of economic and political stability in the Far East.

In discussing the forces behind Japan's expansion and those which he feels will enable Japan to achieve Far Eastern stability, Mr. Kawai stresses the influence of *musubi* This philosophical term is little known and less understood. It is an archaic word, shrouded in the mists of Shinto doctrine It cannot be found in most modern dictionaries and even the standard Japanese encyclopedia (*Kokumin Hyakka Dai Jiten*) contains only a brief and wholly inadequate account. Basically, *musubi* means the power which generates life and promotes growth, which harmonzies and unites conflicting forces. The word is incomprehensible to all but well educated Japanese. Most people confuse it with a cognate word of the same pronunciation, but with the limited meaning

of tying, binding, or uniting. Nevertheless, for many educated Japanese *musubi* is a philosophical and almost a religious concept which has exercised considerable influence, especially on the political and spiritual aspects of modern Shinto. It is through the operation of this force that they distinguish Japanese imperialism from that of the West, and Mr. Kawai believes that through its influence there will eventually be formed on the Asiatic mainland a spiritual as well as a political and economic bloc, each component part of which will function as a vital unit of a new organism, which will be something different from an ordinary empire of conquests built up out of the territorial appendages attached to Japan.

Many Westerners will probably regard this argument as mystic nonsense, camouflaging bare military aggression and territorial aggrandisement; but before passing such a judgment it should be realized that there is a vast domain of Japanese conduct which Japanese interpret or rationalize in philosophical terms often incomprehensible to anyone else. This Japanese characteristic of dealing with mundane experience in abstract terms has proved a serious handcap in relations with Western countries, in social and cultural matters as well as in economic and political affairs It is not a question, however, of asking Japan to discard this attitude in order to meet the West entirely on its own ground, because what the Japanese feel to be a crisis in their own civilization today is also partly the result of the same attitude. The West would be on firmer ground in asserting its own convictions if it would recognize the peculiarities of the Japanese outlook, without necessarily accepting Japanese convictions.

Even for the Japanese reader many parts of Mr. Kawai's book must be abstruse. The style is far from easy and the text is frequently burdened with classical quotations, philosophical allusions and mathematical analogies. Yet the book is a best seller among the Japanese intelligentsia. It may well be regarded as a first attempt to present a comprehensive interpretation of Japan's expansion and the present war. If Westerners regard it as merely a rationalization of stark imperialism, it nevertheless reflects an important attitude in the contemporary Japanese mind.

CHARLES NELSON SPINKS
Tokyo University of Commerce, November 1938

Canada Today. By F R. Scott. London, Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press. 1938. pp. 12 + 163.

The author, Professor of Civil Law at McGill University, wrote this book for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, as the principal Canadian paper for the second British Commonwealth Relations Conference, at Sydney, during September 1938. His main purpose was to provide a "photograph of social facts, rather than to answer the questions raised." The author has a rare ability to describe and interpret facts At the same time, by a patient analysis of alternatives, he suggests reasonable solutions of problems. Professor Scott, a member of the National Council of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, makes no secret of his political philosophy in his general approach to Canada's domestic and external problems He subscribes to "the idea that the first duty of the state is to see that the economy provides a basic standard of decent living for every citizen. " But his political values in no way prevent his giving a lucid and objective account of "the most important economic, political and social factors which determine Canada's national interests and outlook . . . and the relation between internal forces and external policy"

In the first three chapters on geographical, population and economic factors, there is a fund of very carefully selected data, clearly arranged and ably interpreted Professor Scott makes a special point of exploding the "great open spaces" myth of unlimited immigration opportunities in a rural Canada now faced with a million unemployed and a growing urban drift He has some very revealing data showing the rapid development of monopoly corporations and its effect on domestic politics, the maldistribution of wealth and the surprisingly low standard of living of the prairie farmers. In the admirably clear chapter on constitutional problems he shows how recent decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have so narrowed the residuary power of the Dominion parliament over matters effecting "the peace, order and good government of Canada," its right to regulate "trade and commerce" and its treaty-making power, that at present "the Dominion . . . is incompetent to meet concentrated economic power with an equal political authority, or to provide remedies for economic problems which are essentially national in scope" Listing the various attempts, especially under Mr. Bennett's 1935 "new deal," to introduce labor and social welfare legislation, which were thwarted by this doctrine of narrow judicial review, Professor Scott emphasizes the seriousness, for Canada's welfare,

of continuing to allow a British court to be "the arbiter of Canadian constitutional growth."

The last six chapters deal with the whole range of external problems and policy· defense, relations with England and the British Commonwealth, the United States and other countries, and foreign policy objectives both, actual and possible. Professor Scott proves fairly conclusively that the only real threat to Canada's security would come from a victory of the fascist bloc of Powers over the democracies, or from toleration of the growing German-Italian-Japanese expansion. "Russia and France are part of Canada's defense at the present moment quite as much as Great Britain (whose recent policy, indeed, appears to many Canadians to be one of encouragement for Germany's expansion)." Professor Scott goes on to analyze the three possible policies which he finds have behind them considerable though varying popular support: "non intervention in foreign wars," "imperialism or a British front policy," and "collective security." He points to difficulties and dangers in all three, but is especially alive to the dangers of Canadian involvement in *any* war entered upon by *any* British Government, as a result of the state of technical belligerence that would be created by a British declaration of war.

In an excellent short discussion of the complex issues of Dominion neutrality within the Commonwealth he shows, first, that the Government's present policy is dangerously confused in its assumption of the *existence now* of the right to neutrality (without question of how it has been achieved or may be exercised), and, secondly, that the acquisition of the right to neutrality (assuming the temporary absence of an international security system capable of rendering neutrality "obsolete"), is essential for the formation of a coherent and responsible foreign policy Professor Scott makes a revealing analysis of the strength of isolationist sentiment in Canada, and it would have been interesting to have had some estimate of the effect of such acquisition of neutrality rights on this "keep out" sentiment.

One is amazed at the amount of material and the range of analysis packed within this book. Professor Scott has the gift of condensed and lucid statement, coupled with a power of pithy characterization, as instanced in the sentence describing Canadians' feelings towards the British Commonwealth and the United States· "The Commonwealth provides the Sunday religion, North America the week-day habits, of Canadians." I wish only that space could have been made for a fuller account of

political parties in Canada, and for a chapter on historical background and the evolution of significant social trends.

IAN F. G MILNER
New York, December 1938

THE FUTURE OF IMMIGRATION INTO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND *Edited by W. G. K. Duncan and C V. Janes Sydney Angus & Robertson 1937 pp 291 6s*

THIRTEEN papers here present intelligent opinions in Australia on the problem of immigration, dealt with from the point of view of national defense as well as from that of economic development

Although the writers are by no means unanimous, the broad facts are not very difficult to grasp The Australian continent, once looked upon as a land of unlimited resources, is in fact a vast country very difficult to develop as a whole A large part of it has an insufficient rainfall, while the possibility of irrigation is not so large as has usually been imagined Some experts estimate the natural limit of future population at 20 million, others at only 13 million The real difficulty in the way of expansion, however, does not lie in this natural disadvantage, since it is hardly denied that there are still many possibilities left of turning the bushes into farms The real difficulty will come from the falling birth rate and the natural increase of deaths, both in Australia and the mother country While it is doubted whether Great Britain will be able to export manpower on any considerable scale, Australia's population is estimated by Mr Wolstenholme to reach the maximum of a little more than 7,750,000 by 1977, after which the number would slowly decline This calculation assumes that the birth rates and death rates will continue at their present ratio and may, of course, fail as a prophecy, but it points to a possibility of what is widely considered a "national danger" Australia, in spite of being a new country, now faces the same problem of "dwindling families" as the old countries in Europe Another fact, very important in connection with the problem of population, is that Australian agriculture will not be able to absorb a very large number of newcomers Recent technical progress has made it more economical to employ more machinery and less manpower Employment for increased population has, therefore, to be found in the secondary industries This seems to lead to the conclusion that the production of capital goods should be established, if Australia is to allow an expansion of its population.

The problem of Australia is discussed in this volume as a matter inside the British Empire. Political and economic developments in the Far East therefore enter into discussion only in connection with the problems of defense, and not as matters involving trade possibilities

TEIJIRO UYEDA

Tokyo, November 1938

AUSTRALIA ADVANCES *By David M Dow New York and London Funk & Wagnalls Co.* 1938 *pp* 268. $2 00

AUSTRALIA has made experiments of great worth in parliamentary democracy and social legislation in the past, and its experiments in overcoming an economic crisis are of great practical value to the rest of the world Mr Dow, for 13 years an Australian Government official in America, has written a very readable account of social and economic trends in Australia In 1938 Australia celebrated the 150th anniversary of settlement at Sydney. A continent about as large as the United States has been opened up to settlement by a people who today are more than 98 per cent of British stock The first gold rush in the late forties and early fifties brought a spreading flood of Chinese immigrants, which was gradually restricted by the adoption of the White Australia policy This became a cardinal principle of the Commonwealth, under the Federation of 1901

Assisted immigration from Great Britain is a settled policy, subject to waves of enthusiasm, but adds only slowly to a population of less than 7,000,000 The main political problem of population is the empty tropical North In 1907, Mr Dow, then a press correspondent, was granted an interview by President Theodore Roosevelt whose advice was. "Send your ships to the Mediterranean, collect thousands of settlers from the Southern European countries, and pack them into your empty North" After the post-war immigration restriction in America, a small but increasing number of South Europeans went to Australia, particularly to Queensland, but their low standard of living and habit of congregating together roused such resentment that restrictive devices were adopted. Mr Dow asserts that Australia will fill up its empty North, "but the filling process will be strictly selective." This is one of the reasons why there will be no tea-dumping incident in Sydney Harbor. There has never been war in Australia, and Australian defense policy is directed towards keeping it so. "In these circumstances Australians are, in point of fact, unable to accept any policy other than

wholehearted cooperation with Great Britain." The Singapore Naval Base is considered of vital importance.

Within this vast continent, where flight is a natural means of transportation, the Australians are trying to maintain a high uniform standard of living—a true Commonwealth Mr Dow relates the history of the early trade union movement and the development of the Political Labor Party after the fiasco of the 1890 Maritime Strike. This was responsible for "a large part of the important experiments which Australia has made in social legislation"—a legal minimum wage, better working conditions, 8 hour day, the industrial arbitration system He remarks on the apparent paradox that many reform measures have emanated from the nominally conservative party, and explains it by the defection of right wing Laborites into the conservative ranks

However, the depression convinced Australians of their dependence on the world economy. For years they tried to build up manufactures behind high tariff walls, but stability still depends largely on agricultural exports—primarily wool and wheat When the depression struck, these became so much "flotsam and jetsam," while the money markets in England on which Australia was dependent for large annual investments for development closed up Interest on past loans had to be met, and payments made for imports, which were now severely restricted by governmental action Unemployment, which even in 1922 29 was estimated at 10 per cent of the employable population, jumped to 30 per cent

Economic theories as to the best course of action abounded and a deflationary theory won out The Federal Arbitration Court, in January 1931, effected a 10 per cent reduction in *real* wages for at least 12 months, but emphatically declared that wage reduction alone would not materially ameliorate the situation and that all groups should share in the redistribution of the national income Since these groups were beyond the Court's jurisdiction, it could only urge that the legislatures face the necessity Mr Dow suggests that the wage-cut should have accompanied rather than preceded the later measures, but that it gave a perhaps necessary impetus to the adoption of the famous "Premiers' Plan," providing for "constructive deflation," in June 1931. This aimed to spread the loss in national income equitably The most difficult measure was a conversion of the internal debts of the Commonwealth on the basis of a 22½ per cent reduction of interest Following a dramatic appeal to the people, 97 per cent of the entire internal debt was converted voluntarily This general deflationary policy was followed by

measures for "controlled inflation" which, in Mr. Dow's opinion, would have been more effective earlier; but on the whole he believes that the combined use of intelligent deflation and controlled inflation was effective By 1933 Australia was well on the road to recovery.

PERSIA CAMPBELL
New York, June 1938

BACK IN THE STONE AGE THE NATIVES OF CENTRAL AUSTRALIA. *By Charles Chewings, Ph D, F R G. S, A M I M E. Sydney Angus & Robertson, Ltd* 1936. *pp. xviii* + 161. *7s 6d.* $2.50.

THE author spent more than 50 years in Central Australia as a pioneer, contractor, trader and leader of camel caravans He crisscrossed the sand hills, camped at muddy water holes, swam through rivers swollen by heavy rains He lived always with his native "boys," who took care of him and his horses, mules or camels. This account is a recollection of personal experiences. There is a wealth of observations on personal behavior of the blacks, their psychology and institutions Mr Chewings asserts (p 133) that "there appears to be no evidence from any relics hitherto discovered in Central Australia suggesting more ancient cultures than that existing when the whites first went among them"

This does not settle, of course, the question of the history and origin of the Australian natives. They themselves have fantastic myths about their ancestors, who are supposed to have been supermen and creative gods who wandered up and down the earth just as the natives do today When they had done enough they threw themselves on the ground and changed into rocks, trees or other natural objects. It is also these ancestors who produce children. They throw a tiny *tjurunga* (boomerang) into a woman, where it turns into a child Or in another manner such a child germ enters a woman when she passes near the abode of an ancestor, who is supposed to have turned for a while into a kangaroo, an emu, a duck or some natural object Consequently this animal or object becomes the child's "totem."

The comments on changes in native life are especially interesting. During the decades of his stay in Central Australia Mr. Chewings saw the infiltration of the land by the whites, and its effect on the blacks. The feeding of the "boys" who served among the whites improved the diet of the natives and they began to flock to the stations of the whites for food. This tendency increased as hunting grounds became scarce,

when the whites (and even the natives) killed off the kangaroos with their rifles. Moreover, the cattle and sheep brought by the whites scared the game away. As the natives now do not find enough game, they are compelled to look for service with the whites.

They are drifting in (to the mission stations, reports a missionary) because the white man's teaching is shaking their religious beliefs, and undermining their social organization. Their unbounded faith in magic is being shattered by the ridicule that the whites pour into them. The native has arrived at the stage when he willingly parts with his most sacred *tjurunga* and other ceremonial objects to the whites for a little tea or sugar, flour or clothing, and having done so means the end of his old beliefs and of ever reviving them. It would make very sorry reading if the real story of the wandering native should be written. The Stone Age man stands in jeopardy of being swallowed up by twentieth century civilization. It is certain that, even if it were tried, no policing of them to keep them back in their own country would keep them there. The impact with the whites is inevitable sooner or later, and only kindness and protection can postpone for a little the time when their complete extinction will have to be recorded.

That is the problem of the 60,000 natives. They have learnt many useful crafts and some are doing very well with the whites. They are almost indispensable helpers to the white men and fit excellently for handling horses and camels. Nevertheless they are on the way to degenerate into a kind of proletariat. How can they be educated according to their natural gifts, not only as servants but as people able to display their faculties in their own way? They may be taught how to fight contagious diseases, prevented from practicing blood revenge, protected from unscrupulous whites. But the aboriginal is woefully deficient in business acumen and has not the slightest aptitude for spending judiciously, for striking a bargain, for providing the food he knows he will need tomorrow. Here proper official surveillance should be kept up. Perhaps a kind of banking system adapted to the requirements of the natives and connected with the tribe as a whole could be made useful. The various parts of the country and the different tribes would need different treatment. But the greatest obstacle is their desire for a nomadic life. If it takes them "they must go," Mr Chewings observes. This is the tragedy of the Australian race.

R. C. THURNWALD
Berlin, November 1937

RURAL AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. *By Edmund de S Brunner. American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.* 1938 *pp. xiii,* 70. $1.50.

THE American Council claims too much for this little book No one, in 70 small pages, could possibly achieve "a striking analysis" of all the subjects touched on Dr Brunner has made some shrewd comments, but not a "striking analysis" He himself states clearly that during seven weeks in Australia and New Zealand he had "little time for research in the accepted sense" His "report" was not originally written for publication but for the benefit of the United States Department of Agriculture.

The author also admits the lack of specific sources for the data he gives This is the most irritating feature of the text, in which there are too many unsupported and unexplained statements For example, the following statement of one cause of urban growth in Australia "for each family engaged in the city on work which in other countries is decentralized, it is estimated that there are probably two other families supplying goods and services to it" On p 25 again Dr Brunner states correctly enough that the first cause of the failure of closer settlement in Australia is that "areas were assigned which were too small" He adds that "areas were assigned on the basis of a guess as to the total capital value a settler might repay if he earned the statistically reported average income of all farmers" What "statistical average"? Was this a guess too? Dr Brunner also admits the inadequacy of his bibliography He should at least have mentioned some of the outstanding Royal Commission reports and the excellent documentary series edited by Professors Shann and Copland and, since Shann's death, by Copland and Janes The difficulties of marketing primary produce, noted but hardly discussed by Dr. Brunner, are fully treated in *Australian Marketing Problems*

Dr. Brunner rebukes the Australians, as they and to a lesser degree New Zealanders deserve, for lack of organized agricultural, economic and social research Agricultural extension staffs in Australia are pitifully meagre, rural economics sparsely served and sociological study as such hardly exists Dr Brunner could have been much less mild Indeed he hopes too much of the United Australian Party proposal for agricultural extension comparable to that of the United States This is not a vote-winner and is likely to be neglected accordingly.

Dr. Brunner deserves commendation for supporting Australians and

New Zealanders who have dared to be critical of closer settlement history and proposals In the face of present marketing difficulties he makes a timely suggestion that any increase in Australian agricultural production might well come not from new settlement but from increased efficiency of the present farmers. He also shrewdly notes that the financial burden of the misfortunes of Australian closer settlement is being increasingly passed from the settler to the Government, which "bears the penalty for poor guessing in making the original acreage allotment on a demonstrably uneconomic basis" He thinks this might have been avoided by a little fundamental research in soils, economics and social organization. This is doubtful, losses might have been reduced, but not avoided Who, in 1920, foresaw the present plight of wheat producers? "Economic" farm areas are partly a function of estimated incomes, which might have been forecast wrongly in 1920 even by the best of economists Nevertheless Dr Brunner's main point is valid that there could and should have been more thinking and planning in Australian closer settlement His comments on land utilization, erosion and marketing are weaker. There is no mention of the central erosion measures then being debated in New South Wales and now embodied in law The butter marketing scheme is less than adequately described, while cotton is given undue space On p 36 he states that in return for a monopoly on sugar refining, domestic prices are regulated "This arrangement might be suggested to some of our protected industries" (in America) God forbid, if it means regulation so effectively in the monopoly's interest!

I cannot comment at first hand on his New Zealand section. The treatment of marketing is much better, but the recent elections have demonstrated the willingness of the people to allow the Labor Government to continue its experiments

I have been quarrelsome enough with Dr Brunner's statistics and conclusions; but in truth the many criticisms which can be made constitute an indictment of Australian rural scientists for failing to produce a really comprehensive and analytic survey of rural life New Zealand has made an excellent start with *Agricultural Organization in New Zealand*, by Belshaw and others, published in 1936, but this too requires revision because of the new Labor rural legislation. In view of the lack of authoritative sources, Dr. Brunner is to be congratulated on the amount of his correct data and the shrewdness of some of his judgments after only seven weeks of observation.

J. G. Crawford

CONTEMPORARY NEW ZEALAND *A Survey of Domestic and Foreign Policy. Issued under the auspices of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs London Oxford University Press.* 1938 *pp* 276. 10*s* 6*d*.

THIS volume compiled by a group of New Zealanders for the British Commonwealth Relations Conference is an interesting reflection of the somewhat immature stage of the Dominion's development in regard to foreign affairs The great bulk of the book is concerned with economic problems, and among them two in particular, the economic development of the Dominion itself and its external trading relations.

Nevertheless, there are signs throughout of some change in New Zealand's traditional attitude of unquestioning loyalty to the British Empire as represented by the government of the day in the United Kingdom The somewhat skeptical, and indeed ironical, tone of M Beaglehole's introductory chapter in which he discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the Imperial connection is very far from the unvarying "robust imperialism" of former generations In later chapters devoted to Imperial Policy, the League of Nations, Defense, etc., there can be detected a note of anxiety. It is evident that recent British policy in regard not only to the League but to the whole conception of international politics and trade has placed a certain strain on Dominion loyalty. The clearest expression of independent policy has been manifested significantly enough by the Dominion's representatives at Geneva. In fact this is the result of the advent to power of the Labor Government, but it seems also to reflect the beginnings at least of a more conscious national sense of responsibility.

Foreign politics are remote from New Zealand, but economically as well as militarily, any conflict abroad which involved Great Britain would have serious consequences in the Dominion. Relations are correct and friendly with all its great neighbors in the Pacific. With the United States they are marked by increasing cordiality and mutual understanding Directly, therefore, New Zealand has little to fear or prepare against, but indirectly it may become involved in international conflict. Hence its concern over policies that may threaten its peace and security

J. B. CONDLIFFE
London, 1938

the other members of the Commonwealth. Professor Keith states that such a declaration of neutrality would mean automatic secession from the Commonwealth. This would infer that Canada's constant refusal to be necessarily committed to a war involving Great Britain is a warning that any future war may see the final dissolution of the Commonwealth.

Because Professor Keith is mainly legalistic in his approach, the complete picture of the relations between the Dominions and the degree of actual independence attained is not given. But this is not due to any inability on the part of the author, or to failure to recognize the importance of other factors, as seen by his brief discussion of the effects of the Ottawa Agreements, but rather to what seems to be a conscious effort to limit his field of investigation. At times, he breaks through his legal restraint, either to denounce the native policy of the Union of South Africa, or to deride the Conservative Government "surrender" to Italy on the Ethiopian question after winning an election on the platform of upholding League obligations, or to attack the use of poison gas "on a population (Ethiopia) without means of resistance."

IRVING S. FRIEDMAN
New York, October 1938

LE CANADA ET LA DOCTRINE DE MONROE, ÉTUDE HISTORIQUE SUR L'INFLUENCE DE L'IMPÉRIALISME AMÉRICAIN DANS L'ÉVOLUTION DE L'EMPIRE BRITANNIQUE. *By Pierre Sebilleau. Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey. 1937. pp. vii + 219.*

M. SEBILLEAU seems to have had some difficulty making up his mind whether he was writing on his title or his subtitle. There are times, in fact, when he abandons both and lapses into a mere chronology of Canadian-American relations. The result is that the Monroe Doctrine alternates between a complete disappearance and a monopoly of credit for everything that ever happened in either Canada or the United States. A fuller knowledge of the history of the two countries might have made possible a more balanced picture. It might also have saved certain unfortunate slips—such as the classification of Webster as a Southern Democrat, or the rather curious account of Canadian politics in the 1840's. Above all, it might have helped to distinguish the ordinary aspects of diplomatic relations from those into which the Monroe Doctrine really entered. The importance of the Monroe Doctrine for Canada is undeniable, and its influence had an effect on many

aspects of Canadian development. But M. Sebilleau has hardly succeeded in distinguishing these aspects from factors such as geographical position or economic dependence, which would still operate if the Monroe Doctrine had never been uttered.

EDGAR McINNIS
University of Toronto, October 1938

AMERICA'S STAKE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS *By Cleona Lewis. Washington, D. C The Brookings Institution.* 1938. *pp.* xvi + 710 $4 00

THIS book carefully covers America's international financial affairs from the American Revolution to 1937. The first 20 chapters treat historically the investment of foreign money in America—in securities and in agricultural and industrial enterprises—and the investment of American money abroad Chapter 21 deals with changes in America's creditor-debtor position In order to give perspective, chapter 22 discusses historically developments in several other countries. Considerable statistical material is contained in the extensive appendixes

France, Holland and Spain helped finance the American Revolution. After the war, American credit in Europe gradually strengthened and additional borrowing abroad took place By 1835, however, the national debt of the United States, domestic and foreign, was entirely liquidated, including the $11,250,000 of "6 per cent stock" issued for purchasing Louisiana. Although the Government did not owe money abroad, private industry was financed increasingly with foreign funds. Domestic capital was inadequate, and American merchants and manufacturers received credits from England Foreign trade, as well as much domestic trade, was dependent on British credits.

During the nineteenth century the internal development of the United States was greatly assisted by foreign money The Erie canal was financed with New York State bonds, most of which were bought by English investors. Other states also sold bonds readily in Europe, and indulged in a spending orgy during the 1820's and 30's In 1841-42 large scale defaults took place, with some repudiation. Subsequently all but two of the states resumed payments, although some settled at a discount. The discovery of gold in California stimulated trade and led to new foreign borrowing. Railway construction expanded, with the help of German, Dutch and British money, particularly after the Civil War. Some of the railways borrowed directly in foreign markets, others

sold bonds to foreign buyers, principally British, in New York, Boston and Philadelphia

Foreigners *preferred* bonds, but also bought stocks. In recent years common stocks constitute much the largest portion of American securities held abroad The switch from bonds to common stocks is shown in chart form Prior to 1914 foreign investors showed a marked preference for railroad securities, although industrial bonds and shares were becoming increasingly popular Although American railroads were largely built with foreign capital, they were mostly controlled by Americans Other enterprises, however, were in the hands of foreigners Direct investments, where the foreigner was the entrepreneur, were in mining, oil, liquor, cattle, land and insurance. In 1914 about $1,300,000,000 of foreign money was represented by such direct investments, about half controlled by British and one fourth by German investors At the end of 1936 foreign claims against America totaled 6 per cent more than in the middle of 1914 In the interval, wide fluctuations had taken place The inflow of foreign funds was especially large during the first half of 1937

Prior to 1900 export of capital from America was small With the passing of the frontier, industrial development of America and the expansion of foreign trade, American funds began to move abroad Producers tended to establish their own sales organization abroad and to seek new markets Among the earliest of America's foreign investments were those in gold and silver mining in Mexico, Canada and South America Some of these American enterprises date back to the 1820's, but most of them to the latter part of the century After about 1900 American capital invested heavily in oil, particularly in Mexico

The author also discusses broader problems of America's foreign investments, including the future of existing investments abroad and the difficulties of a creditor, the inflow of foreign funds and the extent to which this has taken the form of gold, future investment opportunities, political difficulties and efforts of Latin American countries to regain control of their natural resources The question of foreign investments "is of broader scope than considerations of profits for individual investors It is interrelated with questions of national and international financial stability, with the supply of raw materials—with foreign outlets for the products of American industry—and with questions of international peace and good-will."

John Parke Young
Occidental College, September 1938

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The Editors cannot undertake to return unsolicited manuscripts unless accompanied by stamped addressed envelopes or International Reply Coupons.

POTENTIALITIES OF AMERICAN FAR EASTERN POLICY

ALBERT K. WEINBERG

AT NO time since the turn of the twentieth century, when visions of Oriental lands and trade launched America on the career of a world power, has there been greater evidence than in the present of forces straining to break away from the moorings of American Far Eastern policy. Now the stimulus is not the prospect of national aggrandizement but a realization that the aggression of an Oriental nation menaces seriously existing American interests. Now the question is not whether America should depart from isolation but whether it should go beyond even the relatively vigorous policy developed since its advent to national maturity. In the first year of the Sino-Japanese conflict America pursued a policy midway between isolation and active intervention; in the second year its policy has been at least a little beyond this midway point. But now from the most varied quarters—public organizations, members of Congress, and even, by implication, from the President in his last annual Congressional message—come proposals to the effect that America's policy should progress considerably farther, even if by no means to active intervention. In sum, there are indications that the potentialities of America's Far Eastern policy are much greater than has been commonly assumed.

The times and their practical issues thus emphasize an important problem—that of how far, in terms of specific measures in relation to the Far Eastern conflict, the potentialities of American Far Eastern policy do extend. The problem must be differentiated from the undertaking of prophecy, which the quick play of the casual or the imponderable has never made more venturesome than in the present. The question here raised is rather that of what new methods are potentialities of American Far Eastern policy, in the sense that they are compatible with its fundamental principles and the trends evinced in the development of those principles. Such a

question can only be answered in the light of a historical survey designed to distinguish between basic, enduring American principles of reserve and secondary principles which have been or may be sloughed off in the course of evolution. The answers will not reveal the future but they will at least be pertinent to a theory of long-run probability; for, as the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department has written of the American Government in its choice of methods, "though it may often originate and make trial of new methods, seldom does it depart from well-established principles."[1]

One of the best established of American principles, a major element in that tradition of political reserve designated exaggeratedly as isolation, is the policy known as non-intervention. This policy implies and is the source of the distinct doctrines forbidding alliances and joint action, but it is much broader than these in that its prohibition applies even to single-handed participation in foreign conflicts. Originating in the early years when America was faced with the issue of participation in Revolutionary France's wars, the principle of non-intervention was motivated by the belief that Europe had "a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation" and consequently must be "engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns." While formulated originally with reference to the wars of Europe, the doctrine of non-intervention soon became generalized on the isolationist assumption that foreign wars everywhere were ordinarily none of America's business. Moreover, the doctrine stipulated in addition to non-participation in formal wars two other principles: non-intervention in civil conflicts and, by implication, in all other unformalized hostilities; and observance of the legal duties of neutrality, given in the American code the strictest possible interpretation.

But more extensive restrictions than those of the doctrine of non-intervention have arisen from the realization that participation in foreign conflicts often comes about without any deliberate choice. Accepted widely and frequently even if not officially or always, a group of so-called corollaries aim to safeguard the doctrine of non-

[1] *Amerasia*, March, 1937, p. 20.

میں لاؤ گئیں۔ ایمپر ہندوستان اور پاکستان کے باہمی مذاکرات میں۔ شیخ عبداللہ نے چاہا کہ پنڈت نہرو ۴۸-۱۹۴۷ء
میں پاکستان کو الٹی میٹم دیں اور اس ملک کے خلاف جنگ کا اعلان کر دیں مگر پنڈت نہرو نے ان کے اس خیال کو رد
کر دیا۔ اقوام متحدہ میں، برطانیہ اور امریکہ نے بڑی بے شرمی کے ساتھ کشمیر کے معاملے میں پاکستان کی دلیلوں کی
تائید کی۔ برطانیہ نے جناح صاحب کا یہ نظریہ کہ ہندو اور مسلمان دو الگ الگ قومیں ہیں، مان لیا تھا۔ وہ یہ نہیں مان
سکتے تھے کہ وہ غلطی پر تھے اور ان کی سمجھ میں یہ بات بھی نہیں آ سکتی تھی کہ کشمیر جیسا بڑی مسلم اکثریت والا علاقہ ہندو
انڈیا کے ساتھ اپنے الحاق کو ترجیح دے سکتا ہے۔ ماؤنٹ بیٹن نے تو یہاں تک کیا کہ وہ جولائی ۱۹۴۷ء میں بنفس نفیس
کشمیر گئے تاکہ مہاراجہ کو پاکستان کے ساتھ الحاق پر تیار کر سکیں۔ مگر شیخ عبداللہ نے بار بار اس بات پر اصرار کیا۔
وہ ہندوستان کی طرف ہیں۔ مسئلے کے اقوام متحدہ میں جانے کے پورے ایک سال گزرنے پر جنگ بندی کے بعد
پاکستان نے "آزاد کشمیر" کی حکومت کے قیام کا اعلان کیا اور اس کی راجدھانی اپنے مقبوضہ علاقہ مظفر آباد (یہ
شہر جسے حملہ آوروں نے لوٹا تھا) میں بنائی۔ جنگ بندی نے درحقیقت لڑائی کو ختم کرایا اور لیڈروں کو اس
بات کا موقع دیا کہ ان وعدوں کی طرف توجہ مبذول کر سکیں جن کا انھیں پاس رکھنا ہے۔

ہندوستان کے آئین نے مسئلے کی، جو بین الاقوامیت اختیار کر چکا تھا، خصوصی نوعیت کو تسلیم کرتے ہوئے
کشمیر کو آئین کی دفعہ ۳۷۰ کے ذریعے ایک خصوصی حیثیت عطا کی۔ اب شیخ عبداللہ نے الحاق کے لیے عوامی جواز کے
حصول کا عمل شروع کیا۔ اکتوبر ۱۹۵۰ء میں نیشنل کانفرنس کی جنرل کاؤنسل نے، ایک آئین ساز اسمبلی کے قیام کے
لیے انتخابات کا باقاعدہ مطالبہ کیا۔ ستمبر اکتوبر ۱۹۵۱ء میں انتخابات ہوئے۔ نیشنل کانفرنس نے ہر کامیابی حاصل کر لی۔
وادیٔ کشمیر اور لداخ کی پینتالیس نشستوں میں سے صرف دو پر، پارٹی کے امیدواروں کے خلاف امیدوار کھڑے ہوئے
اس زبردست کامیابی پر اظہار خیال کرتے ہوئے مولانا مسعودی نے کہا کہ یہ کامیابی، پاکستان کے ان دعووں کا کہ کشمیری
پاکستان سے الحاق چاہتے ہیں، کشمیری مسلمانوں کی طرف سے مسکت جواب تھا۔ اپنے دوست کی کامیابی کا جشن منانے
کے لیے پنڈت نہرو سری نگر گئے۔ وہاں یکم ستمبر کو ان کا استقبال "نہرو اور ہندوستان ہمیشہ" "کشمیر جنگ بازوں کے
ساتھ نہیں نہرو کے ساتھ جائے گا" جیسے نعروں سے ہوا۔ پاکستان نے جب دیکھا کہ پاکستان دوست امیدواروں
کی جیت کے کوئی امکانات نہیں ہیں تو اس نے ان انتخابات کے معتبر ہونے میں شکوک پیدا کرنے کی کوشش کی۔ نتیجتاً
بھوائی گئیں کہ امیدواروں کو اپنے نامزدگی پرچے داخل کرنے چاہئیں اور پھر کوشش کرنا چاہیے کہ ان کو گرفتار کر لیا
جائے۔ بلکہ پاکستان یہ دعویٰ کر سکے کہ انتخابات میں بے ایمانی ہوئی ہے۔ مگر شیخ عبداللہ کی حکومت نے کرائے اپنی

میں لائی گئیں یا پھر ہندوستان اور پاکستان کے باہمی مذاکرات میں۔ شیخ عبداللہ نے چاہا کہ پنڈت نہرو ۱۹۴۸ء
میں پاکستان کو الٹی میٹم دیں اور اس ملک کے خلاف جنگ کا اعلان کر دیں مگر پنڈت نہرو نے ان کے اس خیال کو رد
کر دیا۔ اقوام متحدہ میں برطانیہ اور امریکہ نے بڑی بے شرمی کے ساتھ کشمیر کے سلسلے میں پاکستان کی دلیلوں کی
تائید کی۔ برطانیہ نے جناح صاحب کا یہ نظریہ کہ ہندو اور مسلمان دو الگ الگ قومیں ہیں، مان لیا تھا۔ وہ یہ نہیں مان
سکتے تھے کہ وہ غلطی پر تھے اور ان کی سمجھ میں یہ بات بھی نہیں آسکتی تھی کہ کشمیر جیسا بڑی مسلم اکثریت والا علاقہ ہند
انڈیا کے ساتھ اپنے الحاق کو ترجیح دے سکتا ہے۔ ماؤنٹ بیٹن نے تو یہاں تک کیا کہ وہ جولائی ۱۹۴۷ء میں بہ نفس نفیس
کشمیر گئے تاکہ مہاراجہ کو پاکستان کے ساتھ الحاق پر تیار کر سکیں۔ مگر شیخ عبداللہ نے بار بار اس بات پر اصرار کیا
وہ ہندوستان کی طرف ہیں۔ مسئلے کے اقوام متحدہ میں جانے کے پورے ایک سال گزرنے پر جنگ بندی کے بعد
پاکستان نے "آزاد کشمیر" کی حکومت کے قیام کا اعلان کیا اور اس کی راجدھانی اپنے مقبوضہ علاقہ مظفر آباد (جس
شہر جسے حملہ آوروں نے لوٹا تھا) میں بنائی۔ جنگ بندی نے درحقیقت لڑائی کو ختم کرایا اور لیڈروں کو اس
بات کا موقع دیا کہ اُن وعدوں کی طرف توجہ مبذول کر سکیں جن کا انھیں پاس رکھنا ہے۔

ہندوستان کے آئین نے مسئلے کی، جو بین الاقوامیت اختیار کر چکا تھا، خصوصی نوعیت کو تسلیم کرتے ہوئے
کشمیر کو آئین کی دفعہ ۳۷۰ کے ذریعے ایک خصوصی حیثیت عطا کی۔ اب شیخ عبداللہ نے الحاق کے لیے عوامی جواز کے
حصول کا عمل شروع کیا۔ اکتوبر ۱۹۵۰ء میں نیشنل کانفرنس کی جنرل کاؤنسل نے، ایک آئین ساز اسمبلی کے قیام کے
لیے انتخابات کا باقاعدہ مطالبہ کیا۔ ستمبر اکتوبر ۱۹۵۱ء میں انتخابات ہوئے۔ نیشنل کانفرنس نے ہر کامیابی حاصل کر لی۔
وادیٔ کشمیر اور لداخ کی بینتالیس نشستوں میں سے صرف دو پر، پارٹی کے امیدواروں کے خلاف امیدوار کھڑے ہوئے
اس زبردست کامیابی پر اظہار خیال کرتے ہوئے مولانا مسعودی نے کہا کہ یہ کامیابی، پاکستان کے ان دعووں کا کہ کشمیری
پاکستان سے الحاق چاہتے ہیں، کشمیری مسلمانوں کی طرف سے مسکت جواب تھا۔ اپنے دوست کی کامیابی کا جشن منانے
کے لیے پنڈت نہرو سری نگر گئے، دہاں یکم ستمبر کو ان کا استقبال "نہرو اور ہندوستان ہمیشہ" "کشمیر جنگ یا امن کے
ساتھ نہیں نہرو کے ساتھ جائے گا" جیسے نعروں سے ہوا۔ پاکستان نے جب دیکھا کہ پاکستان دوست امیدواروں
کی جیت کے کوئی امکانات نہیں ہیں تو اس نے ان انتخابات کے معتبر ہونے میں شکوک پیدا کرنے کی کوشش کی۔ نتیجتاً یہ
بھی الزام لگایا گیا کہ امیدواروں کو اپنے نامزدگی پرچے داخل کرنے چاہیئں اور پھر کوشش کرنا چاہیے کہ ان کو گرفتار کر لیا
جائے تاکہ پاکستان یہ دعویٰ کر سکے کہ انتخابات میں بے ایمانی ہوئی ہے۔ مگر شیخ عبداللہ کی حکومت نے کہا کہ اسے اپنی

اسمبلی پر کامل یقین تھا کسی کو بھی گرفتار نہیں کیا۔ جس دن اسمبلی کا پہلا اجلاس ہوا سارے کشمیر میں خوشی و انبساط کی ایک لہر دوڑ گئی۔ ہر طرف اس احساس کی ایک مسرت تھی کہ بالآخر صدیوں بعد کشمیر کے عوام اپنی قسمت کا خود فیصلہ کر رہے تھے۔ اسمبلی سے خطاب کرتے ہوئے مولانا مسعودی نے کہا "ہمارا مستقبل اب ہمارے ہاتھوں میں ہے۔ آج ہم نے اپنے مقدر کو اپنی آرزوؤں اور اپنے خوابوں کے مطابق بنانے کا حق حاصل کر لیا ہے۔" اسی دن ایک جلسۂ عام میں شیخ عبداللہ نے ہندوستان کے عوام اور ان کے لیڈر پنڈت جواہر لال نہرو کا، کشمیر کی تاریک ترین گھڑی میں پاکستانی حملے کے وقت مدد دینے پر شکریہ ادا کیا۔ انھوں نے مزید کہا کہ ہم نے اب پہل اپنے ہاتھ میں لے لی ہے اور اب اپنے ملک کی تقدیر [illegible] کے اقدامات ہم کریں گے۔ ۵ نومبر ۱۹۵۱ کو اسمبلی کو پہلی دفعہ خطاب کرتے ہوئے شیخ عبداللہ نے وہ چار اہم [illegible] سوئے جو کرنے تھے۔ "مستقبل کی کشمیر کی حکومت کے لیے ایک دستور کی تیاری، شاہی خاندان کے مستقبل کا فیصلہ، جاگیرداروں کے مسئلے پر غور کر کے جو اس زمین کے معاوضے طلب کر رہے تھے جو ان سے لے لی گئی تھی اور ہندوستان سے الحاق پر فیصلہ لینا۔" انھوں نے یہ بات بالکل صاف کر دی کہ وہ ہندوستان کے الحاق کو ترجیح دینا اسمبلی کے لیے [illegible] نیا کارگزاری سمجھتے ہیں۔

بہ حال، جلدی ہی ان کے دماغ میں کچھ شکوک پیدا ہونے لگے۔ ہندوستان سے کشمیر کے تعلقات سے متعلق [illegible] سے مسئلے کو بالآخر قانون ساز اسمبلی ہی کو طے کرنا ہوگا۔ کیا یہ دہلی کے تمام اثرات اور تعلق کو ختم کرنے کا فیصلہ کرے گی؟ بات بالکل صاف ہے کہ اب شیخ عبداللہ نے یہ سوچنا شروع کر دیا تھا کہ کیا یہ بات مناسب ہو گی کہ کشمیر اگرچہ محدود [illegible] کسی حد تک خود مختاری حاصل کرے جس سے اس بات کی ضمانت ہو گی کہ کشمیر ابھی ابھی پاکستان کے چنگل سے نکل جانے کے بعد ہندوستان کا غلام نہ ہو جائے۔

یہ صحیح ہے کہ ہندوستان ایک سیکولر ملک ہے لیکن کیا یہ ہمیشہ ایسا ہی رہے گا؟ وہاں بہت سے ہندوؤں کی خاصی تعداد تھی جو ایسا موقع ملنے پر اپنے زہریلے دانت دکھانے کے لیے تیار تھے۔ شیخ کی پریشانی کا ایک سبب یہ بھی تھا کہ ہندوستان پر ہمیشہ ہمدرد حکومت نہیں رہ سکتی۔ حکومت میں ہندو متعصب کی علامتیں ابھی سے نظر آنے لگی تھیں۔ شیخ کی پریشانی کا ایک ضروری سبب خود مختار رہنے کا پرانا ولولہ بھی تھا اور ایسے خیالات کو [illegible] برطانیہ کی [illegible] سے تقویت ملی تھی جو پانچ عظیم قوتوں کے درمیان کشمیر کے غیر معمولی جغرافیائی محل وقوع کی فوجی اہمیت کو سمجھتے تھے، [illegible] بہت بڑے حصے پر نظر رکھنے کے لیے کشمیر میں ایک اچھا اڈا قائم کیا جا سکتا تھا۔ شیخ نے اب [illegible] شروع [illegible] ستانی فوجوں کی واپسی کی، ہندوستان کی فوجی سرگرمیوں میں کمی کی اور اس کے بعد اقوام متحدہ کے زیر اہتمام

اس استصواب رائے عامہ کی جس کا کہ وعدہ کیا گیا تھا۔ بعد کو جب انھوں نے دیکھا کہ ہندوستان اور پاکستان دو
میں سے کوئی بھی کشمیر کے ان حصوں کو چھوڑنے پر آمادہ نہیں ہیں جہاں ان کی فوجیں ہیں تو انھوں نے ایک مختلف منصوبہ
کی وکالت شروع کی۔ پاکستان، ہندوستان اور کشمیر کا ایک وفاق۔ یہ وفاق کچھ اس قسم کا تھا جو ۱۹۴۶ میں کیبنٹ
مشن نے سارے برصغیر کے لیے تجویز کیا تھا جس میں مرکز کو محدود اختیارات حاصل تھے۔ اور ریاستوں کو مکمل خود مختاری
دی۔ کانگریس نے اس خیال کو مسترد کر دیا تھا اور ان کا مطالبہ ملک کی مکمل اور خالص سالمیت کا تھا۔

ڈرانے والوں کی کمی نہیں تھی۔ جو کشمیر کے موڈ کی تبدیلیوں کی کہانی دلی کو، جو انھیں بڑے اشتیاق سے
سنتا تھا، سناتے رہتے تھے۔ شیخ کو اپنے رویے کی طرف سے ہر وقت محتاط رہنا تھا۔ مبادا ان کے دشمن یہ کہتے پھریں
کہ وہ خفیہ طور پر غدار ہیں ان پر چھینٹے پڑیں۔ جاگیردارانہ نظام کی حکومت ختم ہو گئی ہو گی مگر ان کا اثر و رسوخ باقی
تھا خصوصاً بڑے لوگوں میں۔

چونکہ تقسیم کی جانے والی زمینیں عام طور پر محدود رقبے کی تھیں اور ان کے حاصل کرنے والے مسلمان کاشت کار
اور زمین جوتنے والے تھے اس لیے ان زمینداروں نے جن کی زمین بے زمین افراد کو دی گئی تھی اس بات کا پروپیگنڈہ
شروع کیا کہ شیخ عبداللہ کی اصلاحات سوائے چھپی ہوئی ہندو مخالفت کے اور کچھ نہیں۔

وائی ڈی گنڈیویا جنھوں نے اپنا کیریئر انڈین سول سروس میں شروع کیا تھا اور چھتیس سال ملازمت کرنے
بعد جس میں ہندوستان کی فارن سکریٹری کی خدمات بھی شامل ہیں ریٹائر ہوئے تھے، اپنی زبردست کتاب "آؤٹ سائیڈ
دی آرکائیوز" میں ایسی ایک گفتگو کو بتاتے ہیں جو انھوں نے ۱۹۴۹ء میں شیخ عبداللہ سے کی تھی۔ گنڈیویا کہتے ہیں
"آزاد کشمیر کے امکان کی بات کر رہے تھے جس کے دفاع کے ضامن ہندوستان اور پاکستان دونوں ہوں۔ میرا
جواب تھا "نہیں، نہیں، یہ کبھی بھی کامیاب نہیں ہو سکتا۔ پاکستان ہمیں ایک سبق پڑھا چکا ہے۔ کشمیر بہت چھوٹا
ہے اور بہت غریب۔ پاکستان کشمیر کو ایک ہی نوالے میں ہڑپ کر جائے گا۔ وہ ایک دفعہ اس کی کوشش کر چکے
ہیں۔ وہ ایک دفعہ پھر بھی کریں گے۔" گنڈیویا لکھتے ہیں کہ "حیرت ناک بات ہے کہ یہ ریکارڈ کسی بڑے اوپری
معزز شخص اور شیخ عبداللہ کے مابین ہونے والی گفتگو کا نہیں ہے ... میں ان سے سوال پوچھ رہا تھا، شیخ
اس کا منفی جواب دے رہے تھے۔"

اس بات کو اچھی طرح سمجھنے کی ضرورت ہے کہ ایک طرف نہرو اور شیخ عبداللہ اور دوسری طرف جناح کے
کے لیے کشمیر کی لڑائی ایک نظریاتی جنگ تھی۔ کشمیر کے بغیر ہندوؤں اور مسلمانوں کے دو الگ الگ قوموں کے

نظریہ بے بنیاد ہو جاتا تھا۔ اگر کشمیر کے مسلمان ایک اسلامی ریاست کا حصہ نہ ہوتے تو جناح صاحب کی ساری مہم کی ہوا نکل جاتی۔ اسی طرح نہرو کے لیے یہ حقیقت کہ ایک مسلم اکثریت والی ریاست ایک مذہبی ملک کے بجائے ایک سیکولر جمہوریت سے رشتہ جوڑنا چاہتی ہے اس قوم پرستی کی بین فتح تھی جس کی کانگریس نے ہمیشہ تبلیغ کی تھی۔ نہرو اور شیخ عبداللہ دونوں اس نکتے پر برابر زور دیتے رہے۔ ایک انٹرویو جو جرنل آف انڈین ایبوسی ایشن جولائی۔ نومبر، ۱۹۵۷ء) میں شائع ہوا تھا، اس میں جب ہزار دیں بار یہ سوال نہرو سے پوچھا گیا تھا، تو انھوں نے کہا تھا "پاکستان نے یہ جواز رکھا ہے کہ کشمیر کے عوام کی اکثریت مسلمانوں کی ہے۔ یہ ایک بڑی عجیب و غریب دلیل ہے جب دفعہ جب ہم یہ مان لیں کہ ملک مذہب کی بنیاد پر بنتے ہیں تو ہم درحقیقت یورپ کے یا دوسری جگہوں کے قرون وسطیٰ میں چلے جاتے ہیں، یہ ایک ناممکن جواز ہے۔ اگر ہم اسے قبول کرلیں تو جو صورت حال آج تقسیم کے بعد ہے یہ ہے کہ چار کروڑ مسلمان ہندوستان میں ہیں۔ کیا یہ سب کے سب پاکستان کے شہری ہیں؟ اور ان کی وفاداریاں پاکستان کے ساتھ ہیں؟ ہندوستان کے ہر گاؤں میں مسلمان ہیں، عیسائی ہیں۔ بتایئے کہ وہاں عیسائی قوم ہے مسلمان، بدھ قوم ہے یا ہندو۔ یہ ایک ناممکن منطق ہے .. کشمیر بلاشبہ آئینی طور پر، تاریخی طور پر قانونی طور پر ہندوستان کا ایک حصہ ہے۔ یونین آف انڈیا کا ایک حصہ ۔"

اپنی انتہائی مایوسی کے دنوں میں بھی شیخ عبداللہ نے اس نظریے کو کبھی ترک نہیں کیا کئی برس ہندوستانی جیلوں میں گزارنے کے بعد شیخ عبداللہ مئی ۱۹۶۴ء میں پہلی بار پاکستان گئے تو پاکستانیوں نے یہ سوچا کہ کم از کم اب شیخ عبداللہ سیکولر ہندوستان سے مایوس ہو چکے ہوں گے اور یہ مانیں گے کہ مسلمان ایک ہندو اکثریت والے ہندوستان میں امن، حفاظت اور عزت کے ساتھ نہیں رہ سکتے شیخ عبداللہ نے یہ کہہ کر اپنے میزبانوں کو ششدر کر دیا کہ وہ اب بھی سیکولرزم پر ایمان رکھتے ہیں اور اب بھی وہ دو قومی نظریہ کو رد کرتے ہیں کراچی کے اخبار ڈان نے اپنی جھینپ کو چھپانے کی تھوڑی کوشش کی اپنے اداریے میں یہ لکھ کر کی کہ "شیخ عبداللہ کا بیان اور ہندوستان کے نام نہاد سیکولرزم کے حوالے نے عوام میں عام طور پر اور دانشوروں میں خصوصاً کچھ مایوسی پیدا کی ہے۔" دوسرے لوگوں کے رد عمل نسبتاً زیادہ تلخ تھے کہ "شیخ عبداللہ نے اپنے بیان میں نو ملیک سیدنہ وکیلیو دوسرے جنگجو بھارت کو" دوسری طرف ہندوستان میں بھی متعصب لوگوں نے نہرو اور شیخ عبداللہ کے تعلقات خراب کرنے میں کوئی کسر اٹھا نہیں رکھی اور ۱۹۵۳ء تک وہ لوگ بڑی حد تک کامیاب بھی ہو گئے۔

۱۹۵۲ء میں نہرو اور شیخ عبداللہ کے درمیان ایک معاہدہ ہوا جو دہلی معاہدے کے نام سے جانا جاتا ہے

لنڈ یو یا لکھتے ہیں "میں پرانی دہلی میں کسی جگہ جہاں شیخ صاحب زیرحراست (چھٹی دہائی میں) سے گفتگو کر رہا تھا میری یہ ملاقات، خواہ مخواہ خفیہ رکھی جانے والی اور رات کے اندھیرے میں ہونے والی ملاقاتوں میں سے ایک تھی۔ میں وہاں شاستری جی کی موت کے ایک سال بعد پولیس کی جیپ میں گیا تھا دوران گفتگو جب میں نے 'دہلی معاہدے' کا ذکر کیا تو شیخ صاحب نے کچھ جذباتی ہوتے ہوئے مجھے بتایا کہ جواہر لال نے بہت سی باتوں کو طے کرنے کا کام کشمیر قانون ساز اسمبلی پر چھوڑنے پر رضامندی ظاہر کی تھی اور نہرو کے آخری الفاظ تھے کہ " ارے پریشان نہ ہوئیے ہم آپ کو سونے کی زنجیروں سے باندھیں گے . . ." سونے کی زنجیر محض ایک سال بعد ان میں سے ایک کے ہاتھ کی ہتھکڑیوں میں کیوں کر تبدیل ہو گئی؟ شیخ نے اس گفتگو کے دوران مجھ سے اس کی وضاحت یوں کی کہ یہ دراصل دائیں بازو والوں، رجعت پرستوں اور گھٹیا لوگوں کی بتدریج فتح تھی"۔ انھوں نے مجھے بتایا کہ "ان کے خیال میں، رجعت پرست عناصر کی ٹولی میں جنت دست ہیں ہے۔ نہرو کے دربار میں نہیں مگر دوسری جگہوں پر یقیناً۔ شیخ نے مزید کہا کہ سردار پٹیل اور بہت سے دیگر لوگوں کو مجھ پر بالکل بھروسہ نہیں تھا۔ نہرو نے شروع شروع میں مجھے بدنام کرنے کی کوششوں کا معاملہ کیا۔ بالآخر انھوں نے بھی ہتھیار ڈال دیئے۔

۱۹۵۱ء کے انتخابات میں شرمناک ہزیمت اٹھانے کے بعد ہندوستانی مذہبی متعصبین نے نہرو پر حملے کا ایک مختلف طریقہ اختیار کیا۔ ایک کمتر جس پر وہ سمجھتے تھے کہ نہرو کو آسانی کے ساتھ زک پہنچائی جا سکتی ہے وہ شیخ عبداللہ پر ان کا بھروسہ۔ چوں کہ وہ نہرو کو اپنا ہدف نہیں بنا پائے اس لیے انھوں نے اپنا نشانہ شیخ کو بنایا اس سلسلے میں انھیں اچھی کامیابی حاصل ہوئی۔ اس میں پاکستان کی ہٹ دھرمی اور مسلسل پروپیگنڈے نے بھی بہت مدد کی پاکستان ہر محاذ پر شکست کھا چکا تھا۔ پہلے حملہ آوروں کی ناکامی اور پھر پاکستانی فوج کی شکست کی وجہ سے میدان کارزار میں وہ جنگ ہار گئے۔ ہری سنگھ کے ہندوستان سے الحاق کے بعد وہ آئینی اور قانونی لحاظ سے بھی اپنے مقصد میں ناکام ہو گئے۔ اور شیخ عبداللہ کی طرف سے انتہائی غیر مبہم الفاظ میں پاکستان کو رد کیے جانے کے بعد تو عوامی محاذ میں بھی ان کو شکست ہو گئی۔

یہ بات ان لوگوں کو بڑی عجیب معلوم ہوگی جو ہندوستان کے مسائل کو ہندو مسلم روایتی دشمنی کی صورت میں دیکھنے کے عادی ہیں۔ مگر یہ شیخ عبداللہ تھے جو ۱۹۴۷ء میں اس بات کے لیے پریشان تھے کہ دہلی میں کچھ خاص ہندو لیڈر کشمیر کو پاکستان کے حوالے کر دینے کی کوششوں میں دانستہ لگے ہوئے ہیں اور حقیقت یہ ہے کہ شیخ کی اس بات پر سردار پٹیل نے احتجاج بھی کیا اور شیخ عبداللہ ظاہر ہے کہ بین السطور یہ کہہ رہے تھے کہ یہ سردار پٹیل تھے جو اس قسم کے

intervention by forbidding actions and interests which tend to force the nation into foreign wars, whether by provoking a belligerent or by making war a political or emotional necessity for the United States. President Roosevelt apparently had these principles in mind when he said in 1935 that Americans are not isolationists save in the sense that they desire to isolate themselves from war. To achieve such an isolation America for long, and particularly in reference to Europe, avoided taking sides verbally in foreign wars or even in controversies, that is, through official expressions of sympathy or condemnation or through diplomatic pressure partial to one belligerent. In recent years, and especially since the beginning of the discussion of neutrality legislation, three other principles have been advocated, only the first of which passed into legislation: suspension during foreign wars of commercial relations with belligerents which might raise perilous issues of maritime rights or create a vested economic interest in the victory of one belligerent; equal treatment of belligerents not merely formally but in effect as well; and—what extreme isolationists in vain demanded in the Sino-Japanese conflict—withdrawal of all citizens and troops from zones of war.

To be sure, the principle of non-intervention did not prohibit participation in foreign conflicts actually involving American interests; but perhaps the most far-reaching limitation of all arose from the fact that their extreme fear of violating this principle for a long time led Americans to interpret very narrowly national interest as involved in the conflicts of others. It has seemed generally (the Spanish-American War was too safe an adventure to count) that participation in foreign wars is demanded by national interest only in the case of attack upon primary values such as independence, national honor and security, the last of which has the special form called the Monroe Doctrine. With regard to armed interposition short of war, or to purely verbal intervention, the criteria of national interest have indeed not been as narrow. But even in this sphere Americans adhered through the greater part of their history to the view that, especially in Europe, siding with one party to a controversy was warranted only by the direct involvement of their legal rights. Aside from the responsibilities of the Monroe Doctrine and of a few special interests such as Liberia, Hawaii and Samoa,

ہاتوں کے مجرم سمجھے۔ مگر ۱۹۵۲ء تک اسی متعصب ہندو لابی نے کشمیر کی حیثیت سے متعلق شیخ عبداللہ کے مبینہ مذہب کا ڈھنڈورا پیٹنا شروع کر دیا تھا۔ ان اختلافات کو جو کشمیر دستور ساز اسمبلی میں ہونے والی بحثوں کے درمیان سامنے آئے اور جو بہترین حالات میں بھی ناگزیر تھے، موت اور زیست کا مسئلہ بنا دیا گیا۔ ۱۹۵۲ء کے اواخر میں ان تنظیموں کے ایک گروپ نے جن کے مقاصد کے سلسلے میں کسی شبہے کی گنجائش تھی ہی نہیں، مل کر منظم طور پر جموں میں شیخ مخالف احتجاج شروع کیا۔ ان میں شیاما پرشاد مکرجی کی قیادت میں نئی نئی قائم ہوئی جن سنگھ پارٹی کے علاوہ ہندو مہاسبھا، راشٹریہ سوئم سیوک سنگھ اور جموں پرجا پریشد شامل تھیں سب کی سب ہندو جماعتیں۔ ان کے ساتھ سکھوں کی جماعت اکالی دل بھی تھی جس کی قیادت ماسٹر تارا سنگھ کر رہے تھے۔ نہرو جیسا شخص جس نے اس سے کہیں زیادہ سنجیدہ اور پریشان کن حالات میں ہمت اور بہادری کا مظاہرہ کیا تھا۔ اس بحران میں حیرت انگیز طور پر بے اثر تھا کیا ان کی جرأت و توانائی جواب دے چکی تھی یا کہیں ایسا تو نہیں تھا کہ اپنے دوست پر سے ان کا بھی اعتماد اٹھ رہا تھا۔ نہرو کے سب سے زیادہ معتقد اور ہمدرد سوانح نگار ایس گوپال اپنی تین جلدوں پر مشتمل تصنیف کی دوسری جلد میں لکھتے ہیں کہ یہ مخصوص احتجاج ملک کو تقسیم کے وقت کے تشدد اور غارت گری کی تباہی کی طرف لے جاسکتا تھا ایسی خطرناک صورت حال سے نپٹنے کے لیے مختلف سطحوں پر سخت اور فوری کارروائی کی ضرورت تھی۔ مگر نہرو کسی سطح پر بھی پورے طور پر کامیاب نہیں ہوئے اور نتیجے کے طور پر یہ بحران قابو سے باہر ہو گیا ان کے احکامات پر کہ ہندوستان میں جہاں بھی گڑبڑ ہو وہاں اسے فوراً دبا دیا جائے، بڑی بے دلی سے عمل کیا گیا وزارت امور داخلہ اس وقت کیلاش ناتھ کاٹجو کے پاس تھی۔ کاٹجو نہرو کے وفادار پیرووں میں تھے مگر اب ان کی عمر بہت ہو چکی تھی اور ان کی رعشہ زدہ نااہلی، ان افسروں کی سستی اور کاہلی کی وجہ سے اور بڑھ گئی تھی جن کی متعصبانہ ہمدردیاں چھپی ہوئی نہیں تھیں اس تحریک کے شخصی اور فرقہ وارانہ کردار کو آشکار کرنے کے لیے احتجاج کو دوسرے ہنگاموں سے الگ کرنے کی نہرو کی کوششیں کچھ زیادہ کامیاب نہ ہو سکی۔ اور ان سب سے بڑھ کر یہ کہ ثابت کرنے کے لیے کہ شیخ عبداللہ کا ایڈمنسٹریشن سیکولر، کھلے دماغ والا اور قوم پرست ایڈمنسٹریشن تھا، پنڈت نہرو، اس تحریک کے فرقہ وارانہ اور متعصب مرکز کو تنہا اور بے یار و مددگار کرنے کی اپنی اصل کوششوں میں بھی کامیاب نہیں ہوئے۔

شیاما پرشاد مکرجی کے اس احتجاج نے صرف یہ کام کیا کہ نیشنل کانفرنس والوں کے دل و دماغ میں ہندو متعصب اور کٹرپن کے بارے میں مزید شک اور خوف بٹھا دیا۔ شک و شبہات پیدا کرنے کا یہ وقت بہت خطرناک تھا کیونکہ قانون ساز اسمبلی اپنے فیصلوں کو آخری شکل دینے میں مصروف تھی۔ کشمیر، کشمیریوں کے ہاتھ میں رکھنے کی

ترغیب اور ان کے خیالی لطف نے الگ اثر ڈالا۔ شیخ عبداللہ نے خود مختاری اور آزادی کی خواہش کبھی نہیں کی۔ (نہرو نے اس خیال کو "بکواس" سے تعبیر کیا تھا) ان کے اس رویے کی اگر کوئی دوسری وجہ نہیں تھی تو صرف یہ تھی کہ وہ اس خیال کو قابل عمل اور چلنے والا نہیں سمجھتے تھے۔ آزادی وخود مختاری کے لیے کشمیر بہت کمزور تھا مگر انھوں نے انڈین یونین کے اندر رہتے ہوئے خود اختیاری کی بات شروع کی۔ نہرو کو اس بات کا یقین تھا کہ امریکی ان مطالبوں کی حمایت کر رہے ہیں۔ مسٹر ایس گوپال کے مطابق نہرو نے ہندو فرقہ پرستوں کی سرگرمیوں کا سر کچلنے کی کوشش کی جو کمیونسٹ دشمنی سے کچھ ہی کم ہوں گی اور شیخ عبداللہ کو مزید وقت فراہم کر دیا کہ وہ اپنے اعصاب کو ٹھیک کر لیں ... مگر نہرو کے ہاتھ وزارت داخلہ کی مسلسل نااہلیت اور ناکارکردگی کی وجہ سے کمزور ہو چکے تھے۔ کیلاش ناتھ کاٹجو اپنے وزیر اعظم کی تجویز (جن سنگھ پر پابندی لگانے اور احتجاجیوں کو گرفتار کرنے) پر عمل کرنے کے لیے تیار نہیں تھے۔ ہندوستان کے وزیر داخلہ بالکل واضح طور پر ان لوگوں کے ہمراہ تھے جو شیخ عبداللہ کو برطرف دیکھنا چاہتے تھے۔ اور ان لوگوں میں مہاراجہ ہری سنگھ کے بیٹے ڈاکٹر کرن سنگھ بھی تھے (ابھی ابھی وہ اپنی سلطنت سے محروم ہوئے تھے اس کے لیے ان کا یہ رویہ سمجھ میں آتا ہے) جو کشمیر کی تاریخ میں اس خاندان کی حیثیت کے پیش نظر ریاست کے آئینی سربراہ (یہ ایک رسمی عہدہ تھا) بنا دیے گئے تھے۔ کرن سنگھ نے کہا کہ شیخ عبداللہ پر دباؤ ڈالا جانا چاہیے کہ وہ احتجاجیوں سے بات چیت کریں۔ نہرو نے اس خیال کو فوراً مسترد کیا اور کرن سنگھ کو لکھا "میرے نقطہ نظر سے ان لوگوں نے (احتجاجیوں نے) جو کچھ کیا ہے وہ وطن دشمنی سے کم نہیں ہے اور عوام کو اس بات کو سمجھنا چاہیے" (کرن سنگھ کی خود نوشت سوانح عمری "ہیئر اپارنٹ" آکسفورڈ یونیورسٹی پریس) شیخ عبداللہ کو ہٹانے کی سازش ۱۹۵۳ء میں شروع کی گئی۔ بروٹس کا رول ادا کرنے کے لیے جس شخص کا انتخاب کیا گیا وہ تھے نائب وزیر اعظم بخشی غلام محمد۔ جنھیں کرن سنگھ ایک موقع پرست اور کاروباری آدمی کہتے ہیں۔ جون میں شیاما پرشاد مکرجی نے بغیر ضروری اجازت نامے کے جموں میں داخل ہونے کا فیصلہ کیا۔ ایسے نازک وقت میں انھیں جموں جانے سے روکنے کے بجائے حکومت پنجاب کے حکام درحقیقت سرحد تک ان کے ساتھ گئے اور اسے پار کرنے میں ان کی مدد کی۔ اس طرح کی مدد انتظامیہ کی طرف سے اس شخص کو دی جا رہی تھی جس پر نہرو نے وطن دشمن احتجاج کی قیادت کرنے کا الزام لگایا تھا۔ نہرو نے پنجاب کے وزیر اعلیٰ بھیم سین سچر اور خود اپنے وزیر داخلہ کیلاش ناتھ کاٹجو سے مکرجی کو جموں میں داخل ہونے کی اجازت دیے جانے پر زبردست احتجاج کیا۔ لیکن انتہائی حیرت ناک طور پر نہرو کو نظر انداز کر دیا گیا۔ شیخ عبداللہ کی حکومت نے مکرجی کو گرفتار کر لیا اسے مقدر ہی کہیے کہ وہ قلب کے ایک حملے میں

تیسری بار مرگئے۔ شیخ عبداللہ کو بدنام کرنے اور بدمعاش ثابت کرنے کے لیے دشمنوں کو کسی ایسے ہی ہتھیار کی ضرورت تھی۔

۱۰ جولائی کو شیخ عبداللہ نے ایک تقریر کی جسے یہ ثابت کرنے کے لیے خوب خوب استعمال کیا گیا کہ وہ ہندوستان کے ایک غدار ہیں۔ کہا جاتا ہے کہ نیشنل کانفرنس کے ہیڈکوارٹرز مجاہد منزل میں شیخ عبداللہ نے کہا کہ جب ہندوستان میں فرقہ پرست عناصر کو نہرو بھی قابو میں نہیں رکھ سکے تو ایک ایسا وقت آسکتا ہے جب کشمیر کو سیکولر ہندوستان سے جدا ہونا پڑے۔ پارٹی کی ورکنگ کمیٹی میں شیخ عبداللہ کے قریب ترین ساتھی مرزا افضل بیگ نے تجویز رکھی کہ ہندوستان سے الحاق کو ان شرائط سے آگے نہیں جانا چاہیے جنھیں ہری سنگھ نے منظور کیا تھا یعنی صرف دفاع، امور خارجہ اور مواصلات ہی کے تحت ہونے چاہییں۔ بخشی غلام محمد نے نسبتاً وسیع تعاون کی بات کی۔ شکست و فتح کے فیصلے کا وقت آ رہا تھا اور ایک مایوس اور افسردہ نہرو صرف یہ دیکھ سکتا تھا کہ حالات کیا رُخ اختیار کرتے ہیں۔ شیخ عبداللہ میں بھی جھنجھلاہٹ کے آثار پیدا ہونے لگے تھے اور خصوصاً اس وقت سے جب سے ان پر یہ انکشاف ہوا کہ ان کے وہ ساتھی جن پر انھوں نے بھروسہ کیا تھا ان کے خلاف ہوتے جا رہے ہیں اور یہ کہ ان کی نظریاتی ایمان داری پر بھی شکوک و شبہات کیے جانے لگے ہیں۔ گندیویا کا کہنا ہے کہ "پروپگنڈے کا جو سیلاب پریس میں امڈ آیا اس میں کہا گیا کہ شیخ عبداللہ بدنام اور غدار ہیں وہ پاکستان دوست ہیں، وہ عن قریب کشمیر کے ہندوستان سے الحاق کی تردید کرنے والے ہیں وہ ایک آزاد کشمیر چاہتے ہیں۔"

۷ اگست کو شیخ عبداللہ نے کابینہ میں اپنے مخالفین کے خلاف کارروائی کا فیصلہ کیا اور اپنے وزیر صحت پنڈت شیام لال صراف سے استعفا طلب کیا۔ ۸ اگست کو بخشی غلام محمد، وزیر مالیات جی ایم ڈوگرا اور شیام لال صراف کے دستخطوں سے شیخ عبداللہ کے خلاف کرن سنگھ کے پاس ایک میمورنڈم بھیجا گیا جس میں شیخ عبداللہ پر یہ الزام لگایا گیا کہ وہ ہندوستان کے ساتھ ریاست کے تعلقات میں نا چاقی پیدا کرنا چاہتے ہیں۔ میمورنڈم میں وزیر اعظم کو یہ اطلاع بھی دی گئی تھی کہ دستخط کنندگان کے خیال میں کابینہ عوام کا اعتماد کھو چکی ہے۔ ۹ اسی دن شیخ عبداللہ، اپنی بیوی اور اپنے خاندان کے ساتھ ایک آدھ دن خاموشی اور سکون کے ساتھ گزارنے کے لیے گلمرگ چلے گئے۔

ایس گوپال کے مطابق، نہرو نے ۲۴ اگست ۱۹۵۳ کو گرجا شنکر باجپئی کو لکھا کہ "میں پچھلے تین مہینے سے یہ صورت حال کو آتا ہوا دیکھ رہا تھا ایک غیر مرئی تباہی کی طرف رینگتا ہوا۔ مگر یہ نہیں جانتا تھا کہ یہ قطعی شکل کیا اختیار کرے گی۔" ہوا یہ کہ کرن سنگھ نے ۸ اگست کی سہ پہر، برطرفی کا مسودہ تیار کرنے میں صرف کی۔" ور چوں کہ ایک ایسی منزل آگئی ہے جس میں ایک ایمان دار اور کارگزار انتظامیہ ناقابل عمل ہو کر رہ گئی ہے اور چوں کہ

آخر مشترکہ ذمہ داری کی بنیاد پر موجودہ کیبینٹ کا کام کرنا ناممکن ہو گیا ہے اور اس سب کے نتیجے کے طور پر پیدا ہونے والے تنازعات نے ریاست کی یک جہتی، خوش حالی اور استحکام کو بری طرح مجروح کر دیا ہے۔ ... (یہ) شیخ محمد عبداللہ کو جموں کشمیر کی ریاست کی وزارت عظمیٰ سے سبکدوش کرتا ہوں اور نتیجتاً ان کی سربراہی والی کاؤنسل آف منسٹرز بھی اس کے ساتھ ختم ہوتی ہے۔"

۸ اگست کی شام کا موسم، شیکسپیئر کے ڈرامے میکبیتھ کا سین تھا جب کرن سنگھ کے اے۔ ڈی۔ سی میجر بی ایس باجوا نے اپنے کچھ ساتھیوں کے ساتھ، تنگ مرگ کی طرف سے گلمرگ جانے والا دشوار گزار راستہ اختیار کیا۔ رات کے گیارہ بجے جب میجر باجوا نے دروازے پر دستک دی تو اس وقت شیخ اور ان کی بیگم سو رہے تھے۔ پولیس نے گھر کو گھیر لیا تھا۔ انھیں ٹھیک دو گھنٹے کی مہلت دی گئی جس میں سامان باندھ لیں اور نماز ادا کر لیں۔ علی الصباح انھیں لے جایا گیا۔ یہی وہ گھڑی تھی جس کے بعد سے جیلوں کی وہ دس سالہ آمد و رفت اور بے سمتی کے تقریباً بیس سال گزرنے تھے جنھیں شیر کشمیر کے ایمان اور ہمت کی آزمائش کرنا تھی۔ مرزا افضل بیگ جیسے ان کے ساتھی اور ہمدرد بھی گرفتار کر لیے گئے۔ اسی رات کی تاریکی میں، صبح طلوع ہونے سے قبل ہی غلام محمد کی قیادت میں ایک نئی حکومت نے حلف لے لیا تھا۔ سریر حکومت پر آنے سے پہلے بخشی غلام محمد نے صرف ایک شرط رکھی تھی اور وہ یہ کہ شیخ عبداللہ کو گرفتار کر لیا جائے گا۔ کیونکہ اگر شیخ آزاد رہے تو وہ کشمیر کو قابو میں نہ رکھ سکیں گے۔ اخباروں میں یہ پروپگنڈہ کرایا گیا کہ ہندوستان کو بچا لیا گیا ہے اور شیخ عبداللہ کو اس طوفانی رات میں عین اس وقت گرفتار کر لیا گیا ہے جب وہ سرحد پار کر کے پاکستان میں داخل ہونے والے تھے۔

پنڈت نہرو کو یہ کبھی نہیں بتایا گیا کہ ان کے دوست کو جیل میں بند کر دیا جائے گا۔ ہندوستان بھر میں سیاست داں حتی کہ حزب اختلاف والے بھی بڑے حیرت ناک طور پر بہرہ لب تھے۔ ملک بھر میں اعتماد کی ایک کمی سی تھی واضح طور پر نظر آ رہی تھی اور ایک خوف کو شاید بقا اور یک جہتی کے لیے یہ قیمت دینا ضروری تھی۔ سوشلسٹ لیڈر رام منوہر لوہیا بھی جو کسی بھی بات پر نہرو پر تنقید کر سکتے تھے اپنے تاثرات کے اظہار میں بڑے نرم نرم سے تھے، بعد کو جے پرکاش نراین اور اشوک مہتا جیسے کچھ لیڈر رہے جنھوں نے یہ کہنا شروع کیا کہ شیخ کی گرفتاری تباہ کن حماقت تھی اور درحقیقت وہ علیحدگی پسند نہیں تھے (مگر شاید ۱۹۵۳ء کی خاموشی کا جرم ۱۹۸۴ء میں اس وقت دھو دیا گیا جب فاروق عبداللہ کی حکومت کو بالکل اسی طرح اور بالکل ویسے ہی بہانوں پر برطرف کیا گیا تھا، ملک بھر کے حزب مخالف کے لیڈر، شیخ عبداللہ کے بیٹے کی حمایت میں جمع ہو گئے) شیخ عبداللہ کی گرفتاری کا حال بیان کرتے ہوئے گنڈیو

کا کہنا ہے کہ "یہ ایک دوطرفہ چوٹ تھی صرف شیخ ہی کی شکست نہیں ہوئی تھی، نہرو نے بھی شکست کھائی تھی۔"

بہت عرصے بعد ۱۹۷۸ء میں، مصنف سے بات کرتے ہوئے شیخ عبداللہ نے کہا تھا کہ انھوں نے اپنی زندگی میں تین بڑے بحرانوں کا سامنا کیا ہے۔ پہلی دفعہ اسی وقت جب میں نے مسلم کانفرنس کو نیشنل کانفرنس میں تبدیل کیا تھا اور کشمیر کے مُلّا میری تباہی کے درپے ہو گئے تھے۔ میں نے سوال کیا کہ آپ نے ان کا مقابلہ کیسے کیا؟ "خود ایک طاقت بن کر" شیخ نے ہنستے ہوئے جواب دیا۔ دوسرا بحران ۱۹۴۷ء میں اس وقت آیا تھا جب سارا ملک ظلمت کا شکار ہو گیا تھا۔ ہمارے چاروں طرف فرقہ وارانہ فسادات ہو رہے تھے۔ پنجاب میں، راشٹریہ سویم سیوک سنگھ کی طرف سے قتل و غارت گری اور دوسری طرف مسلم لیگ کا تمام غیرمسلموں کو مارنا۔ ہم دو سمتوں سے گھرے ہوئے تھے۔ شمال سے مسلم فرقہ پرستی کی آگ لے کر حملہ آور آئے اور جنوب سے راشٹریہ سویم سیوک سنگھ ہندو فرقہ پرستی کا زہر لے کر، مگر کشمیر کو بچا لیا گیا۔ ۱۹۵۳ء میں قید کا تجربہ تیسرا بحران تھا۔ جب سیکولرزم، جمہوریت اور سوشلزم پر ہمارے ایمان و یقین پر سخت آزمائش کا وقت پڑا تھا۔ اس وقت جیل میں میرے ساتھیوں نے مجھ سے کہا "اب باقی کیا بچا ہے؟ اگر یہی نتیجہ ہے تو ہم آخر ہندوستان کے ساتھ کیوں جائیں؟ ہمیں پاکستان چلے جانا چاہیے۔" مگر حقیقت یہ ہے کہ وہ نظریات جنھیں لے کر ہم کھڑے ہوئے تھے، زیادہ اہم تھے۔ پاکستان سے بھی زیادہ ہندوستان سے بھی زیادہ۔ ہم ہندوستان کے ساتھ ملے تو اس کے سیکولرزم اور سوشلزم کے نظریات کی وجہ سے۔ ہندوستان نے ایک ایسا ملک تعمیر کرنا چاہا تھا جہاں انسانیت کا دور دورہ ہوگا۔ جب تک ہندوستان ان نظریات کا پیرو رہتا ہے، اس وقت تک ہمارے ہ کے لیے کوئی دوسری جگہ نہیں ہے سوائے ہندوستان کے۔"

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کچھ بھی ثابت نہ ہوا

شیخ عبداللہ کی سیاسی زندگی نصف صدی سے زیادہ کا قصہ ہے۔ اس مدت میں وہ نو مرتبہ جیل گئے بحیثیت مجموعی پندرہ سال سات مہینے اور پانچ دن حراست میں گذارے۔ ہری سنگھ کے جیلوں میں زندگی بہت سخت تھی۔ ایک دفعہ تو شیخ عبداللہ نے جیل کے کھانے اور وہاں کی ابتر حالت کے خلاف احتجاج کرنے کی خاطر بھوک ہڑتال کی۔ ہری سنگھ کی حکومت میں زیر حراست رہنا وہ منظور کر سکتے تھے مگر ان کے لیے یہ سمجھنا بہت دشوار تھا۔ پنڈت نہرو جیسا ایک دوست ان پر سے اپنا اعتماد کیوں ختم کر دے اور پھر آزادی اور حریت سے مشترکہ طور پر بندھے ہوئے یہاں رہنما ایک ڈیموکریٹ کیسے نظر انداز کر دے؟ ان کے اور ان کے ہمدردان کے خلاف پروپگنڈے کا جو طوفان اٹھایا گیا وہ زخم پر نمک چھڑکنے کے مترادف ہے ہو سکتا تھا اس بات کو کہ شیخ عبداللہ کشمیر کو پاکستان میں جانے کی کوشش کر رہے تھے ... اور اس کے علاوہ اور بھی زیادہ شرارت آمیز الزامات تھے مثلاً یہ کہ شیخ عبداللہ کو پاکستان سے بڑی بڑی رقوم مل رہی ہیں۔ بخشی غلام محمد کی موجودگی میں جو یہ ثابت کرنے پر تلے ہوئے تھے کہ انھوں نے جو کچھ کیا وہ قومی مفاد کے پیش نظر کیا۔ محکمۂ خفیہ کی ایجنسیاں اور دہلی میں وزارت داخلہ میں جس میں ایسے لوگوں کا زور تھا جو شیخ عبداللہ کو تباہ کرنے کے درپے تھے۔ وطن دشمنی کی شہادتیں جمع کرنے کی ایک زبردست کوشش کی گئی۔ چار سال تک اسپیشل جج کے سامنے یہ دعویٰ کرتا رہا کہ وہ ایک پاکستان دوست سازش میں شیخ کے ملوث ہونے کے ثبوت فراہم کرنے کے قریب پہنچ چکا ہے مگر کبھی کچھ بھی نہ ڈھونڈا جا سکا ... الزام بھی طے نہ کیا جا سکا۔ مگر شیخ صاحب جیل میں رہے۔

شیخ عبداللہ کی بیوی، بیگم اکبر جہاں عبداللہ نے ایک ملاقات میں اُدے شرما راسدے ۵ جون ۱۹۰۳، یہ بتاتے ہوئے کہ انھوں نے اپنے شوہر کو پہلی بار کب دیکھا، ایک بہت دلچسپ کہانی سنائی۔ بیگم صاحبہ

تعلق ایک متمول اور روشن خیال خاندان سے ہے۔ سری نگر کا مشہور ہوٹل "نیڈوز" ان ہی کے خاندان کا تھا، اس زمانے
میں لڑکیاں کشمیر میں پڑھ نہیں سکتی تھیں اس لیے یہ کشمیر سے باہر رہتی تھیں۔ اس وقت ان کی عمر محض سولہ سترہ سال
کی تھی اور ۱۹۳۲ء میں وہ سری نگر اپنی تعطیلات گزارنے آئی تھیں۔ ایک دن ایک دبلا پتلا اور لمبا نوجوان ہوٹل میں
ن کے والد سے، اپنی سیاسی سرگرمیوں کے سلسلے میں چندہ مانگنے آیا۔ جب مستقبل میں ہونے والی بیگم عبداللہ
نے اس نوجوان کو دیکھا، انھوں نے اپنی ماں سے پوچھا کہ یہ شخص کون تھا؟ تو ان کی ماں کا جواب تھا کہ یہ کشمیریوں کے
لیے ایک فرشتہ ہے، فرشتہ جو مہاراجہ سے اپنے حقوق حاصل کرنے کی لڑائی میں ان کی مدد کر رہا ہے۔ یہ لڑکی
نوجوان سے متاثر ہو چکی تھی اور نوجوان کو اور اچھی طرح دیکھنا چاہتی تھی مگر شرم وحیا کے اصولوں نے اسے وہاں نہ
جانے دیا جہاں وہ اس کے والد کے پاس بیٹھا ہوا تھا۔ بہرحال جلد ہی دونوں کی شادی کی بات چیت شروع ہو گئی جب
لڑکی کے باپ مسٹر نیڈو کو یہ خبر ملی تو وہ چلا پڑے "یا خدا! یہ آدمی تو اپنی ساری زندگی جیل میں گزارنے والا ہے
میری بچی کا کیا ہوگا؟" بہرحال ایک شفیق باپ نے اپنی بیٹی کی خواہش کے سامنے ہتھیار ڈال دیے مگر لڑکی کے
باپ نے جو کچھ کہا تھا وہ ایک پیغمبرانہ پیشین گوئی ثابت ہوئی۔ شیخ عبداللہ ۱۹۵۳ء اور ۱۹۸۵ء کے درمیان اس
وقت بھی جیل میں رہے جب کوئی الزام بھی ان کے سر نہیں منڈھا جا سکا

بالآخر ۱۹۵۷ء میں حزب اختلاف کی کچھ پارٹیوں نے شیخ کی رہائی کا مطالبہ کرتے ہوئے ایک تحریک کا
آغاز کیا۔ لیکن تھکے اور تنگ آئے ہوئے نہرو نے حکم دیا کہ شیخ کو چھوڑ دیا جائے۔ تقریباً ساڑھے چار سال بعد ۸
جنوری ۱۹۵۸ کو پانچ بجے شام کورڈائی کے احکامات اس بنگلے تک پہنچے جہاں شیخ عبداللہ بانیہال رینج کی جنوبی
جانب واقع کُد کی پہاڑی آرام گاہ میں رکھے گئے تھے۔ حکومت کی طرف سے انھیں بتایا گیا کہ ایک ہزار روپے کا
وظیفہ اور جو یومیہ الاؤنس انھیں ملا کرتا تھا اب موقوف ہو گیا ہے اور ایک کار انھیں سری نگر ان کے گھر لے جانے
کے منتظر کھڑی ہے۔ شیخ عبداللہ نے کار واپس کر دی اور مزید ایک دن خود اپنے خرچ پر جیل ہی میں رہنے کا فیصلہ
کیا۔ وہ سرکاری کار کا استعمال نہیں کریں گے۔ دوستوں نے فوراً گاڑی کا انتظام کر دیا اور انھوں نے اس انتظام کو
پہلے کے مقابلے میں نسبتاً بہتر سمجھا۔

اس وقت تک حالات بہت بدل چکے تھے۔ کشمیر کی قانون ساز اسمبلی نے ہندوستان سے الحاق کی توثیق
کر دی تھی اور اس دستور کو مان لیا تھا جس کا نفاذ ۲۶ جنوری ۱۹۵۷ء کو ہوا تھا۔ بخشی غلام محمد جنھوں نے شیخ کا تختہ الٹ
کر حکومت دونوں کو اپنے ہاتھ میں لے لیا تھا، اب بھی وزیراعلیٰ تھے۔ مگر ان کے کچھ ساتھی، ان پر بدعنوان اور نااہل

ہونے کا الزام لگا کر ان سے الگ ہو چکے تھے۔ بخشی غلام محمد کی ماتحتی میں "آزادی کی کمی کو محسوس کرتے ہوئے جی، صادق اور ڈی پی دھر نے ڈیموکریٹک نیشنل کانفرنس کی بنیاد ڈالی۔ شیخ کے حامی نئے نئے بنے ہوئے استصواب محاذ کے جھنڈے کے نیچے جمع ہو گئے۔ فرنٹ کی قیادت مرزا افضل بیگ کر رہے تھے۔ اس پارٹی کے سامنے صرف ایک مقصد تھا۔ ۹۔ اگست ۱۹۵۳ کو شیخ عبداللہ کی گرفتاری سے جمہوریت کو قتل کر دیا گیا تھا، قانون ساز اسمبلی عوام کی نمائندہ نہیں رہ گئی تھی اور اس لیے اس کے لیے ہوئے تمام فیصلے کالعدم ہو گئے تھے۔ نتیجتاً یہ بات لازمی تھی کہ عوام کی خواہشات معلوم کرنے کے لیے ایک نیا استصواب رائے ہونا چاہیے جس کا الحاق سے متعلق بھی
شیخ عبداللہ کے لیے تو کشمیر کی گھڑی ۸۔ اگست ۱۹۵۳ کی نصف شب سے ایک گھنٹہ قبل ہی رک چکی تھی اور وہ اب دہلی کے ساتھ کسی ایسے معاہدے کو ماننے کے لیے تیار نہیں ہو سکتے تھے جو "اسٹیٹس کو" کو بحال کرتا ہو۔ شیخ عبداللہ کے حقیقی نظریات کا کیا ہوا؟ کیا چار سال کی بے وجہ اور من مانی سزائے قید نے انھیں تبدیل کر دیا تھا۔؟

۱۰ جنوری ۱۹۵۸ کو انھوں نے پریس والوں سے ملاقات کی۔ کالی شیروانی اور سفید پاجامے میں ملبوس، وہ خوش و خرم نظر آ رہے تھے۔ پہلے سوال کا ان کا جواب یہ تھا کہ ان چار برسوں میں، مہاتما گاندھی پر ان کا عقیدہ اور پختہ ہو گیا ہے۔ گاندھی جی کی زندگی اور ان کے تجربات، مشکل دنوں میں "روشنی کی کرن" رہے تھے، انھوں نے اعادہ کیا کہ میں آج بھی ۱۹۴۷ء ہی جیسا عبداللہ ہوں۔ جب لوگ کہیں اور جا رہے تھے۔ میں نے گاندھی جی کے آئیڈیل کو بچائے رکھنے کی کوشش کی۔ میں آج بھی بدستور یہی کر رہا ہوں۔ میں تبدیل نہیں ہوا ہوں۔ میرے خیالات پختہ ہیں۔ میں اس قسم کا سیاست داں نہیں ہوں جو حقائق کو دوسروں سے چھپائے۔ میرے خیالات سب ہی لوگ جانتے ہیں ..... قدرتی طور پر، عوام ہی آخری فیصلہ کرنے والے ہیں۔ میں آخری ثالث نہیں ہوں .. میرے پاس لوگوں کو زیر کرنے کے لیے بندوقیں نہیں ہیں انھیں دینے کے لیے روپیہ بھی نہیں ہے میرا طریقہ تو صرف سمجھانے کا، قائل کرنے کا ہے۔"

شیخ عبداللہ میں اگر تلخی تھی تو صرف ان لوگوں کی طرف سے جن کے بارے میں وہ یہ محسوس کرتے تھے کہ ان لوگوں نے ۱۹۵۳ء میں حکومت پر قبضہ کرنے کے لیے ان کے ساتھ غداری کی تھی: "میں نے دوستوں کی پیٹھ پر چھرا گھونپنا نہیں سیکھا ہے۔ دوستوں میں بہت سے وہ ہیں جنھیں میں نے پروان چڑھایا اور انھیں اپنے ہی خاندان کا فرد سمجھا۔ میں نے سازش کرنا یا دوستوں کے ساتھ غداری کرنا نہیں سیکھا ہے۔"

شیخ کی ناراضگی اور ان لوگوں کی دلیلیں جنھوں نے انھیں چھوڑ دیا تھا، دونوں کا بہت اچھا تذکرہ اس خط و کتابت
ملتا ہے جو اگست ۱۹۵۶ کے بعد شیخ عبداللہ اور جی ایم صادق کے مابین اس وقت ہوئی تھی جب شیخ کو یہ معلوم
ہوا تھا کہ قانون ساز اسمبلی عن قریب ایک دستور کی توثیق کرنے والی ہے (یہ خط و کتابت مصنف کو صادق صاحب
کے خاندان والوں سے ملی تھی) صادق صاحب اس وقت قانون ساز اسمبلی کے صدر تھے اور شیخ صاحب نے "ان
مجوزہ اقدامات کے امکانی سنگین اثرات" سے انھیں متنبہ کیا تھا۔ شیخ عبداللہ نے کشمیر کی حالت کو جو اُن کے
خیال میں اب ہو گئی تھی، بیان کیا ان کی رائے میں کشمیر "حقیقی معنوں میں ایک جہنم بن چکا تھا اور حقائق کو دبانے
چھپانے کے لیے ایک آہنی پردہ ڈال دیا گیا تھا" ۹۔اگست ۱۹۵۳ کی حکومت کا تختہ پلٹنے کی کارروائی "فرقہ
پرست، رجعت پسند عناصر اور خود غرض افراد کے مابین ایک گہری سازش کا نتیجہ تھی۔ آخر میں شیخ نے کہا، مجھے یقین
ہے کہ اگر آپ نے اپنے عوام دشمن راستے کو ترک نہ کیا اور کشمیر کے عوام پر ایک دستور تھوپنے کی کوشش کی
تو وہ آپ کے ناپاک ارادوں کا تلخ ترین انجام تک مقابلہ کریں گے۔"

۱۱ستمبر ۱۹۵۶ء کے اپنے جواب میں صادق صاحب نے شیخ عبداللہ کو یاد دلایا کہ اسمبلی کے سامنے اپنی پہلی
تقریر میں خود شیخ صاحب نے مشورہ دیا تھا کہ "اپنی خود مختاری کا پورے طور پر تحفظ کرتے ہوئے تاکہ ہمیں اپنے ملک
کی سابقہ روایات، اور عوام کے مزاج کے مطابق بنانے کی آزادی رہے، ہم (انڈین) یونین کے ساتھ مناسب
دستوری انتظامات کے ذریعے اس عظیم کام میں وفاقی تعاون و امداد پانے کے اپنے حق کو منوا سکتے ہیں اور ساتھ
ہی ہم ان کو اپنے پورے تعاون اور امداد کی پیش کش کر سکتے ہیں۔ صادق صاحب کا کہنا ہے کہ یہ شیخ عبداللہ تھے
جن کی ہندوستان سے وفاداری اگست ۱۹۵۲ کے دہلی معاہدے کے بعد سے متزلزل ہونا شروع ہو گئی تھی انھوں
نے ہی "ہندوستان کے ساتھ ہمارے الحاق کے مفاد کی اذیت ناک تلاش شروع کرنے" کا الزام لگایا: "براہِ
کرم یاد کیجیے کہ اس پورے زمانے میں آپ نے ایک ایسی ٹوٹی پھوٹی ریاست کی خود مختاری کے خیال سے اپنی دلچسپی
کا اظہار فرمایا تھا جس میں کم و بیش صرف وادیٔ کشمیر شامل ہوگی۔ ہماری پُرخلوص التجاؤں اور درخواستوں کے باوجود آپ
اس خیال سے چپٹے رہے اور خود ان رذیل دلیلوں کے باوجود جو اس سے پہلے آپ خود اس کے خلاف دیا کرتے تھے!"

۲۹ستمبر کو شیخ نے اس خط کا جواب بھیجا پہلے تو انھوں نے اس بات کی طرف اشارہ کیا کہ صادق صاحب نے
اس امر کو کہ قانون ساز اسمبلی نے اپنا نمائندہ کردار "جمہوریت کے قتل" کے بعد کھو دیا تھا، نظر انداز کر دیا تھا اس
کے بعد شیخ نے سازش کے الزام کا تذکرہ کیا اور کہا "میری گرفتاری کے فوراً بعد آپ پہلے شخص تھے جس نے ۹ اگست

کی کارروائی کو "صحیح اور برو قت" قرار دیا تھا۔ آپ اس کے فوراً بعد ہی دوڑے دوڑے دہلی اور بمبئی گئے۔
کشمیر کو ایک دوسرے کوریا میں تبدیل کرنے کے لیے کچھ بدیشی قوتوں کے ساتھ سازش کرنے کا مجھ پر الزام رکھ
آپ نے یہ دھمکی بھی دی کہ الزام کو ثابت کرنے کے لیے حکومت کے قبضے میں ناقابلِ تردید ثبوت موجود ہے۔ اگرچہ
تین سال سے زیادہ کا عرصہ گذر چکا ہے مگر ان غیر ذمہ دارانہ الزامات کے نام نہاد ثبوت ابھی تک سامنے نہیں آئے
ہیں۔" شیخ صاحب نے مزید لکھا کہ اگر بخشی گروپ یہ سمجھتا تھا کہ وہ اکثریت میں ہے تو جائز طریقہ یہ ہوتا کہ وہ شیخ
کے خلاف عدمِ اعتماد کی تحریک لاتے اور ایوان میں رائے شماری کے ذریعہ شیخ کو حکومت سے نکال باہر کرتے
"اگر تجویز منظور ہو جاتی۔" شیخ نے لکھا "میں نے اپنا استعفیٰ پیش کر دیا ہوتا" "مگر یہ موقع کبھی نہیں دیا گیا یہاں
تک کہ جواہر لال نہرو نے بھی جمہوریت کے ساتھ اپنے جذباتی اور ذہنی وفاداری کے باوجود اس ضابطہ شکنی کو ہونے
دیا۔ اور عوام پسند بہانہ تھا قومی مفاد کا۔ مگر شیخ نے اس بات کے لیے اپنے دوست پر برسرِ عام کبھی الزام
نہ رکھا اگرچہ نجی گفتگو میں ہو سکتا ہے کہ انھوں نے یہ مسئلہ اٹھایا ہو۔

درحقیقت، اگر سیاست کو نہیں تو جواہر لال نہرو کی شخصیت کو اس سے بہتر خراجِ عقیدت پیش ہی نہیں
کیا جا سکتا جو انھیں ایک ایسے شخص نے پیش کیا جو ابھی ابھی چار سال سے زیادہ عرصہ جیل میں گزار کر آیا تھا "میں
محبت اور اس خلوص کو کیوں کر بھول سکتا ہوں جو انھوں نے اپنے خاندان کا ایک فرد سمجھ کر میرے ساتھ برتا؟ میں
سمجھ سکتا ہوں، بہت سی قوتیں برسرِ عمل ہوتی ہیں جب کوئی کسی جد و جہد کی منجھدھار میں ہوتا ہے۔ اس پر چہار سمت
سے کھینچا تانی ہوتی ہے۔ خود غرض مفاد پرستوں کی طرف سے قومی اور بین الاقوامی مطالبات کی طرف سے۔ اگر کوئی
شخص ان مطالبات کا مقابلہ کر سکتا ہے تو وہ ہیں، صرف پنڈت جی، غالباً صورت حال میں کارفرما قوتیں یہ نہیں
تھیں کہ مسائل کو جلدی حل کرنے کی غرض سے انھوں نے مجھے جیل میں بند کر دیا۔"

۱۲ جنوری ۱۹۵۸ء کو شیخ عبد اللہ سری نگر پہنچے۔ سارا شہر "شیرِ کشمیر زندہ باد" کے نعروں سے گونج اٹھا
انھیں دیکھنے کے لیے سارا شہر ٹوٹ پڑا۔ ۱۳ جنوری کو انھوں نے ایک جلسہ عام کو خطاب کیا۔ ان کی شعلہ بیانی پھر
عروج پر تھی۔ ایک جذباتی تقریر میں انھوں نے ان لوگوں پر حملے کیے جو کہتے تھے کہ اب جب کہ دستور ساز اسمبلی
توثیق کر دی ہے۔ الحاق کو قطعی سمجھ کر اس پر بحث ختم ہو جانا چاہیے۔ شیخ کا کہنا تھا کہ اسمبلی اپنا جمہوری کردار کھو چکی
ہے اس لیے لوگوں کو رائے دینے کا ایک اور موقع دیا جانا چاہیے۔" مسٹر نہرو نے سری نگر کے اسی لال چوک
پر کشمیریوں کی طرف اپنا ہاتھ بڑھایا تھا (نومبر ۱۹۴۷ء کے اسی انتہائی جذباتی دن پر) اور عوام کو یقین دلایا تھا

the independence and the welfare of other peoples seemed valid grounds for intervention only when they were supplementary to obvious self-interest, never when they stood alone.

So much for the isolationist factors of American tradition, of which some remain in official policy even today and of which all are still influential among some sections of national opinion. But that there have been counter-forces is sufficiently clear from the fact that America has moved so far from isolation. Progress toward intervention was made possible by the fact that the doctrine of non-intervention has always been qualified by the principle that intervention in any necessary degree was justified by involvement of the nation's substantial interest or legal rights. Such progress was made inevitable by the gradual expansion in the conception of national interest which accompanied the increase in the scope of national life and in its interdependence with world politics. Finally, America's escape from isolation was facilitated by the fact that the so-called corollaries of non-intervention, being without explicit authorization in the most august sources of American tradition, never achieved the degree of national allegiance reached by the doctrine of non-intervention itself.

This progression away from relative isolation took place in all phases of American foreign relations but it first started, went farthest, and now promises most in relations with the Far East, America's veritable training-school for world politics. For its westward enterprise so involved America there that the Orient came more and more to belie the premise of non-intervention, formulated in contemplation of Europe, that the wars and controversies of others arose from causes essentially foreign to America's concerns. In three roughly distinguishable stages, each marked by a broadened idea of national interest and of the valid scope of intervention, America progressed to a middle-of-the-road policy which is as noteworthy for its distance from isolation as for its remoteness from active intervention.

THE FIRST stage, built upon the needs of the trader and the missionary, was one in which the objective that evoked intervention was the imposition upon Oriental nations of Occidental legal

کشمیر کے الحاق کے بارے میں آخری اور قطعی فیصلہ عوام پر چھوڑ دیا جائے گا۔ اس یقین دہانی کی توثیق بعد میں سیکورٹی کونسل میں بھی کی گئی۔ میں مسٹر نہرو سے پوچھتا ہوں وہ اب اس پہلو پر خاموش کیوں ہیں؟ کیا وہ اب کشمیریوں کو بھیڑ بکریاں سمجھتے ہیں؟ ہندوستان کو اپنے اس رویّے کے بعد جو اس نے ۱۹۵۲ء میں اختیار کیا کشمیریوں کی شکست کو جیتنے کی توقع نہیں کرنا چاہیے (کشمیر کے مستقبل کے) مسئلے کو جو لوگ طے کر سکتے ہیں وہ صرف کشمیر کے عوام ہیں، چالیس لاکھ، مرد، عورتیں اور بچے۔ یہاں کے مسلمان ہیں اور ہندو ہیں جو اس سرزمین پر رہتے بستے ہیں دہلی میں وزیر دفاع دی کے کرشنا مینن ایسی تقریروں کو وطن دشمن قرار دے رہے تھے اور ظاہر ہے کہ بخشی غلام محمد کا ہر لمحہ اصرار تھا کہ ہندوستان سے الحاق اب کسی تنازعے سے مبرا ہے۔ محکمہ خفیہ ایک بار پھر سرگرم عمل ہو گیا (اس موقع پر یہ بات یاد رکھنے کی ہے کہ دستور کی دفعہ (۱۹) کی تحت علیحدگی کا پروپگینڈا کرنے کا حق بدستور حاصل تھا۔ مثال کے طور پر جنوبی ہندوستان میں علیحدگی، ڈی ایم کے کے مشن کا بنیادی نکتہ تھا۔ یہ آزادی تو اسی وقت ختم ہوئی جب ۱۹۶۳ء میں پارلیامنٹ نے دستور میں سولھویں ترمیم منظور کی)

جس دن شیخ عبداللہ کی رہائی ہوئی تھی اسی دن پاکستان کے وزیر اعظم، ملک فیروز خاں نون نے یہ بات بڑی صفائی سے کہا تھا کہ شیخ کی گرفتاری پاکستانی پروپگنڈے کے لیے ایک بہت موثر ہتھیار ثابت ہوئی تھی "مجھے افسوس ہے کہ وہ ہتھیار ہمارے ہاتھوں سے نکل گیا۔ حالات جس طرح وقوع پذیر ہوئے اس میں ملک فیروز خاں نون کچھ اور تو نہ کر سکے سوائے اس کے کہ انھیں مزید چار ماہ انتظار کرنا پڑا۔

۳۰ اپریل ۱۹۵۸ء کو رات کے سوا گیارہ بجے شیخ کو دوبارہ گرفتار کر لیا گیا۔ اس مرتبہ ان کی گرفتاری پریونٹیو سیفٹی ایکٹ کے تحت ہوئی تھی۔ پولیس کے انسپکٹر جنرل ڈی ڈبلو مہرا نے کہا کہ "ان کا آزاد رہنا ریاست کی سلامتی کے لیے نقصان دہ تھا" کہانی (ہر طرف سے معمہ اٹھایا گیا) یہ مشہور کی گئی کہ شیخ عبداللہ نے، ان مجرموں کو پناہ دی ہے جن کی، استصواب محاذ کی بھڑکائی ہوئی قتل و غارت گری، آتش زنی اور لوٹ مار میں ملوث ہونے کے وجہ سے تلاش تھی۔ حسب معمول مخالف پروپگنڈے کے بند ٹوٹ گئے۔ بخشی غلام محمد نے لندن کے اخبار ڈیلی ٹیلی گراف کو انٹرویو میں جو ۲ مئی کو شائع ہوا تھا، بتایا "انھوں نے (شیخ عبداللہ نے) مسلم تشدد اور تعصب کو تبلیغ کی...... اس سلسلے میں بھی کسی شک وشبہہ کی گنجائش نہیں ہے کہ شیخ عبداللہ پاکستان کے ساتھ سازباز کر رہے تھے اور یہ پاکستان ہی تھا جہاں سے ان کو اپنی فوج بنانے کے لیے روپیہ مل رہا تھا۔" خود نہرو کا بھی یہ خیال تھا کہ شیخ عبداللہ اب "جس پالیسی کو اپنا رہے ہیں وہ تنگ دماغ، فرقہ پرست اور نہایت خطرناک ہے۔"

شیخ عبداللہ نے نہرو کے اس خیال کو درست کرنے کی کوشش کی۔ دی نیویارک ٹائمز کے دہلی میں نامہ نگار اے۔ ی۔ روزنیتھال نے شیخ کے اس خط کا حوالہ دیا جو انھوں نے نہرو کو جیل سے لکھا تھا "میں اس سب کو خاموشی کے ساتھ دیکھ رہا ہوں تاکہ میں خود یہ معلوم کر سکوں کہ ریاست کے مسلم اکثریت والے حصے میں ہندوستانی جمہوریت کس ڈھنگ سے چل رہی ہے۔ اس بات میں کوئی شک نہیں ہے کہ میں اس پالیسی سے بالکل اتفاق نہیں کرتا ہوں جس پر حکومت عمل پیرا ہے...... دس سالہ یہ تنازعہ کشمیر کے عوام کو وہ حق خود اختیاری دے کر (یہی حل ہو سکتا ہے) جس کی خود آپ نے پُرزور حمایت کی تھی...... میں اب بھی سمجھتا ہوں کہ مسئلے کے حل کی کنجی آپ کے ہاتھ میں ہے اور آپ سے اپیل کرتا ہوں کہ آپ ایک ایسی پالیسی پر عمل پیرا ہو کر، جو بہرحال ہم سب کے لیے تباہ کن ثابت ہوگی، بخشی اور ان کے حامیوں سے دھوکہ نہ کھایئے۔ امید ہے کہ آپ کی صحت ٹھیک ہوگی۔"

پچھلے واقعات پر غور کرتے ہوئے اگر دیکھا جائے تو شیخ عبداللہ کی بار گرفتاری پہلی گرفتاری کے مقابلے میں زیادہ منطق اور زیادہ ضروری معلوم ہوتی ہے۔ شیخ عبداللہ کی دوسری گرفتاری کے لیے بخشی غلام محمد جو دلیلیں دیتے ہیں انھیں غیر ذمہ دارانہ کہہ کر نظر انداز کیا جا سکتا ہے مگر شیخ عبداللہ کو فرقہ پرست کہنے پر نہ دکھ دفاع نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔ پاکستان نے ان پچیس برسوں میں کتنی تمنا اس بات کی کی ہوگی کہ کاش شیخ عبداللہ درحقیقت وہ سب کچھ ہوتے جو ان کے ناقد کہتے تھے کہ وہ ہیں۔ ابھی تک شیخ عبداللہ کا ایک بیان بھی کوئی ایسا نہیں ڈھونڈ پایا جس میں شیخ نے کشمیر کے پاکستان سے مل جانے کی وکالت کی ہو یا کہا ہو کہ کشمیریوں کی استصواب میں پاکستان کے حق میں ووٹ دینا چاہیے۔ مگر آزادی اور عزت کے ساتھ اپنا مستقبل طے کرنے کے کشمیریوں کے حق کے سلسلہ میں وہ ذہنی طور پر کسی سمجھوتے کے لیے تیار نہیں تھے۔ وہ یہ سوچ رہے تھے کہ اپنے عوام کو سب سے بڑی چیز جو وہ دے سکتے ہیں وہ خود اعتمادی اور افتخار ہے جو مغل، پاٹھان، سکھ یا ڈوگرہ حکمرانوں نے یکے بعد دیگرے تباہ کر دیا تھا اور خود اپنی بے وجہ برطرفی کو انھوں نے نوآبادکاری نظام اور نیم جاگیردارانہ قوتوں کی واپسی اور عوام کی خودمختاری کی تحقیر تصور کیا جسے قبول کرنے کے لیے انھیں وہ سب کچھ تج دینا پڑتا جس کے لیے وہ زندگی بھر لڑے تھے، جدوجہد کی تھی۔ اس میں کسی شک کی گنجایش نہیں ہے کہ اگر ۱۹۵۸ء میں انھیں آزاد چھوڑ دیا جاتا تو عوام کی خفگی کا مقابلہ کرنا حکومت ہند کے لیے مشکل ہو جاتا۔ ۱۹۵۳ء میں لیا جانے والا فیصلہ برا تھا مگر جب وہ ایک دفعہ لے لیا گیا تو پھر نہرو کو ایک برے فیصلے کی منطق کے مطابق عمل کرنا ہی تھا۔ غلطی پر مزید غلطیوں ہی سے قابو پایا جا سکتا ہے۔

شیخ عبداللہ جس قسم کا استصواب چاہتے تھے اس کا مسئلہ بہت سیدھا سادا تھا۔ دہلی کا حکمران طبقہ یہ سمجھتا
تھا کہ کشمیر کے مسلمان ہندوستان سے الحاق کے لیے اب، اور خصوصاً شیخ عبداللہ کی گرفتاری کے بعد ووٹ نہیں
دیں گے۔ اگر نہرو ابھی تک استصواب کے بارے میں سرگرمی دکھاتے رہے تو اس کی وجہ یہ تھی کہ انھیں شیخ عبداللہ
کی طرح اس بات کا یقین تھا کہ عوام کی بہت بڑی اکثریت کا جواب ہندوستان کے حق میں اثبات میں ہوگا۔ اس بات
کا ثبوت بھی ۱۹۵۱ء کے دستور ساز اسمبلی کے انتخابات میں مل چکا تھا جب پاکستان دوست عناصر نے شرمناک
شکست کھائی تھی۔ پاکستان کے بھیجے ہوئے لیڈروں کے خلاف غصہ اپنے عروج پر تھا۔ پاکستانی "جنگ بازوں"
کے خلاف نعرے عام تھے۔ مگر ۱۹۵۲ء تک سیکولرازم کے عقیدے سے کشمیر کی وفاداری پر دہلی کا اعتماد بڑی حد
تک کم ہو چکا تھا۔ بالکل اسی طرح جس طرح جمہوریت پر دہلی کے ایمان کے سلسلے میں کشمیر بے یقینی میں مبتلا ہو گیا تھا۔
۱۹۵۷ء تک حکومت ہند نے یہ اعلان کر دیا تھا کہ اب استصواب رائے عامہ کا کوئی سوال نہیں رہا ہے۔ سرکاری
وضاحت یہ تھی کہ استصواب کا وعدہ صرف اس حالت میں تھا کہ پاکستانی فوجیں کشمیر چھوڑ دیں گی۔ وہ چوں کہ
ابھی بدستور موجود ہیں اس لیے کوئی استصواب نہیں ہو سکتا اور یقیناً پاکستانی فوجی اب بھی وہاں ہیں اور وہ
اس وقت تک نہیں جائیں گے جب تک ہندوستانی فوج اس قابل نہیں ہوتی ہے کہ انھیں نکال باہر کرے
نامہ نگار تحریر: ایسا لگتا ہے کہ ہندوستانی اور پاکستانی فوج کم از کم اس وقت تو ایسی نہیں کہ ایک دوسرے
کو نکال سکے۔ کشمیر اس دن تک منقسم رہے گا جب تک، اگر کبھی ایسا ہو جائے کہ پرانا ملک پھر سے متحد ہو جائے
ایک حقیقی وفاق وجود میں آجائے۔ وفاق کا خیال آخری دفعہ ۱۹۶۴ء میں سامنے آیا تھا اور یہ آخری چیز تھی جس
کے لیے دو دوست جواہر لال نہرو اور شیخ عبداللہ اس ہنگامی موسم گرما میں کوشش کرنے والے تھے۔

گرما ۱۹۶۴ء سے چھ موسم گرما قبل شیخ عبداللہ پر "مجرمانہ قوت کے بل پر" جموں و کشمیر کی حکومت کا تختہ پلٹنے کی
سازش کے الزام میں مقدمہ چل رہا تھا۔ ۲۱ مئی ۱۹۵۸ء کو جموں کے ایک مجسٹریٹ کی عدالت میں، پچیس مجرموں کے خلاف
سازش "کشمیر کانسپریسی کیس" نام کے مقدمے کی سماعت شروع ہوئی۔ ۲۳ اکتوبر کو استغاثہ کے سینیئر وکیل جے۔
نے سازش کرنے والوں کی فہرست میں دو اہم ناموں کو شامل کرنے کی درخواست گزاری۔ یہ نام تھے شیخ محمد
عبداللہ اور مرزا افضل بیگ کے۔ ۲۴ اکتوبر کو عدالت لوگوں سے کھچا کھچ بھری تھی۔ کشتی رنگ کے کرتے پاجامے
میں ملبوس شیخ عبداللہ نے وہاں کے مجمع کو مسکرا کر تہنیت پیش کی۔ دوسرے دن انھوں نے عدالت کو بتایا
کہ "شکایت نامے کو پڑھ لیا ہے۔" اور اچھے خاصے لطف کے ساتھ، پھر انھوں نے اپنا نقطۂ نظر بتایا کہ

یہ مقدمہ ہے کس سلسلے کا۔ انھوں نے کہا کہ یہ بات صاف ہے کہ اس استغاثہ کے پیچھے ایک سیاسی چال ہے۔ مقدمہ
سوائے سیاست کے اور کچھ نہیں ہے۔ شیخ نے مزید کہا کہ "ایک سازشی کہنے کے بجائے زیادہ صحیح یہ ہوتا کہ اسے
"ایک سازش کا شکار کہا جاتا۔ حکومت ہند چھ سال اس بات کو ماننے میں لے گی کہ شیخ عبداللہ صحیح تھے۔ حکومت
کی ساری قوت کی پشت پناہی اور دلوں میں انھیں بدنام کرنے کے عزم مصمم کے ساتھ بھی شیخ عبداللہ کے مخالفین
ا۔ پھر کچھ ثابت کرنے میں ناکام تھے۔ شیخ عبداللہ ایک بار پھر جیل سے نکلیں گے اور سر اٹھائے ہوئے نکلیں گے

شیخ کی حراست کے زمانے میں جموں اور کشمیر کی حکومت نے جمہوری ہونے کی اداکاری تک چھوڑ دی۔"
الیکشن تو قانون کی رو سے ہونے ہی تھے۔ مگر کھلم کھلا اس بات کی کوشش ہوئی کہ عبداللہ دوست امیدوار جیتنے نہ پائیں
ایک خط جس نے خاص شہرت پائی، اس میں ۱۹۶۲ء کے انتخابات کے بعد جس میں تقریباً تمام نشستیں نیشنل کانفرنس
نے جیتی تھیں، خود نہرو نے بخشی غلام محمد کو لکھا تھا۔ "حقیقت تو یہ ہے کہ آپ کچھ نشستوں پر اپنے اچھے مخالف
امیدواروں سے ہار جاتے [illegible] ایس۔ گوپال کے مطابق، پنڈت نہرو نے اپریل ۱۹۶۲ء میں ایک کوشش کی کہ شیخ
رہا ہو جائیں مگر د[illegible]ت، [illegible] اور سری نگر کی حکومت نے مزاحمت کی۔

۱۹۶۲ء کی چین ہندوستان جنگ نے کشمیر کے مسئلے پر اچھا خاصا اثر ڈالا تھا۔ امریکہ اور برطانیہ نے ایوب
خان کو کشمیر کا داؤ اس وقت کھیل لینے سے روکنے میں مدد کی جب ہندوستانی فوج پر ہمالیہ پہاڑوں میں مار پڑ رہی تھی۔
جنگ بندی اور چینیوں کی غیر متوقع واپسی کے بعد نہرو پر پاکستان سے کشمیر کے معاملے میں کوئی تصفیہ کرنے کے
لیے اینگلو امریکی دباؤ ڈالا جانے لگا۔ چینیوں کی فتح پر پاکستان خوش تھا اور ایوب خان نے دو عالمی جنگوں میں
بہترین مظاہرہ کرنے والی "عظیم ہندوستانی فوج" کی اچانک شکست کے بارے میں کسی موزوں ہندوستانی پر
کرنے کا کوئی موقع کبھی ہاتھ سے جانے نہ دیا۔ ہندوستان اور پاکستان کے مابین مذاکرات کا ایک طویل سلسلہ دسمبر
میں شروع ہوا۔ یہ مذاکرات راولپنڈی، دہلی، کراچی اور کلکتہ میں ہوئے اور اگلے سال مارچ تک چلتے رہے
ہندوستان، پاکستان کو مزید پندرہ ہزار مربع میل علاقہ اس شرط پر دینے کو تیار تھا کہ پاکستان نئی سرحد کو
بین الاقوامی سرحد مان لے۔ مگر ایوب خان اور ناٹک کے شوقین ان کے چیلے ذوالفقار علی بھٹو کے ذہن میں
کچھ اور ہی تھا۔ پاکستان نے اپنی نیت کا اظہار واضح طور پر اس وقت کر دیا جب ہندوستان سے مذاکرات شروع
ہونے سے ایک دن قبل پاکستان نے پاکستان اور چین کے درمیان ایک سرحدی مصالحت کا اعلان کر دیا
اور یہ بھی واضح کر دیا کہ یہ مصالحت کشمیر کے مسئلے کے طے ہونے کے بعد ایک باقاعدہ معاہدے میں تبدیل کر دی۔

جائے گی دیر تو ضروری تھی اس لیے کہ درحقیقت پاکستان وسیع و عریض بنجر مگر فوجی نقطۂ نظر سے اہم کشمیر کا علاقہ
چین کے حوالے کر رہا تھا) ہندوستان کے ساتھ یہ عمل بہرحال ان مذاکرات سے ایک دن پہلے ظاہر ہے کہ کوئی مناسب
بات نہیں تھی جن مذاکرات کے بارے میں خیال تھا کہ وہ ایک "تاریخی" امن کے قیام کی طرف لے جائیں گے۔ پُراعتماد
بھٹو نے یہ سمجھتے ہوئے کہ بالادستی ان کی ہے، کہا کہ پاکستان ہماچل پردیش سے ملحق تھوڑے سے حصے کو چھوڑ کر
ساری وادی کشمیر سے کم پر مطمئن نہیں ہو سکتا۔ بھٹو نے ہندوستانی وفد سے کہا تھا (گندیویا کے حوالے سے جو
خود شریک وفد تھے) "دیکھیے نا آپ ایک ہاری ہوئی قوم ہیں"۔ مگر ہندوستان کی تاریخ میں وہ ایک ایسا وقت
تھا جب ۳۷ سال کا ایک نو آموز پاکستانی سیاست دان ایسے بیانات دے اور اسے کوئی جواب دینے والا نہ ملے
پاکستان اور چین نئے نئے دوست ہو گئے تھے اور بھٹو شیخی بھی بگھار سکتے تھے اور دھمکی بھی دے سکتے تھے کہ ہندوستان سے
مستقبل کی کسی بھی جنگ میں اس کا مقابلہ ایشیا کے سب سے طاقت ور ملک پاکستان کے ساتھ ہوگا اور ظاہر ہے کہ
یہ حقیقت کہ پاکستان کا اسلحہ بار دنیا کے سب سے طاقت ور ملک سے پہلے ہی آ چکا تھا (۱۹۶۲ء کی جنگ
کے بعد ہندوستان نے امریکہ اور برطانیہ سے پانچ سو ملین ڈالر کے ہتھیاروں کی درخواست کی تھی اور اسے صرف
سات ملین ڈالر کے ہتھیار ملے تھے، جب کہ پاکستان کو اس وقت تک مغربی ملکوں سے آٹھ سو ملین ڈالر کی قیمت کے
ہتھیار دیے جا چکے تھے) یہی پاکستانی گھمنڈ تھا جس نے ملک کو ۱۹۶۵ء کی اس جنگ میں دھکیل دیا جس کے
بارے میں ایوب خاں اور بھٹو دونوں کو یقین تھا کہ اس میں جیت اِدھر سے ٹہلتے ہوئے اُدھر جانے کے مترادف
ہے۔ دراصل یہ خود اعتمادی کی زیادتی تھی جس نے ایوب خاں سے ۱۹۶۴ء کی نہرو، عبداللہ تجویز کو حقارت آمیز طریقے پر
ٹھکرایا۔ کشمیر میں اپنی فوجی فتح کے خواب میں گم پاکستانی اس آگ کو بھول گئے جو خود ان کے پچھلے صحن میں لگ چکی
تھی۔ اگرچہ نہرو نے انہیں اس کے بارے میں آگاہ کرنے کی بھی کوشش کی تھی۔

پاکستان کے ساتھ ۱۹۶۲ء کے مذاکرات سے پہلے پنڈت نہرو کو اس خیال کی خوبیاں نظر آنے لگی تھیں کہ
ہندوستان اور پاکستان کی الجھن کا حل ایک وفاق ہی میں تھا۔ پنڈت نہرو کا خیال تھا کہ اسے ایک ڈھیلی ڈھالی یونین ہونا
چاہیے۔ ہندوستان، مغربی پاکستان، کشمیر اور مشرقی بنگال، دفاع، امور خارجہ اور مواصلات کی ایک مشترکہ پالیسی کا
وفاق۔ اس وفاق سے نہ صرف یہ کہ کشمیر کے لیے ہونے والی جدوجہد میں کمی آئے گی بلکہ یہ پاکستان کے دونوں
حصوں کے درمیان فاصلے کے مسئلے کو بھی حل کر دے گا اور زیادہ خود مختاری دے کر مشرقی بنگال کے بڑھتے ہوئے
غم و غصہ کو بھی قابو میں رکھا جا سکے گا جیسا کہ پنڈت نہرو نے واشنگٹن پوسٹ کے دلی میں مقیم نامہ نگار کو بتایا تھا۔

بیان ۱۹ دسمبر ۱۹۶۲ کو شائع ہوا اور ایس گوپال نے حوالہ دیا) "وفاق ہماری غلطی اور آخری منزل ہے - یورپ کو دیکھیے کامن مارکٹ پر نظر ڈالیے ۔ ہر جگہ یہی خواہش ہے۔ کہیں بھی دو قومیں اتنے قریب نہیں ہیں جتنی کہ ہندوستان اور پاکستان کی - حالانکہ اگر ہم یہ کہیں تو وہ گھبرا جاتے ہیں وہ سوچتے ہیں کہ ہم ان کو نگل لینا چاہتے ہیں۔"

شیخ عبداللہ کے سلسلے میں بھی نہرو کو احساس جرم ہونے لگا تھا انھوں نے کہا کہ ایسا معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ شیخ عبداللہ کو چھوڑنے کی ہمت ملک میں نہیں تھی۔ پھر سری نگر میں ایک واقعہ ہوا جس نے یہ ظاہر کر دیا کہ شیخ عبداللہ اور ان کے وفاداروں کے تعاون کے بغیر آتش فشاں کتنی آسانی سے پھٹ سکتا ہے۔ حضرت بل کی خوب صورت مسجد میں جہاں جمعہ کی نماز کے بعد شیخ عبداللہ نے اکثر خطاب کیا تھا، وہاں ساتویں صدی میں رسول اللہ صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم کا ایک بال تبرک کے طور پر رکھا گیا تھا - ۱۲ دسمبر ۱۹۶۳ کو یہ مقدس یادگار معلوم ہوا کہ غائب ہے - سری نگر پھٹ پڑا۔ ایک ہفتہ تک لوگ سڑکوں پر رہے اور اس احتجاج کے آگے آگے عبداللہ دوست قوتیں تھیں ۔ ایک ہفتہ میں موئے مبارک ریکا یک پردہ خفا سے نکل آیا سکیوں نے سوال کرنا شروع کیا کہ آیا یہ بال حقیقتاً موئے مبارک ہے یا لوگوں کے جذبات کو ٹھنڈا کرنے کے لیے اس کی جگہ کوئی اور بال رکھ دیا گیا ہے - بال کو دیکھ کر اس کی اصلیت کا تعین کرنے کی معتبر شاہدوں کو اس کی اجازت نہ دے کر ریاستی حکومت نے جذبات کی آگ پر اور تیل چھڑکا ۔ پنڈت نہرو نے مداخلت کی اور لال بہادر شاستری سے جو اس وقت ایک وزیر بے قلمدان تھے فوراً سری نگر جانے کے لیے کہا۔ موئے مبارک کا جانچ کرنے کے لیے شاستری جی نے چند مذہبی افراد سے درخواست کی ان میں شیخ عبداللہ کے پرانے اور بزرگ ساتھی مولانا مسعودی بھی تھے سب نے سکون و اطمینان کی سانس لی جب ان لوگوں نے موئے مبارک کے حقیقی اور اصلی ہونے کا اعلان کیا۔

اس واقعے کے بعد شاستری جی اس گروہ میں شامل ہو گئے جو شیخ عبداللہ کی رہائی کے لیے پنڈت نہرو پہ زور ڈال رہا تھا۔ پنڈت جی نے شاستری سے کہا کہ وہ جیل میں شیخ عبداللہ سے ملیں۔ شاستری جی ملے، مگر شیخ عبداللہ اپنی رہائی کے سلسلے میں کسی شرط کو ماننے کے لیے تیار نہیں تھے۔ اگر وہ ایسا کرنے پر رضامند ہو گئے ہوتے تو بہت پہلے ہی وہ ایک آزاد فرد ہو جاتے۔ وزارت داخلہ کے لیے شیخ صاحب اس بھی ملک کے لیے ایک بڑا خطرہ تھے۔ گنڈیویا (جو اس واقعے میں موجود تھے) نے لکھا ہے کہ "ایک دن نہرو ایک بیوروکریٹ پر جو اس قسم کے شبہات ظاہر کر رہا تھا بھڑک پڑے اور انتہائی غصے میں کہا " اگر کمبخت چار سال اور چھ سال میں کوئی چیز ثابت نہیں کی جا سکتی تو ظاہر ہے کہ ان کو ثابت کرنے کے لیے کچھ ہے ہی نہیں۔"

۵ اپریل ۱۹۶۴ء کو پنڈت نہرو کی براہ راست ہدایت پر وزارت داخلہ کو نظر انداز کرتے ہوئے کشمیر کے وزیر اعلیٰ جی ایم صادق نے اعلان کر دیا کہ شیخ عبداللہ کے خلاف دائر کیے جانے والے مقدمات فوراً واپس لیے جا رہے ہیں۔ شیخ صاحب ۸ اپریل کو رہا کر دیے گئے اور ایک بار پھر جموں سے کشمیر تک یہ ایک فاتحانہ سفر تھا۔ شیخ عبداللہ میں اگر کوئی تبدیلی محسوس ہوتی تھی تو وہ صرف یہ تھی کہ وہ پچھلی بار کے مقابلے میں اپنی حراست کے سلسلے میں کچھ فلسفی نظر آتے تھے ان میں تلخی نہیں تھی۔ "یہ سب کھیل کا حصہ ہے اور میں نے اسے اسی جذبہ سے لیا ہے۔"

۱۰ اپریل کو پنڈت نہرو نے اپنے پرانے دوست کو ایک ذاتی خط لکھا اور اس میں انھیں رہائی کے بعد دہلی آنے اور اپنے ساتھ قیام کرنے کی دعوت دی۔ یہ خط شیخ کو ۱۰ اپریل کو ملا۔ اس وقت سڑک کے ذریعہ سری نگر لے جانے کا پروگرام طے ہو چکا تھا۔ شیخ پنڈت نہرو کے گھر پر ان کے مہمان کی حیثیت سے قیام کرنے کے لیے ۲۹ اپریل کو دہلی آ سکے۔ اب بڑے طول طویل اور سنجیدہ مشورے شروع ہوئے صرف پنڈت جی اور شیخ کے درمیان ہی نہیں بلکہ دوسرے متعدد بڑے اور اہم لیڈروں کے ساتھ بھی جن میں جے پرکاش نارائن، سی راج گوپال اچاریہ اور اچاریہ کرپلانی جیسے وہ لوگ بھی شامل تھے جو کانگریس چھوڑ چکے تھے۔ شیخ عبداللہ حالات پر تبادلہ خیال کے لیے محترم اچاریہ ونوبا بھاوے کی خدمت میں بھی حاضر ہوئے جو اب تارک دنیا ہو چکے تھے اور واردھا میں اپنے آشرم میں رہتے تھے۔ ("اگر آپ روحانیت اور عمل سیاست کو ملانے میں کامیاب ہو جاتے ہیں" شیخ نے ایک پریس کانفرنس کو خطاب کرتے ہوئے کہا "تو پھر آپ کو کسی چیز کے لیے پریشان ہونے کی ضرورت نہیں ہوتی ہے")

شیخ کی شرائط وہی تھیں۔ جو بھی فیصلہ ہو اسے کشمیریوں کے لیے قابل احترام ہونا چاہیے اور ہندوستانی سیکولرزم پر اس کے کسی قسم کے منفی اثرات نہیں پڑنے چاہییں مگر ہند چین جنگ کے بعد کے زمانے میں توجہ کا مرکز بدل گیا تھا۔ خود جنگ کے دوران شیخ نے پنڈت نہرو کو لکھا تھا کہ آزادی کی مشترکہ کوشش کے لیے کشمیر کے مسئلے کو حل کرنا ایک اہم قدم ہوگا۔ اب انھوں نے یہ بھی کہنا شروع کیا کہ مقبوضہ کشمیر کا ایک بڑا حصہ ہندوستان اور پاکستان کی باہمی رنجشوں کی وجہ سے چین کے حوالے کر دیا گیا۔ ہمارا مقصد صرف یہی نہیں تھا کہ کشمیر کے الحاق کے آئینی یا قانونی ہونے کی توثیق ہو جائے، بلکہ اصل کام یہ ہے کہ مسئلے کا ایک ایسا حل تلاش کیا جائے جو برصغیر کے امن اور استحکام کو خطرے سے نکال کر دے جو کشمیر کے تنازعہ ہونے کی وجہ سے برباد ہوا ہے۔ شیخ عبداللہ کے خیال

کا منطقی جواب صرف ہندوستان، پاکستان اور کشمیر کا ایک وفاق تھا۔ شیخ عبداللہ اس وقت بڑے اچھے موڈ میں تھے۔ غالباً طویل حراست کے بعد اعلیٰ ترین سطحوں پر ملک کی سیاست میں شرکت مسکّن ثابت ہو رہی تھی۔

۶ مئی کو ایک اور ٹھوکا لگا یہ محسوس کرتے ہوئے کہ اس ساری چپقلش میں پاکستان پیچھے چھوٹا جا رہا ہے، ایوب خاں نے شیخ عبداللہ کو ایک خط بھیجا "آپ ظاہر ہے، ہندوستانی لیڈروں کے ساتھ کشمیر کے مستقبل کے بارے میں تبادلہ خیال کر رہے ہیں اس بات کو مدنظر رکھتے ہوئے ہم نے کشمیر کے عوام سے ایک وعدہ کیا ہے کہ ریاست کا مستقبل ان کی خواہشات اور اقوام متحدہ کی تجاویز کے مطابق ہوگا اور پھر یہ حقیقت کہ کشمیر میں ہمارے بھی اہم مفادات مضمر ہیں اس سلسلے میں ہمارے مشورے اور ہماری رضامندی کے بغیر کوئی فیصلہ نہ ہو جائے۔ آپ ہماری تشویش کا اندازہ کر سکتے ہیں اس لیے اگر آپ سمجھتے ہیں کہ ایسے مشوروں کے لیے اب وقت آگیا ہے تو ہمیں آپ کا یہاں استقبال کرنے اور آپ کے ساتھ مسئلے پر غور کرنے میں بڑی مسرت ہوگی۔"

دعوت قبول کر لی گئی۔ شیخ عبداللہ یہ آزمائش کرنے کے مشتاق تھے کہ وفاق کے خیال کا پاکستانیوں پر کیا رد عمل ہوتا ہے۔ غالباً پنڈت نہرو نے ان سب میں کچھ ضرورت سے زیادہ مضمرات پڑھ لیے اور جھنجھلا گئے۔ انھیں اس بات کا یقین تھا کہ پاکستان اس خیال پر راضی نہ ہوگا اور یہ خیال محض ایک سعی لاحاصل ہو کر رہ جائے گا ایوب خاں یہ کہیں گے کہ یہ پاکستانیوں کو ایک بار پھر ہندوستان میں مدغم کر لینے کی ایک چھپی ڈھکی کوشش ہے شیخ عبداللہ اس کی کامیابی کے لیے زیادہ پرامید تھے۔ انھوں نے ایوب خاں کو جواب دیا وہ اس "محبت آمیز دعوت" پر "جوں ہی یہ تجویز کوئی قطعی شکل اختیار کر لیتی ہے" وہاں آنے میں انتہائی مسرت محسوس کریں گے۔ شیخ نے تو یہاں تک تجویز کر دیا کہ وہ کشمیر کی جنگ بندی لائن کو پار کر کے پیدل اسی طرح پاکستان جائیں گے جس طرح مہاتما گاندھی نے ہندوستان اور پاکستان کی سرحد کو انھیں تسلیم نہ کر کے ختم کرنا چاہا تھا۔ نہرو نے جب یہ سنا تو وہ خود دہشت زدہ ہو گئے کہ اگر شیخ نے ایسی کوئی حماقت کی حرکت کی تو کہیں ان پر بھی ویسی ہی نہ گذرے۔ ان کی سلامتی کی ذمہ داری کون لے سکتا ہے؟ شیخ عبداللہ نے جب یہ سنا کہ سرحد پیدل عبور کرنے کے ان کے منصوبے کی مخالفت ہو رہی ہے تو ان کو شدید غصہ آیا۔ انھوں نے اس کا الزام بیوروکریٹس پر رکھا۔ انھیں اپنی رائے بدلنے پر مجبور کرنے میں کافی دشواری پیش آئی مگر وہ جب ۲۴ مئی کو پاکستان پہنچے تو ستان بین الاقوامی ائرلائنز کے ایک خصوصی جہاز سے پہنچے — پاکستان جو ان کی آمد کو ایک بہت بڑا اہم واقعہ بنانے کا عزم کیے ہوئے تھا اس نے ان کا بڑے عظیم پیمانے پر استقبال کیا۔ ہوائی اڈے پر انھیں

وش آمدید کہنے کے لیے ایوب خاں کے اس وقت وزیر خارجہ ذوالفقار علی بھٹو، اور وزیر داخلہ و امور کشمیر حبیب اللہ خاں موجود تھے۔ شیخ کے ساتھ مرزا افضل بیگ اور مولانا مسعودی کے علاوہ ان کے بیٹے فاروق عبداللہ بھی تھے جنھیں وہ اپنی جانشینی کے لیے تیار کر رہے تھے۔ ہوائی اڈے پر موجود دس ہزار کے مجمع نے شیخ کے استقبال کے جوش میں پولیس کے حلقے توڑ دیے۔ مگر دو دن کے اندر اندر شیخ عبداللہ نے اپنے پاکستانی میزبانوں کو مایوس کر دیا تھا۔ انھوں نے ہندوستان پر نکتہ چینی کرنے سے انکار کر دیا۔ ایسا کرنے کے بجائے وہ ہندوستان کے سیکولر نظریے کی تعریف کرتے رہے۔ ایوب خاں نے شیخ کے وہاں پہنچنے کے چند ہی گھنٹے بعد ان سے ملاقات کی حسب توقع انھوں نے وفاق کے خیال کو مسترد کر دیا۔ اپنی خود نوشت سوانح عمری میں، اسے نہرو کے ایما پر لائی جانے والی ایک "بے ہودہ تجویز" قرار دیا ہے (شیخ عبداللہ نے بعد کو ایوب خاں کو لکھا تھا اور اس بات کی تردید کی تھی کہ انھیں نہرو نے بھیجا تھا) اور پاکستانی اخبارات و رسائل نے جو شیخ عبداللہ کی توصیف کے گن گانے کے لیے تیار تھے یہ محسوس کیا کہ انھیں اب ان کی برائی کرنا چاہیے۔ شیخ کو یہ آگاہی دی گئی کہ وہ ایک ایجنٹ نہ بن جائیں جو یہاں ہندوستانی مسلمانوں کے تحفظ کے لیے ہندوستان کے ہاتھ کشمیر کا سودا کرنے آئے ہیں۔ یہ ایک انتہائی غیر معمولی منطق تھی جس نے پاکستان بنایا اس سفر میں شیخ عبداللہ، ایوب خاں سے صرف اس ایک رعایت کو حاصل کرنے میں کامیاب ہوئے کہ انھوں نے ہندوستان آنے کا وعدہ کر لیا شیخ عبداللہ نے پنڈت نہرو سے ایوب خاں کو ایک دعوت نامہ بھیجنے کے لیے کہا۔ ایک بیمار اور تھکا ہوا نہرو جس دن آرام کرنے کی خاطر جس کی شدید ضرورت تھی، دہرہ دون روانہ ہو گیا تھا مگر دعوت نامہ فوراً لکھا گیا اور ۲۷ مئی ۱۹۶۴ء کو ایوب خاں کو دینے کے لیے پاکستان میں انڈین ہائی کمیشن پہنچا دیا گیا۔ اسی دن یعنی ۲۷ مئی ۱۹۶۴ کو جواہر لال نہرو، وہ عظیم ترین فرد جسے اپنا سپوت کہنے کا فخر اس برصغیر کو حاصل تھا، مر گیا — ۲۷ مئی کو شیخ عبداللہ "آزاد کشمیر" کے صدر ایچ خورشید کے ساتھ کشمیر کے اس حصے میں تھے جہاں وہ ۱۹۴۷ء کے بعد سے نہیں گئے تھے وہ یہیں تھے جب انھیں نہرو کے انتقال کی خبر ملی۔ چند منٹ تک شیخ عبداللہ پھوٹ پھوٹ کر روتے رہے۔ اس حادثے پر ان سے کچھ کہنے کے لیے درخواست کی گئی مگر وہ کچھ نہ کہہ پائے بمشکل تمام انھوں نے کہا "وہ مر گئے۔ میں ان سے مل نہ سکوں گا..... میں کچھ نہیں کہہ سکتا" یہ کہہ کر وہ پھر زار و قطار رونے لگے۔ انھوں نے اپنا باقی دورہ ملتوی کر دیا اور دوسرے دن اپنے گھر ہندوستان واپس آ گئے۔

اور یہ جیل میں گزرنے والی ایک اور دہائی کا آغاز تھا۔

(۶)

مرنا — ایک ہندوستانی کی حیثیت سے

"ادھر کچھ عرصے سے ہم شدت کے ساتھ یہ محسوس کر رہے ہیں کہ وہ وقت آگیا ہے جب ہمیں اس سلسلے
میں عوام کو اعتماد میں لینا چاہیے کہ ہم کشمیر کے ہندوستان سے تعلقات کے بارے میں کیا محسوس کرتے ہیں اور ایسا
کرتے وقت ہمیں اس حقیقی صورت حال کو بھی پیش نظر رکھنا چاہیے جو ریاست اور ریاست سے باہر اس وقت
ہے برصغیر کے تمام لوگ اور خصوصاً ریاست کے باشندے اچھی طرح واقف ہیں کہ پچھلے گیارہ برسوں میں
ہندوستان کے ساتھ ریاست کے الحاق کو جو ۱۹۴۷ء میں ہوا تھا، قطعیت دینے کے لیے ہم نے پوری
کوشش کی۔ خوش گوار حالات میں بھی اور ناخوش گوار حالات میں بھی۔ ہم نے اسے ناقابل تنسیخ اور مکمل کرنے میں
کوئی دقیقہ اٹھا رکھا اور نہ ہی اس مقصد کے حصول کے لیے کسی قربانی سے گریز کیا۔ بدقسمتی سے ہماری یہ تمام
کوششیں مطلوبہ نتیجے کے حاصل کرنے میں بالکل ناکام رہیں۔۔۔۔۔۔ ریاست کے اندر عوام نے دلوں میں تبدیلی
کی کوئی علامت ظاہر نہیں کی۔ وہ مصائب سے گزرے، انھوں نے تکلیفیں جھیلیں اور ہندوستان، پاکستان
اور اقوام متحدہ کے کیے ہوئے وعدوں کے نفاذ کے مستقل مطالبہ کرتے رہے۔ اس صورت حال کے نتیجے
کے طور پر پیدا ہونے والی بے یقینی اور عدم تحفظ کے احساس نے دائمی کرب میں سیاسی اور اقتصادی تباہی
کو شامل کر دیا ہے۔ اور عوام، غالباً ریاست کی تاریخ کے بدترین اور انتہائی تکلیف دہ مرحلے سے گزر رہے ہیں۔"

شیخ عبداللہ کی، اپنی خفگی کے اظہار کی ایک اور مثال۔ جی نہیں۔ یہ بیان بخشی غلام محمد کا ہے جو انھوں
نے ۱۹۶۲ء میں اس وقت دیا تھا جب انھیں کشمیر کی وزارت اعلیٰ سے ہٹا دیا گیا تھا۔ ۱۹۶۲ء میں یکایک
شکست ہو جانے والے نہرو نے (ذہین اور آتش مزاج مینو مسانی سے کہا۔ "شکست ان کے دل و دماغ پر
چھا گئی") ان اصولوں کو بحال کرنے کی ایک زبردست کوشش شروع کی جنھیں اقتدار کے زمانے میں

standards of commercial prerogative and the safety of aliens. The defense of these obvious interests meant taking part in an inter-racial quarrel, for European nations were already aligned in determined opposition to China and Japan on the same issues. Washington had counseled his country to extend its commercial relations without forming political connections, but it was found impossible to follow this advice in dealing with a region which would provide a basis for commercial relations only when faced by united pressure. The United States, concealing from the left hand what the right hand did, pursued a method of coincident diplomatic protest and pressure and even of occasional joint military action in emergencies imperiling nationals.

In a second stage the chief object of intervention, the preservation of China's integrity, not only marked a complete break with the previous conception of the proper motive of intervention but predestined America to a momentous step forward in respect to method. While in its initial appearance in Hay's second Open Door note the integrity of China was but a means to equality of commercial opportunity, it soon became an end-in-itself of political character; and, with minor exceptions previously noted, this was the first instance in which the United States became the active champion of the territorial integrity of a country in another hemisphere. Reinforced by commercial interests and America's traditional sympathy for the Chinese, the chief motive of this departure was a political self-interest cognizant of the fact that America's prestige and security as a world power dominating the Pacific demanded preservation of the status quo in the Far East. The interests of a world power entailed adoption of its methods, and the United States entered not only upon new modes of peaceful collaboration but also upon a more venturesome type of intervention. Although it continued to trust in the potency of words, diplomatic pressure was now designed to tip the scales in a new type of international controversy. It was not a controversy in which America sided with world powers against weak Oriental nations, but one in which it entered into the disputes of world powers in order to stand on the side of China.

The failure of traditional methods of world politics to safeguard

...ت تک گیا تھا۔ کابینہ کے بڑے وزیروں اور وزرائے اعلیٰ سے کہا گیا کہ وہ اپنے اپنے عہدے چھوڑ دیں اور اپنا وقت پارٹی کے کاموں میں لگائیں۔ کچھ بدعنوان لوگوں سے چھٹکارا حاصل کرنے کے لیے یہ بہت اچھا طریقہ تھا۔ یہی اندازہ تھا جس میں بخشی غلام محمد کو ہٹا کر ان کی جگہ پر جی ایم صادق کو رکھا گیا اس وقت تک کشمیر میں سیاست بڑی پست سطح پر پہنچ چکی تھی۔ ۱۹۵۳ء سے وہاں کی سیاست میں انحطاط کی یہی کیفیت تھی

جھوٹ بولنے والے کی مزید کوئی ضرورت نہیں تھی اسی لیے بخشی غلام محمد کشمیر کے بارے میں اب سچ بول رہے تھے۔ بہرحال وہاں اب بھی ایک آدمی تھا جس کی بات عوام سن سکتے تھے، ایک فرد واحد تھا جس کی زبان ہندوستان سے کشمیر کے الحاق کے جواز کی ضمانت لے سکتی تھی اور اس شخص کا نام تھا شیخ محمد عبداللہ۔

پنڈت نہرو کے انتقال کے بعد شیخ عبداللہ کو دلی میں اس نسل کے لوگوں سے مل کر کام کرنا پڑا جن سے ان کا ذاتی کوئی رابطہ یا تعلق نہیں تھا۔ شاستری اور سورن سنگھ اچھے لوگ تھے مگر شیخ کے ساتھیوں اور دوستوں میں سے نہیں تھے، مزید یہ کہ حکومت میں جو فرقہ پرست عنصر تھا اور جسے نہرو نے کچھ قابو میں رکھا تھا وہ سرگرم ہو گیا تھا۔ وزیراعظم لال بہادر شاستری نے ۱۹۶۳ء کے حضرت بل کے تجربے کی روشنی میں شیخ کے ساتھ ہمدردانہ رویے کے ساتھ کام شروع کیا۔ مگر ایک دفعہ پھر ایسے لوگوں کی کمی نہیں تھی جو مفاہمت اور مصالحت کے ہر امکان کو ختم کرنے پر کمر باندھے ہوئے تھے۔ شیخ عبداللہ کو بھی اس بات کا یقین تھا کہ شاستری جی بھی ایسے لوگوں کے خلاف کوئی اقدام نہ کر سکیں گے۔ انھوں نے اپریل ۱۹۶۵ء میں لے موند کو بتایا تھا " مسٹر شاستری میں وہ فراخ دلی نہیں ہے جو نہرو میں تھی۔ جب سے شاستری جی سربراہ حکومت پر آئے ہیں ہندوستان میں صورت حالات کو موڑ دیا گیا ہے۔" شیخ عبداللہ میں ضد کچھ بڑھ ہی گئی تھی۔ جو بات وہ بار بار کہنے میں جھجکتے نہیں تھے اسی میں زیادہ تیکھا پن آ گیا تھا۔ وہ خود اختیاری کے خیال کو ہرگز ترک نہیں کریں گے اور جب کبھی بھی وہ ایسی کوئی بات کہیں گے دلی کے محب وطن حضرات برداشت کریں گے۔

فروری ۱۹۶۵ء میں حج کے لیے مکہ جانے سے پہلے شیخ عبداللہ بیرونی ملکوں کے ایک طویل دورے پر گئے۔ اس زمانے میں پاکستان اور چین کے تعلقات بہت بہتر ہو رہے تھے اور چین نے کشمیر میں رائے شماری کی حمایت کی تھی۔ ۱۸ مارچ ۱۹۶۵ء کو کراچی کے اخبار "ڈان" کے نامہ نگار مقیم لندن کو دیے جانے والے انٹرویو میں شیخ نے چین کے موقف کی تعریف کی۔ ۲۸ مارچ کو کراچی میں چین کے وزیر خارجہ کے اعزاز میں دیے جانے والے ایک عشایئے میں مسٹر بھٹو نے یہ انکشاف کیا کہ چین نے شیخ عبداللہ کو اپنے

یہاں آنے کی دعوت دی ہے ہندوستان میں، جہاں ایک غدار کی حیثیت سے ان کی مذمت ہوتی رہی تھی، توقع
کے مطابق بڑا شور ہوا۔ اسی کے ساتھ ہندوستانی پارلیامنٹ میں اس درخواست کی تکمیل کے حوالے سے، ان
کے خلاف بڑی جم کر کوششیں ہوئیں جو انھوں نے اپنے اس پاسپورٹ کو حاصل کرنے کے لیے دی تھی جو انھیں مئی ۱۹۶۴
میں ان کے پاکستان جانے سے پہلے پنڈت نہرو کی حکومت نے دیا تھا۔ درخواست کے فارم میں قومیت کے
میں شیخ عبداللہ نے اپنے آپ کو "کشمیری مسلمان" لکھا تھا۔ نہرو نے اسے یہ کہہ کر نظر انداز کر دیا تھا کہ اگر شیخ
ہندوستانی پاسپورٹ پر سفر کرنا چاہتے ہیں تو ان کے لیے (نہرو کے لیے) یہی کافی ہے۔ مگر لال بہادر شاستری
کے عہد میں اس بات کو غداری کا ثبوت قرار دیا گیا اور پارلیامنٹ میں ایک ممبر کے بعد دوسرا ممبر ہندوستانی حکومت
پر "علیحدگی پسندی" کی حمایت کرنے کا الزام لگاتا رہا۔ یہ یاد ابھی ہمارے دلوں میں تازہ ہے کہ اگرچہ نہرو کا نام
نہیں لیا گیا تھا مگر جب ۲۹ مارچ کو اسپیکر نے ایوان کو یہ بتایا کہ شیخ کے پاسپورٹ کی منظوری نہرو کی حکومت نے
"اعلیٰ ترین" سطح پر ہوئی تھی، تو پارلیامنٹ میں ممبران بڑے تمسخر آمیز اور حقارت انگیز طور پر ہنسے تھے

۳۰ مارچ کو کشمیر اسمبلی نے، کشمیر جسے ابھی تک گورنر اور چیف منسٹر کے ناموں کی جگہ پر دوسرے خصوصی نام
رکھنے کی خصوصی رعایت حاصل تھی، ملک کی دوسری ریاستوں کے مماثل کر دیا۔ ابھی تک جموں اور کشمیر میں گورنر
کے بجائے صدر ریاست یا صدر ہوا کرتا تھا اور ریاست کا وزیر اعلیٰ وزیر اعظم کہلاتا تھا۔ مزید یہ کہ صدر کو ہندوستان
کا صدر مقرر نہیں کرتا تھا بلکہ اس کا انتخاب اسمبلی کیا کرتی تھی۔ اب یہ سب کچھ بدل گیا تھا۔

۳۱ مارچ کو وزیر اعظم لال بہادر شاستری نے ہندوستان کی پارلیامنٹ کے موڈ کی نمائندگی کرتے ہوئے شیخ
عبداللہ کو آگاہ کیا کہ اگر انھوں نے چین کا دورہ کیا تو "سخت اقدامات اٹھائے جائیں گے"۔ حکومت نے پاسپورٹ
کے مسئلے میں پہلے جو کوتاہی ہوئی تھی اس کے لیے معافی چاہی اور یہ وعدہ کیا کہ اس قسم کی بات اب آیندہ نہیں ہوگی۔ مگر
اسی دور شیخ عبداللہ کوئی ایسی بات کرنے میں مصروف تھے جو ان کے دشمنوں کو ایک اور ہتھیار فراہم کر دے
تھی۔ الجزائر میں ایک دعوت کے دوران شیخ عبداللہ چین کے وزیر اعظم چو این لائی سے ملے اور گفتگو کی۔

دوسرے دن لال بہادر شاستری نے پارلیامنٹ کو بتایا کہ حکومت نے اس ملاقات کو "سنجیدگی" کے ساتھ
محسوس کیا ہے۔ ۲۰ اپریل کو شاستری جی نے کانگریس پارلیامانی پارٹی کو بتایا کہ شیخ عبداللہ اور چو این لائی کی اس
ملاقات کو حکومت ایک معاندانہ فعل سمجھتی ہے اور شیخ عبداللہ کا پاسپورٹ ان کی واپسی پر یا تو ضبط کر لیا جائے گا یا انھیں
واپس آنے پر مجبور کرنے کے لیے وہ منسوخ کر دیا جائے گا۔ اگر انھوں نے دشمن ملکوں کا دورہ کر کے حکم عدولی کی

،ایک ناپسندیدہ "فرد قرار دے دیا جائے گا۔ بھٹو جو ہمیشہ ہی موقع کی تلاش میں رہتے تھے فوراً میدان میں کود
ے اور شیخ عبداللہ کو ایک پاکستانی پاسپورٹ کی پیش کش کی۔ شیخ عبداللہ نے ان کی اس فیاضی کو نظر انداز کر دیا۔
پریل کو وزیر خارجہ سردار سورن سنگھ نے، تالیاں بجاتی ہوئی پارلیمنٹ میں لوک سبھا کو بتایا کہ شیخ عبداللہ کا
ٹ اب صرف ۳۰۔اپریل تک قانونی رہے گا اور مزید یہ کہ اس پر ان ملکوں کے سفر کی جو جاہے ان کے سفر
گرام میں ہوں یا نہ ہوں، توثیق کو ختم کر دیا جائے گا۔ جب ۲۹۔ اپریل تک شیخ کا سفر ختم نہیں ہوا تو حکومت
ہیں مزید آٹھ دنوں کے لیے ایک خصوصی اجازت نامہ دیا۔ پاسپورٹ رد کر دیا گیا۔ جب ۹ رمئی کو شیخ عبداللہ
کی بیگم ہندوستان آئے تو ان کے لیے وہی مانوس بسیرا تھا جس کی ان کے خسر صاحب نے پیشین گوئی کی تھی۔
یل خانہ۔ صرف فرق یہ تھا کہ اس دفعہ یہ قید جنوبی ہندوستان کے حسین پہاڑی مقام اوٹی اور کوڈائی کنال میں
۔ دس کے مزید تیس مہینے ضائع ہو گئے، مگر بہرحال اس دفعہ یہ پنجرہ سونے کا تھا۔ اس دفعہ حراست کے دوران
کے ساتھ رہنے کے لیے ان کی سب سے چھوٹی بیٹی ثریا علی آئیں۔ انھوں نے کشمیر یونیورسٹی کی طرف سے شائع
ہونے والی یادگار جلد میں لکھا ہے "میرے پاپا کو (سب سے پہلے) ان کے قریبی معتمد مرزا افضل بیگ کے ساتھ
ے جایا گیا۔ ... پاپا کو کوڈائی کنال منتقل کر دیا گیا کیوں کہ وہ وہاں سیاحوں کی دل چسپی کا باعث بن رہے
تک ان کے خلاف اٹھائے گئے حکومت کے اس اقدام پر نکتہ چینی کرتے تھے ... ہمیں کوہ نور محل نام کی
منزل شاندار اور خوب صورت عمارت میں لے جایا گیا جہاں ہمارا استقبال کرنے کے لیے پاپا دروازے پر موجود
ہمیں سب سے اوپر والی منزل میں رکھا گیا۔ دوسری منزل میں سکیورٹی والے تھے اور تیسری منزل ملازموں کے
۔ پاپا کی کھانا پکانے کی صلاحیتوں سے کم ہی لوگ واقف ہوں گے۔ وہ اپنا صبح کا وقت کھانا پکانے میں
رتے تھے۔ وہ قورمہ، روغن جوش اور شب دیگ پکانے میں ید طولیٰ رکھتے تھے۔ شب دیگ شلغم گوشت
ہے جسے دھیمی آنچ پر کئی گھنٹے پکانا ہوتا ہے۔ ان کے کھانوں کی خوشبو سکیورٹی والوں کے منہ میں
نی لاتی تھی۔ میں سکیورٹی عملے کے ایک موٹے آدمی کو خوب اچھی طرح دیکھ سکتی تھی جو زینے پر کھڑا انتظار
تھا کہ کب ملازمین بچے ہوئے کھانے کو لے کر اتریں اور کب وہ اس میں اپنا حصہ لے۔ میں نے پاپا سے
نا یہ سیکھی کہ کسی کو اپنا وقت یوں ہی برباد نہیں کرنا چاہیے۔ انھوں نے اپنے لیے ایک استاد ظاہر ہو
ن کے غریب پر، تامل زبان پڑھانے کے لیے رکھا ... ہماری شامیں طول طویل سیروں کے لیے وقف
دن ہی چہل قدمیوں کی وجہ سے ہم نے سارا کوڈائی دیکھ ڈالا۔ کل ملا کر ہم نے ڈھائی سال کی مدت

کوڈائی کنال میں گذاری، دو مہینے آل انڈیا انسٹی ٹیوٹ آف میڈیکل سائنسیز میں، اور اپنے وطن واپس آنے سے پہلے تقریباً ایک سال دہلی میں تین کوٹھیوں میں۔ یہ ان کی ہمت اور ناقابل تسخیر عزم اور عوام پر ان کا غیر متزلزل اعتماد تھا جس نے اس پورے عرصے میں ان کا ساتھ دیا۔ عوام ان کے لیے آخری اور عظیم ترین قوت تھے۔"

شاید یہ اچھا ہی تھا کہ شیخ عبداللہ پاکستان سے ہونے والی جنگ کے سال میں حراست میں تھے۔ بھٹو خاں نے جو تاریخ سے کوئی سبق نہیں سیکھ سکے تھے، وہی چالیں اپنائیں جو جناح صاحب نے کشمیر پر حملے سے اپنائی تھیں۔ قبائلی لٹیرے جہاد کا نعرہ لگاتے ہوئے آئے، ان کے پیچھے پیچھے پاکستان کی مسلح فوجیں اور ایک بار پھر کشمیر کے مسلمانوں نے انھیں مسترد کر دیا۔ پاکستان اس بات کو کبھی نہیں سمجھ سکا کہ کشمیر کے لوگ دل سے ہو سکتے ہیں مگر پاکستان سے بھی انھیں کبھی کوئی دلچسپی نہیں رہی، اور حقیقت تو یہ ہے کہ دونوں میں ہندوستان کی سمت ترجیحی حیثیت رہی ہے۔ ہندوستان نے نہ صرف یہ کہ پاکستان کے ابتدائی کامیاب حملے کا رخ موڑ دیا بلکہ جنگ بندی کے وقت تک اس نے پاکستان کو مدافعتی صورت حال میں پہنچا دیا تھا۔ ایوب اس جنگ کے ابعاد شناخت کرنے کے قابل نہ ہو سکے جس کے بارے میں ان کا خیال تھا کہ لٹیروں اور فوجیوں کے اتحاد کی مدد سے وہ جیت لیں گے۔

بہ ہر حال شیخ عبداللہ کے ایک صاحب زادے اس جنگ کے دوران پاکستان کی طرف چلے گئے۔ دونوں نے جنھیں کشمیر کی سیاست میں بعد کو ایک رول ادا کرنا ہے، بڑے فاروق عبداللہ اور چھوٹے طارق عبداللہ، دو اس وقت انگلستان میں رہتے تھے۔ پنڈت نہرو نے اپنے دوست کے بچوں کی فلاح و بہبود میں ذاتی دلچسپی لی تھی۔ انھوں نے ہی فاروق کو جے پور میڈیکل کالج میں داخلہ دلوایا جہاں سے انھوں نے میڈیسن میں ڈگری لی، وہ لندن میں رہنے اور پریکٹس کرنے لگے۔ طارق عبداللہ بھی قیام کے خیال سے لندن گئے۔ نہرو نے لندن میں انڈین ہائی کمیشن میں ایک ملازمت حاصل کرنے میں ان کی مدد کی۔ مگر جب ۱۹۶۵ کی جنگ شروع ہوئی، طارق نے پاکستان ہائی کمیشن میں نوکری کر لی۔ پاکستان ان کی اس کارگزاری پر بہت خوش تھا۔ پروپیگنڈے کے لیے یہ ایک مسالہ تھا۔ طارق عبداللہ کو، اقوام متحدہ میں پاکستانی وفد کا ایک رکن بنایا گیا (طارق عبداللہ کا اس غیر یقینی رد عمل کی ایک پوری تاریخ ہے جو خود شیخ عبداللہ کے لیے اکثر ندامت کا باعث بنی تھی، مثلاً جب شیخ عبداللہ دوبارہ وزیر اعلیٰ ہوئے تو انھوں نے اپنے بیٹے کو ایک سرکاری نوکری دلا دی۔ اس پر ایک دفعہ انھیں غصے کا ایسا دورہ پڑا کہ انھوں نے ۲۲۶ ملازموں کو برخاست کر دیا اور ان میں سے ہر ایک کی سبک دوشی کے پروانے بھی خود ٹائپ کیے۔ ان کا ہندوستانی پاسپورٹ ۱۹۷۵ء کے کشمیر معاہدے کے وقت بحال کیا گیا تھا۔)

نہیں رہتا ہے اس پر تباہی آتی ہے تو دوسروں کو کیسے بچایا جاسکتا ہے؟" ..... "میں شیخ عبداللہ کی ر
وکالت کیوں کرتا ہوں، کیونکہ اس سے ہمیں وہ واحد موقع مل جائے گا جو کشمیر کے مسئلے کو حل کرنے کے لیے ہار
پاس ہے۔"

۲ جنوری ۱۹۶۸ء کو رہائی ہوئی مگر مسئلے کے حل کے لیے ہمیں اب ہندوستان اور پاکستان کی ایک
جنگ کے نتیجے کا انتظار کرنا تھا۔ ملک کی تقسیم جو اسلام کے نام پر ہوئی تھی اور دونوں ملکوں کی طرف سے یہ وعدہ
وہ ا سے باقاعدہ کہیں یا نہ کہیں، کہ کشمیر میں جنگ بندی لائن کو عملی طور سے سرکاری سرحد تصور کیا جائے گا

جنوری ۱۹۶۸ء میں رہائی ہو گئی مگر تبدیلی کوئی نہیں ہوئی۔ اپنی رہائی کے بعد شیخ عبداللہ نے ...
کو بتایا کہ انھیں توقع ہے کہ پنڈت نہرو کی ۱۹۶۴ء میں موت کے بعد جہاں سے سلسلہ منقطع ہوا تھا وہیں سے
آغاز کر سکیں گے۔ عید کی نماز کے بعد مسلمانوں کو خطاب کرتے ہوئے انھوں نے لوگوں سے کہا تھا کہ انھیں ہندو
کو اپنے ملک کی حیثیت سے دیکھنا چاہیے۔ انھیں یہیں رہنا چاہیے اور یہیں مرنا چاہیے۔ ۳ جنوری کو ایک
کانفرنس میں گفتگو کرتے ہوئے انھوں نے چواین لائی والی کہانی کا اپنا رخ دکھایا۔ وہ چو این لائی سے ایک ...
میں ملے تھے وہاں انھوں نے کشمیر کے اس حصے کے بارے میں ان سے پوچھا جو اب چین کے قبضے میں ہے
ہندوستان سے چین کے تعلقات کے متعلق معلوم کیا۔ شیخ صاحب نے بتایا کہ بعد کو انھوں نے الجزائر میں ...
کے سفیر کو اپنی اس گفتگو کا متن بتا دیا تھا تاکہ وہ حکومت ہند کو اطلاع دے سکیں۔

مسز گاندھی کے سامنے جواب وزیر اعظم تھیں، سوال یہ تھا کہ کشمیر کی گتھی کو کس طرح سلجھایا جائے، اور ال...
آئینی معاملات کو متاثر کیے بغیر کشمیر میں شیخ عبداللہ کے لیے کیونکر کوئی جگہ نکالی جائے۔ جیسا کہ جے پرکاش نر...
نے جواب شیخ عبداللہ کے بہت قریب تھے، اس بات کو کہا تھا کہ شیخ صاحب کی رہائی ہندوستان کی ...
طرز زندگی کا اگرچہ تاخیر کے ساتھ ثبوت ہے مگر یہ اس کا نسبتاً کم اہم پہلو ہے۔ زیادہ اہم بات اس موقع
تعمیری اور عقل مندانہ طور پر فائدہ اٹھا کر کشمیر کے عوام کی، کشمیر کی اس حیثیت سے متعلق تمناؤں اور آرزوؤں کو ...
ہے جو سارے ہندوستانی کمیونٹی کے ایک حصے کے طور پر سیلف گورنمنٹ اور احترام نفس پیدا کر دے گا۔ ...
۱۹۶۸ء میں شیخ عبداللہ دو دفعہ مسز اندرا گاندھی سے ملے۔ ظاہر ہے مذاکرات کا آغاز ہو گیا مگر ان کے بار...
ہونے کے لیے ابھی مزید کئی برسوں کی ضرورت ہوگی۔

مسئلے کے حل کی تلاش میں شیخ نے اب اپنی کوششوں کو ایک فرد کے جہاد تک محدود رکھنے کی ...

س میں دوسروں کو بھی شامل کرنا شروع کیا۔ اکتوبر ۱۹۶۸ء میں انھوں نے چھ دن کا ایک آل کشمیر اسٹیٹ پیپل کنونشن
نظیم دیا۔ اس میں تمام اہم پارٹیوں کی نمائندگی تھی۔ جے پرکاش نرائن نے اس کنونشن کا افتتاح کیا۔ انڈین یونین کے
تحت صوبوں کی زیادہ خودمختاری کا نظریہ مسئلے کا ایک حل تجویز کیا گیا۔ اس سے کشمیر کی سلف گورنمنٹ کی خواہش کو
تسکین ہوگی اور یہ بھی نہیں محسوس ہوگا کہ یہ بات خصوصی طور پر کشمیر کے لیے کی جارہی ہے۔ جے پرکاش نرائن نے یہ
بات بالکل واضح کردی کہ ہندوستان سے الگ یا اس کے باہر کشمیر کے خیال کو کوئی بھی منظور نہیں کرے گا، لیکن
ساتھ ہی انھوں نے کہا کہ "ہمارے جیسے ایک وسیع و عریض ملک میں، قومی اتحاد کو صرف علاقائی جذبات اور مفادات
کی تفہیم اور باہمی تحمل و برداشت کے ماحول ہی میں پروان چڑھایا جاسکتا ہے۔" کنونشن میں شرکت کرنے والوں
میں بڑی دلچسپ بات یہ ہے کہ وہ لوگ بھی تھے جنھوں نے ۱۹۵۳ء میں شیخ عبداللہ کو جیل بھجوایا تھا۔ بخشی
غلام محمد اور شام لال صراف۔ مگر شیخ کا اب بھی اصرار تھا کہ اگر برصغیر کشمیر کے مسئلے پر مزید جنگیں نہیں چاہتا ہے تو پھر
ہندوستان، پاکستان اور کشمیر کے نمائندوں کی گول میز کانفرنس ناگزیر ہے اچھا ہوگا اگر کسی ثالث کی بھی مدد
لی جائے اور ایک ایسا حل نکالا جائے جو خود اختیاری کے مطالبے کو بھی ایک حقیقی روپ عطا کردے گا اور
ہندوستان اور پاکستان دونوں کے لیے باعزت بھی ہوگا۔ ظاہر ہے کہ شیخ کی آنکھ میں ابھی ایک تمنا باقی تھا جو
۱۹۷۱ء کی جنگ کے بعد پاکستان کے نظریے کی تباہی کے ساتھ ساتھ آخری طور پر معدوم ہوگا۔

۱۹۷۰ء میں پاکستان میں ہونے والے انتخابات مشرقی پاکستان کے لیے استصواب رائے عامہ ہوگئے
شیخ مجیب الرحمٰن کی زبردست کامیابی کا مطلب بالکل واضح تھا۔ بنگال پنجاب کے ساتھ بڑے معمولی سے تعلقات
چاہتا تھا اور اگر اسلام آباد ڈھاکہ کو یہ خودمختاری دینے پر راضی نہیں تھا تو پھر مشرق آزادی کا مطالبہ کرسکتا ہے مسز
گاندھی ظاہر ہے کہ اس خودمختاری یا آزادی کی دل سے حامی تھیں، مگر یہ بات واضح تھی کہ بنگالیوں سے اس
ہمدردی کو کشمیر کی صورت حال کے برابر سمجھ لیا جاتا۔ شیخ عبداللہ کا استصواب رائے عامہ محاذ ابھی موجود تھا۔ اس
محاذ نے ایک اہم لیڈر شیخ عبداللہ کے داماد اس کی بیٹی خالدہ کے شوہر غلام محمد شاہ تھے) دنیا کی نگاہیں برصغیر
پر مرکوز ہونے اور خبروں کے لیے نامہ نگاروں کی دھکا پیل میں، مسز اندرا گاندھی، اس امکان کو نظر انداز
نہیں کرسکتی تھیں کہ شیخ عبداللہ بھی ان کے ساتھ وہ کریں جو شیخ مجیب نے کیا تھا ۹ جنوری ۱۹۷۰ء کو شیخ
عبداللہ، ان کے وفادار ساتھی مرزا افضل بیگ اور غلام محمد شاہ کے کشمیر میں داخلے پر پابندی لگادی گئی۔ استصواب
رائے عامہ محاذ کے تقریباً چار سو لیڈر گرفتار کرلیے گئے۔ حکومت جموں و کشمیر کے چیف سکریٹری پی کے ڈوبے

نے کہا کہ یہ کارروائی بڑے پیمانے پر تخریبی کارروائیوں کو روکنے کے لیے ضروری تھی جلد ہی استصواب رائے محاذ پر بھی پابندی لگادی گئی ۔ ۵ جون ۱۹۷۲ء کو ہندوستانی فوج کی دسمبر ۱۹۷۱ء کی مشہور فتح کے بعد ہی شیخ عبداللہ کو کشمیر اپنے گھر واپس آنے کی اجازت ملی اس وقت شیخ عبداللہ کو کشمیر سے باہر رکھنا بڑی شرمندگی کا باعث ہوتا کیونکہ مسٹر بھٹو جون کے آخر میں شملہ میں امن کی بات چیت کرنے کے لیے آرہے تھے ۔

اس وقت تک شیخ عبداللہ کو اس بات کا پورا الیقین ہو چکا تھا کہ مسئلے کے کسی حل کی توقع صرف دہلی کے ساتھ براہ راست بات چیت کے ذریعے ہی کی جا سکتی ہے ۔ پاکستان اپنے سہارے کھو چکا تھا ۔ ۳ جون کو حضرت بل کی مسجد میں تقریر کرتے ہوئے شیخ عبداللہ نے اعلان کیا کہ انھوں نے کشمیر کے لیے نسبتاً زیادہ خود مختاری کے بارے میں مسز اندرا گاندھی کے کسی بھی نمائندے سے بات کرنے کا پورا پورا اختیار مرزا افضل بیگ کو دے دیا ہے اور انھوں نے اپنے حامیوں سے کہا کہ وہ دنیا میں ایک ناقابل احترام مقام حاصل کرنے کی اپنی جدوجہد میں مدد کے لیے پاکستان یا کسی دوسری طاقت کی طرف نہ دیکھیں ۔ ۲۵ جون کو مقبوضہ کشمیر پاکستان میں ہندوستان کے سامنے گھٹنے ٹیکنے کی مذمت میں شیخ عبداللہ کے خلاف مظاہرے ہوئے ۔ (ظاہر ہے کہ ان مظاہروں کی قیادت ملا کر رہے تھے ۔

۲ جولائی ۱۹۷۲ء پیر کے دن علی الصباح ، ذوالفقار علی بھٹو اور مسز اندرا گاندھی نے اس دستاویز کے ذریعے جو " شملہ معاہدے " کے نام سے مشہور ہے اس بات پر رضامندی ظاہر کی کہ جموں اور کشمیر میں ۱۷ دسمبر ۱۹۷۱ء کی جنگ بندی کے وقت قبضے میں رہنے والی لائن کی جانبین بغیر کسی تعصب کے دونوں فریقوں کی تسلیم شدہ حیثیت کا احترام کریں گے ۔ کوئی بھی فریق اپنے طور پر باہمی اختلافات اور آئینی تاویلوں سے قطع نظر اس میں کسی تبدیلی کی کوشش نہیں کرے گا ۔ دونوں فریق اس لائن کی خلاف ورزی میں طاقت کے استعمال کی دھمکی سے احتراز کرنے کا وعدہ کرتے ہیں ۔ اگرچہ انھوں نے اس کا اقبال نہیں کیا مگر ہندوستان اور پاکستان دونوں نے اس دستاویز کی رو سے کشمیر کو یقیناً تقسیم کر دیا ۔

شیخ عبداللہ اپنے آپ کو بالکل خاموش تو نہ رکھ سکے مگر وہ جانتے تھے کہ کشمیر کے لیے ایک آزاد حیثیت کا اب کوئی امکان باقی نہیں رہا ۔ یہاں سے ۱۹۷۵ء کے کشمیر معاہدے تک صرف وقت کا سوال تھا اس معاہدے کو کرنے میں جن لوگوں نے کلیدی رول ادا کیا ان میں مقبول سیاست داں ڈی ۔ پی ۔ دھر بھی تھے جنھوں نے بنگلہ دیش کے معاملے میں بڑا کامیاب اور اہم کردار ادا کیا تھا ۔ ۲۸ دسمبر ۱۹۷۲ء کو انھوں نے مسز اندرا گاندھی کو ایک مسودہ ایک تحریر بھیجی جس میں انھوں نے ان باتوں کا ایک خاکہ پیش کیا تھا جو وہ سمجھتے تھے کہ شیخ عبداللہ مسئلے کے حل سے

ہیے چاہتے تھے: "مجھے بہت معتبر ذریعوں سے اجمالی طور پر ان تجاویز کا پتہ چلا ہے۔ جو شیخ صاحب وزیر اعظم سے
قات ہونے پر پیش کرنے والے ہیں۔" وہ جموں و کشمیر کی قانون ساز اسمبلی کے وسط مدتی انتخاب چاہیں گے .....
اس کا وقت جو ان کے ذہن میں ہے وہ غالباً مارچ ۱۹۷۵ء ہوگا۔ وہ اس درمیانی وقفے کو اپنی پارٹی کو جو اس
وقت داخلی اختلافات کی وجہ سے بری حالت میں ہے مستحکم کرنے میں استعمال کرنا چاہیں گے تاکہ وہ ایک ایسی
پوزیشن میں ہو جائیں کہ دادی میں، پاکستان دوست عناصر کے متحدہ حملوں کا مقابلہ کر سکیں   غیر حل شدہ مسائل
ن کا تعلق ان تمام موضوعات سے ہے جو اس وقت دستوری لحاظ سے مرکز کے تحت ہیں، ان کا خیال ہے کہ
وہ انہیں اسمبلی کے سامنے اس وقت رکھیں گے جب وہ نئے انتخابات کے بعد اس کی دوبارہ از سر نو تشکیل ہوگی۔"

شیخ نے اب ایک ایسے شخص کی طرح بات کرنا شروع کر دیا تھا جس کی دلی سے لڑائی ختم ہو چکی تھی اور جس کی
توجہ کشمیر پر اثر انداز ہونے والے دوسرے مسائل کی طرف مبذول ہو گئی تھی۔ ۲۹ دسمبر ۱۹۷۳ء کو کشمیر کے وزیر
... سید میر قاسم نے ڈی پی دھر کو شیخ عبداللہ کی اس تقریر کی تفصیلات بھیجیں جو انھوں نے ۱۹ دسمبر کو جموں
... ٹ ہاؤس میں ہندوستان سے تعلقات کو حق بجانب قرار دیتے ہوئے ڈیڑھ سو اہم شہریوں کے سامنے کی
... شیخ نے کہا کہ وہ نہرو اور دوسرے دن ہندوستانی لیڈروں کے ساتھ خیالات میں ایک ہم آہنگی پاتے
... جو ان سے سارے عوام کے لیے انصاف اور سیکولرزم کی خاطر ذات اور نسل کی تفریق کے بغیر مشترکہ طور پر
... جہد کی   بدقسمتی سے ۱۹۴۷ء میں ملک تقسیم ہوگیا مگر اس تقسیم کے باوجود ہم نے سوچا کہ ہمیں کشمیر کو سیکولر
... ایک ماڈل بنانا چاہیے اور خود گاندھی جی نے اس وقت جب سارے ملک میں فرقہ پرستی کی آگ لگی ہوئی تھی کشمیر
... امید کی ایک کرن بتایا تھا ... ہم نے چاہا تھا کہ کشمیر کو باعزت طور پر ہندوستان کا ایک حصہ رہنا چاہیے۔
... سلسلے میں میں نے لوگوں سے خوراک کے معاملے میں خود کفیل ہونے کے لیے کہا تھا اور چاہا تھا کہ ریاست مرکز
... محتاج نہ بن جائے مگر مجھے غلط سمجھا گیا اور بعض لوگوں نے میرے موقف کا یہ کہہ کر مذاق اڑایا کہ شیخ عبداللہ لوگوں کو
... رہے ہیں کہ وہ آلو کھائیں اور بچے کم پیدا کریں۔ نتیجے کے طور پر ریاست کو خوراک کی اشیا کی قیمتوں میں
... کی امدادی رقمیں دینا پڑیں۔ میں چاہوں گا کہ ریاست ہندوستان پر بوجھ بننے کے بجائے خود کفیل ہو اور خود
... زیادہ دسترس کرنے والی ہو۔ ہمیں اپنے پیروں پر کھڑے ہونے کی کوشش کرنا چاہیے اور دہلی کے سامنے کاسۂ
... نے کر نہیں جانا چاہیے۔ اس وقت ریاست مرکز کے قرضے کے بوجھ تلے دبی ہوئی ہے اور اس میں قرضوں
... ملہ رقم کا سود ادا کرنے کی بھی استطاعت نہیں ہے۔"

شیخ عبداللہ سے آخری مذاکرات کرنے کی ذمہ داری جس شخص پر ڈالی گئی تھی وہ مسز گاندھی کی حکومت کے
انتہائی ذہین اور مستعد فرد جی پارتھا سارتھی تھے۔ ۲۶ فروری ۱۹۷۵ کو چھ نکاتی کشمیر معاہدے کا پارلیامنٹ میں اعلان
کیا گیا "جموں کشمیر، انڈین یونین کا ایک حصہ جس پر بدستور آرٹیکل ۳۷۰ کے تحت حکومت ہوگی۔ ریاست کو آئین
سازی کی بقیہ حقوق حاصل ہوں گے مگر پارلیامنٹ، ملک کی علاقائی یک جہتی سے متعلق معاملے میں قانون سا
کا اختیار اپنے پاس رکھے گی۔ اختیارات کی تقسیم اس مفروضے پر ہوگی کہ مرکز کی ذمہ داری ملک کا اتحاد ہوگا؛
ریاست اپنی فلاح وبہبود کی ذمہ دار ہوگی

اس وقت سری نگر میں کانگریس کی حکومت تھی اور میر قاسم وزیر اعلیٰ تھے۔ میر قاسم ۱۹۵۳ میں شیخ عبد
کے خلاف تھے۔ اب وہ شیخ عبداللہ کے لیے راستے سے ہٹنے پر نہ صرف راضی بلکہ اس کے مشتاق تھے۔ ۲۵ ف
۱۹۷۵ء کو شیخ عبداللہ کو ایوان کے لیڈر جموں وکشمیر کے وزیر اعلیٰ کی حیثیت سے حلف دلایا گیا۔ وہ عہدہ جو
سے ۱۹۵۳ میں چھین لیا گیا تھا، اکیس سال سے زیادہ کی مدت کے بعد انھیں واپس ملا۔ اکیس برسوں کی
مدت میں انھوں نے مصائب کا مقابلہ، اس ہمت، وقار اور عزم سے کیا تھا جو بہت کم افراد میں سے اکثر میں ہی

مگر شاید یہ سفر کا ایک نسبتاً دشوار مرحلہ بھی اسی دن شروع ہوا تھا۔ تامل ناڈو میں ڈی ایم کے نے اس
کی چھٹی دہائی میں خود مختاری اور آزادی کے خیالات کو خیرباد کہا تھا، نیشنل کانفرنس نے یہی بات ساتویں دہا
میں کی، اگر دونوں ریاستوں میں جمہوریت کے کامیاب نفاذ ہی سے یقین وایمان کی تصدیق ہوتی تھی۔ وہ
آزادی وخود مختاری سے زیادہ، درحقیقت خود اپنی حکومت کا احساس اور اپنے مقدر پر اپنا قابو ہونے کا جذبہ
چاہتے تھے۔ صدیوں کے جاگیردارانہ نظام اور استعماریت کے بعد عوام کی خواہش اور پیار زندہ فطری تھی
کے بعض علاقوں میں یہ خوف چھایا ہوا تھا کہ وہاں جمہوریت میں، غلبے اور تسلط کی کوئی دوسری شکل جاگیردارانہ
اور استعماریت کا بدل ہو جائے گی مسلم لیگی لیڈروں کا کہنا تھا کہ ایک جمہوری ہندوستان، ہندو فرقہ پرستوں کی حکومت
کا مترادف ہوگا۔ مسلمانوں میں شرکت ومشمولیت کا احساس جو حب الوطنی کی پہلی شرط ہے کبھی بیدار نہ ہو سکا۔ ڈی ایم
کے کے لیڈروں کو یقین تھا کہ خوبصورت بیانات کا ملمع جب اتر جائے گا تو اس وقت انڈین یونین ہندی
ریاستوں کے غیر ہندی ریاستوں پر عموماً اور جنوبی ہندوستان پر خصوصاً غلبے کی شکار ہو جائے گی۔ شیخ عبد
کی زیر قیادت چلنے والی نیشنل کانفرنس نے ہندوستان کی بنیادی اقدار، سیکولرزم، سوشلزم اور ڈیموکریسی
پر ایمان رکھنے کے باوجود یہ سوچنے لگی تھی کہ آیا یہ آئیڈیلزم، اس نسل کے بعد جس نے ہندوستان کو آزادی دلائی

the integrity of China was one of the factors predisposing Am to advance its Far Eastern policy to a third stage, characterize a collective aim and method. The ideal of China's integrity incorporated into an end broader than any existing before- preservation of world peace and international law conceive national interest. Wilson's program of collective security, w despite rejection introduced this third stage, was followed by more moderate collective commitments of the Washington tre of 1922 and still later by the quasi-universal engagements of Pact of Paris. These treaty equities in the principle of non-ag sion, together with new mechanisms of international consulta enabled the United States to engage in an unprecedentedly lenging and yet relatively safe mode of intervention—collectiv dictment of the aggressor. Supplemented by the Non-Recogn Doctrine, this collective diplomatic intervention was America's method in the Manchurian crisis of 1931-32

The resurgent isolationism which resulted in the neutrality lation of 1935-37 was not directed against Asia; nor, despite the that it had just been passed, was the present Neutrality Act inv upon the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in July, 1937. anomalous course of the Roosevelt Administration in this re reflected not merely a determination to defend American right an aversion to injuring China. And before long Hull followe the footsteps of Stimson, registering coincidently with the Lea similar pronouncement America's judgment that Japan had lated its treaties. He also avowed that more fundamental America's interest in the immediate situation was its concern orderly processes in international relations be maintained." from America's original conception of its interest in the Far was this motive, which brought verbal intervention to its ze But America's course had not yet become more than a "midd the-road policy," as Secretary Hull characterized it. Such a p permits the most vigorous assertion of America's legal rights even of its judgment regarding the merits of the controversy it forbids anything beyond words in differential aid of a belliger

In the second year of the conflict American policy was det

ہزادوں کے حملوں کی تاب لاسکے گا؟ شبہات حقیقی تھے اور ایک ابھرتے ہوئے اور ایک قطعی شکل اختیار کرتے ہوئے
ک کے لیے ضروری تھا کہ وہ ان شبہات کا مقابلہ پختگی اور بلوغت کے ساتھ کرے۔ کشمکش اور کھچاؤ کی کیت اور
یفیت میں فرق تھا۔ تامل علیحدگی پسندی کے خیال پر رد عمل کبھی بھی تلخ اور شدید نہیں ہوا کیوں کہ تامل ناڈ تقسیم ملک
کے وقت ہونے والے بھیانک تنازعے میں کسی طرح بھی شریک نہیں تھا۔ مگر مسلمان ۱۹۴۷ء میں ہندوستان سے لڑا
تھا اور اگرچہ کشمیری مسلمانوں نے اس زمانے میں بڑے عجیب و غریب اور حیرت انگیز آئیڈیل ازم کا مظاہرہ کیا
تھا مگر ابھی بھی اسے اس شبہہ کا شکار ہونا پڑتا تھا کہ وہ پاکستان کی طرف ہمدردانہ رویہ رکھتا ہے۔

کشمیر میں، بخشی غلام محمد کے زمانے میں دو بوگس الیکشن ہوئے انھوں نے کشمیریوں کو جمہوری نظام کی
خوبیوں کا یقین نہیں دلایا۔ اب شیخ واپس آئے تھے اگر وہ اپنے پیچھے کامیابی کی کوئی یادگار چھوڑنا چاہتے ہیں تو انھیں
کشمیریوں کو یہ یقین دلانے میں کافی محنت کرنا ہوگی کہ کشمیر اور ہندوستان کی دوستی ایک اچھا اور مفید فیصلہ تھا۔ شیخ
کی آزمائش کا وقت اس سے بہت پہلے آجائے گا جو انھوں نے سوچا ہوگا۔

ساتویں دہائی کے جو ایک غیر معمولی دہائی تھی، معیاروں کو پیش نظر رکھتے ہوئے بھی ۱۹۷۵ء ایک بڑا
ہنگامہ خیز سال تھا۔ اسی سال جون میں ایمر جنسی کا نفاذ ہوا۔ مارچ ۱۹۷۷ء تک مسز اندرا گاندھی نے انتخابات کرائے
اور شکست کھائی، جنتا پارٹی نے حکومت بنائی مرارجی ڈیسائی وزیر اعظم بنے۔ دہلی میں حکومت ہاتھ سے نکل جانے
کے بعد، کانگریس نے کشمیر میں انتہائی عجیب و غریب رد عمل کا اظہار کیا۔ مفتی محمد سعید نے ۲۹ مارچ کو (اسی ہفتہ
جس میں کانگریس حکومت سے ہٹائی گئی تھی) گورنر ایل۔ کے۔ جھا کو اطلاع دی کہ ان کی پارٹی نے شیخ عبداللہ کو
حمایت دے رکھی تھی اسے وہ واپس لے رہی ہے۔ ۱۹۷۵ء کے معاہدے کی شرائط کے مطابق، یہ کانگریس
پارٹی کے ممبر ہی تھے جنھوں نے اسمبلی کے انتخابات جس میں شیخ کی پارٹی حصہ لے سکتی تھی، نہ ہونے کی وجہ سے شیخ
کو دوٹ دے کر وزارت اعلیٰ کا عہدہ دلایا تھا۔ شیخ مبہوت رہ گئے۔ ایمر جنسی سے متعلق کچھ ذہنی تحفظات
کے باوجود الیکشن کی مہم کے دوران شیخ کوئی ایسی بات کہنے یا ایسا کچھ کرنے میں بہت محتاط رہے جسے مسز
اندرا کی مخالفت تعبیر کیا جاسکتا۔ مگر اب ۳۰ مارچ کو ایک جلسہ عام میں ایک ناراض اور تلخ شیخ عبداللہ نے کہا کہ کانگریس
نے انھیں ہمیشہ دھوکا دیا ہے۔ بہرحال اس وقت دہلی میں ایک ایسی حکومت تھی جو ڈیموکریسی کی نام لیوا تھی اور اس پر
اعتماد کیا گیا اس نے یہ مان لیا کہ اس گورکھ دھندے سے نکلنے کا صرف ایک طریقہ، نئے انتخابات ہیں۔ جیسی دکم
پیدوں کے ساتھ ساری پارٹیاں میدان میں کود پڑیں۔ اس موقع سے فائدہ اٹھا کر شیخ کے ساتھ متحدہ محاذ بنانے

کے بجائے جنتا پارٹی خود بھی میدان میں آگئی۔ دوسرے لوگوں نے لگتا ہے کہ یہ بھلا دیا کہ کشمیر کے لیے شیخ کا مطلب کیا ہے؟ وہاں ان کی حیثیت کیا ہے؟ شیخ نے ان سب کو جولائی ۱۹۷۷ کے انتخابات میں یہ دکھا دیا۔ انھوں نے انتخابات میں زبردست کامیابی حاصل کی۔ مفتی سعید کی کانگریس وادیٔ کشمیر میں ایک نشست بھی نہیں لے سکی۔ ۹ جولائی ۱۹۷۷ء کو شیخ عبداللہ نے وزیر اعلیٰ کے عہدے کا حلف اٹھایا اور پھر ۸ ستمبر ۱۹۸۲ء تک یعنی اپنے انتقال تک مسند حکومت پر متمکن رہے۔

مگر اقتدار اپنے ساتھ اپنے مسائل لایا۔ سری نگر اور دہلی کے مابین نہ شک و شبہات دور کیے جا سکے اور نہ ہی بھڑکانے والوں کی نسل ہی ختم ہوئی۔ اگرچہ ۱۹۷۷ء کی انتخابی مہم میں جنتا پارٹی نے شیخ اور نیشنل کانفرنس کے خلاف بڑی ترش و تلخ لڑائی لڑی تھی مگر اس نے اتنی شرافت ضرور دکھائی کہ شیخ عبداللہ کو ان کی اتنی زبردست کامیابی کے بعد سکون سے رہنے دیا۔ ۱۹۸۰ کے انتخابات میں شیخ نے جنتا پارٹی کے خلاف مسز اندرا گاندھی کی اعلانیہ حمایت کی۔ اگرچہ وہ خود انتخابی مہم میں کہیں نہیں گئے، مگر ان کے بیٹے فاروق عبداللہ نے مہم میں سرگرمی سے شرکت کی۔ جیت کے بعد مسز اندرا گاندھی دوسری بار وزیر اعظم کی حیثیت سے جب پہلی بار کشمیر گئیں تو ان کا زبردست ... ہوا۔ مگر یہ ماہِ عسل ایک ایسے ملک میں جہاں سیاسی رشتے یونہی بڑے ناپائدار ہوتے ہیں بہت ہی مختصر رہا۔ جیسا کہ ہم دیکھیں گے کہ اس بات میں بہت وقت نہیں لگا کہ فاروق عبداللہ نے بھی ... انھیں مانوس لہروں کا اٹھنا محسوس کرنا شروع کر دیا۔

مگر شیخ عبداللہ کو سب سے زیادہ جس بات نے افسردہ خاطر کیا، وہ وہ بدعنوانیاں تھیں جن میں ان کے کچھ اعزا ملوث ہونے لگے تھے۔ اشوک جیٹلی ان بیوروکریٹس میں سے ایک ہیں جنھوں نے ایک ایسے شخص کے ماتحت کام کیا تھا جس کی لو جلائی جا سکتی تھی۔ وہ ایک ایسے کیس کا ذکر کرتے ہیں جس میں شیخ کے رشتہ داروں میں سے ایک نے بدعنوانی میں تعاون نہ دینے والے ایک افسر کی ایمانداری پر ناراض ہو کر اسے پریشانیوں میں مبتلا کرنے کی کس کس طرح کوشش کی۔ شیخ نے مذکورہ افسر کو بلایا اور کہا "میرا رشتہ دار کبھی کبھی اپنا توازن کھو دیتا ہے مگر وہ میرا رشتہ دار ہے۔ آپ اس کی طرف سے میری پرخلوص معافی کو قبول کیجیے" ایسے رشتہ داروں کے لیے بہرحال عزت اور احترام کا کوئی جذبہ باقی نہیں رہ سکتا۔ شیخ کی نسل اور ان کے بعد آنے والوں کا موازنہ کرتے ہوئے بی کے نہرو نے کہا کہ "ہمارے لیڈر اس وقت سیاست داں کہلاتے تھے۔ آج جو حکومت کی گدیوں پر بیٹھتے ہیں وہ بھی سیاست داں کہلاتے ہیں۔ یہ بڑا طرفہ تماشہ ہے کہ یہ دونوں جو ایک دوسرے

سی مختلف قسم کے انسان ہیں، جن میں کوئی بات بھی مشترک نہیں ہے انھیں ایک ہی نام سے پکارا جائے.. ..
دل اللہ کرنے اپنے اختیارات کا استعمال) ایمان داری، لگن اور بے غرضی سے کیا اور جس کی ان کی ساری زندگی پر
فرماں روائی رہی، یہی خوبیاں تھیں جو شیخ میں بدرجہ اتم موجود تھیں اور اپنے نظریات اور اپنے اصولوں کی خاطر
میں کی بلکہ اس سے بھی زیادہ صعوبتیں برداشت کرنے پر ان کا ہمہ وقت تیار رہنا ہی تھا جس کی وجہ سے وہ قومی
ہیرو تھے۔"

بہرحال قومی ہیرو کو بھی اپنے پیچھے جانشیں چھوڑنے ہوتے ہیں۔ جمہوریت کے مبلغات اور خاندانی
ستائی کے جو ہندوستان میں بہت عام ہے، پیش نظر یہ ناگزیر تھا کہ جانشیں خود خاندان سے نکلے۔ انتخاب
" دار تک محدود تھا۔ پہلے دعوے دار تھے داماد، جی ایم شاہ، ایک سیاسی مددگار کے لحاظ سے جن کی حیثیت
سلم تھی مگر ایک سیاسی لیڈر کی حیثیت سے ان میں بہت سی مزید خوبیوں کی ضرورت تھی مگر شاید یا اپنے بیٹے سے
رت محبت کا جذبہ تھا جس کی بنا پر شیخ نے فاروق عبداللہ کا انتخاب کیا۔ بہرحال، دونوں کے مابین ایک جنگ
ھڑ گئی جس میں جانشینی کی مغل سیاست کا پرتو دیکھا جا سکتا تھا۔ اس جھگڑے کی بہرحال ایک بڑی قیمت چکانا ہوئی

شیخ پر دل کا پہلا دورہ جون ۱۹۷۷ء میں پڑا۔ دوسرا دورہ، ۵ ستمبر ۱۹۸۲ء کی سہ پہر میں دو بجے کے
وقت ہوا۔ اس وقت یہ اندازہ ہو گیا تھا کہ شیخ اس سے بچ نہ پائیں گے۔ بیماری کی خبر جواب ہی سڑکوں اور وادی کے
... ن میں پہنچی۔ لوگ ان کے گھر کے چہار طرف جمع ہونے شروع ہو گئے اور سارے کشمیر کے یہ دعا مانگنی شروع
ی " لا الٰہ الا اللہ۔ زندہ تھا اور زندہ عبداللہ (کوئی معبود نہیں ہے سوائے اللہ کے، وہ عبداللہ کو زندہ رکھے)
... تاسودی ملائی شیر کشمیر س" (اے خدا ہماری عمریں لے لے اور انھیں شیر کشمیر کو عطا کر) ... ے دن مسز
... گاندھی دہلی سے جہاز کے ذریعے شیخ عبداللہ کو دیکھنے کے لیے سری نگر پہنچیں اس وقت وہ ہوش میں تھے
ہوں نے مسز گاندھی کی موجودگی میں پھلوں کے رس کا ایک گلاس پیا مگر ان کی آنکھیں کہہ رہی تھیں کہ کہانی اب ختم
ہوئی۔ ان کے ارد گرد، شیخ کے بغیر مستقبل کی پریشانی، لوگوں کے دل و دماغ پر چھانے لگی تھی۔ ان لوگوں کے دل و
... پر بھی جو شیخ کو زندہ رکھنے کی کوشش میں اپنی جانیں دے دینے کی کوشش ... تھے ۸ ستمبر کی شام
... کی چالیس منٹ پر سری نگر کے دوکان داروں نے اپنی دوکانیں بند کر دیں اور ساری وادی میں آہ و بکا
ہونے لگی۔ شیخ کی موت کا کوئی سرکاری اعلان نہیں ہوا تھا اور حقیقت تو یہ ہے کہ ریڈیو سری نگر نے ایک خبر نشر
کی جس میں کہا گیا تھا کہ شیخ ابھی زندہ ہیں۔ ظاہر ہے یہ سچ نہیں تھا۔ عوام، حسب معمول، زیادہ جانتے تھے

حکومت ہند نے ایک ایسی گھڑی میں جو پالیسیاں مرتب کرنے والوں کے لیے کابوس ہوتی ہے، ذرہ برابر
خطرہ مول لینے سے انکار کیا۔ یہ اصول کو عملی شکل دینے کا سوال تھا "بادشاہ مر گیا۔ بادشاہ امر رہے" ایک طرف
دُنیا کو شیخ عبداللہ کی موت کے بارے میں غلط خبر سنائی گئی، تو دوسری طرف ان کے بیٹے، ریاستی کابینہ کے سب
سے جونیئر وزیر، کو جانشین کی حیثیت سے حلف اٹھوایا گیا۔ ابھی وقتی منصوبہ بندی نے دستوری اور سیاسی دو
پہلوؤں کا خیال رکھا تھا۔ یہ جی ایم شاہ تھے جن سے "اگلے وزیرِ اعلیٰ کے عہدے کے لیے فاروق عبداللہ یعنی اس شخص
کا نام تجویز کرایا گیا جس سے انھوں نے ہمیشہ نفرت کی تھی۔ شیخ کی موت کی خبر اس رات ساڑھے بارہ بجے بتائی گئی
(ایک اخبار کے دہلی ایڈیشن نے ایک عجیب و غریب سرخی لگائی تھی "شیخ کا انتقال ہو گیا ہوگا") مگر دوسرے
تمام اخباروں نے زیادہ یقین کے ساتھ خبر شائع کی تھی)

"ار چھا تم بجا . . . اکسی رد آؤ باب" (روؤ کہ آج ہم نے اپنا باپ گم کر دیا ہے) کوئی بیان، کوئی
نذرانۂ عقیدت اس بات کو کہ شیخ عبداللہ کشمیر کے لیے کیا تھے، عوام کے ردِ عمل سے بہتر ڈھنگ سے ظاہر نہیں کر
سکتا۔ وہ پولو گراؤنڈ پر جہاں شیخ کا جسدِ خاکی رکھا گیا تھا ٹوٹ پڑے اس کے بعد یہ سب لوگ وہاں سے دو
کیلومیٹر دور، حضرت بل کی مسجد کے پاس ایک چنار کے درخت کے سائے میں، جو تدفین کی جگہ تھی گئے۔ اس دن
وہاں نہ تو کوئی مسلمان تھا اور نہ ہی کوئی ہندو یا سکھ۔ اسی صدی کی چوتھی دہائی میں شیخ نے جو نعرہ دیا تھا آج اس کا عملی
مظاہرہ ہو رہا تھا اور جو جنازے کے ساتھ ساتھ مسلسل فضا میں گونج رہا تھا "شیرِ کشمیر کا کیا ارشاد ہندو، مسلم،
سکھ اتحاد" مرد اور عورتیں بوڑھے اور جوان، غرض ہر وہ فرد جس کا اس عظیم آدمی کی سحر انگیز شخصیت سے ذرا
تعلق رہا تھا وہ آج اس موقع پر اسے رخصت کرنے کے لیے موجود تھا۔

اور وہ جسدِ خاکی، جس پر ساری دُنیا کی نظریں جمی ہوئی تھیں، ہندوستانی ترنگے میں لپٹا ہوا تھا۔ شیخ
عبداللہ ایک ہندوستانی رہ کر مرے تھے۔

شیخ عبداللہ کی موت پر، حکومتِ پاکستان کے پاس کہنے کے لیے کچھ نہیں تھا۔

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دُوسرا مقدّمہ

شیخ عبداللہ سری نگر میں ہوتے تو وہ ہمیشہ جمعہ کی نماز حضرت بل کی مسجد میں ادا کرتے تھے اور اکثر اس
دن وہ اپنے عوام سے گفتگو کا ایک موقع بنا لیتے تھے ۔ اگر کوئی سیاسی بیان ہوتا تو وہ وہاں دے دیتے تھے
... تو یہ ان کے لیے ایک موقع ہوتا تھا ، لوگوں سے ملنے کا ، جو انھیں اپنے عوام سے جو ان کے معتقد تھے اور
... سے انھوں نے خود محبت کی تھی جسمانی طور پر بھی اور جذباتی طور پر بھی قریب کر دیتا تھا ۔ ۱۹۸۱ء کے اوائل موسم
... میں انھوں نے ایک جمعہ کو ، نمازیوں کو بتایا کہ وہ اب اپنے آپ کو بوڑھا اور تھکا ہوا محسوس کرنے لگے ہیں اور
... چاہتے ہیں کہ وہ اپنی ذمہ داریاں اب بتدریج کسی نوجوان کے سپرد کر دیں ۔ انھوں نے مجمع سے پوچھا تھا کہ آیا وہ
... نام تجویز کر سکتا ہے وہ لوگ اس جواب کو جانتے تھے جو بوڑھا شیر سننا چاہتا تھا ۔ مجمع میں سے کسی نے نام
... کا لیا " فاروق عبداللہ " دوسروں نے فوراً نہایت وفاداری کے ساتھ اسی نام کو دہرانا شروع کر دیا ۔ جمہوریت
... شہنشاہ نے عوام کی آواز سن لی ۔ مسند نشینی کی تاریخ ۲۱- اگست ۱۹۸۱ء قرار پائی ۔

اگست کے اُس دن کی تقریبات پر شاہی کو بھی رشک آتا جس دن فاروق عبداللہ کو نیشنل کانفرنس کا صدر
... گیا اور شیخ عبداللہ کا وارث ۔ شہر میں لوگوں کا ہجوم امنڈ پڑا تھا ۔ سڑکوں پر لوگ ٹوٹے پڑتے تھے ۔ گھروں سے
... نکل رہا تھا اور انسانوں کا ایک سیلاب تھا جو بہے جا رہا تھا ۔ یہ خبر بھی لوگوں کے کانوں میں پڑی کہ شیخ عبداللہ چاہتے
... ان سری نگر سُرخ دکھائی دے ، سُرخ ، خون شہیداں کی طرح ، سرخ ، نیشنل کانفرنس کے جھنڈے کی طرح
... انسانوں کی نجات کی علامت کی طرح ۔ ہر فرد پارٹی کا جھنڈا اٹھائے ہوئے تھا ۔ ہر عمارت پر سرخ پرچم لہرا
... تھا موسم گرما کی ایک خوش گوار سہ پہر ، چمکتی دھوپ میں فاروق عبداللہ نے ایک کھلی ہوئی جیپ میں کھڑے ہو کر
... سے مجاہد منزل سے اقبال پارک کی طرف جلوس کی قیادت کی ۔ تین کلومیٹر کے اس فاصلے کو طے

کرنے میں پانچ گھنٹے لگ گئے۔ شام کا دھندلکا چھا رہا تھا جب باپ نے بیٹے سے کہا "یہ تاج جو میں آج تمہارے سر پر رکھ رہا ہوں، کانٹوں کا بنا ہوا ہے۔ تم نوجوان ہو، فاروق عبداللہ، اور اتنے نوجوان کہ زندگی کے چیلنج کا مقابلہ کر سکتے ہو۔ میں خدا سے دعا کرتا ہوں کہ وہ ان عوام کے سلسلے میں عائد ذمہ داریوں کو پورا کرنے کی تم میں ہمت پیدا کر دے۔ یہ لوگ جن کی پرورش میں نے اتنے فرزندانہ کی ہے اور اپنی زندگی کے بہترین سال میں نے ان کے لیے صرف کیے ہیں۔" اتنا کہنے کے بعد شیخ عبداللہ رو پڑے اور مجمع نے بیک آواز کہا "آمین"۔ باپ نے بیٹے کے سینے پر صدارتی بیج لگا دیا اور مشعل منتقل ہو گئی۔

۸ ستمبر ۱۹۸۲ء کی نصف شب کے قریب، حکومت اس وقت قانونی طور پر فاروق عبداللہ کے ہاتھ میں آ گئی جب نئی دہلی کی اجازت سے فاروق عبداللہ نے عہدے کا حلف اٹھایا۔ ۱۱ ستمبر کو نیشنل کانفرنس کے سارے چھیاسی اراکین اسمبلی نے جی ایم شاہ کی پیش کی ہوئی تجویز کے حق میں ووٹ دے کر نئے وزیر اعلیٰ کے انتخاب کی توثیق کی۔ صحیح طریقہ "درحقیقت اس کے برعکس ہوتا" مگر دہلی، جانشینی کے معاملے میں، رسوم میں الجھ کر وقت ضائع نہیں کرنا چاہتا تھا۔ دہلی کو جو چیز سب سے زیادہ پریشان کر رہی تھی وہ تھی کہ چھوٹے مگر منظم اور مالی وسائل کی طرف سے مضبوط پاکستان دوست گروہ کشمیر میں، شیخ عبداللہ کی موت کے نتیجے میں پیدا ہونے والی افراتفری اور جذباتی اتھل پتھل سے فراہم کیے ہوئے اس موقع سے کہیں فائدہ اٹھانے کی کوشش نہ کریں اور پھر پاکستان کو بھی مداخلت کی ترغیب ہو سکتی تھی۔ ترلین سنگھ نے ۶ ستمبر ۱۹۸۱ء کے ہفتہ وار سنڈے میں، پاکستان دوست تنظیم جماعت اسلامی کے سرکردہ قائد سیف الدین قاری کے اسی قول کا حوالہ دیا ہے کہ "شیخ کی موت کے بعد زبردست تبدیلی ہو گی۔ کشمیر کا دانش ور طبقہ ہمارے ساتھ ہے، کیونکہ ہماری پارٹی، کردار اور اصول رکھنے والی واحد پارٹی ہے ۔۔ ایک دفعہ جب وہ (شیخ صاحب) منظر سے اوجھل ہو جاتے ہیں تو زبردست تبدیلی وقوع پذیر ہو گی۔"

فاروق عبداللہ کے سامنے ان کے کام متعین تھے۔ انہیں سب سے پہلے تو خفیہ اور کھلے ہوئے علیحدگی پسندوں کے خوابوں کو توڑنا تھا، اس کے بعد بدعنوانیاں تھیں جو ان کے باعزت باپ کے سائے میں پروان چڑھی تھیں اور ظاہر ہے کہ مرکز کے ساتھ ریاست کے تعلقات کا ازلی مسئلہ تھا جو اس وقت ری سیٹلمنٹ بل کی وجہ سے اور بھی زیادہ شدید ہو گیا تھا۔ اس بل کے ذریعے شیخ عبداللہ پاکستانی مقبوضہ کشمیر کے لوگوں کو واپس آنے اور وطن میں بسنے کا حق دلانا چاہتے تھے۔ دہلی کا خیال تھا کہ یہ بل پاکستان میں تربیت یافتہ جاسوسوں اور تخریب کاروں کے لیے ایک دعوت نامہ بن جائے گا اس لیے اس نے اپنی منظوری نہیں دی۔ عام تاثر یہ تھا کہ غیر یقینی اور نازک

ہور اور باپ کی رہنمائی سے محروم فاروق عبداللہ اپنے عمل میں محتاط رہیں گے۔ خوب صورت، جوان، گولف کھیلنے والے، مغربی تہذیب میں پروان چڑھے ہوئے بیٹے نے، جس نے ایک ریاست ایک عظیم باپ سے ورثے میں پائی تھی، ان تمام شاہدین کو حیرت میں ڈال دیا جو کناروں پر کھڑے انتظار کر رہے تھے کہ وہ کب لڑکھڑائے اور کب پھسلے۔ فاروق عبداللہ نے بہت جلد یہ ظاہر کر دیا کہ وہ کس قسم کے وزیر اعلیٰ ہوں گے۔ ڈرامائی، کھلا ہوا، صاف گو، نڈر اور عوام سے یک مسلسل رابطے میں۔ فاروق عبداللہ مسند سے اتر آئے اور بیچ بیچ ایک موٹر سائیکل پر سوار ہو گئے۔ کوئی حفاظتی عملہ شاذ ہی ان کے ساتھ ہوتا۔ اکثر یہ منظر دیکھنے کو ملتا کہ وہ سری نگر کی سڑکوں پر اپنے تین بچوں میں سے کسی یک کو موٹر سائیکل پر بٹھائے، پیراکی کے لیے ڈل جھیل کی طرف رواں دواں ہیں۔ یا وزیر اعلیٰ خود اپنی کار چلا رہے ہوں، دفعتاً رکیں اور ٹریفک کے کسی پولیس والے کو تنبیہ کریں کہ گاڑیوں کی بھیڑ کو جلدی ختم کرادے۔ انھوں نے اختیارات کے استعمال میں احساس ذمہ داری کو مجروح کیے بغیر اپنائیت کا ایک تفریحی عنصر پیدا کر دیا۔ ان کے نکتہ چینوں سے ملا۔ ہے کہ یہ سب دیکھ کر انھیں آوارہ یا یلے لوائے کہہ کر ان کی مذمت شروع کی اور کہنا شروع کیا کہ ایسے آدمی پر یک ایسے عظیم ورثے کی نگہداشت کے سلسلے میں بھروسہ نہیں کیا جا سکتا مگر انھوں نے اپنے مخالفین کو بہت جلد یہ دکھا دیا کہ انھوں نے جب کوئی سیاسی فیصلہ لیا تو نہ صرف یہ کہ سمجھ دار اور ذہین ثابت ہوئے بلکہ وہ سنگ دل بھی نکلے۔ اسی کے ساتھ انھوں نے تعریف و تحسین بھی حاصل کی۔

حکومت میں آنے کے بعد انھوں نے پہلا کام یہ کیا کہ ان تمام وزرا کو سبک دوش کر دیا جو شیخ عبداللہ کی عمیق نظروں کے نیچے "بہت اہم" بن گئے تھے۔ فاروق عبداللہ کے اس فعل سے متعلقہ افراد کو دھکا بھی لگا تھا ،، وہ خوف زدہ بھی ہو گئے تھے۔ انھوں نے ساری کابینہ کو بدل کر ان لوگوں کو اس میں رکھا جن پر وہ اعتماد کر سکتے تھے۔ س کا روائی کا نتیجہ یہ تھا کہ ڈی ڈی ٹھاکر جیسے پرانے "سپاہی" وزارت کے مانوس عیش سے محروم ہو گئے۔ جن لوگوں نے بدعنوانیوں میں اپنا نام پیدا کر لیا تھا ان کو بہت جان بوجھ کر اور سختی کے ساتھ عہدوں سے الگ رکھا گیا۔ ان سب کے علاوہ پاکستان دوست تنظیمیں تھیں جن سے نپٹنا تھا۔ فاروق عبداللہ نے اعلانیہ ان سب کو تنبیہ کی کہ وہ شر انگیزی سے باز آجائیں پھر انھوں نے یہ بھی تجویز رکھی کہ اگر انھیں تمام پارٹیوں کا تعاون حاصل ہو جائے تو وہ ان گروہوں پر پابندی بھی لگا سکتے ہیں۔ جہاں تک دہلی سے تعلقات کا معاملہ تھا۔ نئے وزیر اعلیٰ نہرو خاندان سے بہتر ہی ذاتی رابطہ رکھتے تھے۔ وہ مسز اندرا گاندھی کو ممی کہتے تھے اور راجیو گاندھی کے بہت اچھے دوست تھے انھوں نے اس ذاتی تعلق کو سیاسی اتحاد میں بدلنے کی کوشش کی مثال کے طور پر نہ صرف یہ کہ وہ سری نگر کے ہوائی اڈے

پر راجیو گاندھی کو الزام دیں گے بلکہ اس بات کا بھی انھوں نے ہمیشہ خیال رکھا کہ وہ جو فیصلے لے رہے تھے ان سے
نئی دہلی کو باخبر رکھا جائے۔ تاکہ کسی قسم کے شک و شبہے کی کوئی بنیاد نہ رہ جائے گا اور آخر میں، اپنے بہنوئی جی. ایم.
شاہ کے ساتھ خاندانی جھگڑا تھا۔ شاہ نے پیش کش کی کہ اگر انھیں نائب وزیر اعلیٰ بنا دیا جائے تو خفگی اور ناراضگی جو
دونوں سے ان پر پڑتے رہتے ہیں وہ نہیں پڑیں گے۔ مگر فاروق عبداللہ نے فیصلہ کیا کہ وہ ان پر اعتبار نہیں کریں گے۔
جیسا کہ بعد کے واقعات نے ثابت کر دیا کہ وزیر اعلیٰ درست تھے۔

دونوں اشخاص کے درمیان سیاسی عناد کے علاوہ کچھ اور بھی تھا۔ فاروق عبداللہ نے ایک ملاقات میں
مصنف کو بتایا کہ "میرے والد کو ہمیشہ یہ احساس رہا کہ انھوں نے میری بہن کی شادی جی ایم شاہ سے کر کے سب سے
بڑی غلطی کی اور یہ کہ وہ کسی نہ کسی طرح اس کی تلافی کریں گے۔ میرا خیال ہے کہ (میرے اور شاہ کے درمیان) علیحدگی
اس وقت ہوئی جب میں پارٹی کا صدر ہوا اور آخر میں وزیر بنا دیا گیا۔ یہی وقت تھا جب شاہ نے کابینہ سے
مستعفی دیا۔ میری بہن بہر حال والدہ سے ملنے ہمارے گھر آتی رہی، والد کے انتقال کے بعد بھی وہ والدہ سے ملنے
کبھی کبھی گھر آتی تھی۔ مگر مجھ سے اس کے بہت کم تعلقات تھے۔ کیوں کہ وہ سمجھتی تھی کہ میں نے اس کے شوہر کے سر
سے تاج اتار لیا ہے۔" ہندوستانی جمہوریت کی سیکولر کن اور اشخاص کی بنیاد پر بنی ہوئی دنیا میں یہ چیزیں نہ صرف یہ
کہ اہمیت رکھتی ہیں بلکہ جیسا کہ ہم دیکھیں گے کہ بسا اوقات ایک ریاست کے مقدر کی فیصل و ثالث بن جاتی ہیں

مسز گاندھی کا مسئلہ یہ تھا کہ وہ ایک وزیر اعظم تھیں جس کی بنیادی ذمہ داری ملک کی یک جہتی اور اس کا دفاع ہے
اور شیخ عبداللہ اور ان کے خاندان کے مابین قابل قبول تعلقات کس طرح استوار رکھیں۔ مزید یہ کہ صدر کی حیثیت
سے اس پارٹی کے مفادات کا بھی تحفظ کریں، جو درحقیقت اب ان کے نام سے (کانگریس۔ اندرا) وابستہ ہو گئی
تھی۔ ۱۹۸۲ء میں ایک فاروق عبداللہ کی حکومت، ہر لحاظ سے کشمیر کے تحفظ اور اس کی سلامتی کے لیے لازمی تھی
مگر کیا یہ سمجھنا چاہیے کہ ریاست کے سامنے صرف یہی ایک واحد طریقہ تھا؟ کیا مسز گاندھی، اپنی پارٹی کو آگے بڑھانے
اور ایک جمہوری نظام میں ایک جائز کوشش، انتخابات کو جیتنے کے، ایک سیاسی لیڈر کے فطری حق کو چھوڑ سکتی
تھیں، یا انھیں اس حق سے دستبردار ہو جانا چاہیے۔ اس مشکل کا ایک حل شیخ عبداللہ نے تجویز کیا تھا کہ نیشنل
کانفرنس جموں اور کشمیر میں کانگریس کی ایک الحاقی پارٹی ہو جائے مگر مسز اندرا گاندھی نے اس میں بھی خطرات دیکھے
فرض کیجیے کہ الحاقی پارٹی، قومی یک جہتی اور اتحاد کے مقصد سے انحراف کر دیتی ہے، کیا یہ ضروری نہیں تھا کہ
کانگریس ریاست میں اپنا ایک وجود قائم رکھے تاکہ ایسی کسی صورت میں وہ صورت حالات کو سنبھال لے؟ اسی لیے

رہ گاندھی اس صورت حال کو قبول نہیں کر سکتی تھیں کہ کانگریس کشمیر کو کانفرنس کے لیے چھوڑ دے۔ خود شیخ عبداللہ کی
زندگی میں انھوں نے اپنی پارٹی کے فروغ و استحکام کے لیے ریاست کے دورے کیے۔ پھر وہ اتنی ظرف کی بھی نہیں
تھیں کہ شیخ عبداللہ کے سیکولرزم پر نکتہ چینی نہ کرتیں۔ مثال کے طور پر اپریل ۱۹۸۱ء میں انھوں نے جموں کے
ہندوؤں کے ساتھ اظہار ہمدردی کیا جو ایک مسلم اکثریت والی ریاست میں عدم تحفظ کے مسائل کا سامنا کر رہے
تھے۔ انڈین اکسپریس کو ایک انٹرویو دیتے ہوئے شیخ عبداللہ نے یہ مانا تھا کہ یہ انداز گفتگو، پارٹی کے مفادات
کے پیش نظر لڑی جانے والی لڑائی کا حصہ ہے مگر ساتھ ہی انھوں نے یہ بھی کہا کہ "پارٹیوں کی باہمی لڑائی
ہمارے قومی مفادات کو نقصان نہیں پہنچانا چاہیے ...... میرے اجداد ہندو تھے۔ کشمیر میں ہم سب کا خون
ایک ہے۔ ہم سب بھائی ہیں اور بدستور ایک تہذیب کے وارث ہیں اس لیے ایسی بات ہم سب کو حیرت میں ڈال
دیتی ہے اور اگر ایک ملک کا وزیر اعظم ایسے الزامات لگاتا ہے تو ریاست کے باہر کے لوگ انھیں سنجیدگی
سے لیں گے۔"

شیخ عبداللہ اور ان کے خاندان سے متعلق افراد کے ذہنوں میں یہ بات ہمیشہ رہی کہ کوئی مضائقہ نہیں
رہ جاتا ہے جتنی بار اس بات پر احتجاج کریں مگر پاکستان کی طرف "نرم" رویئے اور خفیہ طور پر علیحدگی پسند لیڈروں
سے ساز باز رکھنے کے الزام کے ہدف وہ کسی وقت بھی بنائے جا سکتے ہیں۔ وہ جانتے تھے کہ دلی جب بھی انھیں جھکانا
چاہے گی یہ الزام سر اٹھائے گا اور اگر ضروری سمجھا گیا تو ایسے بہانے کو حکومت کو برخاست کرنے کے لیے بھی استعمال
کرنے سے گریز نہ کیا جائے گا۔ غداری کا الزام سنتے سنتے شیخ عبداللہ نے اپنی عمر بتا دی۔ اس کا جواب صرف ان کے
ذاتی یقین اور خود اعتمادی میں تھا بہر حال آخر میں وہ ان الزامات سے بری کر دیئے گئے۔ فاروق عبداللہ بھی جانتے
تھے کہ محض وقت کی دیر سویر ہے نہیں تو متعدد دشمن قوتیں انھیں بھی بدنام کرنے کی تحریک شروع کر دیں گی میں
ہی فطرت کے مطابق انھوں نے اس مسئلے کا مقابلہ دو بدو کرنے کا فیصلہ کیا۔ شیخ عبداللہ نے، بیٹے کی رائے کے
مطابق، ایک غلطی یہ کی تھی کہ اپنے آپ کو کم و بیش خود اپنی ریاست تک محدود رکھا تھا؛ فاروق عبداللہ نے طے کیا
کہ وہ سارے ملک میں ذاتی اور سیاسی روابط قائم کریں گے۔ وہ صرف مسز اندرا گاندھی کو نہیں سارے ملک کو
اپنی وفاداری کا یقین دلائیں گے۔ اگر وہ ملک کے لوگوں اور یہاں کی سیاسی پارٹیوں کے ذہنوں کو اس
شبہ سے صاف کر سکے تو انھیں صرف ایک پارٹی کانگریس کی خیر سگالی پر کم انحصار کرنا ہوگا۔ اس کے بعد اگر کبھی انھیں
علیحدگی پسند کہا گیا تو انھیں توقع تھی کہ ایک واحد طاقت ور آواز سے زیادہ آوازیں اٹھیں گی جو یہ کہیں گی یہ الزام

ایک جانب دارانہ دھوکا دھڑی ہے جو قوت کے غیر اخلاقی کھیل کی پردہ پوشی کے لیے گھڑا جا رہا ہے۔

فاروق عبداللہ نے تمام فرقہ پرست جماعتوں پر، وہ چاہے ہندو ہوں یا مسلمان، پابندی لگائے جانے کی مانگ شروع کی۔ اس خیال کو خوش آمدید کہنا تو دور کی بات ہے کانگریس اس خیال ہی سے پیچھے ہٹ گئی "دی اسٹیٹسمین" کے ایڈیٹر اور ایک صحافی، نکھل چکرورتی جنہوں نے کشمیر کے مسئلے کا عقلی اور آزادانہ مطالعہ کیا ہے کہا ہے کہ "سیکولر ہونے کا دعویٰ کرنے والی پارٹیاں، کانگریس بھی اور کمیونسٹ بھی ہندوستان کی مختلف ریاستوں میں برسر اقتدار ہیں۔ یہ کیسی بات ہے کہ انھوں نے ابھی تک، فرقہ پرست تنظیموں پر پابندی لگانے کے فاروق عبداللہ مطالبے کی پرجوش حمایت نہیں کی ہے؟ اس سے بھی زیادہ حیرت انگیز جموں اور کشمیر میں فاروق عبداللہ کی اس تجویز پر کانگریس (اندرا) کے لیڈروں کا اگر بالکل گھٹا ہوا نہیں تو دبا دبا رد عمل ہے۔ کانگریس کے رد عمل کے گھٹے ہوئے کی وجہ یہ تھی کہ اس نے خود نیشنل کانفرنس کی حکومت کے لیے مشکلات پیدا کرنے کی خاطر، فرقہ پرست تنظیموں کو استعمال کرنے سے پرہیز نہیں کیا اور اب بھی وہ اس حربے کو ترک کرنا نہیں چاہتی ہے" انتخابات جو آخری دفعہ ۱۹۷۷ء میں ہوئے تھے، بہرحال ۱۹۸۳ء میں پھر ہونے ہیں۔

کشمیر کے کانگریسیوں کے سامنے ایک اور مسئلہ بھی تھا۔ وہ ۱۹۷۵ء سے حکومت سے الگ تھلگ رہے تھے، اور اب جب کہ شیخ عبداللہ کا انتقال ہو چکا تھا اگر ان کے بیٹے کو اپنا اثر و رسوخ بڑھانے کی اجازت دے دی گئی تو پھر ان کے سامنے بے بسی اور بے کاری کی ایک اور طویل مدت منہ پھاڑے کھڑی تھی۔ اسی لیے وہ نہ صرف الیکشن لڑنے کے ہی نہیں بلکہ کافی نشستیں حاصل کرنے کے خواہش مند تھے تاکہ وہ نیشنل کانفرنس کے ممبروں کو توڑ کر اپنے ساتھ شامل کر کے حکومت بنا سکیں۔ (کانگریس خود براہ راست حکومت بنانے کی توقع کبھی نہیں کر سکتی تھی) صرف ایک پرانے اور اہم کانگریسی لیڈر تھے جنھوں نے اس انداز فکر کی مخالفت کی اور وہ تھے سید میر قاسم جنھوں نے شیخ عبداللہ کے لیے راہ ہموار کرنے کی خاطر وزارت اعلیٰ کی کرسی چھوڑی تھی۔ ان کا کہنا تھا کہ ہندوستان کی خاطر، کشمیر کی خوش حالی کے لیے ضروری ہے کہ فاروق عبداللہ کو، اگر وہ الیکشن میں جیت جائیں تو بغیر کسی مزاحمت کے حکومت کرنے کا موقع دیا جائے۔ حقیقت تو یہ ہے کہ وہ نیشنل کانفرنس اور کانگریس کا اتحاد چاہتے تھے، چاہے یہ اتحاد ایسی ہی پارٹی کی قیمت پر قائم ہو۔ ان کا کہنا تھا کہ کانگریس کو، قومی مفاد کے پیش نظر اتنی قربانی تو کرنا ہی چاہیے مگر کوئی سن نہیں رہا تھا۔

۱۸ جون ۱۹۸۳ء کو میر قاسم نے مسز اندرا گاندھی کو لکھا۔ "آپ میری ان کوششوں سے اچھی طرح واقف ہیں کہ

interesting. The most obvious is the fact that words had failed; the more inevitably because self-limitation to words had entailed the United States selling unrestrictedly to the aggressor nation the very weapons and materials of war which American opinion condemned it for using. In the second place, all the traditional factors of the American attitude toward the Far East were given extreme stimulation by Japan's later conduct—its inhumane mode of warfare, its forthright repudiation of the Open Door, its challenge to America's claim to influence in the Far East, and its occupation of regions that menaced the Philippines. Finally, most important of all, developments in world politics gave to the conflict an altogether new bearing, one affecting the national interest which has always seemed to Americans the preeminent warrant of radical action. For the first time the independence of China entered into association with America's security in America's own hemisphere.

Long believed forever safe, the Monroe Doctrine has come to be threatened by—of all things—an attack upon the independence of China. The threat, indeed, proceeds most immediately and directly from the now formidable infiltrations in Latin America of the European dictatorships, the immense expansion of whose power in the past year has completely upset the European balance of power upon which the security of the Doctrine always depended. But Japan also is involved, if only because of the interdependence of Europe and Asia effected by the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Triangle. Japan's victory in China would strengthen immeasurably the potentialities of all three powers for challenging the Monroe Doctrine, while the defeat of Japan would greatly reduce that danger. From America's viewpoint Japan is the base of the Triangle: with the further weakening of this base, which is already the weakest side, the entire structure of menace to the Monroe Doctrine might collapse.

In the past year, with its series of aggressions, these considerations have finally been borne in upon American public opinion both by the lesson of events and by expositions such as the radio address of Senator Pittman on February 20, 1939. The increase in public readiness for a bolder policy is shown by various indices: the favorable reception given to the President's "measures short of war" ad-

یں نے اپنے حقیر طریقے پر (۱۹۷۵ء میں) شیخ عبداللہ کے ساتھ ہونے والے اس تاریخی معاہدے کی تکمیل کے عمل کو تیز تر کرنے کے سلسلے میں کی تھیں جس نے دنیا کے سامنے ہندوستان کی جمہوریت کی اختلاف کو برداشت کرنے اور مشکل ترین مسائل کے دوستانہ حل ڈھونڈنے کی فطری صلاحیت اور توانائی کو آشکارا کر دیا تھا ..... ایک حلقے نے، کانگریس (اندرا) کا اس نئی صورت حال سے مطمئن ہونا دشوار سمجھا۔ یہ حلقہ حکومت سے چپکا رہنا چاہتا تھا اور شاید اس نے کبھی بھی وسیع تر قومی مفادات کے پیش نظر حکومت سے الگ رہنے کا تصور بھی نہیں کیا تھا۔ میر قاسم کی نظر میں یہی وہ لوگ تھے جنھوں نے اتحاد کے موقع کو گنوا دینے کا شعوری اہتمام کیا۔

میر قاسم کی اس تحریر کا جواب دیتے ہوئے مسز اندرا گاندھی نے لکھا "میرے نزدیک (۱۹۷۵) کا معاہدہ ریاست کی تمام سیکولر اور محب وطن قوتوں کے درمیان تعاون کا ایک موثر اور بار آور طریقہ پہلے بھی تھا اور اب بھی ہے۔ اس کا یہ مطلب یقیناً نہیں تھا کہ کانگریس گوشہ گمنامی میں چلی جائے۔ میں نے معاہدے کی یہ تاویل نہ کبھی مانی تھی اور نہ اب مان سکتی ہوں مگر آپ کا نقطۂ نظر یہی معلوم ہوتا ہے، اور برا یہ ہوا کہ آپ پہلے شیخ عبداللہ اور ان کے بعد فاروق عبداللہ سے اپنے نقطہ نظر کو منوانے میں کامیاب ہوئے۔ نیشنل کانفرنس میں حکمرانی کی بد دماغی کے پس پشت یہی بات ہے۔"

ٹھیک ہے، مگر یہ بد دماغی عوامی خواہش اور عوامی ارادے کی بنیاد پر تھی فاروق عبداللہ اور ان کی ماں بیگم اکبر جہاں دونوں جانتے تھے کہ وہ کانگریس کی امداد کے بغیر الیکشن جیت سکتے ہیں۔ اتحاد تو بعد کی امکانی ساز باز اور جعل سازیوں کے تحفظ کے لیے نیچے کی ایک پالیسی تھا۔ مگر کانگریس نے ایک قیمت مانگی اور جو بہت زیادہ تھی۔ فاروق عبداللہ کسی ایسے معاہدے یا مفاہمت کو نہیں منظور کریں گے جو اسمبلی میں نیشنل کانفرنس کی زبردست اکثریت کو یقینی نہ بناتی ہو۔ ... کی اور غداری کی یادیں ابھی تازہ تھیں۔ کانگریس سے ہونے والے مذاکرات ختم ہو گئے۔ طرفین ۵ جون ۱۹۸۳ء کو ... کا اور وعدہ وفائی کا پانی کرنے پر تل گئے۔ "عفو و درگزر کی نہ تو کسی نے درخواست کی، اور نہ ہی کسی نے کیا۔ کانگریس نے ... قوت استعمال کی جو اس کے قبضۂ قدرت میں تھی اور یہ قوت اس کے پاس بہت تھی۔ ملک کی سب سے بڑی سیاسی پارٹی ہونے کی وجہ سے بھی اور مرکزی حکومت کے وسائل کی موجودگی کی وجہ سے بھی۔ چھوٹی پارٹیاں، جو اپنے بل بوتے پر ایک نشست بھی نہیں جیت سکتی تھیں مگر ایک دو حلقوں کے انتخاب میں بڑی موثر حمایت دے سکتی تھیں، انہیں خوب ... دی گئی۔ اس سارے عمل میں فاروق عبداللہ کو ایک ایسے خاندان کی طرف سے تعاون ملا جو شیخ عبداللہ کے خاندان کا پچھلے پچاس سال سے شدید دشمن رہا تھا۔ یہ خاندان تھا ایک مذہبی لیڈر مولانا یوسف شاہ کا، جو قیصر کی دائی ... اس وقت بھی شیخ عبداللہ کے دشمن تھے جب دونوں مسلم کانفرنس میں تھے۔ جب شیخ عبداللہ نے نیشنل کانفرنس

شروع کی تو اس وقت بھی کٹر بنیاد پرست مولانا نے مسلم کانفرنس کی ڈیڑھ اینٹ کی مسجد بنائے رکھی اور بعد کو وہ کچھ دنوں کے لیے پاکستانی مقبوضہ کشمیر بھی گئے۔ مگر شیخ عبداللہ کے کشمیر میں وہ طنز و مزاح کا ایک موضوع تھے۔ شیخ کا لقب شیر تھا، مولانا کی عرفیت بکری پڑ گئی تھی۔ مولانا کے وارث میر واعظ فاروق کا بہت دنوں موقف یہ رہا کہ کشمیر پاکستان کو دے دیا جانا چاہیے مگر ۱۹۷۷ء میں انھوں نے جنتا پارٹی میں شامل ہونے کے لیے اپنے اس خیال کو اعلانیہ ترک کر دیا۔ ۱۹۸۳ء کے انتخابات سے قبل عبداللہ خاندان سے ان کی معروف دشمنی کی وجہ سے کانگریس نے میر واعظ کو بہت لالچ دیئے اور ان کی بہت ہمت افزائی کی مگر انھوں نے کانگریس کی بجائے فاروق عبداللہ کی حمایت کا اعلان کر کے سبھوں کو حیرت میں ڈال دیا۔

فاروق عبداللہ نے اگر کوئی غلطی کی تو وہ اس وقت جب انھوں نے اپنی والدہ جو خاندان میں تفرقہ نہیں چاہتی تھیں، کے زور ڈالنے پر امیدواروں کی فہرست میں شامل کرنے کے لیے جی ایم شاہ کے تجویز کیے ہوئے نا موں کو مان لیا۔ ان ناموں کا اعلان انھوں نے ۲۹-اپریل کے ایک بہت بڑے جلسۂ عام میں کیا۔ مجھے کو اس بات پر دھکا سا لگا کہ شاہ کے وفادار ابھی ختم نہیں ہوئے۔ لوگوں کا ردِ عمل ظاہر ہوا جب یہ نام سنائے جا رہے تھے، اس وقت انھوں نے شور کیا انھوں نے ڈائس پر چپلیں اور جوتے پھینکے۔ آگے چل کر یہ غلطی بڑی مہنگی ثابت ہوگی۔ بٹ نے مستقبل کے اپنے ارادوں کو راز میں نہیں رکھا۔ صرف یہی نہیں کہ انھوں نے کانفرنس کے ایجنڈا کے لیے کوئی کام نہیں کیا بلکہ انھوں نے الیکشن کی مہم جب اپنے عروج پر تھی، اس وقت سری نگر میں کانگریسی لیڈروں سے ملاقات کی۔ دوسری طرف جموں میں مسز اندرا گاندھی نے بڑے واضح طور پر ہندو موافق جھکاؤ کے ساتھ ایک جارحانہ انتخابی مہم چلائی ان کا یہ جھکاؤ اس مفروضے پر (اور صحیح طور پر) تھا کہ وادی میں انھیں مسلمانوں کے ووٹ ملنے کا کوئی امکان نہیں اس لیے انھیں میدانی علاقوں کے ہندوؤں کے ووٹوں پر اپنی توجہ مرکوز کرنا چاہیے۔ فاروق عبداللہ نے اپنے اسر باپ کے وارث اور جانشین کی حیثیت سے مہم چلائی جو کشمیری مسلمان اور ہندوستانی سیکولرزم دونوں کا محافظ تھا۔ ر کے والد کا دیا ہوا "مسلم، ہندو، سکھ اتحاد" کا نعرہ بار بار دہرایا جا رہا تھا۔ انھوں نے عوام کو یاد دلایا کہ شیخ عبداللہ نے اپنی وصیت میں کشمیریوں سے اپیل کی ہے کہ "وہ نیشنل کانفرنس کے قلعے" کی ہمیشہ حفاظت کریں ان کے ایک اتحاد کا پیچ میں کانگریس کو مہاراجہ ہری سنگھ کے ساتھ رکھا گیا تھا۔ دونوں نے کشمیر کو "غلام" بنایا تھا۔ فاروق عبداللہ نے کہا کہ "ان قوتوں کو یہ یاد رکھنا چاہیے کہ شیخ عبداللہ نے یہ کام میرے ذمے اپنی زندگی ہی میں کیا تھا۔ یہ لوگ کہتے ہیں کہ اگر فاروق عبداللہ کو اسی طرح بڑھنے دیا گیا تو کل وہ ایک دوسرا شیخ عبداللہ بن جائے گا۔ ریاست کے عوام

ریاست کی خود مختاری، عزت نفس اور ایک خصوصی تشخص کے سبق پڑھائے گا۔ تولین سنگھ نے روزنامہ ٹیلیگراف میں ایک ایسے وزیراعلیٰ کے جو انگلستان میں رہا تھا، انفرادی انداز کے بارے میں لکھا ہے " ڈاکٹر عبداللہ جین ٹی شرٹ، انگریزی برساتی اور آرمی بوٹ پہنتے ہیں۔ جس قسم کا استقبال ان کا ہوتا ہے ویسا شاید ہی ہندوستان میں کسی سیاست داں کا نہیں ہوتا۔ جب وہ آتے ہیں تو وہ (ان کے حامی) زبردستی انھیں گاڑی سے نیچے اتار لیتے ہیں اور سب کے ساتھ چلنے پر مجبور کر دیتے ہیں۔ اسٹیج پر بس یوں سمجھو کہ لوگ انھیں اٹھا کر پہنچا دیتے ہیں۔ اگر وہاں اسٹیج نہیں ہے تو وہ اپنی میٹاڈور کی چھت پر چڑھ جاتے ہیں اور میگافون کی مدد سے تقریر کرتے ہیں۔ وہ ان سے کشمیری زبان میں بات کرتے ہیں، مذاق کرتے ہیں، چٹکلے سناتے ہیں، ان سے نعرے لگانے کو کہتے ہیں اور انھیں بتاتے ہیں کہ یہ بات بہت اہم ہے کہ وہ سب لوگ ۵ جون کو گھر سے جلدی نکلیں اور اپنا ووٹ ڈالیں۔"

الیکشن کے نتائج نے ثابت کر دیا کہ نیشنل کانفرنس کا قلعہ بالکل محفوظ و مستحکم ہے۔ فاروق عبداللہ نے زبردست کامیابی حاصل کی۔ اگرچہ جموں میں کانگریس نے اچھی کامیابیاں حاصل کیں۔ بہرحال جموں میں بھی نیشنل کانفرنس نے ۱۹۷۷ء میں شیخ عبداللہ نے جتنی نشستیں جیتی تھیں ان سے زیادہ نشستوں پر کامیابی حاصل کی۔ جموں میں اسے اڑتیس فی صدی ووٹ ملے۔ یہ ۱۹۷۷ء کے مقابلے میں معتدبہ اضافہ ہے۔ الیکشن کا نتیجہ، پارٹی نے کہا شہادت ہے اس کے سیکولر کردار کی اور ثبوت ہے اس بات کا کہ یہ پارٹی صرف کشمیری مسلمانوں کی نہیں ہے۔

جماعت اسلامی نے ۲۵ امیدوار کھڑے کیے تھے، اس کا نقطۂ نظر بالکل غیر مبہم تھا۔ "کشمیر میں ہندوستان ایک قابض قوت" ہے اور نیشنل کانفرنس کے لیڈر "ہندوستانی کتے"۔ انھوں نے کہا ہمارا قائد رسول اللہؐ اور لوگوں سے اپیل کی کہ وہ انھیں ووٹ دیں تاکہ وہ کشمیر میں اسلامی نظام کے قیام کو یقینی بنا سکیں۔ الیکشن میں جماعت اسلامی کا صفایا ہو گیا۔

مگر کانگریس اپنی شکست تسلیم نہیں کرے گی اس نے ذرائع ابلاغ پر اپنے اثر اور اپنے کنٹرول کی مدد سے یہ تاثر پھیلایا تھا کہ یہ الیکشن جیتنے جا رہی ہے، اب اس نے دعویٰ کرنا شروع کیا کہ نیشنل کانفرنس نے دھوکا دیا، دھاندلی اور بے ایمانی سے الیکشن میں کامیابی حاصل کی۔ دلی میں حکومت ہونے کا فائدہ اٹھاتے ہوئے کچھ دن تو یہ الزام موضوع بحث بنا رہا، مگر کچھ عرصہ بعد اپنی موت آپ مر گیا۔ مگر یہ صاف تھا کہ کانگریس اور کانفرنس کے درمیان لڑائی جاری رہے گی۔

الیکشن میں فتح حاصل کرنے کے بعد سری نگر کی جامع مسجد میں نمازیوں کو خطاب کرتے ہوئے فاروق

عبداللہ نے کہا کہ کانگریس (اندرا) سے ان کی لڑائی ابھی ختم نہیں ہوئی ہے۔ میں ان سے گلی اور کوچوں میں، د
ملک کے ہر کونے میں لڑوں گا۔ میری آزمائش پوری ہو چکی۔ مگر انھیں (ملک کے باقی حصوں میں) ابھی جلد ہی
رائے دہندگان کے سامنے جانا ہے۔ دیکھنا ہے کہ وہ کیا کامیابیاں حاصل کرتی ہے" انھوں نے مزید کہا کہ وہ
حزب اختلاف کی ان پارٹیوں سے قریبی تعلقات قائم کرنے کی کوشش کریں گے جو ہم پر وقت پڑنے پر ہمارا
آئیں اور ہمارے ساتھ کھڑی ہوئیں۔ ایچ این بہوگنا اور بیجو پٹنائک جیسے حزب اختلاف کے اہم لیڈروں نے نیشنل
کانفرنس کی انتخابی مہم میں عملی طور پر شرکت کی تھی۔

مسز گاندھی سے مقابلہ (تنازعہ) صحیح معنوں میں ۲۷ مئی ۱۹۸۲ء کو شروع ہوا۔ اسی روز جنوبی ہندوستان
کے شہر وجے واڑہ میں، این ٹی راما راؤ نے، جو اب فلمی اداکار کے بجائے سیاست داں بن گئے تھے، سارے ملک
کے حزب اختلاف کے لیڈروں کی ایک میٹنگ بلائی۔ میٹنگ کا بظاہر مقصد، مرکز اور ریاستوں کے باہمی تعلقات
کے مسائل کو حل کرنے کے لیے مشترکہ جدوجہد شروع کرنا تھا مگر اس کے ساتھ ساتھ اس امید کی بھی لو جھلملاتی تھی کہ یہ
میٹنگ شاید اگلے عام انتخابات میں کانگریس کے خلاف ایک متحدہ محاذ کی تشکیل کی طرف بھی رہنمائی کر دے
۲۸ مئی کو، اگرچہ خود ان کی ریاست میں انتخابی مہم اپنے عروج پر تھی۔ فاروق عبداللہ وجے واڑہ میں موجود تھے
مسز اندرا گاندھی نے جو اس وقت اپنی انتخابی مہم کے سلسلے میں جموں اور کشمیر میں تھیں برملا احتجاج کیا کہ فاروق عبداللہ
"میرے دشمنوں" سے ہاتھ ملا رہے ہیں ان کے اس احتجاج کے پیچھے ایک حقیقی وجہ تھی، درحقیقت فاروق عبداللہ
نے کوئی ایسی بات کی بھی تھی جو خود ان کے والد صاحب نے کبھی نہیں کی۔ شیخ عبداللہ نے اُن لوگوں کے باہمی مسائل
کی نوعیت چاہے جو ہو ہمیشہ یہ موقف اختیار کیا کہ نہرو خاندان کی باقی تمام ملک میں حمایت کی جانا چاہیے۔ حقیقت
تو یہ ہے کہ شیخ ایک سودا کرنا چاہتے تھے۔ نہرو کا خاندان ہندوستان کو رکھ سکتا ہے اگر وہ عبداللہ کے خاندان
کو کشمیر دے دے۔ ۱۹۷۷ء اور ۱۹۸۰ء کے دونوں عام انتخابات میں شیخ عبداللہ نے مسز گاندھی کی حمایت
کی۔ مگر فاروق عبداللہ کو اپنے ماننے والوں کے لیے ایک نوکری سے زیادہ کی ضرورت تھی اور اسی وجہ سے وہ وجے
واڑہ میں ان تین وزرائے اعلیٰ اور گیارہ اہم پارٹی لیڈروں میں تھے جنھوں نے کانگریس (اندرا) پر ملک کو تباہ
کرنے کا الزام لگایا اور انھوں نے وہاں یہ وعدہ بھی کیا کہ اس سلسلے کی تیسری میٹنگ سری نگر میں ہوگی جہاں
وہ اس کی میزبانی کریں گے۔

کانگریس نے حزب اختلاف کی پارٹیوں کے درمیان اس پنپتے ہوئے اتحاد کو توڑنے کی بڑی سرگر

لمش کی۔ تامل ناڈو کے وزیر اعلیٰ ایم جی راما چندرن نے جو وجے واڑہ میں موجود تھے، کانگریس کے ساتھ کچھ ساز
ی ورحزب اختلاف کا ساتھ دینے سے منکر ہو گئے۔ اس مجوزہ میٹنگ کو منسوخ کرنے کے لیے فاروق عبداللہ
بہت دباؤ ڈالا گیا مگر انھوں نے سوچا کہ وہ اپنے "بھائیوں" کو دھوکا نہیں دے سکتے۔ اور اکتوبر کے پہلے
تے میں مسز اندرا گاندھی کے مخالف ہندوستانی لیڈر سری نگر میں جمع ہوئے۔ ان کا یہ اجتماع باہمی اتحاد کا
۔ مظاہرہ بھی تھا اور ساتھ ہی یہ ایک کوشش بھی تھی مرکز اور ریاستوں کے درمیان اختیارات کے توازن میں
بی کا مطالبہ کرنے کی۔

ردِ عمل فوری طور پر سامنے آیا۔ فاروق کے حامیوں کو توڑ کر انھیں وزارت اعلیٰ کے عہدے سے ہٹانے
منصوبے پر عمل شروع ہو گیا۔ جی ایم شاہ سے کہا گیا کہ وہ اپنے خرگوشوں کو نیشنل کانفرنس کے پیٹ سے نکال
اندازہ یہ ہوا کہ یہ کام جتنا آسان سمجھا گیا تھا وہ اتنا تھا نہیں۔ بالکل اسی قسم کے حالات کا اندازہ کر کے شیخ عبداللہ
سمبلی کے خلاف ریپریزنٹیشن آف دی پیپلز ایکٹ پاس کرایا تھا صرف ایک خالص تکنیکی جواز تھا جس کی مدد
س قانون کو بھانسا دیا جا سکتا تھا اور وہ تھا "دل بدلو" کی تعریف۔ مگر یہاں بھی ایک ایسے گورنر کی ضرورت
رکسی وزیر اعلیٰ کو برطرف کرنے کے لیے حقیقت کی طرف بڑا متزلزل رویہ رکھتا ہو۔ اکتوبر ۱۹۸۲ میں جموں و
اگورنر وہ شخص تھا جو شیخ عبداللہ اور پنڈت نہرو کے ساتھ دہلی میں فلم "دی رینزرس اینج" دیکھنے گیا تھا،
ن کے نہرو۔ وہ ایسی قابل اعتراض حکمت عملی میں شامل نہیں ہو سکتے تھے جو کچھ ہو رہا تھا اس سے واقف
مل دھسے ڈاکٹر فاروق عبداللہ نے اپنے طور پر یہ فیصلہ کیا کہ وہ اپنے بہنوئی کا بہت خیال رکھ چکے۔ ۶۔
۔ نیشنل کانفرنس کی ورکنگ کمیٹی نے جی ایم شاہ کو پارٹی سے نکال دیا۔

۔ طرف سے مایوس ہو کر کانگریس (اندرا) نے اس مانوس الزام کی طرف اپنی توجہ مرکوز کر دی کہ فاروق عبداللہ
ہ کے ساتھ سازباز میں ملوث تھے جو ہندوستان کو برباد کرنا چاہتے ہیں۔ کانگریس کے لیڈروں نے اجن
راندرا گاندھی اور ان کے بیٹے بھی شامل تھے) یہ کہا کہ سکھ انتہا پسند، مسلح جنگ کے فن کی تربیت کشمیر میں حاصل
ہے ہیں۔ اس کی کوئی شہادت کبھی نہیں ملی۔ یہاں تک کہ ۱۹۸۴ء میں، فوجی کارروائی کے بعد، حکومت نے
سے متعلق جو قرطاس ابیض شائع کیا تھا وہ بھی یہ ثابت نہ کر سکا کہ فاروق عبداللہ سکھ انتہا پسند لیڈروں
ی ربط رکھتے ہیں۔ مگر حکومت کے ماتحت ریڈیو اور ٹیلی ویژن نے یہ بات سارے ملک میں پھیلا دی ۱۳۔
۱۹۸۱ء کو سری نگر میں ہونے والے، ویسٹ انڈیز اور ہندوستان کے درمیان کرکٹ میچ کے ایک

واقعے کو بڑھا چڑھا کر ایک بڑا اسکنڈل بنا دیا گیا۔ پاکستان دوست طالب علموں کے ایک چھوٹے سے گروہ نے یہ
کے ٹیلی ویژن پر دکھائے جانے کا فائدہ اٹھاتے ہوئے اسٹیڈیم کے ایک کونے میں ہندوستان مخالف نعرے
لگانے شروع کر دیئے۔ ڈاکٹر عبداللہ کو ندامت تھی۔ انھوں نے سوپور میں ایک جلسہ عام کو خطاب کرتے ہوئے
کہ "اس واقعے پر ہمارے سر شرم سے جھک جاتے ہیں"۔ مگر بجائے اس کے کہ یہ کہا جاتا کہ فاروق عبداللہ ایک ے
شخص تھے جو ایسی منفی طاقتوں کا مقابلہ کر سکتے تھے اور ان پر قابو پا سکتے تھے، سرکاری ذرائع ابلاغ نے یہ تاثر
کر دیا کہ گویا وزیر اعلیٰ خود اس مظاہرے کے پس پشت تھے۔ اس حقیقت کا کہ اس واقعے کے بعد فاروق عب
نے جماعت اسلامی کے خلاف خفگی اور مذمت کا ایک سلسلہ شروع کر دیا۔ شاذ ہی ذکر کیا گیا۔ نہ ہی ابلاغ کے
سرکاری ذریعوں کے پاس کبھی اتنا وقت ہوا کہ وہ ملک کی یک جہتی اور اس کے اتحاد سے وفاداری کے فاروق عبد
کے اعلان کی خبریں نشر کریں۔ بہر حال پھانسی پر لٹکانے سے پہلے فاروق عبداللہ کو بُرا نام تو دینا ہی تھا۔ اسی دوران
کا بحران بھی بھڑکنے والی منزل پر پہنچ چکا تھا۔ گولڈن ٹیمپل میں فوجی کارروائی پر مسز گاندھی کو ملک گیر پیمانے پر حما
ملی۔ اسی مستی میں کسی کے دماغ میں یہ زبردست خیال آیا کہ ایک ہی تیر سے دوسرا شکار بھی کیا جا سکتا ہے۔ ایک
پھر جی ایم شاہ کو سبز جھنڈی دکھائی گئی۔ مگر اس بار بہتر احتیاطی اقدامات کر لیے گئے تھے۔ بی کے نہرو کا تبادلہ
میں کر دیا گیا تھا اور سری نگر میں ان کی جگہ ایک مطیع و فرماں بردار ایڈمنسٹریٹیو بیوروکریٹ جگ موہن کو گورنر بنا دیا گیا تھا

اسلامی کیلنڈر میں عید کا دن، انتہائی خوشی و مسرت کا دن ہے۔ روزوں، عبادات اور توبہ و استغفار
مشترک ایک مہینے کے بعد آنے والا یہ دن ایک ایسا موقع ہوتا ہے جب مسلمان اخوت اور بھائی چارہ اور اس
کا جشن مناتے ہیں کہ یہ ان کے عقائد کی نظریاتی اساس ہے۔ دن کا آغاز شکرانے کی نماز سے ہوتا ہے جس کے
تمام مسلمان سماجی حیثیت اور اقتصادی مرتبے کی تخصیص کیے بغیر ایک دوسرے سے گلے ملتے ہیں۔ لوگ
دوسرے کے گھروں پر جاتے ہیں اور خوشی و مسرت کی یہ تقریبات اگلے دن تک چلتی رہتی ہیں۔ اس دن عداوت
اور دھوکہ دھڑی کسی کے ذہن میں آخری خیال ہو سکتا ہے۔

مگر اس کے باوجود کوئی جواز نہیں تھا کہ فاروق عبداللہ اتنے لاپرواہ ہوتے جتنے کہ وہ ۳۰ جون ۱۹۸۴
کی عید کے دن تھے۔ ان کے خلاف سازش کا جال پھیلنا شروع ہو چکا تھا اور ایک زیادہ چوکنا وزیر اعلیٰ
پک رہی تھی، اس کا بہتر علم رکھ سکتا تھا لیکن جس وقت یہ وزیر اعلیٰ دوستوں اور ساتھیوں سے گلے ملنے میں کھویا
تھا۔ اس کے بہنوئی جی ایم شاہ چھری پر دھار رکھ رہے تھے۔ ایک بار پھر، یہ سب کچھ رات کی تاریکی میں ہوا

ی اتوار کے دن نیشنل کانفرنس کے ایک حامی اور مشہور مقرر شفیع شائز نے عید کے موقع پر ایک عشائیہ دیا۔ روق عبداللہ کے چھوٹے بھائی طارق عبداللہ سے جو اس وقت جی ایم شاہ کے ساتھ ہو چکے تھے، رہا نہ گیا اور ں نے صحافیوں کو بتایا کہ فاروق عبداللہ کے دوست بہت جلد ایک سبق پڑھیں گے۔ طارق عبداللہ کو کسی نے یدگی سے نہیں لیا کہ تیزی اور غیر ذمہ داری ان کی عادت تھی اور وہ اکثر ایسی دھمکیاں دیتے رہتے تھے۔ اس ت پونے گیارہ بجے کا عمل ہوگا۔ جموں اور کشمیر میں قانون ساز اسمبلی کے نیشنل کانفرنس کے بارہ ممبر اور ایک آزاد ر شیخ عبداللہ کے خاندان سے قربت رکھنے والے ایک بزنس مین کے گھر پر جمع ہوئے۔ شب کے گیارہ بجنے کے بعد انھوں نے گورنر جگ موہن کو بتایا کہ وہ تیار ہیں۔ گورنر نے ان سے کہا کہ وہ علی الصباح ان کی سرکاری یش گاہ راج بھون آجائیں۔ انھیں ابھی کچھ اور انتظامات کرنے تھے ان میں سب سے اہم کام تھا فاروق عبداللہ کی برخواستگی کے بعد جب غم و غصے سے بھرے ہوئے عوام سڑکوں پر آئیں تو انھیں دبانے کے لیے نیم فوجی طاقتوں کو تعینات کرنے پر بلانا۔

ایک ایسے منتخب وزیراعلیٰ کے بارے میں جو آئینی طور پر ابھی اپنے عہدے پر فائز تھے، ایسے استغاثی فیصلے لینے کا حق گورنر کو کسی طرح بھی نہیں تھا۔ مگر اس رات قانون اور ضابطے مد فاصل تھے۔ مقصد صرف یہ تھا کہ چارج سنبھالنے کے بعد نظم و ضبط قائم رکھا جائے۔ جگ موہن کو دو اور اہم بیوروکریٹس کا تعاون حاصل تھا۔ ایک چیف سیکریٹری نور محمد اور ڈائرکٹر جنرل آف پولیس پیر غلام حسن شاہ۔ یہ سرکاری افسران بھی ایک وزیراعلیٰ کی موجودگی میں گورنر سے احکامات لے کر ایک بالکل غیر قانونی بات کر رہے تھے۔ درحقیقت شاہ تو ۳۰ جون کو ہی ملازمت سے ریٹائر ہو رہے تھے مگر فاروق عبداللہ نے ان کی مدت ملازمت میں دو سال کی توسیع کر دی تھی۔ شکر گزاری کے اظہار کا یہ ایک انوکھا طریقہ تھا۔

۲ جولائی کی صبح کو بہت سویرے ہی اہم حکام کو جگا کر یہ ہدایت کی گئی کہ وہ سری نگر ہوائی اڈے پر پہنچیں کیوں کہ وہاں کچھ خصوصی ہوائی جہاز جلدی ہی اترنے والے ہیں۔ ۶ بج کر دس منٹ پر انڈین ایرلائنز کا ہوائی جہاز بوئنگ ۷۳۷ سری نگر کے ہوائی اڈے پر اترا اس کے مسافر دھیرے دھیرے سنٹرل اسپیشل آرمڈ پولیس کے دستے تھے، یہ ایک خصوصی پولیس ہے جسے ڈاکوؤں کے خلاف کارروائی کرنے کی خصوصی تربیت ملی ہے۔ ایک ان کی آمد بھی یکسر غیر آئینی تھی کیوں کہ اس کی بھی منظوری منتخب کی ہوئی حکومت سے نہیں لی گئی تھی اور درحقیقت یہ تھا کہ وہ واحد شخص جو ان لوگوں کی یہاں موجودگی کی منظوری دے سکتا تھا، وہ تھا فاروق عبداللہ مگر اسپیشل

آرمڈ پولیس کے یہاں آنے کے بہت دیر بعد تک خود اسے اس کی خبر نہیں تھی۔

صبح کے کوئی ساڑھے پانچ بجے ہوں گے، فاروق عبداللہ ابھی سو ہی رہے تھے کہ چار کاریں گوپکار روڈ پر ان کے مکان کے سامنے سے گذریں جس میں، پارٹی چھوڑنے والے اور ایک کانگریسی لیڈر افتخار انصاری تھے جو گورنر سے ملنے جا رہے تھے انھوں نے گورنر کو ہاتھ سے لکھا ہوا ایک خط دیا جس میں یہ کہا گیا تھا کہ وہ فاروق عبداللہ کی حمایت سے دست کش ہو رہے ہیں۔ گورنر نے وزیر اعلیٰ کو ساڑھے سات بجے صبح کو فون کیا۔ فاروق عبداللہ بہت رہ گئے۔ انھوں نے مطالبہ کیا کہ ان کی اکثریت وہاں آزمائی جائے جہاں قانون کہتا ہے یعنی اسمبلی میں۔ ۱۹۵۳ء میں ان کے والد نے بھی یہی حق مانگا تھا۔ باپ کی طرح بیٹے کو بھی یہ حق نہیں ملا۔ پھر فاروق عبداللہ نے الیکشن کرائے جانے کا مطالبہ کیا، اس کا ظاہر ہے کہ کوئی سوال ہی نہیں تھا۔ اسی شام جی ایم شاہ کو (جو باقاعدہ منتخب کی ہوئی اسمبلی کے رکن بھی نہیں تھے) جموں و کشمیر کے وزیر اعلیٰ کی حیثیت سے حلف دلا دیا گیا۔

تیرہ کے تیرہ مردوں اور عورتوں کو جنھوں نے اپنی جگہیں بدل لی تھیں، کابینہ درجے کی وزارتیں عطا ہوئیں۔ گورنر نے اعلان کیا کہ نئے وزیر اعلیٰ کو ۳۱ جولائی کو اسمبلی میں اپنی اکثریت کا ثبوت دینا ہوگا۔ مگر ظاہر ہے کہ اصل سوال یہ نہیں تھا جس بات پر شبہہ تھا وہ یہ تھی کہ دل بدلی مخالف قانون کے مطابق وہ اراکین جنھوں نے فاروق عبداللہ کو چھوڑا ہے، اسمبلی میں ووٹ دینے کا حق رکھتے ہیں یا نہیں؟ گورنر کی دلیل یہ تھی کہ ان لوگوں نے اپنی پارٹی چھوڑا نہیں ہے، یہ تو تقسیم یا علیحدگی کی بات ہے۔ یہ اس قسم کی دلیل تھی جسے جمہوریت بار بار سننے کی تاب نہیں لا سکتی کہ جمہوریت اتنی ہی اپنی روح کے سہارے زندہ رہتی ہے جتنی کہ آئین و قوانین کے سہارے۔

عوام نے دکھا دیا کہ وہ کس کے ساتھ تھے۔ تمام فاضل پولیس والوں کی مدد ضروری تھی۔ سری نگر میں ایک اضطراب تھا۔ مسلسل کرفیو اور پولیس کی فائرنگ ہی عارضی اور وقتی امن قائم کر سکی۔ ایک بار پھر کشمیر کے جمہوریت پر ایمان اور منتخب لیڈروں کے اپنے اختیارات کو استعمال کرنے کے حق کی کڑی آزمائش ہو رہی تھی مگر اس دفعہ کشمیر تنہا نہیں تھا ملک کے ہر کونے میں احتجاج ہوا اور مہینے کے آخر میں جب پارلیمنٹ کا سیشن ہوا تو کئی دن شور اور ہنگامے رہے جن میں حزب اختلاف کے لیڈروں نے اس کارروائی کے لیے حکومت سے وضاحت طلب کی۔ نئی حکومت کے خلاف اپنے جذبات کا اظہار کرنے اور کشمیر لیڈروں کے شانہ بشانہ چلنے کے لیے، ملک بھر سے ہر سیاسی خیال کے لیڈر سری نگر آئے۔ ان میں مغربی بنگال کے مارکسی عالم اور وزیر مالیات ڈاکٹر اشوک مترا تھے اور پارلیمنٹ میں بہار کی نمائندگی کرنے والے سوشلسٹ مقرر جارج فرنانڈیز نے جمشید پور سے اپنی آواز اٹھائی، مدھو دنڈوتے نے جنوب سے،

ہت پسند آر کے ہیگڈے اور پیلے لباس پوش این ٹی راماراؤ نے اس کارروائی کو جمہوریت کے خلاف جرم قرار دیا۔
نتا پارٹی کے لیڈر راو اتر پردیش کی طرف سے پارلیمنٹ کے ممبر چندر شیکھر نے وعدہ کیا کہ ان کی پارٹی فاروق عبداللہ
اس لڑائی کو اپنائے گی۔ ایچ۔ این بہوگنا اور چندرجیت یادو جیسے اتر پردیش کے دوسرے لیڈروں نے اسی طرح
دلچسپی کا اظہار کیا۔ ۱۲ جولائی کو، چار غیر کانگریسی وزرائے اعلیٰ نے اپنی ناراضگی کے اظہار کے لیے ریاستی سربراہوں
روزیر اعظم کے درمیان ہونے والے نیشنل ڈیولپمنٹ کاؤنسل کے سالانہ جلسے سے نکل جانے کا فیصلہ کیا۔ اس
یرحاضر دار فورم سے اس طرح کے واک آؤٹ کا یہ پہلا واقعہ تھا۔ ۱۹۵۳ء اور ۱۹۸۴ء میں بہت سی چیزیں مشترک
ہوں گی مگر کم از کم ایک بہت بڑا فرق تھا۔ اس دفعہ ملک خاموش نہیں تھا اور یہ اس لیے تھا کہ ہندوستان اپنے بعض
ڈیموکریٹس کی بکبردی کے باوجود ایک جمہوری ملک تھا اور یہی وجہ تھی کہ فاروق عبداللہ تالیاں بجاتے ہجوم کے سامنے
یہ کہہ سکے کہ وہ مسز گاندھی کے خلاف اپنی اس لڑائی کو ملک کے ہر کونے تک لے جائیں گے اور یقیناً اگر وہ اپنی اس
لڑائی کو ہندوستان کے کونے کونے تک لے جاسکتے تھے تو پھر اسے پاکستان کے کسی بھی کونے تک لے جانے
کی ضرورت نہیں تھی کشمیر کے مسئلے کا اہم ترین پہلو اعتماد اور بھروسے کا سوال ہے اور مسلمان کی حب الوطنی کی
کیفیت اور کمیت کے سلسلے میں ہندو کے شک و شبہات ہیں۔ جموں و کشمیر، ایک مسلم اکثریت والی ریاست ہونے
اور پاکستان کے قریب ہونے کی وجہ سے ظاہر ہے کہ شکوک و شبہات کے طوفان کا ہدف ہے۔ غیر مسلم حکمران طبقے
دوسری طور پر دو گروہوں میں تقسیم کیا جاسکتا ہے، ایک وہ جو مسلمانوں سے بحیثیت ایک فرقے کے شدید نفرت کے
جذبات رکھتا ہے، وہ چاہے گا کہ اس کمیونٹی کو مطیع و مغلوب بنایا جائے اور ہر ہر طرح سے اسے ذکھ پہنچا کر وہ حساب
چکایا جائے جسے وہ تاریخ کا ورثہ سمجھتا ہے۔ دوسرا گروہ، سیکولر اور قوم پرست عناصر پر مشتمل ہے۔ پہلے کو منتشر
ہونے کی وجہ سے شاید آسانی سے قابو میں رکھا جاسکتا تھا اگر یہ ایک حقیقت نہ ہوتی کہ دوسرے گروہ کے لیے بھی ۱۹۴۷
میں جناح اور مسلم لیگ سے شکست کھانے کے بعد شک کے اسباب مہیا ہو گئے تھے۔ اسی لیے یہ جاننا بڑا
مشکل ہو جاتا ہے کہ کب ایک سیاسی فیصلہ لیا جاتا ہے، اور کس نیت سے لیا جاتا ہے۔ ایک انتہا پسند عام طور پر
اپنے ڈنک علی الاعلان دکھانے کی غلطی نہیں کرتا۔ بہرحال ہمیشہ کوئی نہ کوئی عقلی دلیل ہوتی ہے جو تنگی فرقہ پرستی
کی بنیاد پر لیے گئے فیصلے کو حق بجانب ثابت کرنے کے لیے استعمال کی جاتی ہے۔ مسلمان کے لیے جو اس شک کا ہدف
ہوتا ہے، خط فاصل کا طے کرنا انتہائی دشوار ہو سکتا ہے اور بالآخر یہ فیصلہ لینا کہ نظام پر بھروسہ کیا جائے یا نہیں
صرف کسی مخصوص فیصلے کی خوبیوں سے زیادہ پچھلے ریکارڈ کی جانچ کے ذریعے ہی ممکن ہوتا ہے۔

۱۹۴۰ء کو پاکستانی فوج کے افسروں کو خطاب کرتے وقت دینے کی کوشش کی۔ "ہندوستان میں اپنے مسلمان بھائیوں کے لیے میری یہی نصیحت ہے کہ وہ جس ریاست میں ہوں اس کے ساتھ بغیر کسی جھجک اور تکلف کے وفاداری کا اظہار کریں" ایک ہندو اکثریت والی ریاست میں وفاداری پر ان کا اصرار دس سال بعد ہندوستانی مسلمانوں کے لیے یکسر ناقابلِ قبول تھا۔ ۱۱ اکتوبر والی نصیحت تقریباً بے کار اور ناحق تھی

مگر جناح صاحب، جیسا کہ ہم نے دیکھا، پاکستان کے نظریے کی منظوری کے فوراً بعد اچانک ایک ملک کے خیال کے شیدائی ہو گئے تھے۔ یہ وہی تصور تھا جسے جب مہاتما گاندھی یا پنڈت نہرو، ایک نئے ہندوستان کی اساس کی حیثیت سے سامنے رکھتے تھے تو جناح صاحب ان کا مذاق اڑایا کرتے تھے۔ ۱۹۴۷ء کی اپنی مشہور پریس کانفرنس میں جناح صاحب نے کہا "اقلیتوں کی حفاظت کی جائے گی۔ اقلیتیں) ان کے مذہب، ان کے عقائد کا ہر امکانی طور پر تحفظ کیا جائے گا۔ ان کی عبادت کی آزادی میں کسی قسم کی مداخلت نہیں ہو گی" اور آج یقیناً احمدیہ فرقہ کے لوگ بھی جناح صاحب کے پاکستان میں برابر کے شہری ہیں۔ مگر یہ اکیلے جناح صاحب نہیں تھے جو اس پاکستان کا تصور کرنے سے قاصر رہے جو درحقیقت بننے والا تھا۔ متحدہ بنگال کے آخری وزیر اعظم کے عہدے سے سبکدوش ہوتے ہوئے ۱۴ اگست کو شہید سہروردی نے کہا تھا "ملک کا تقسیم ہونا میرے نزدیک ایک تباہی اور تکلیف دہ حادثہ ہی رہے گا۔ مشرق اور مغرب ایک دوسرے سے قریب ہیں کہ یہ ناممکن ہے کہ اس تقسیم سے انھیں دھکا نہ لگے اور یہ کہ وہ یہ امید نہ پالتے رہیں کہ کبھی نہ کبھی ہم ایک پھر ایک ہو جائیں گے۔ مگر سیاسی جنون کی شدت سے جو کچھ اچھلا ہے اسے ہمیں زیادہ سے زیادہ کارآمد بنانا ہوگا ..... ایک ایسا وقت تو بہرحال آئے گا کہ اکثریت اور اقلیت کا مسئلہ سرے سے معدوم ہو جائے گا اور صوبے کے ہندو اور مسلمان اس صوبے کے باشندوں کی طرح، اپنے اپنے علاقے کی ترقی اور خوش حالی کے لیے مل کر کام کریں گے۔ اور مشترکہ اقتصادی اور سیاسی اصولوں پر ایک دوسرے سے تعاون کریں گے ..... خدا اس ملک پر یہ ایسے امن اور سکون کی بارش کرے جو حکومت کی قوت سے نہیں بلکہ یہاں کے عوام کی دلی خواہشات سے پیدا ہو۔"

اب اُن لوگوں نے امن کی بات شروع کی تھی جنھوں نے ایک تکلیف دہ خانہ جنگی کے شروع کرنے میں مدد کی تھی۔ اے کے فضل حق نے ۱۴۔ اگست کو کہا تھا "میری پہلی اپیل اپنے مسلمان بھائیوں سے ہو گی۔ میں ان سے عاجزانہ درخواست کروں گا کہ وہ یاد کریں کہ ان کا مذہب اسلام بنیادی طور پر امن و سلامتی کا مذہب ہے۔ "امن سلامتی" کے الفاظ ہی سے مسلمان ایک دوسرے کو خوش آمدید کہتے ہیں..... "وہ منزل جس کی طرف ہم

dress as contrasted with that given his Chicago "quarantine" speech; recent *Fortune* and Gallup polls, demonstrating the preponderance of willingness to give economic aid in war to European democracies; and analyses of press opinion relative to the Far Eastern issue, indicating overwhelming support for economic reprisals against Japan.[2] This advance in public opinion has given greater freedom to those conducting America's foreign policy, which, to quote again the Chief of the Far Eastern Division, "cannot in action run far ahead of . . . public opinion."

The first real indication that the Government proposed measures more effective than words was the announcement of Secretary Hull on June 17, 1938 that he was taking informal action to discourage the sale of airplanes to nations engaging in the indiscriminate bombing of civilians. A second measure, giving positive aid to China, was the 25 million dollar loan extended on December 15, 1938 by the Export-Import Bank to the Universal Trading Corporation, an American concern owned by Chinese interests. Though nominally concerned with the sale of American agricultural and manufactured products, the loan was generally understood as aid to China in the reorganization of its transport system in relation to war needs, and in the light of this interpretation was gravely deplored by the Japanese Foreign Minister. Another act of economic assistance, also in December, 1938, was the extension by the Treasury of the Chinese-American Agreement of July 9, 1937, by which China may obtain dollar exchange against its gold reserves in the United States. It has been rather widely urged that such informal, semi-official or ostensibly routine measures be extended, especially the use of pressure upon those American business men over whom hangs the whip of Government contracts.

However significant an advance for a country of isolationist tradition, such measures as have thus far been taken lie only a little beyond a middle-of-the-road policy. But there are official pronouncements which, even if not immediately followed up in action, represent definite advances in national policy and usually impose a tendency upon later action. On January 4, 1939, in his annual

[2] *Amerasia*, December, 1938, pp. 496 ff., and February, 1939, pp. 598-600.

لیےآ ہے جائےامن ہے (قرآن کریم۔ باب ۱۰ سورہ ۲۵) اے بھائیو ٹھہرو اور سوچو، وہ لوگ جو امن کی فضا کو برباد کرنے بلکہ بے گناہوں کو قتل کرنے کے لیے تمھارے جذبات برانگیختہ کرتے رہے ہیں، وہ سیاسی مکار ثابت ہو چکے ہیں۔ جنھوں نے انتہائی بے شرمی اور بے حیائی کے ساتھ آزمائش کی گھڑی میں تمھارا ساتھ چھوڑ دیا اور تمھیں تمھارے مقدر کے حوالے کر دیا۔ اُن سیاسی تحریکوں نے، جن کے لیے تمھیں استعمال کیا گیا صرف ان ہی مکاروں کو فائدہ پہنچایا جو اب بڑی بڑی ملازمتیں اور بڑے بڑے عہدے حاصل کر رہے ہیں اور غریب اور بے سہار لوگوں کو یکّا و تنہا چھوڑ دیا ہے ان کی حالت اب پہلے سے بھی زیادہ زبوں ہے۔"

امن کی تلاش میں، صرف ایک شخص تھا جو دو دہائیوں سے زیادہ عرصے تک لگاتار بغیر ہار مانے ہوئے بغیر کسی وقتی مصالحت کے "ہندو مسلم اتحاد سوت کاتنے والے چرخے سے کم اہم نہیں ہے۔ یہ ہماری زندگی کی سانس ہے لیکن میں کچھ ایسے ہندوؤں کو اور کچھ ایسے مسلمانوں کو جانتا ہوں جو اگر خالص ہندوستان یا خالص مسلم ہندوستان حاصل نہ کر پائیں تو وہ برطانیہ عظمیٰ کی غلامی کی موجودہ صورت حال کو ترجیح دیتے ہیں" یہ گاندھی جی تھے جنھوں نے یہ بات ۱۹۲۴ء میں، بلگام میں اُنتالیسویں کانگریس سیشن میں کہی تھی، ایسے ہندوؤں اور ایسے مسلمانوں کی تعداد کم تھی مگر یقیناً موثر تھی اور انھوں نے ہندوستان کے ہندو اور ہندوستان کے مسلمان کے درمیان ایسا تفرقہ پیدا کیا کہ دونوں نے ۱۹۴۷ء میں ملک کو چیر کر ٹکڑے ٹکڑے کر دیا۔

ان کی نفرت کی حماقت آمیزی اور زہر دونوں کو بیک وقت ظاہر کرنے والی حقیقت شاید اس کے علاوہ کوئی دوسری نہ ہو کہ دلی میں جناح صاحب کے مکان کو ۸۔ اگست کو ایک دولت مند بزنس مین رام کرشن ڈالمیا نے تین لاکھ روپے میں خرید لیا اور اسے ذبیحہ گاؤ مخالف لیگ کا ہیڈ کوارٹر بنا دیا۔ موسسِ پاکستان کے گھر پر گائے کا پرچم لہرا دیا گیا۔ سمجھدار آدمی کے لیے یہ سمجھنا ناممکن ہے کہ وہ اس بات پر ہنسے یا روئے۔

ہندوستانی مسلمان کون ہے؟ اس موضوع پر کلاسکی کام جامعہ ملیہ اسلامیہ کے سابق وائس چانسلر پروفیسر محمد مجیب نے کیا ہے (دی انڈین مسلمس، جارج ایلین اینڈ اَن وِن ۱۹۶۷) اس سوال کا ان کا جواب ہے، "مردم شماری کا اصول اگر جو کوئی بھی ہندوستانی ہے اور اپنے آپ کو مسلمان کہتا ہے وہ ایک ہندوستانی مسلمان ہے۔ ظاہر ہے یہ اصول اس کی طرف کوئی اشارہ نہیں کرتا کہ کیا بات ہے جو ہندوستانی مسلمان ہونے کے نیچے مضمر ہے ۔۔۔ ہندوستانی مسلمانوں کو باہم طور پر متحد کرنے والی چیز صرف اسلام کی مشترکہ اطاعت ہے کہ اطاعت نے ایک کمیونٹی سے متعلق و منسلک ہونے کا جذبہ پیدا کیا ہے اور یہی جذبہ وہ نقطہ رہا ہے جس پر کچھ

سکتے ہیں کہ مذہب، بقا کی جبلت، سیاسی مفاد اور سماجی روایات یکجا ہو جاتی ہیں۔ یہ جذبہ کئی پشتوں تک خوابیدہ
بھی رہ سکتا ہے لیکن اسے ایک لمحے میں انتہائی بھڑکایا بھی جا سکتا ہے۔ مگر اس کا مطلب یہ نہیں ہے کہ ہندوستانی
ایک کمیونٹی کے لحاظ سے بے چہرگی کا شکار رہیں۔ اتحاد کی فطری خواہش کی وجہ سے یہ بہت آسان تھا کہ ہندوستانی م
کے اسلام کے ماننے والوں کے تشخص کو الگ سیاسی وجود اور ایک الگ قوم سے خلط ملط کر دیا جائے جو یہ نہ
تھے اور نہ ہی ایسا ہونا چاہتے تھے۔"

مگر ہندو بنیاد پرستوں نے جو اس صدی میں اپنے آپے میں آ گئے ہیں اور شہری متوسط طبقے کے ایک
کی وفاداری ان کو حاصل ہے، اس حقیقت کو ماننے سے انکار کر دیا کہ یہاں ہندوستانی مسلمان نام کی بھی کو
شے ہے ان کے نقطہ نظر سے، مسلمان اپنی تعریف کے اعتبار سے ایک تارک وطن نہیں بدیسی تھا۔ ہندوستا
ایک ہندو ملک تھا اور صرف ہندو ملک ہی ہو سکتا تھا اسی طرح ہندوستانی ثقافت اپنے سنسکرت روپ میں صرف
ثقافت ہی ہو سکتی تھی۔ مشترکہ ثقافت تخلیق کیا ہوا ایک بڑا عیب تھا جسے بہر حال دور کرنا تھا۔ صرف وہی
ہندوستانی کہلا سکتے تھے جنہوں نے اس ملک میں جنم لیا ہو۔ اسی طرح اگر ایک طرف بدھ ازم اور سکھ ازم نیم
مذہب کی حیثیت سے قابل قبول تھے تو دوسری طرف اسلام، عیسائیت، یہودیت اور پارسی مذاہب بدیسی
عقائد کے نشان تھے۔ ہندو قدرتی طور پر ہندوستان کی مقدس سرزمین کے مالک تھے اور وہ ہمیشہ اسی سرزمین
کی اولاد رہے تھے باقی لوگ بیرونی حملہ آور تھے۔ قدیم ہندوستانی تہذیب کا زمانہ تاریخ کا ایک شاندار زما
رہا ہے۔ ذات پات کے نظام کی عطا کی ہوئی پیوستگی اور ہم آہنگی کی ضمانت تھی کہ سماج مستحکم تھا۔ یہ عہد ایک
نقش تھا عظیم سلطنتوں کا اور غیر معمولی سائنسی کامرانیوں کا۔ پھر زوال آیا، ظالم مسلمان لٹیروں کی آمد سے جنہوں نے
ہندوؤں کو بزور شمشیر مذہب تبدیل کرائے اور ہندوستان میں سیاسی اور سماجی تنازعات شروع کرا دیئے۔ بپن چندر
(کمیونل ازم ان ماڈرن انڈیا، وکاس پبلشنگ ہاؤس ۱۹۸۴ء) کے الفاظ میں "اس طرح ۔ ۔ ۔ مسلمانوں
کی جو شکل ابھری وہ ایک ازلی ظالم، جنسی عیاش اور لڑاکو کی تھی۔ مسلمانوں کی اس تصویر کو ہندو فرقہ پرستوں نے
ڈر کے اس احساس بلکہ ایک نفسیاتی ماحول کو پیدا کرنے میں استعمال کیا جسے عام حالات میں اکثریت نے محسوس نہ کیا
ہوتا۔ اور اس کو استعمال کیا گیا مسلمانوں کو شہری حقوق نہ دینے کا مطالبہ کرنے میں ..... اور زمانہ حال میں ظلم و ستم
کی تلخ یادوں کی بنا پر ہندو مسلم اتحاد کے امکانات کو ختم کرنے میں۔ کٹر فرقہ پرست عناصر نے تو اس نظریے
کی ترویج کی کہ ہندوؤں کو انتقام لینا چاہیے یا کم از کم کچھ معاوضہ ان زیادتیوں کا جو ان پر عہد وسطیٰ میں کی گئی تھیں

وے کے لیے کہ ہندوستان ہندوؤں کا "موروثی علاقہ" ہے یا مقبوضہ سرزمین ہے، یہ موقف ضروری تھا، اور صرف یہی نہیں یہ موقف مسلمانوں کی بیرونیت پر زور دینے اور اتنے دن یہاں رہنے کے باوجود انھیں ہندوستانی ہونے کے حق سے محروم کرنے کے لیے بھی ضروری تھا۔"

مگر اس خیال میں ایک گرفت بھی تھی۔ تکنیکی لحاظ سے دیکھیے تو خود ہندو بھی بدیسی تھے کیوں کہ خود آریا، روسی سٹیپس سے ۱۵۰۰ سال قبل مسیح کے آس پاس برصغیر میں آئے تھے، مزید یہ کہ جدید ہندوستان کے ایک عظیم سپوت، جن پر مسلمانوں کا ایجنٹ ہونے کا الزام نہیں لگایا جا سکتا یعنی لوکمانیہ تلک نے خود تحریری طور پر اس بات کو قبول کیا ہے کہ آریہ دراصل آرکٹک سے یہاں آئے تھے مگر اس دائرے کو چوکور کرنے کا صرف ایک ہی طریقہ تھا، اگر ہندو آرکٹک نہیں پہنچ سکتا تھا تو خود آرکٹک کو ہندوستان لایا جا سکتا تھا۔ چنانچہ، ہندو بنیاد پرست تحریک کے ایک اہم دانش ور ایم۔ایس گولوالکر نے اپنی کتاب "وی" میں لکھا کہ "ویدوں میں مذکور آرکٹک وطن دراصل ہندوستان میں تھا، ایسا نہیں تھا کہ ہندو ترک وطن کر کے اس سرزمین پر گئے بلکہ آرکٹک کے علاقے نے ترک وطن کیا۔ وہ تو چلا گیا اور ہندوؤں کو ہندوستان میں چھوڑ گیا" اس حماقت آمیز بات پر کچھ کہہ کر کوئی اپنا وقت ضائع کرنا پسند نہیں کرے گا صرف یہ کہ گولوالکر کے چیلے، آج ہندوستان کی سیاست میں بڑا اثر و رسوخ رکھتے ہیں اور ہندوؤں اور مسلمانوں کے درمیان ہمہ وقت موجود اس تشدد کا سب سے بڑا سبب ہیں جس سے خطرہ ہے کہ وہ ملک کو ٹکڑے ٹکڑے کر کے رکھ دے گا۔

تاریخ مسلمانوں کے صدیوں کے ظلم و ستم کی کہانی کی حیثیت سے پیش کی جاتی رہی ہے بلکہ آج بھی کی جا رہی ہے مسلمان "زناکار" اور "قاتلوں کے گروہ" "ہمارے پرانے اور کٹر دشمن" اور بہت کچھ۔ یہ سمجھنا بہت دشوار نہیں ہے کہ اس طرح کی لسانی سے، جذبات کو، خصوصاً کش مکش اور تناؤ کے زمانے میں کس طرح برانگیختہ کیا جا سکتا ہے۔ متعصب مسلمانوں نے تاریخ کے اس انداز کی ہمت افزائی میں مدد کی۔ سر فیروز خاں نون جو ایک دن پاکستان کے وزیر اعظم بنے، ۱۹۴۶ اور ۱۹۴۷ء کے تشویش ناک برسوں میں، اپنی تقریروں میں، ہندوؤں کو ڈرایا کرتے تھے کہ وہ بالکل اسی طرح قتل کیے جائیں گے جس طرح چنگیز خاں نے انھیں قتل کیا تھا سر فیروز خاں یہ نہیں جانتے تھے کہ چنگیز خاں مسلمان نہیں ایک منگول تھا جس کے خدا کا نام تنگری تھا اور جس نے عجب ہی کبھی کسی اسلامی سلطنت پر حملہ کیا تو بہت بڑی تعداد میں مسلمانوں کا قتل کیا تھا۔ ۱۹۳۴ء میں جیل میں لکھے ہوئے اپنے ایک مضمون میں پنڈت نہرو نے لکھا تھا "ہندوؤں میں ایک عام خیال یہ ہے کہ اسلام ایک بے صبر مذہب ہے اور یہ بزور شمشیر پھیلا ہے۔

اس قسم کے ہندوؤں میں سے اکثر، جابر و ظالم مسلمانوں کی مثال دیتے ہوئے چنگیز خاں، تیمور اور محمود غزنوی کا نام
لیتے ہیں۔ میں نہیں جانتا کہ ان میں سے کتنے لوگ ہوں گے جنھیں یہ معلوم ہوگا کہ چنگیز خاں مسلمان تھا ہی نہیں، اور
کھوپڑیوں کے مینار بنانے کا شوق مغربی ایشیا میں بھی جہاں ہندوستان کی طرح اسلام پھلا پھولا دلیا ہی تھا، اور محمود
غزنوی نے بغداد کے خلیفہ کو بھیانک سزاؤں کی دھمکی دی تھی۔

چوں کہ ایسی نصف حقیقتیں اور کہانیاں، ہندوستان میں ہندوؤں اور مسلمانوں کے تعلقات میں
رول ادا کرتی ہیں اس لیے ضروری ہے کہ تاریخی ریکارڈوں کو جانچا اور پرکھا جائے۔ نیچے لکھے ہوئے واقعات
کی ساری تفصیلات، آر سی موجدار، ایچ سی رائے چودھری اور کالی کنکر دتا کی معیاری تصنیف[1] میں دیکھی جا
سکتی ہیں۔ میں نے ان حضرات کی کتاب دانستہ طور پر چنی ہے کہ ان کی تاویلات اور تشریحات ہندو بنیاد پرستوں کے
حق میں ہیں مگر خود ان کے بیان کیے ہوئے حقائق کی روشنی میں یہ بات بالکل صاف ہو جاتی ہے کہ پچھلے ایک ہزار
برسوں میں لڑی گئی تمام جنگیں بادشاہوں کے درمیان تھیں نہ کہ مذاہب کے مابین۔ یہ سارا کاروبار حاکموں کی
صلاحیتوں اور کمزوریوں کا باہمی کھیل تھا جس کا نتیجہ کسی ایک خاندان کے عروج اور دوسرے کے زوال کی شکل میں
سامنے آتا تھا۔ مذہبی جوش و خروش اگر کبھی میدان میں آیا تو اس کا استعمال صرف اس حد تک ہوتا تھا جس حد تک
کہ آج رجمنٹ کی تشکیل میں نسل کو کام میں لایا جاتا ہے۔ مسلمانوں کی آمد کے بعد سے شاید ہی کوئی جنگ ایسی ہو
جسے آپ خالص ہندو مسلمان معاملہ قرار دے سکیں۔ مقابل فوجوں میں ہمیشہ خلط ملط ہوتا تھا۔

پہلا مسلمان جو ایک فوج کے ساتھ یہاں آیا وہ ایک نوجوان عرب تھا (بعض کے تذکروں کے مطابق اس
کی عمر اس وقت محض سترہ سال تھی) عراق کے گورنر کا بھتیجا اور اس کا داماد۔ محمد بن قاسم کو عرب جہازوں پر حملہ
کرنے اور قزاقوں کی ہمت افزائی کرنے پر سندھ کے برہمن راجہ داہر کو سزا دینے کے لیے بھیجا گیا تھا مگر سپردلی
عرب مسلمانوں اور دیسی برہمنوں کے اس اولین مقابلے میں بھی محمد بن قاسم کی طرف سے بدھ بھکشو اور دو مقامی
سردار تھے جو داہر کے خلاف تھے۔ یہ کھلی ہوئی غداری تھی مگر سیدھی سادی حقیقت یہ تھی کہ ان سرداروں نے
لڑائی کو دو جاگیر دارانہ بادشاہوں کی باہمی لڑائی سمجھا اور بس۔ عربوں اور ان کے مقامی حامیوں نے دھاوا بول
کر فتح کر ڈالا جو آج جنوبی پاکستان ہے۔ یہاں تک کہ شمال میں کرکوٹاؤں نے، جنوب میں چالوکیاؤں نے، اور مشرق میں
پرتی ہاروں نے ان کی پیش قدمی روک دی۔ کچھ ہی عرصے بعد عربوں نے اپنے آپ کو خلافت سے الگ کر لیا اور
سندھ میں اپنی خود مختار سلطنت قائم کر دی جو شمال میں ہونے والے عظیم نشیب و فراز سے بڑی حد تک محفوظ رہی۔

لہ "AN ADVANCED HISTORY OF INDIA"

ہندوؤں کی نظروں میں سب سے بڑا بدمعاش اور بُرے مسلمانوں کا اصلی نمونہ محمود غزنوی ہے جس کا ذکر بہو
مندرجہ بالا اقتباس میں ہے۔ محمود غزنوی آج بھی مشہور و معروف سومناتھ مندر کو لوٹنے اور تباہ و برباد کرنے
پہ قابلِ نفرین سمجھا جاتا ہے۔ ہندوستان کی دولت کو لُوٹنے کے لیے وہ سترہ مرتبہ یہاں آیا اور ہر بار اتنا مال
ت یہاں سے لے گیا جتنا کہ لے جا سکتا تھا۔ اس نے پنجاب کو افغان سلطنت میں شامل کیا مگر اس کی زندگی کا اصل
مقصد ایسا خزانہ جمع کرنا تھا جو کبھی خالی نہ ہو، تاکہ وہ ایک طرف تو اپنی بار بار کی مہموں کو چلا سکے اور دوسری طرف فنون
کی سرپرستی کر سکے۔ مو جمدار، رائے چودھری اور دتا نے اس کا ذکر یوں کیا ہے "سلطان محمود عظیم ترین فوجی لیڈر
تھا جس کی نظیر دنیا میں نہیں ملتی۔ اس کی ہمت، اس کی زیرکی، اس کی خود تدبیری اور سمجھ بوجھ کے علاوہ اس کی دوسری
خوبیوں نے اس کو ایشیا کی تاریخ کی دلچسپ ترین شخصیت بنا دیا ہے۔ ہندوستان میں اس کی فتوحات
کے علاوہ ترکوں کے خلاف دو یادگار مہموں کا سہرا بھی اس کے سر بندھا ہے، جس میں اس نے الک خان اور
سلجوقیوں کے لشکروں کو شکست فاش دی تھی۔ وہ ایک عظیم سپاہی تو تھا ہی، ساتھ ہی وہ فن و ادب کا بھی زبردست
سرپرست تھا۔ وہ اپنے ملک میں نہ تو اپنے مذہب کا مبلغ تھا اور نہ ہی سلطنت کا معمار" مگر عوامی سطح پر
وہ تبدیلِ مذہب کرانے والے تشدد پسند کی حیثیت سے یاد کیا جاتا ہے، اس کی یہ حیثیت رہینِ منت ہے ان
ہندوؤں کی جو سومناتھ کے مندر کے لوٹے جانے کی وجہ سے خفا تھے، اور (فیروز حاں نون جیسے) ان مسلمانوں
کی جو اسے اسلام کی زبردست تلوار قرار دیتے تھے۔ محمود کی تلوار محمود کے فائدے کے لیے استعمال ہوئی تھی،
اس معاملے میں وہ کسی بھی جاگیردارانہ حکمراں سے مختلف نہیں تھا۔

دلی میں مسلمانوں کی اولین سلطنت قائم کرنے والا غور سے آنے والا محمد غوری نام کا ایک افغان تھا۔ وہ
معمارِ سلطنت تھا اور وہ شخص جو اس کی راہ میں مزاحم ہوتا تھا اسے اس کا مقابلہ کرنا ہوتا تھا۔ اس کی پہلی
جنگ ۱۱۷۵ء میں ملتان کے مسلمان حکمرانوں کے خلاف ہوئی تھی، اُس وقت اس نے لاہور کے مسلمان حکمراں
... کو شکست دینے کے لیے جموں کے ایک ہندو راجہ وجے دیو کے ساتھ اتحاد کا ایک معاہدہ کیا تھا۔ عوام
... جانے والے اور دلی اور اجمیر کے درمیانی علاقے کے حکمراں پرتھوی راج چوہان اور اس کے درمیان
دشمنی اس کے بعد ہی پیدا ہوئی۔

۱۱۹۱ء اور ۱۱۹۲ء میں پرتھوی راج چوہان اور محمد غوری کے درمیان ہونے والی دونوں لڑائیاں بڑی بڑی
بہادری کی تحسین کا سبب نہیں۔ ان تحقیقات کے لیے ہمیں برطانوی مورخ کرنل جیمس ٹوڈ کی خیالی تحریروں کا ممنون

منت ہونا چاہیے۔ اس وقت شمال کے راجاؤں میں سب سے زیادہ طاقت ور راجا جے چند راٹھو
قنوج سے حکومت کرتا تھا۔ کہتے ہیں کہ خوب صورت نوجوان پرتھوی راج جے چند کی بیٹی کو لے کر بھاگ
جے چند کو بھارت ماتا کا غدار کہا جاتا ہے، کیوں کہ مبینہ طور پر یہ کہا جاتا ہے کہ اس نے پرتھوی راج
حملہ کرنے اور دہلی پر قبضہ کرنے کے لیے غوری کو دعوت دی تھی۔ اسی واقعہ کی بنیاد پر یہ کہانی بنی ہے
ہیرو پرتھوی راج نے بدیسی مسلمان لٹیروں سے شکست اسی غداری کی وجہ سے کھائی۔ آئیے ہم ذرا اپنی "ایڈ
میں چھان بین کریں۔ بہر حال یہ یقین کرنے کی کوئی وجہ نہیں ہے کہ ہندوستان پر حملہ کرنے کے لیے غو
نے بلایا۔ اس ملک پر حملہ، پنجاب میں غزنوی حاکم محمد غوری کی مکمل فتح کا لازمی نتیجہ تھا مگر ہمارے طالب علمو
نہیں بتائی جاتی ہے۔

محمد غوری اور پرتھوی راج چوہان کے درمیان پہلی لڑائی، دہلی سے ۸۴ میل شمال میں ترائن ۔
ہوئی۔ متحدہ راجپوت ریاستوں کی سربراہی کرتے ہوئے، پرتھوی راج کے پاس دو لاکھ گھوڑے اور
ہاتھی اس کی کمان میں تھے۔ میسرہ اور میمنہ کی معیت میں، غوری خود قلب فوج کی سربراہی کر رہا تھا۔ تعدا
سے راجپوت غالب ہوئے، غوری کو پسپا ہونا پڑا۔ میسرہ اور میمنہ دونوں کو میدانِ جنگ سے پسپا کر د
پرتھوی راج کے بھائی گوبند رائے کے ہاتھوں غوری کے زخمی ہونے کی وجہ سے قلب بھی بکھر گیا۔ افغانو
میل تک پیچھا کیا گیا کہ ان کے گھوڑے زیادہ تیز رفتار تھے اور وہ اگلے سال پھر لڑنے کے لیے بچ گئے
غوری ایک لاکھ بیس ہزار فوجیوں اور لڑائی کی ایک مختلف منصوبہ بندی کے ساتھ آیا تھا۔ دس دس
کے چار ڈویژن ہاتھیوں سے بچنے، میمنہ، میسرہ اور قلب پر حملہ کرنے اور گھیرے میں لے کر پشت پر
مامور کیے گئے۔ لڑائی صبح کے نو بجے شروع ہوئی، سہ پہر تک غوری دشمن کو شکست فاش دینے کے
اس نے اپنے بارہ ہزار تازہ دم اور چیدہ سپاہیوں کو لے کر قلب پر دھاوا بول دیا اور راج پوت ہار
پرتھوی راج بھاگتے ہوئے دریائے سرسوتی کے قریب پکڑا گیا اور قتل کر دیا گیا، اور اس طرح دہلی میں
کی حکومت کا آغاز ہوا۔

ایک زناکار، جنسی گرسنگی کے شکار بدمعاش اور بدمسلمان کے تصور کا، جو اُن ہندو رانیوں کی
لیے تھا، جو اپنے آپ کو بدمعاش فاتح کے سپرد کر دینے پر، خودکشی کر لینے کو ترجیح دیتی تھیں، آغاز عظیم تو
علاءالدین خلجی (۱۲۹۶ء۔۱۳۱۶ء) دوسرا سکندر بننا چاہتا تھا کی کہانی سے ہوا۔ وہ جلال الدین فیروز کے بھت

میں سے ایک تھا (یہ فیروز وہی ہے جو اشوک کی لاٹ دلی میں لایا تھا) دکن میں اپنی فتوحات کے نشے میں سرشار اس نے ۱۹ جولائی ۱۲۹۶ء کو چاقو کے انتہائی موثر استعمال سے دلی کی حکومت پر قبضہ کیا۔ جلدی ہی اس نے اپنی سلطنت کو بڑھالیا۔ ۱۲۹۷ء تک گجرات کے شہزادے رائے کرنا دیو کو شکست ہو چکی تھی بعد کو اس کی بیوی کملا دیوی خلجی بادشاہ کی چہیتی بیوی بنی۔ خلجی کا اگلا ہدف، راجپوت قوت کی علامت، رنتھمبور کا قلعہ تھا اس پر ہمیر دیو کا قبضہ تھا۔ مگر ہمیر دیو نے "نئے مسلمان" کہے جانے والے باغیوں کو پناہ دے کر خلجی کی ناراضگی مول لی۔ قلعے کا دفاع راجپوتوں اور مسلمانوں نے مل کر کیا اور مقابلے میں جمے رہے۔ نتیجہ یہ ہوا کہ خود خلجی کو رنتھمبور پر قبضہ کرنے کے لیے ۱۳۰۱ء میں پھر آنا پڑا۔ مسلمان پکڑے گئے اور مار دیے گئے۔ راجپوتوں نے اپنی معروف بہادری کے مثالی مظاہرے پیش کیے۔ لڑتے ہوئے مرے اور ان کی عورتوں نے ستی ہو ہو کر خودکشی کر لی۔ یہ ایک سیدھی سادی کہانی ہے کہ لوک کتھا یہ ہے کہ خلجی کو راجپوت شہزادی پدمنی کی ہوس تھی اور اسی کو حاصل کرنے کے لیے اس نے رنتھمبور کو مسمار کیا۔ کتھا میں یہ بھی ہے کہ شکست کے بعد پدمنی نے خلجی کے حرم میں شامل ہونے کے مقابلے میں ستی ہو کر جان دینے کو ترجیح دی۔ ہمارے مورخ کیا کہتے ہیں؟ "اگر روایت پر یقین کیا جائے تو اس (رنتھمبور کی مہم) کا فوری سبب رانا رتن سنگھ کی ملکہ پدمنی سے اس کا (خلجی کا) عشق تھا مگر یہ بات وضاحت کے ساتھ کسی عصری کرانیکل یا قصے میں نہیں ملتی۔"

پروپگنڈے کے ذریعے اگر حال کو مسموم بنایا جا سکتا ہے تو پروپگنڈا بازوں کو اس سے کوئی مطلب نہیں رہتا کہ ماضی کے بارے میں کیا سچ ہے اور کیا جھوٹ۔ کبھی کبھی صاف جھوٹ کارگر ہوتا ہے جیسا کہ خلجی کی کہانی میں ہوا اور کبھی کبھی انتخاب کی ضرورت پڑتی ہے۔ پانی پت کی پہلی اور تیسری لڑائی کو ہی لے لیجیے۔ دونوں جنگوں میں دلی کو ہتھیانے اور شکست دینے کے لیے درۂ خیبر کے پار سے ایک فوج آئی مگر ان جنگوں میں کون کس سے لڑا؟ اس میں یہ سوال کہاں سے آیا کہ ہندوستان کی آن کو بچانے کے لیے ایک ہندوستانی ہندو نے ایک مسلمان حملہ آور سے مقابلہ کیا؟ کسی کو بھی نہیں۔ ہلدی گھاٹی کی لڑائی ہی کو لیجیے جس کا بہت ذکر ہوتا ہے اور جس کے بارے میں واقعات کو بے پناہ مسخ کیا گیا ہے۔ آیئے ان کچھ مشہور لڑائیوں پر ایک سرسری نظر ڈالیں جن کی کہانیاں ہندوستانی شعور میں لکھ دیے گئے ہیں

چنگیز خاں اور تیمور کا خلف، بابر جب درۂ خیبر سے گذر کر اٹک کے مقام پر دریائے سندھ کو پار کر کے ہندوستان میں داخل ہوا تو اس وقت اس کے پاس صرف بارہ ہزار آدمی تھے۔ یہ تعداد مقدونیہ کے سکندر کی فوج میں جتنے سپاہی تھے ان سے کم ہے۔ بابر نے دریائے بیاس کو جو دلی سے پہلے آخری قدرتی رکاوٹ تھی،

۲ جنوری ۱۵۲۶ء کو پار کیا۔ اس وقت دلی افغان ابراہیم لودھی کے ماتحت تھا۔ ابراہیم لودھی اُس سلسلے کا وارث تھا جس نے ۱۴۵۱ء میں بہلول خاں کی معیت میں حکومت پر قبضہ کر لیا تھا۔ (اس وقت تک ابراہیم خاں اپنے اعتبار سے ہندوستانی ہو چکا تھا۔ کہا جاتا ہے کہ اس نے نجومیوں سے مشورہ کیا تھا اور انھوں نے اس کی کامیابی کی بشارت دی تھی مگر اس خیال سے کہ کہیں ان کی یہ پیشین گوئی غلط نہ ثابت ہو، ابراہیم کی دسترس سے کہیں دور چلے گئے تھے)

بابر ۱۲ اپریل کو پانی پت کے میدان میں پہنچا اور اپنے دفاع کو جمایا اس کا کلیدی ہتھیار توپ تھی ابراہیم خاں جس نے بابر کو چار سو میل تک بغیر کسی حقیقی مزاحمت کے، آنے دیا تھا۔ اب ایک لاکھ فوج کے ساتھ آیا ۲۱ اپریل کو جنگ میں شامل ہو گیا۔ افغان بہادر تھے مغلوں کے پاس مہارت تھی، ان کی منصوبہ بندی اور توپ خانے نے فتح دلائی، ابراہیم لودھی لڑتے ہوئے مارا گیا۔ ۲۷ اپریل جمعہ کے دن پہلی دفعہ دلی کی مسجدوں میں عظیم مغل کے نام پر نمازیں ادا کی گئیں۔ مگر افغان کو آخری اور قطعی شکست ابھی نہیں دی جا سکی تھی۔ ابراہیم کا بھائی محمود لودھی راجپوتوں کے پاس امداد کا طالب ہو کر گیا۔ ایک آنکھ، ایک ٹانگ اور ایک ہاتھ سے محروم، اور زندگی بھر لڑتے بھڑتے رہنے میں آئے ہوئے اسّی زخموں کے نشانات لیے ہوئے میواڑ کے رانا سانگا نے اعلان کیا کہ وہ دلی کے سلطان کی حیثیت سے محمود کے دعوے کی حمایت کرے گا۔ غاصب بابر کا مقابلہ کرنے کے لیے اس نے راجپوتوں کا ایک عظیم اتحادی مورچہ منظم کیا۔ ۱۵۲۷ء میں رانا سانگا نے ایک ایسی فوج کے ساتھ پیش قدمی شروع کی جس میں مارواڑ، آمیر، گوالیار، اجمیر، اور چندیری کے حکمرانوں کے علاوہ اسّی ہزار گھوڑوں اور پانچ سو جنگی ہاتھیوں کے ساتھ متعدد چھوٹے چھوٹے راجپوت سردار شامل تھے اور ان سب کے ساتھ ہی محمود لودھی دس ہزار گھوڑوں کے ساتھ، حسن خاں میواتی بارہ ہزار گھوڑوں اور رائے سین کا صلاح الدین تیس ہزار گھوڑوں کے ساتھ شریک تھے۔ آگرہ کے مغرب میں ایک گاؤں کنواہا میں جب یہ عظیم لشکر جمع ہونے لگا تو بابر کے جنرل گھبرا گئے۔ یہ ایک بار پھر ایسی گھڑی آ گئی تھی جس میں ہندوستان کا مستقبل ایک شخص کی قائدانہ صلاحیتوں پر منحصر تھا۔ بابر نے اپنی تمام طاقتِ لسانی اور سارے جوش و جذبے کو کام میں لاتے ہوئے اپنے جرنیلوں کو بالآخر اس بات پر آمادہ کر لیا کہ بغیر لڑائی کے دلی سے دستبردار نہیں ہوا جا سکتا۔ ۱۶ مارچ ۱۵۲۷ء کو بابر نے راجپوتوں اور افغانوں کی ان فوجوں کو تتر بتر کر دیا اور اُس حکومت کی بنیاد ڈال دی جسے دلی کی عظیم ترین سلطنت ہونا تھا۔

یہ معاملات تاریخی حقائق کے ہیں مگر اس سے یہ نتیجہ کیسے نکلتا ہے کہ باہر سے آنے والے مسلمان حملہ آوروں کا

بـ وطن ہندو، ہندوستانی کرتے ہیں ؟ یہ نتیجہ تو نہیں نکلتا ہے ۔ یہ سچ ہے کہ بابر ۱۵۲۶ء میں بیرونی بھی تھا اور
مان بھی ۔ مگر اس کے مقابلے پر آنے والی فوجوں میں، مسلمان بھی تھے جن میں سے ہزاروں لڑتے ہوئے مارے گئے
کے مسلمان دوسرے ملکوں سے آئے تھے مگر اب وہ یہیں بس گئے ؛ چغتائیوں نے افغانوں کو حکومت سے ہٹایا
۱۹۴۷ء کی طرح انگریزوں کی مانند افغان اپنے وطن واپس نہیں گئے ؛ یہ ملک ان کا وطن بن گیا، ان کا گھر ہو گیا۔
کے خلف آج بھی شمالی ہندوستان میں پھیلے ہوئے ہیں اور بھوجپوری یا دوسری مقامی بولیاں بولتے ہیں۔ انہیں
کوئی بدیسی کہہ دے تو انھیں بڑی حیرت ہو گی۔ جہاں تک کنواہا کی لڑائی کا تعلق ہے بہت سے لوگ ہیں جو اسے ایک
ہی جنگ قرار دینے کی کوشش کرتے ہیں جس میں "قوم پرست" راجپوت ہندوؤں نے بدیسی مسلمان مغلوں کا
مد کیا اور شکست کھائی ۔ مگر پھر اس حقیقت کی توجیہ ناممکن ہو جاتی ہے کہ مسلمان افغانوں نے ایک ہندو،
ہندوستان کی دفاع میں ، راجپوتوں کے شانہ بشانہ اپنا خون کیوں بہایا ؟ چوں کہ ایسے سوالات کا جواب نہیں دیا
سکتا اس لیے حقائق کو اکثر مصلحتاً چھپایا جاتا ہے ۔ یہ بات جادو ناتھ سرکار جیسے ممتاز مورخ کی تصنیفات میں بھی
تی ہے ۔ ۴۰-۱۹۳۰ء میں سر جادو ناتھ نے ریاست جے پور کے آخری راجا مہاراجہ سوائی مان سنگھ دوم
کے لیے ہسٹری آف جے پور لکھی ۔ اس مسودے کو ۱۹۸۴ء میں عام آدمی کے مطالعہ کے لیے اورینٹ
مین نے شائع کیا ۔ شہنشاہ اکبر اور میواڑ کے مہارانا ، پرتاپ سنگھ کے درمیان ہونے والی معروف ہلدی گھاٹی
کا بیان کرتے ہوئے سر جادو ناتھ سرکار نے جان بوجھ کر اس حقیقت کا ذکر نہیں کیا کہ اس معرکے میں مہارانا
پ کی طرف سے مسلمان افغان بھی تھے ۔ سبب یہ ہے کہ اگر وہ اس بات کا اعتراف کر لیں کہ مہارانا پرتاپ کے
ساتھ مسلمان بھی لڑے تب وہ اس طرح کے نتیجے پر نہیں پہنچ سکتے جو وہ نکالتے ہیں "یہ شکست کھانے والی فوج
پرتاپ کی) تھی جس نے اس پیلی مٹی والی گھاٹی کو ہندوستانی حب الوطنی کے زائرین کے لیے ایک مقبول
زیارت گاہ بنا دیا۔" ہلدی گھاٹی ، ایک طویل عرصہ سے بیرونی مسلمان حملہ آوروں کے خلاف ہندو ہندوستانی
الوطنی کی بڑی پسندیدہ "مثال" رہی ہے ۔ حقیقت اس طرح کی تفریق یا درجہ بندی کو یکسر فاسق کر دیتی ہے
یہ ثابت کر دیتی ہے کہ یہ لڑائی شاہی قوت کے خلاف علاقائی چیلنج سے زیادہ کچھ بھی نہیں تھی

ہلدی گھاٹی جنگ ۱۸ جون ۱۵۷۶ء میں اس وقت لڑی گئی جب شہنشاہ اکبر نے اپنے ممتاز جنرل راجہ
سنگھ (جو خود بھی ایک راجپوت شہزادہ تھا) سے میواڑ کو قابو میں لانے کے لیے کہا جو ابھی تک دلی کی آقائیت
تسلیم کرنے سے منکر تھا ۔ پہاڑیوں کے درمیان واقع تین میل لمبی تنگ گھاٹی جو ہلدی گھاٹی کہلاتی تھی ، کے آخری

کنڈے پر رانا پرتاپ کا براہ راست مقابلہ اس مغل فوج سے ہوا جس کی سربراہی راجہ مان سنگھ کر رہا تھا۔ میواڑ
فوجوں کی صف بندی کا ذکر کرتے ہوئے سرجادو ناتھ سرکار لکھتے ہیں۔ "کمانڈر ان چیف کے لیے جو مقام تھا وہ
کی قیادت خود مہارانا کر رہا تھا۔ دائیں اور بائیں بازو کی قیادت، بالترتیب رام ساہ تونور اور جھالا سردار بیدا کر رہے
تھے۔ ہراول دستے کے آگے سب سے خطرناک مقام پر، بہت صحیح طور پر رام داس راٹھور کو تعینات کیا گیا تھا جو
چتوڑ کا دفاع کرنے والے شہید جے مل کا ساتواں لڑکا تھا۔" اس بات کا کوئی ذکر کہیں نہیں ملتا کہ رانا پرتاپ کے
ساتھ ایک افغان حکیم خاں سور کی زیر قیادت گھوڑ سوار فوج کا ایک دستہ بھی تھا اور جس نے جنگ کی ابتدا میں
شاہی فوجوں کو تتر بتر کر دیا تھا اور حقیقت تو یہ ہے کہ رانا پرتاپ بھاگا اور بچ گیا، حکیم خاں ہلدی گھاٹ میں مارا
گیا۔ آر سی مجمدار بہر حال، اپنی کتاب "دی مغل ایمپائر" (بھارتیہ ودیا بھون۔ ۱۹۷۴ء) میں ازراہ نوازش مانتے
ہیں کہ "میواڑ کی فوج اچھی خاصی مرعوب کن تھی اور ہر لحاظ سے مغل فوج کے مقابلے کی تھی۔ ظاہر ہے کہ اس فوج
کو تیار کرنے، اس کے لیے مناسب اسلحہ فراہم کرنے، اور حکیم سور پٹھان جو ہلدی گھاٹ میں میواڑ کی طرف سے
تھا جیسے افغانوں کی امداد حاصل کرنے میں خاصہ وقت صرف کیا گیا ہوگا۔ کتاب کے جس باب میں اس نکتے پر بحث
کیا گیا ہے، اس کی سرخی بہر حال ہے "مسلمانوں کے غلبے کی ہندو مزاحمت" اسی طرح حقائق کی پردہ پوشی کر کے
مورخوں نے ہندو مسلم فساد کا ڈرامہ بنایا ہے۔ معلوم کرنے کی بات یہ ہے کہ ہلدی گھاٹی میں حقیقتاً ہوا کیا تھا؟

طلوع آفتاب کے تین گھنٹے بعد جنگ شروع ہوئی۔ شاہی فوج تقریباً دس ہزار سپاہیوں پر مشتمل تھی
فوج میں سب سے آگے مان سنگھ تھا اور جیٹ کمانڈر راے لون کرن اور راجہ جگناتھ۔ ان کے ساتھ بارہہ سید
غیاث الدین اور علی آصف خاں تھے۔ رانا پرتاپ کی فوج میں تین ہزار گھوڑ سوار، دو ہزار پیدل، ایک سو ہاتھی
اور چار سو تیر کمان والے سپاہی تھے۔ مان سنگھ نے اپنی فوجوں کو قدیم مغل انداز پر مرتب کیا تھا ہراول، قلب،
میسرہ، سیاہ عقب، اور ایک التمش یا فاضل دستہ جسے جہاں ضرورت پڑے بھیجا جا سکے۔ رانا کی فوجوں کو
جنگ میں آنے کے لیے ایک تنگ راستے (درّہ) سے گذرنا پڑا اس لیے وہ اپنے کو کوئی باقاعدہ اور منظم ترتیب نہ
دے پائے۔ لڑائی کا پہلا دور رانا پرتاپ کے حق میں رہا۔ افغان حکیم خاں سور کے ایک حملے نے لون کرن کو
کو بھاگنے پر مجبور کر دیا۔ شاہی فوج بلندیوں سے پیچھے ہٹ کر ایک ایسے مقام پر آگئی جہاں سے وہ لڑائی اپنی مرضی
کے مطابق لڑ سکتی تھی۔ یہ مقام آج کل رکت تلاؤ یعنی "خون کا تالاب" کے نام سے جانا جاتا ہے۔ مان سنگھ
کی حکمت عملی کی صلاحیت کام آئی۔ جب وہ رانا کے ہاتھیوں کے آخری حملے کے مقابلے پر جا رہا تھا تو دشمن

message to Congress, President Roosevelt spoke words which proposed a greater advance in foreign policy than what had been espoused by any President since Wilson. He went considerably beyond the "quarantine" idea of his Chicago speech of 1937, which might reasonably have been interpreted as referring to the exertion of purely moral influence and in any event was too vague to suggest definite lines of action. To be sure, the annual message of 1939 also recognized that "we rightly decline to intervene with arms to prevent acts of aggression." But this fact, the message proceeded to say, did not mean that America needed to act as though there was no aggression at all:

> There are many methods short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the aggregate sentiments of our own people.
>
> At the very least, we can and should avoid any action, or any lack of action, which will encourage, assist or build up an aggressor

It is true that these words referred to Europe as well as to Asia and were apparently instigated chiefly by the desire to discourage Germany from further adventures like that of Czechoslovakia. Yet they epitomize a trend of thought which has for some time prevailed in relation to the Oriental conflict, and, failing the outbreak of a European war, they may find their only early expression in America's Far Eastern policy. It is at any rate in public and Congressional proposals with regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict that one can best see the concrete character of these "measures short of war." The specific proposals have considerable variety and yet also certain qualities in common. They all call for Government action affecting Japan adversely in respect of that broad range of economic life in which the conduct of modern war has its foundation. They all rest upon the assumption—one with the accuracy of which we cannot here concern ourselves—that a nation selling Japan more than 54 per cent of its military supplies and munitions, including some vital war materials scarcely obtainable elsewhere, can either by independent action or collaboration with others seriously impede if not halt Japan's conquest. Finally, all the proposals seem to be designed not to strain unduly America's tradition of political caution: just as previously the method of parallel action was evolved

کامیابی مکمل ہوگئی۔ بدایونی، جو چشم دید گواہ ہے، کے مطابق میواڑ کی فوج کے پانچ سو آدمی مارے گئے۔ اس کے مقابلے شاہی فوجوں میں ڈیڑھ سو افراد مارے گئے اور ساڑھے تین سو زخمی ہوئے۔ مگر ہلدی گھاٹی سے متعلق کہانیوں میں یہ ہے کہ بدمعاش مسلمانوں سے ہندو و ہندوستان کی ناموس کی حفاظت کرتے ہوئے اسی ہزار راجپوت بہادروں کی جانیں تلف ہوئیں۔ تعداد کا نسبتاً کم ہونا برطرف۔ جس طرح رانا کی فوج میں راج پوت تھے اسی طرح اکبر کی فوج میں بھی راج پوتوں کی اچھی خاصی تعداد تھی۔ مگر معمولی معمولی سیاسی جد و جہدیں وہ چاہے علاقائی خودمختاری سے متعلق ہوں یا ان کا تعلق اقتصادی مطالبات سے ہو، مذہبی قومی جنگوں میں تبدیل کی جاتی رہی ہیں جیسا کہ تاریخ داں ڈاکٹر ستیش چندر را نے اپنے ایک مضمون "دی رُوٹس آف ہندو کمیونل ازم" میں اشارہ کیا ہے "حکومت کی مخالف تمام تحریکوں کو، ان کے مقاصد اور ان کے سماجی متن سے قطع نظر، مسلم جبر و ظلم کی ہندو مزاحمت قرار دے کر "تعصب" کو ایک درجہ اور آگے کر دیا جاتا ہے۔ اسی لیے، رانا پرتاپ اور شیواجی جیسے لیڈروں جنھوں نے علاقائی خودمختاری کے لیے جد و جہد کی، یا پھر کسی مخصوص سماجی طبقے کی نمائندگی کی انھیں جابر بدیسی حکومت کے خلاف لڑنے والے قومی لیڈروں کا مرتبہ عطا کر دیا جاتا ہے اس نقطۂ نظر سے پھر یہ کہنا دشوار نہیں رہتا کہ ہندوستان میں بدیسی مسلمانوں کی حکومت کا سارا زمانہ ایک بدیسی حکومت کا زمانہ تھا، اور ایک اکبر، ایک دارا شکوہ بھی اس کے بنیادی کردار کو بدل نہیں سکا۔"

شیواجی۔ مشاہیر میں ایک اہم حیثیت کے مالک ہیں۔ کہا جاتا ہے کہ صحیح معنوں میں اسی مرہٹہ سردار کے ذریعے ہندو ازم کا عسکری احیا شروع ہوا۔ شیواجی کو ہندو احیا کی مسیحائی کے میدان میں اپنے حریف رانا پرتاپ پر فوقیت حاصل ہے وہ اس وجہ سے ہے کہ شیواجی نے جس شخص کو چیلنج کیا اسے بڑی آسانی سے "مسلم جبر" کی علامت بنایا جا سکتا ہے اور یہ شخص تھا، اورنگ زیب۔ دوسری طرف رانا پرتاپ کا حریف عظیم اور روادار خیال شہنشاہ اکبر تھا۔ وی ڈی ساورکر نے تیسری دہائی کے اواخر میں، ہندو مہاسبھا کو خطاب کرتے ہوئے ہندوستان میں بلا جھجک ہم کہہ سکتے ہیں کہ "ہندوستان کی فرقہ وارانہ تاریخ میں" شیواجی کی حیثیت اور اس کے مقام کا تعین یوں کیا تھا: "ہزاروں اور لاکھوں شہزادوں اور کسانوں نے مل کر اپنے غیر ہندو دشمنوں کے خلاف بغاوت کی، اور ہندو جھنڈوں کے سائے میں، ہندوؤں کی حیثیت سے کھڑے ہوئے۔ لڑتے جانیں دیں یہاں تک کہ شیواجی کا جنم ہوا۔ ہندوؤں کی فتح کا زمانہ کی گھڑی آگئی مسلمانوں کے قلعے اور فوقیت کا سورج ڈوب گیا۔ یہ ٹھیک ہے کہ شیواجی نے "ہندو پادشاہی" کا اعلان کیا اور ۱۶ جون ۱۶۷۴ء کو ان کے سر پر چھتر تھا

تاج رکھا گیا۔ مگر اس بات کی شہادت کہیں نہیں ملتی کہ انھوں نے بدیسی اور جابر و ظالم سمجھ کر، تمام مسلمانوں کو ملک سے
نکال باہر کرنا چاہا۔ کچھ دہائیوں بعد رنجیت سنگھ نے خالصہ سلطنت قائم کی مگر یہ نہ تو ہندوؤں کے خلاف تھی اور نہ
ہی مسلمانوں کے۔ شیواجی صحیح معنوں میں ایک ذہین اور طباع آدمی تھے۔ انھوں نے اٹھارہویں صدی میں ایک
غالب طاقت بننے کے لیے مراٹھوں کی بہت ہمت افزائی کی۔ مگر مغلوں کے خلاف ان کی لڑائیوں کو مسلمانوں کے
خلاف لڑی جانے والی جنگوں کا رنگ دے دینا، بدنفس اور شرپسند تاویل کرنے والوں کا کارنامہ ہے۔ حقیقت
تو یہ ہے کہ اکثر لڑائیاں انھوں نے کسی مسلمان جاگیر دار کے تعاون سے لڑیں۔ زندگی کے آخری برسوں میں، پڑوس کے
گولکنڈا کا سلطان اورنگ زیب کے خلاف اپنے مشترکہ مقصد کے پیش نظر ان کا سب سے بڑا ساتھی تھا۔ اورنگ زیب
درحقیقت ایک ایسا بادشاہ تھا جس نے بیجاپور اور گولکنڈہ کے مسلمان حکمرانوں کے خلاف جنگوں میں مراٹھوں کے
مقابلے میں کہیں زیادہ وقت، قوت اور روپیہ صرف کیا۔ ہم یہ بھی نہیں کہہ سکتے کہ مراٹھا مغلوں کو اچھوت سمجھتے تھے
جب اورنگ زیب کے بیٹے شہزادہ اکبر نے بغاوت کی اس وقت شیواجی کا لڑکا شمبھوجی اس کا اصل ساتھی تھا
کچھ مدت کے لیے تو شیواجی کا شمار اورنگ زیب کے درباری روسا میں بھی تھا۔

شیواجی کے باپ شاہ جی نے احمد نگر کے سلطان کی فوج میں ایک سپاہی کی حیثیت سے کام شروع کیا تھا
ان کی صلاحیتوں نے انھیں اعلیٰ عہدوں تک پہنچایا۔ ۱۶۳۶ء میں وہ ریاست بیجاپور کی ملازمت میں شامل ہوئے
اس وقت تک شیواجی پیدا ہو چکے تھے مگر شاہ جی اپنی بیوی جیجا بائی کو چھوڑ کر، اپنی دوسری بیوی کے ساتھ بیجاپور میں
اپنی جاگیر پر چلے گئے۔ جیجا بائی دیوگری کے یادو حکمرانوں کی نسل میں سے تھیں۔ اپنے باپ کی طرف سے
شیواجی میواڑ کے مشہور سیسودیا راج پوتوں سے اپنے سلسلے کا دعویٰ کر سکتے تھے۔ شیواجی کی وراثت میں بھی
عسکری روایات ملی تھیں اور انھوں نے بہت جلد ہی یہ دکھا دیا کہ وہ عام صلاحیتوں سے زیادہ کے حامل ہیں
۱۶۴۶ء میں انھوں نے تورنا کا قلعہ فتح کیا اور اس کے قریب ہی، توسیع کے لیے ایک اڈے کے طور پر ایک نیا
قلعہ تعمیر کیا۔ انھوں نے قلعوں کا ایک سلسلہ بنا لیا جہاں سے بیجاپور کو پریشان کیا اور ایک عظیم سلطنت قائم کر دی
جنوری ۱۶۵۶ء تک انھوں نے جاؤلی کے حکمران چندر راؤ کو قتل کر کے جاؤلی کو ہڑپ کر لیا۔ (اس فتح نے
ان کی ٹیکسوں سے ہونے والی آمدنی کو دوگنا کر دیا) اب وہ اس حالت میں تھے کہ مغلوں سے نبرد آزما ہو سکتے تھے
چنانچہ مغلوں سے ان کی پہلی مڈبھیڑ ۱۶۵۷ء میں ہوئی۔

۱۶۵۹ء میں وہ واقعہ ہوا جو ابھی تک متنازعہ فیہ ہے۔ بیجاپور کے سلطان نے اپنے جنرل افضل خان

کو شیواجی کے مقابلے میں بھیجا۔ اس کی ایک کانفرنس میں، جس کا اہتمام ایک برہمن ثالث نے کیا تھا، شیواجی نے
خفیہ آہنی پنجوں سے اسے موت کے گھاٹ اتار دیا۔ شیواجی کے حامیوں کا کہنا ہے کہ انھوں نے دھوکا دیا مگر
زیادہ اہم بات شاید یہ ہے کہ جنگ اور ان ہنگامی حالات کے باوجود شیواجی کے باپ، بیجاپور کے دربار میں
ایک اہم افسر رہے اور یہ وہی تھے جنھوں نے اس وقت بیجاپور اور شیواجی کے مابین مصالحت کرائی تھی، جب
شائستہ خاں کی قیادت میں، اورنگ زیب نے اس ابھرتی ہوئی مراٹھا طاقت کو زیر کرنے کے لیے مغل فوجیں
بھیجی تھیں۔ بالکل واضح ہے کہ شیواجی بیجاپور کے سلطان کو ایک "بدیسی" نہیں سمجھتے تھے جو
ہندوستان کے ہندوؤں کو غلام بنا رہا تھا۔ جی نہیں وہ ہندوستان کی الجھی ہوئی سیاست کی شطرنج پر ایک ادھا
درجے کی طاقت کا محض ایک اور مظہر تھا۔ شائستہ خاں اپنی ابتدائی کامیابیوں کے باوجود شیواجی کو زیر کرنے میں ناکام رہا
اب اورنگ زیب نے مراٹھوں کو مطیع بنانے کے لیے اپنا بہترین جنرل بھیجا اور یہ آدمی کوئی زہریلا اور
متعصب مسلمان نہیں تھا بلکہ بہترین روایات کی پاسداری کرتے ہوئے ایک راجپوت تھا۔ آمبیر کے مرزا راجا
جے سنگھ نے ۱۶۶۵ء میں شیواجی کے خلاف ایک تیز رفتار اور مستعد فوج کی قیادت کی۔ ۲۲ جون کو شیواجی کے
۳۵ قلعوں میں سے ۲۳ قلعے مغلوں کی نذر کر دیے گئے، اس کے علاوہ مغل فوج کے لیے پانچ ہزار گھوڑسوار فراہم
کر دینے کا وعدہ کیا گیا۔ درحقیقت، بیجاپور سے مغلوں کی اگلی جنگ میں خود شیواجی نے مغلوں کی حمایت کی۔
شیواجی کو اورنگ زیب نے دربار میں ایک جاگیر عطا کی۔ اور پانچ ہزار گھوڑسواروں کے ایک دستے کی قیادت کرنے
والے (پنج ہزاری) سردار کا مرتبہ۔ بہرحال شیواجی نے اس پنج ہزاری کے عہدے کو اپنی حیثیت اور مرتبے کے
اعتبار سے اپنی تحقیر سمجھا۔ انھیں اس سے اعلیٰ مراتب دیے جانے چاہییں تھے۔ یہ خدشہ محسوس کرتے ہوئے
کہ وہ دہلی میں ایک پُرشکوہ قیدی سے زیادہ کچھ نہیں ہوں گے، شیواجی اپنے قلعوں کی طرف فرار ہو گئے۔
اگلے تین برسوں میں مغلوں کے ساتھ کوئی جھگڑا نہیں ہوا۔ لیکن ۱۶۷۰ء تک شیواجی ایک بار پھر فتوحات کی
مہم میں تھے۔ ۱۶۷۴ء تک انھوں نے اپنے آپ کو چھترپتی اعلان کرنے کے لائق سیاسی قوت و استحکام حاصل کر لیا
تھا۔ ۱۹ اپریل ۱۶۸۰ء میں اپنے مرتے وقت انھوں نے ایک مضبوط و مستحکم سلطنت اپنے پیچھے چھوڑی۔ یہ
بڑی عجیب بات ہے کہ دوسری کمیونٹیز کے ساتھ دوستی اور مساوات پر ذاتی طور پر ایمان رکھنے والا، یہ خصوصیت
نہ رکھنے والے دوسرے مراٹھا دانشوروں میں نہیں تھی، شیواجی جیسا ایک شخص ہندو عسکریت کی علامت بن جائے۔ شیواجی
بیسیوں ہندوستانی کمانڈر رہے جنھوں نے ایک علاقائی قوت قائم کی اور جس کے قائم کرنے میں انھیں [illegible] اس کا

خیال کیے ہوئے کردار تخت پر کون ممکن ہے، چیلنج کرنا پڑا۔ ان کی فوج کے سنیر افسروں میں مسلمان تھے (افغ
احمد شاہ ابدالی کے خلاف لڑی جانے والی انتہائی اہم پانی پت کی تیسری لڑائی میں مراٹھا توپ خانہ اور میرہ ک
قیادت ابراہیم خاں گاردی کر رہا تھا۔ روایت ختم نہیں ہوئی تھی)

شیواجی کی فتوحات کی غلط تاویل کی زیادہ وجہ یہ ہے کہ شیواجی پہلے ہندو حکمران تھے جنھوں نے ناقا
تسخیر مسلم راجپوت مغل متحدہ فوجوں کے مقابلے میں اپنے وجود کو نہ صرف برقرار رکھا بلکہ انھیں شکست بھی دی تھ
نے یہ سب کچھ باہمی اخوت اور اتحاد و مساوات کا وہ احساس بیدار کرکے کیا جو ماضی کی ہندو فوجوں میں شاذ ہی نظر
ہے۔ ہندوستانی تاریخ کے بہت سے مشکل سوالات میں سے ایک سوال یہ ہے کہ بار بار ایسا کیسے ہوتا تھا کہ ہو
چھوٹی فوجیں جن کی سربراہی مسلمان کر رہے ہوتے تھے اور جنھیں مشکل ترین مہموں میں اپنے مرکزوں سے سینکڑوں می
مسافت طے کرنا پڑتی تھی، اتنی حقارت آمیز آسانی کے ساتھ اُن فوجوں کی شکست و ریخت کر دیتے تھے جن سے
ن کا راستے میں یا پھر دہلی میں سامنا ہوتا تھا۔ آکسفورڈ ہسٹری آف انڈیا، میں ونسینٹ اسمتھ ایک جواب فراہم کر
ہے۔ " ہندوؤں کی حکمت عملی اور طریقہ کار فرسودہ تھا جن کی بنیاد ان قدیم کتابوں پر تھی جنھوں نے مدتوں سے کو
وئی لحاظ نہیں رکھا تھا اور پھر ہندوستانی فوجوں کی قیادت کا اتحاد، کم و بیش ہمیشہ، قبائلی، فرقہ وارانہ یا ذات
تفریق کی وجہ سے مشکل ہوتا تھا۔"

میں ذات پات پر عقیدہ ہے۔ عوامی ووٹ کے نقطۂ نظر سے، ہندو بنیاد پرست تنظیمیں بہت کامیاب نہیں ہو
سکتی ہیں اس کی اصل وجہ یہی ہے کہ ملک کا ۸۲٫۷ فی صد حصہ جو ذات پات کو مانتا ہے وہ ووٹ دینے والے
ہندوؤں کا ہے۔ اچھوت اور قبائلی ذات پات والے ہندو سماج سے خفا ہیں، ان کی یہ خفگی محض اقتصادی
استحصال کی بنا پر نہیں ہے۔ سماجی تحقیر اتنی زیادہ ہے کہ ملک کے دیہی علاقوں میں انھیں جان بوجھ کر ایک دور
پر رہنے پر مجبور کیا جاتا ہے۔ برہمنوں اور ٹھاکروں کے اعلیٰ طبقات سے لے کر یہ مشکل قابل برداشت اونچ نیچ
تک۔ خود اس نظام میں جو اختلافات اور ضمنی اختلافات ہیں وہ ایک سیاست داں کے لیے جو ووٹ حاصل کرنے
کامیاب ہونے کے لیے کوئی متحدہ گروہ بنانے کی کوشش کرنا چاہتا ہے، بھیانک خواب کی حیثیت رکھتے ہیں۔
"سنہرے قدیم ہندو سماج" کی دلکشی اور دلربائی درحقیقت اوپر کی چند اعلیٰ ذاتوں تک محدود ہے اسی لیے
بات پر کوئی تعجب نہیں ہوتا کہ ملک میں سب سے زیادہ با اثر ہندو تنظیم کی قیادت، جو افغانستان سے برما تک ہندو
سلطنت کے سبز باغ دکھاتی رہتی ہے اور جس کے لیڈر گولواکر اور دیوراس جیسے لوگ ہیں حقیقتاً برہمنوں کی ہاتھ میں
ہے۔ یہی ہے راشٹریہ سویم سیوک سنگھ جو عام طور پر آر۔ ایس۔ ایس کہلاتی ہے۔

آر ایس ایس کا مقصد اور اس کی سمت بالکل واضح ہے۔ "یہ مذکورہ پارٹی، ایک نیم فوجی تنظیم سے
یہ ملک و قوم پر قبضہ کرنا اور نازی لیڈروں کے نمونے پر ایک تحکمانہ حکومت قائم کرنا چاہتی ہے" یہ لکھا تھا
پارٹی کے لیڈر اور ممتاز نظریہ ساز مدھو لیمائے نے ۱۰ جون ۱۹۷۹ء کے رسالہ سنڈے میں شائع ہونے والے
اپنے ایک مضمون میں۔ یہ واقعہ ہے کہ دلی میں آر ایس ایس سے اپنے تعلق کو باقاعدہ ختم کرنے پر نہ تیار ہونے
تنازعے کی بنا پر جنتا حکومت ٹوٹی تھی۔ لیمائے کی بات، درحقیقت بازگشت تھی گاندھی جی کے خیالات کی جس کا
اظہار انھوں نے بہت پہلے کیا تھا۔ گاندھی جی کے سکریٹری پیارے لال کے مطابق، گاندھی جی نے آر ایس ایس کو
ایک یک جماعتی نقطۂ نظر رکھنے والی فرقہ پرست پارٹی کہا تھا اور نازیوں اور فاشسٹوں سے اس کی مثال دی۔
اور یہ سب کچھ اس وقت ہوا تھا جب بیسویں صدی کی بیسویں دہائی میں گاندھی جی کانگریس کو انتہائی عزم کے
ساتھ سیکولرزم کی جانب لے گئے تھے۔

کیشو ہیڈگیوار یکم اپریل ۱۸۸۹ء کو پیدا ہوئے۔ یہ دکن میں کندکرتی گاؤں کے ایک برہمن پروہت
بلی رام ہیڈگیوار کے تیسرے بیٹے تھے۔ ۱۹۰۲ء تک ان کے والدین کا انتقال ہو چکا تھا اور خاندان کی دیکھ بھال
ان کے بڑے بھائی مہادیو نے شروع کی تھی۔ ان کا بچپن کوئی خوش گوار بچپن نہیں تھا۔ بڑا بھائی مسلسل چھوٹے بھائی

ہوا تھا۔ کیشو نے، جنھوں نے ڈاکٹر بننے کا تہیہ کر لیا تھا، کلکتہ میڈیکل کالج میں داخلہ لے لیا۔ سیاست میں ان کی دلچسپی کو مہمیز لگائی مہاراشٹر کے ڈاکٹر بی۔ ایس۔ مونجے نے۔ اور ان ہی نے طالب علمی کے زمانے میں بھی کیشو کی امداد بھی کی تھی۔ ڈاکٹر مونجے جیسے لوگ دوسری دہائی میں کانگریس کے اس نظریاتی رخ سے بہت پریشان تھے جو گاندھی جی اپنائے رہے تھے۔ کانگریس کے پلیٹ فارم پر گاندھی جی کا مقابلہ کرنے میں ناکامی کے بعد انھوں نے ایسی نئی تنظیموں کے قیام کے سلسلے میں سوچنا شروع کیا جو صحیح معنوں میں ان کی آرزوؤں کی عکاسی کریں اور ان کے خوابوں کے ہندوستان کی جو بنیادی طور پر ہندوؤں کے مفادات کو پیش نظر رکھے گا، تشکیل کر سکیں۔ انھیں اس خیال پر بھی طیش آتا تھا کہ صدیوں کی مسلم حکمرانی کے بعد بھی گاندھی جی ایک بار پھر مسلمانوں کے سامنے گھٹنے ٹیک رہے تھے اور ان کے ساتھ اس ہندو ملک میں برابر کے شہریوں کی طرح سلوک کر رہے تھے۔

آر ایس ایس کا قیام کیوں ہوا؟ ان کے بارے میں ہیڈگیوار کے سوانح نگار سی پی بھشیکار لکھتے ہیں " ڈاکٹر جی (ہیڈگوار) کافی مدت تک قومی تشخص کے مسئلے پر غور و خوض کرتے رہے ..... (وہ سوچتے تھے) ہندوستان میں قومیت کے سلسلے میں کوئی ابہام کیوں ہو؟ ..... قوم پرست مسلمان اور قوم پرست عیسائی جیسے الفاظ کے طرز اظہار کا چلن کیوں کر ہوا؟ آر ایس ایس کے غصے کا ہدف بالکل واضح تھا۔ ہندو قوم پرستی کا سب سے بڑا خطرہ "سانپوں" سے تھا۔ ہیڈگیوار کی یہ اصطلاح مسلمانوں کے لیے تھی۔ آر ایس ایس کی ایک آفیشل کتاب "شری گروجی ۔ دی مین اینڈ ہز مشن" میں وضاحت کی گئی ہے۔ "یہ بات صاف ظاہر ہو چکی ہے کہ بھارت میں ہندو قوم ہیں اور یہ کہ ہندوتوا، راشٹریتوا تھی (یعنی ہندو وازم، قوم پرستی تھی) عجیب اتفاق ہے کہ جناح صاحب نے اس سے اتفاق کیا کہ ہندو ایک الگ قوم ہیں) .. . اس عظیم شخصیت کی روحانی الجھن نے، راشٹریہ سویم سیوک سنگھ کے قیام میں اپنے آپ کو ظاہر کر دیا۔ چار دوستوں کے ساتھ مل کر انھوں نے آر ایس ایس کے یومیہ پروگراموں کا آغاز کیا۔ اس تنظیم کے آغاز کا دن تھا ۱۹۲۵ء میں دسہرے کا متبرک دن۔

پانچ دوست جنھوں نے آر ایس ایس کو شروع کیا تھا، وہ تھے ڈاکٹر بی ایس مونجے، ڈاکٹر ایل وی پرانجپے، ڈاکٹر تھولکر، بابا راؤ ساورکر اور خود ڈاکٹر ہیڈگیوار۔ ابتدا میں تنظیم کے نام کے سلسلے میں ایک دقت تھی۔ ۱۹۲۱ء میں کانگریس نے اسی نام کی ایک تنظیم قائم کی تھی۔ یہ تنظیم چل نہ سکی اور ختم ہو گئی۔ مگر اس نئی تنظیم کو اس مشترک نسبت پہ قابل نفرت کانگریس کا ذرا سا بھی سایہ مردود و ملعون تھا۔ پہلا متبادل نام "ہندو سویم سیوک سنگھ" تجویز

ہوا گمنام میں قوم پرستی کے پرتو پر ہیڈگیوار نے اصرار کیا۔ اسی لیے یہ راشٹریہ سویم سیوک سنگھ ہی رہا۔ آر یہ ایس نے ستمبر ۱۹۲۷ء کے ناگ پور کے ہندو مسلم فرقہ وارانہ فسادات میں اپنی کارگزاریوں کی بنا پر سب سے یہ ظاہر ہے کہ ہندوؤں کی "محافظ" تنظیم کا عوامی رتبہ حاصل کیا۔

آزادی کی جدوجہد سے آر ایس ایس نے اپنے آپ کو الگ رکھا کیوں کہ جو شخص اس کی قیادت کر رہا تھا (یعنی گاندھی جی) اس کے لیے سنگھ کے پاس نفرت کے علاوہ کچھ نہیں تھا۔ بلکہ حقیقت تو یہ ہے کہ بعض کو یہ شک بھی تھا کہ آر ایس ایس گاندھی جی کی مخالفت میں انگریزوں کی مدد بھی کر رہی ہے۔ آر ایس ایس نے فرقہ وارانہ فسادات کے زمانے میں اپنی اصل حیثیت اور اپنا حقیقی مقام حاصل کیا۔ ۱۹۴۵ء تک اس کے والنٹیر تھے اور اس کے پاس سرمایہ بھی اتنا ہو گیا تھا کہ اس نے ایک سال سے کم مدت میں "ہیڈگیوار بھون" نام سے اپنے ہیڈکوارٹرز بھی تعمیر کر لیے۔ تقسیم سے قبل کے، پاگل پن کے زمانے میں، خود حکومت کے ترین حلقوں میں امپریل سول سروس میں ایک بازو آر ایس ایس کا تھا۔ امپریل سول سروس کے زیادہ تر لوگ آکسفورڈ اور کیمبرج یونی ورسٹیوں کے گریجویٹس تھے۔ آر ایس ایس کو درحقیقت یہ یقین تھا کہ روایتی جمہوریت کے وسیلے سے نہیں بلکہ نظام حکومت پر قابو کے ذریعے قوت اس کی گرفت میں تھی اس کا ہدف تعداد نہیں تکمیل تھی۔ اور آر ایس ایس کو اس بات کا بھی یقین نہیں تھا کہ انگریز، حکومت ان کھدر پوشوں کے حوالے کر کے گے۔ آر ایس ایس کے ایک سابق ممبر دیس راج گوئل اپنی بڑی معلوماتی کتاب "آر ایس ایس" (رادھا کرشن پرکاشن، نئی دلی) میں لکھتے ہیں کہ وہ کادر کی ایک میٹنگ میں موجود تھے جسے ہیڈگیوار کے جانشین گرو گولوالکر نے خطاب کیا تھا۔ جب ان سے سوال کیا گیا کہ انگریزوں کے ہندوستان چھوڑنے کے بعد آر ایس ایس کا کیا رول ہوگا؟ تو گولوالکر نے ایک طنزیہ مسکراہٹ کے ساتھ جواب دیا تھا کہ "کیا تم کو یقین ہے کہ انگریز ہندوستان چھوڑ دیں گے؟ وہ جن کمزور اور بے وقوف لوگوں کے ہاتھوں میں حکومت کی باگ ڈور دے رہے ہیں وہ اسے دس برس بھی نہ سنبھال پائیں گے۔

۱۹۳۹ء میں آر ایس ایس نے اپنے ممبروں کے لیے باقاعدہ طور پر ایک سنسکرت پرارتھنا شروع کی

"اے مشفق مادر بھومی! میں تیرے سامنے سر جھکاتا ہوں،
اے ہندوؤں کی سرزمین! تو نے سکھ چین میں میری پرورش کی،
اے مقدس اور اچھی سرزمین! میں اپنا سارا وجود تیرے لیے وقف کرتا ہوں میں تیرے سامنے بار بار سر جھکاتا ہوں۔

اے شکتی شالی بھگوان! ہم ہندو راشٹر کے اٹوٹ اراکین تجھے انتہائی عقیدت کے ساتھ سلام کرتے ہیں۔"

(آر) ایس ایس کی مقدس صفوں میں داخلے سے پہلے ہر ممبر کو ایک حلف لینا ہوتا ہے:

"حاضر و ناظر بھگوان اور اپنے اجداد کے نام پر میں قسم کھاتا ہوں کہ میں ہندو مذہب، ہندو سماج اور ہندو سنسکرتی کو بڑھانے میں اور اس طرح اپنے دیس بھارت کی عظمت کو حاصل کرنے کے لیے راشٹریہ سویم سیوک سنگھ کا ممبر بن رہا ہوں۔ میں سنگھ کا ہر کام اپنا نفع نقصان دیکھے بغیر اپنے جسم، اپنے دماغ اور اپنی روح سے ایمانداری کے ساتھ کروں گا۔ اور اپنے اس عہد کو جیون بھر نہیں توڑوں گا بھارت ماتا کی جے۔"

۱۹۴۸ء میں آر ایس ایس کو ایک دھکا پہنچا۔ خود سردار پٹیل بھی اس جرم سے صرف نظر نہ کر سکے جس کی (مر)تکب ذرائی اس تنظیم نے کی تھی، اور یہ جرم تھا مہاتما گاندھی کا قتل۔ وزیر داخلہ سردار پٹیل نے آر ایس ایس کو (ممنو)ع قرار دے دیا۔ کیونکہ "عملی طور پر اس کے ممبروں نے اپنے اعلان کیے ہوئے نظریات کا پاس (نہ)یں کیا تھا۔" بہر حال سنگھ کی قابل اعتراض بلکہ نقصان دہ سرگرمیاں اور سنگھ کی ان سرگرمیوں سے جذبہ اور توانائی (حا)صل کرنے والی پُرتشدد کارروائیاں بدستور جاری رہیں اور بہت سے لوگ ان کے شکار ہوئے۔ سب سے (قیمت)ی جان جو ان کی نذر ہوئی وہ خود گاندھی جی کی تھی۔ سنگھ پر سے یہ پابندی ۱۹۴۹ء میں اس وقت اٹھا(ئی گ)ئی جب سنگھ نے یہ کہا کہ آئینی طور پر اس کے خلاف کوئی جرم بھی ثابت نہیں کیا جا سکا ہے۔ اگر اس بار اس (نے) "ایک تحریری اور طبع شدہ آئین کے تحت، اور اپنی سرگرمیوں کو ثقافت تک محدود رکھنے، تشدد (اور) پوشیدگی کو ترک کرنے، ہندوستان کے آئین اور قومی جھنڈے سے وفاداری کا اعلان کرنے (اور) ایک جمہوری تنظیم" بنانے پر رضامندی ظاہر کی۔ جب ان کا یہ آئین شائع ہوا تو اس میں دفعہ ۵ تھی (جس میں اس ب)ات کو تسلیم کرتے ہوئے کہ ہر شہری کا فرض ہے کہ وہ ملک کا وفادار ہو اور ملک کے جھنڈے کا احترام کرے، "سنگھ ہندو تہذیب کی ایک قدیم علامت بھگوا دھوج کو اپنا جھنڈا بنائے گی۔" دفعہ ۹ (میں یہ) درج تھا کہ اٹھارہ برس یا اس سے زیادہ کا صرف ہندو مرد ہی آر ایس ایس کا ممبر ہو سکتا ہے۔

دوسری بار آر ایس ایس پر پابندی ایمرجنسی کے نفاذ کے بعد لگی۔ مسز اندرا گاندھی نے تمام فرقہ پرست (تنظیم)وں کو ممنوع قرار دے دیا تھا۔ جن میں آر ایس ایس بھی تھی اور جماعت اسلامی بھی۔ بعد کو جب ایمرجنسی ختم (ہو)ئی تو آر ایس ایس نے یہ تاثر دینے کی کوشش کی کہ گویا انھوں نے اس اہم دور میں بڑا دلیرانہ رول ادا کیا (تھا جو د)ر حقیقت بالکل مختلف تھی۔

(۱۰)

جمہوریت کا مظہر

جب ۴ جولائی ۱۹۷۵ کو آر ایس ایس پر پابندی لگی ہے اس وقت اس کے سربراہ دیورس نظربند ہو کر
حراست میں تھے۔ جیل سے آر ایس ایس کے سربراہ نے مصالحت کی درخواست شروع کی۔ اس بات کا پتہ
اس وقت ملی جب ان خطوط کا انکشاف شروع ہوا جو سربراہ نے ایمرجنسی کے زمانے میں حکومت کو لکھے۔
دیورس نے پہلا خط مسز اندرا گاندھی کو اس کمزور سے بہانے کا سہارا لے کر لکھا کہ وہ ان کی پندرہ اگست کی تقریر
پر اظہار خیال کرنا چاہتے ہیں۔ دیورس نے لکھا "آل انڈیا ریڈیو سے نشر ہونے والے قوم سے آپ کے
متوازن خطاب کو میں نے غور سے سنا تھا اسی لیے میں نے آپ کو خط لکھنے کے لیے اس موقع سے فائدہ اٹھایا"
خط میں آر ایس ایس کے خالص ثقافتی تنظیم ہونے سیاست میں کوئی دلچسپی نہ رکھنے اور مسلمانوں اور عیسائیوں کے لیے
نیک خواہشات کے علاوہ دل میں کچھ نہ رکھنے پر ایک طول طویل وعظ کے بعد خط کو ختم اس بات پر کیا گیا کہ
مسز گاندھی سے شرف ملاقات، دیورس کے لیے انتہائی مسرت اور خوشی کی بات ہوگی۔ ایک دوسرے خط میں
اندرا گاندھی کو ۱۹۷۱ء کے انتخابات میں بدعنوانیاں کرنے کے الزام سے بری کرنے کے سپریم کورٹ کے فیصلے
پر مبارک باد دی گئی تھی اور ملک و قوم کی خوش حالی کے لیے آر ایس ایس کے ایک لاکھ والنٹیرز مسز گاندھی کی اطاعت پر
دینے کی پیش کش کی گئی تھی۔ آر ایس ایس کے اخبار اور رسائل نے مسز گاندھی اور ان کے بیٹے سنجے گاندھی کی مدح
و توصیف کرنا شروع کر دی تھی۔ بعد کو جب ۱۹۷۷ء کے انتخابات میں جنتا پارٹی نے کامیابی حاصل کی تو اس
کو آر ایس ایس نے دعویٰ کرنا شروع کیا کہ ایمرجنسی کے زمانے میں جد و جہد کی اصل سپردگی ہے۔ اس نے حکومت میں
اہم اور کلیدی جگہوں پر اپنے ہمدردوں کو پہنچانے میں جنتا پارٹی کے عہد حکومت کو بڑے موثر طریقے سے استعمال
کیا۔ جھوٹی تاریخ کے رول سے اچھی طرح واقف ہونے کی وجہ سے آر ایس ایس دوست سیاست دانوں —

as a substitute for alliances or joint action, so today there
worked out a vicariate for the banned course of active inter

The measures proposed may be divided into (outward
discriminatory action and action openly discriminatory.
discriminatory embargo is urged on the ground that, in
China's present practical inability to obtain supplies from th
States, Japan alone would be adversely affected. Various
which such an embargo is suggested are: (1) the invocatio
present Neutrality Act, which would terminate the Amer
of arms, munitions and implements of war; (2) the prohi
the export of pig iron, scrap iron, or scrap steel to either
Japan;[3] (3) the embargoing of raw materials useful in wa
slim but unanswerable ground of conservation.[4] It may
incidentally that there are proposals of a different type whi
they do not involve aid to China in the existing disregar
Neutrality Act, contemplate the safeguarding of China ag
jury from any future application of the Act. Thus the
purpose of Senator Pittman's neutrality legislation, permi
sale of arms, munitions and implements of war on the
carry principle, is declared to be that of remedying the
imposed by the present Act upon a country like China, la
munitions factories. A similar motive appears to underli
resolutions completely repealing the present Neutrality Ac

Not before the intensification of feeling in more recent
did discriminatory action against Japan receive wide supp
most moderate form which advocacy of such action take
Congress so amend Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930
thorize reprisals for Japanese discriminations against Ame
China.[5] Even without such an amendment the United Sta
institute reprisals were it not for the American-Japanese
1911, which requires six months for denunciation. A sec
posal for discriminatory action seeks to avoid loss of tim
garding this treaty as now suspended in view of Japan's p
lation of the Nine Power Treaty, the Pact of Paris, and A

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[3] H R 2410

تھاپر جیسی ایمان دار تاریخ دانوں کی کتابوں کو تعلیمی اداروں کی منظور کی ہوئی فہرستوں سے خارج کرنے
لیے جنتا حکومت پر دباؤ ڈالنا شروع کیا۔ اس سلسلے میں انھیں کامیابی نہیں ہوئی، مگر ان کے ناکام ہونے کی وجہ
یں تھی کہ انھوں نے کوشش میں کوئی کمی کی تھی۔ بہرحال ان کے ناجائز دباؤ اور مسلمانوں کے خلاف فسادات
ان کے جارحانہ رول نے جنتا حکومت کے پرخچے اڑا دیئے۔

مگر آر ایس ایس کے ایمرجنسی کے زمانے میں اتنی بزدلی کے ساتھ ہتھیار ڈال دینے کی وجہ اس کی
دی بنیاد کی نوعیت تھی۔ برہمن اور ٹھاکر آر ایس ایس کے حوصلوں کے ساتھ اپنی ہمدردی کا اظہار تو کر سکتے تھے
ن دونوں ذاتوں کی سیاست کا کم و بیش تعلق مشترک اور اجتماعی بنیادوں والی پارٹیوں سے رہا ہے۔
ں ایس کو اس کے کٹر اور نرم دونوں طرح کے ممبر شہروں کے متوسط طبقوں اور خاص طور پر چھوٹے تاجروں
ے ملتے ہیں حقیقت تو یہ ہے کہ بہت سے علاقوں میں آر ایس ایس کو "بنیا" یا "تجارت پیشہ" لوگوں
ٹی ہی کہا جاتا ہے۔ یہ یہی تاجر افراد تھے جو حکومت کی سختیوں، خصوصاً ٹیکس کی وصولی کی کارروائیوں سے
لیے آر ایس ایس کے اس تاجرانہ "تاثر سے" اسے مدد نہیں ملی کیونکہ اس نے مزارعوں کو اس سے دور کر
آر ایس ایس اپنے اس تاثر سے اپنے دامن کو چھڑا نہیں سکا، کیوں کہ ہندوستان میں مسلمانوں کے
ذگی سے اس کا براہ راست تعلق ہے۔

ہندوستان کی آبادی میں مسلمان گیارہ فی صدی ہیں، مگر سوائے جموں و کشمیر اور علاقائی اعتبار سے اہم
یپ کے جزائر، کہیں بھی اکثریت میں نہیں ہیں۔ کشمیر میں بھی چھ اضلاع ہیں جن میں ریاست کے چھیاسٹھ
ری مسلمان رہتے ہیں، لیکن ہندوستان کے دوسرے تین سو چھتیس اضلاع میں صرف دو اور ضلع ہیں
سلمان اکثریت میں ہیں۔ ان میں ایک مغربی بنگال میں مرشد آباد، اور دوسرا کیرالا میں نیا بنا ہوا ملاپورم کا
لک کے دو سو چونتیس اضلاع میں مسلمانوں کی تعداد آبادی کے تناسب کے لحاظ سے دس فیصدی
ے۔ صرف تیس اضلاع ایسے ہیں جن میں مسلمان بیس فی صدی سے زیادہ ہیں۔ مسلمانوں کی کل آبادی
با نصف حصہ، اتر پردیش، بہار اور بنگال کے وسیع و عریض صوبوں میں بستا ہے۔ اگرچہ لسانیاتی
ان کی آبادی کا اس طرح بکھرا ہونا ان میں ایک طرف عدم تحفظ کا احساس پیدا کرتا ہے اور دوسری طرف
خود اعتمادی بھی نہیں ہے جو ہونی چاہیے تھی۔

• شہ یہ کہ مسلمانوں کی اقتصادی قوت روایتی طور پر زمین (زراعت) تک محدود رہی ہے، پر دیش

کہ زمیندار طبقے اور ان کے ساتھی بیوروکریٹس ۱۹۴۷ء میں پاکستان چلے گئے۔ جو مسلمان ہندوستان میں رہ
ان میں گاؤں میں، چھوٹے کاشت کار، کھیت مزدور اور اہل حرفہ اور شہروں میں نچلے متوسط طبقے کے لوگ
اگرچہ مسلمان شہری علاقوں میں ہمیشہ بہت بڑی تعداد میں رہے مگر ان میں کوئی سرمایہ دار طبقہ کبھی نہیں تھا۔
کی مردم شماری کے مطابق ہندوستان کی شہری آبادی میں ۲۱٫۱۶ فی صدی مسلمان تھے اور دیہی آبادی میں
کا تناسب محض ۹٫۹۶ فی صدی تھا۔ ملک کی تقسیم جمہوری ہندوستان میں مسلمانوں کے لیے ایک بڑا
دھکا تھی۔ گاؤں میں، زمینداروں کی سرپرستی معدوم ہوگئی۔ دستکار نئے کارخانوں کا مقابلہ کر نہ پائے
بے چارے کے پاس نہ تو تجارتی صلاحیت تھی اور نہ ہی سرمایے کی سہولت۔ شہری علاقوں میں انہیں
اور ایک غیر ہمدرد نوکرشاہی کے زیر اثر چلنے والی ملازمتوں کی منڈی میں جہاں یوں ہی بہت مجمع تھا۔ مسلمانوں
شدید تر امتیاز و تفریق کا ہدف بننا پڑا۔ دیہی علاقوں میں پرامن بقاء کے امکان اگرچہ مبہم تھے مگر ممکن تھے۔
شہری علاقوں خصوصاً چھوٹے قصبوں میں زندگی انتہائی بے رحم اور مقابلہ انتہائی شدید تھا اور مسلمانوں کے
سامنے، حرفوں اور تجارت کے ذریعے اپنے لیے روزگار کے مواقع پیدا کرنے کے علاوہ کوئی صورت نہ
تھی۔ چھوٹی پونجی والے ہندو کے ساتھ ہونے والے مقابلے نے علی گڑھ، جمشید پور، جبل پور، احمد آباد اور
بھیونڈی جیسے چھوٹے اور متوسط شہروں میں بالآخر فرقہ پرستی اور تشدد کا رخ اختیار کر لیا۔ یہ تمام قصبے
تشدد کے لیے مستقل طور پر سازگار ہوگئیں۔ کلکتہ اور بمبئی جیسے بڑے ساحلی علاقوں میں مسلمان نوجوانوں کو
دوسرا موقع ہاتھ آیا اور یہ لوگ اسمگلنگ کے روز افزوں کاروبار میں لگ گئے اور ان کی سرپرستی عرب
دنیا کے مسلمان لیڈروں نے کی جو سیاہ اقتصادیات میں آگے آگے تھے۔ قصبوں میں، ہندو چھوٹی پونجی
کے لیے تحفظ و سرپرستی کی بہترین ضامن آر ایس ایس بن گئی۔ جہاں اقتصادی مفادات کو ایک نسبتاً بڑے
کے پردے میں چھپایا جا سکتا تھا جس نے ہندو ہندوستان پر ایمان رکھنے والے نوجوانوں اور سیدھے
پرولیٹیریٹ (عوام) دونوں کی حمایت حاصل کی۔ مسلمانوں کے پاس اس کا کوئی جواب نہیں تھا کیوں کہ وہ
تنظیموں کے لیے حکام کی خاموشی اور خفیہ امداد و تعاون کی توقع نہیں کر سکتے تھے۔

جہاں تک اہم اور با اثر ملازمتوں کا تعلق ہے، وہ کسی ایک سبب یا کسی دوسری وجہ کی بنا پر ان کے
نہیں تھیں۔ اس صورت حال کی ایک وجہ ان کے اس تعلیم کی طرف سے تحفظات تھے جو ایک ایسے سماج کے لیے
ضروری تھی جو ایک سست رفتار ملی جلی اقتصادیات کے سہارے آگے بڑھنے کی کوشش کر رہا تھا اور

مت پسند مفادات کا غلبہ تھا۔ اگرچہ اعداد و شمار، حقائق کو ظاہر نہیں کرتے، مگر حقیقت کی راہ ضرور سجھا دیتے
ہیں۔ سید شہاب الدین جو فارن سروس میں ایک ذہین افسر تھے، اور جنھوں نے سیاست میں حصہ لینے کے لیے
یہ شاندار کیریر کو ترک کر دیا ہے، آج کل جنتا پارٹی کے جنرل سکریٹری ہیں، ایک ماہنامے "مسلم انڈیا" میں بھی
جو نکالتے ہیں، اکثر بڑے معلوماتی اعداد و شمار شائع کرتے رہتے ہیں، ان کا یہ ماہنامہ تحقیق، حوالہ جات
اور دستاویزی حیثیت رکھتا ہے ان کے دیئے ہوئے اعداد و شمار ملاحظہ ہوں:

۱۹۸۱ء تک، ملک میں انڈین ایڈمنسٹریٹو سروس کے تین ہزار آٹھ سو اسی افسروں میں صرف ایک سو سولہ
مسلمان تھے۔ انڈین پولیس سروس میں بھی تناسب کا کچھ یہی حال تھا۔ ایک ہزار سات سو تریپن میں پچاس
قومی بنکوں کے ایک لاکھ تیرہ ہزار سات سو بہتر افسروں میں سے مسلمان صرف دو ہزار چار سو اناسی تھے۔
مرکزی اور ریاستی حکومتوں کے دفاتر میں تناسب بالترتیب ۴ر۱۴ اور ۶ر۱۰ تھا۔ مدلیہ میں چار ہزار آٹھ
سو اٹھانوے حکام میں تین سو تین مسلمان تھے۔ صرف ایک جگہ ہے جہاں مسلمانوں کی نمائندگی ان کی آبادی کے
تناسب کے مطابق ہے اور وہ ہے مرکزی اور ریاستی حکومتوں کے پبلک سیکٹر کے کاروبار۔ ان کاروباروں
میں کام کرنے والے افسروں کی کل تعداد چار لاکھ چھہتر ہزار نو سو بہتر تھی اور ان میں اکیاون ہزار سات سو چھ
مسلمان تھے۔ نجی سیکٹر میں کام کرنے والے سنیئر مسلم ملازموں کی تعداد کا سرسری جائزہ بھی کچھ بہت ہمت افزا
نہیں ہے۔ یونلیور انڈیا لمیٹیڈ ۱۱۵ میں ایک، دلی کلاتھ ملز ۹۸۷ میں دو۔ بروک بانڈ میں ۱۲۶ میں پانچ، آئی
سی آئی ۹۶۶ میں سترہ۔ جے کے سینتھیٹکس میں ۵۳۶ میں ۵۔ امبالال سارا بھائی میں ۶۲۱ میں ۵ مسلمان
ہیں۔ یہ اعداد و شمار کمپنیوں کی سالانہ رپورٹوں سے لیے گئے ہیں جن میں سنیئر ملازموں کی تنخواہ کی فہرست دینا لازمی
ہوتا ہے۔ مسلمانوں کے اقتصادی مسائل کی وجہ غفلت بھی ہے اور بے توجہی بھی۔ غفلت خود مسلمانوں کی اور
بے توجہی ملک کی۔ آزادی کے بعد ہندوستان میں، مسلم قیادت یا تو مایوسی کا شکار رہی یا پھر اس پر بے یقینی
کی کیفیت طاری تھی، دوسری طرف مسلم لیگ کے جو لیڈر ہندوستان میں رہ گئے تھے انھوں نے مایوسی اور
بے یقینی کی باتیں بنانا شروع کر دی تھیں۔ نمونے کے طور پر اڑیسہ اسمبلی میں مسلم لیگ کے لیڈر لطیف الرحمن
کا بیان ہے جو انھوں نے ۲۵ ستمبر ۱۹۴۷ء کو دیا تھا۔ "انڈین یونین کے مسلمانوں کو اب اس بات کا احساس
ہو گیا ہے کہ انھوں نے پاکستان کی تحریک کی موافقت کر کے ایک فاش غلطی کی ... آیئے اب ہم دو قومی
نظریئے کو بھول جائیں اور اپنی تمام تر وفاداریاں انڈین یونین کے لیے وقف کر دیں کیوں کہ پاکستان اپنے بار

بار دہرائے جانے والے اور فرسودہ وعدوں کے باوجود ہمارے تحفظ کے لیے کچھ نہیں کر سکا اور یہ ہمارے ایک فعل عبث ہوگا کہ ہم اپنے تحفظ اور اپنی سلامتی کے لیے ان کی طرف دیکھیں۔ یہ سر فہرست تحفظ کا مسئلہ جس کا تعلق شدت پسند اور بجا طور پر ناراض رفیوجیوں اور مقامی ہندوؤں سے تھا۔ گاندھی جی نے متعدد بار کہا کہ وہ یہ دیکھنے کے بجائے کہ ان کا ہندوستان ایسے تشدد کی گرفت میں جکڑا جاتا ہے وہ جان دے دینا پسند کریں گے۔ ۳۰ جنوری ۱۹۴۸ء کو انھوں نے اپنی جان کی قیمت دے دی مگر ان کی موت وہ حاصل کرنے میں کامیاب ہو گئی جس کو حاصل کرنے کے لیے انھوں نے ساری زندگی کوشش کی تھی۔ ان کی اس قربانی نے پاگل پن کو ختم کر دیا اور مسلمانوں کو اچھا خاصہ وقفہ مل گیا۔ انھوں نے اپنے بکھرے ہوئے شیرازے کو جمع کرنا شروع کیا مگر اہم قومی مسلمان لیڈر مستقبل کی منصوبہ بندی کے لیے نہ تو وقت ڈھونڈ پائے اور نہ کافی توانائی۔ تین افراد جو مسلمانوں میں از سر نو زندگی پیدا کر سکتے تھے، وہ تھے، مولانا آزاد، رفیع احمد قدوائی اور شیخ عبداللہ۔ شیخ عبداللہ کشمیر ہی میں رہے۔ رفیع احمد قدوائی کا جلد ہی انتقال ہو گیا اور ان کے کچھ ہی دنوں بعد مولانا آزاد بھی چل بسے۔ حکمران پارٹی نے ان مسلمانوں کو آگے بڑھانے کی طرف توجہ کی جو اس کی ووٹ کی ضرورتوں اور مسلمانوں کی امدادی ضرورتوں کے درمیان توازن قائم رکھ سکیں اس کا آسان طریقہ یہ تھا کہ دشوار طلب اقتصادی ضرورتوں کو نظر انداز کیا جائے اور تشخص اور مذہبی حقوق کے تحفظ پر توجہ کو مرکوز کیا جائے اسی لیے زور دیا گیا، ہر ذات پر ہونے والے حملوں سے بچاؤ کے لیے فرقے کی تنظیم پر، اس کے مذہبی قوانین کے مسلم پرسنل لا پر اور دینی اسکولوں اور اوقاف جیسے اداروں کے تحفظ پر۔ اردو زبان کے تحفظ کا مسئلہ اس حد تک موت اور زیست کا مسئلہ بن گیا کہ شدت پسند ہندوؤں نے اس کی تباہی کو اپنا مقصد ٹھہرا لیا۔ (یہ ضرور ہوا کہ اس عمل سے ایک خوب صورت زبان کو نقصان پہنچ گیا) تعلیم یافتہ اور پیسے کی طرف سے مطمئن تھوڑے سے مسلمان اگلے پاکستان پر نظر جمائے ہوئے تھے اس سلسلے کی شاید معروف ترین مثال کرکٹ کے کھلاڑی آصف اقبال کی ہے جو پاکستان گئے اور وہاں کی کرکٹ ٹیم کے کپتان بنے۔ انھوں نے اپنے کھیل کی زندگی کا آغاز ریاست حیدرآباد کی کرکٹ ٹیم کے ممبر کی حیثیت سے کیا تھا اور بمبئی دہائی کے وسط تک پاکستان جانے سے قبل رانجی ٹرافی کے میچ کھیلے تھے۔ تعلیمی اعتبار سے مسلم عوام اردو اسکولوں کے چکر سے نکل نہیں پائے۔ مولانا آزاد نے ان سے بار بار کہا کہ وہ ہندی کو ایک دشمن زبان نہ سمجھیں بلکہ اسے سیکھیں کہ ایسا کرنا ان ہی کے مفاد میں ہوگا۔ مولانا کی نصیحت یہ ہے کہ ان مندھرا اور انگریزی، اس کے حصول کی خواہش (اگر ہوتی) کے باوجود اقتصادی پسماندگی کی وجہ

ز بے دسترس سے باہر تھی۔

رویوں میں تبدیلی کی اگر کوئی تاریخ متعین کرنا ہو تو وہ سن انیس سو اکہتر ہوگی۔ وہ سال جب پاکستان ٹی ہوئی، اس وقت تک ۱۹۴۷ء کے بعد کی نسل (مڈنائٹس چلڈرن) بھی بلوغت کو پہنچ رہی تھی۔ مقابلہ کرنے یے مسائل کی کمی نہیں تھی مگر اس آغاز میں انھیں ایک آسانی ضرور تھی اور وہ یہ کہ ملک کو تقسیم کرانے کے سلسلے میں وئی احساس جرم نہیں تھا اور اس نے جلدی ہی یہ بات واضح کر دی کہ یہ زور زبردستی کو خاموشی سے انگیز ے کے لیے تیار نہیں ہے۔ یہ نسل اس بات سے بخوبی واقف تھی کہ اسے خود اس ملک میں جہاں وہ پیدا ہے رہنا اور مشقت کرنا ہوگا۔ خواب اور اس کا ہوا دونوں ختم ہو چکے تھے اور باقی رہ گیا تھا عزت کی آگ بجھانے کے ساتھ ایک اقلیت کی بقا کو یقینی بنانے کا دشوار کاروبار۔ مگر تسکین کی اس آگ کو لے کے لیے کیا متن ہوں گے؟ کیوں کر ہوں گے؟ خصوصاً اس صورت حال میں کہ ملک کی اقتصادیات یت ہی کے ولولوں کو پورے طور پر نہیں سنبھال سکتی ہے۔ صرف ایک راستہ تھا خود امدادیت کا اور نہ لیے ضرورت تھی جمہوری عمل میں زیادہ سے زیادہ شریک ہونے کی، حکومت میں ان لوگوں کو چن کر ی جو مسلمانوں کی حقیقی احتیاجات کو سمجھنے اور اس کے مطابق عمل کرنے کے لائق ہوں۔ ظاہر ہے یہ سب دوں میں نہیں ہو سکتا تھا، اسے ایک طول طویل عمل ہونا تھا۔ مگر ایک بڑی اہم بات یہ ہوئی کہ مسلم ووٹ اب کانگریس کی جیب میں نہیں رہا۔ کانگریس کو مسلمانوں کے ووٹ دراصل وہ قیمت تھے جو مسلمان ر سلامتی کے وعدے کی ادا کرتے تھے۔ جس لمحے انھوں نے اپنے ووٹوں کو اپنی ضرورتوں کے مطابق رنے شروع کیا، اسی گھڑی سے وہ خود بھی اس واحد عمل کا ایک حزو لاینفک بن گئے جو انھیں ان کی نہ حالت سے نکال سکے گا۔

۱۹۶۹ء میں کانگریس کے لیڈر ہمایوں کبیر نے عثمانیہ یونی ورسٹی میں آزاد میموریل لکچر دیا اس میں انھوں ' جوں جوں صنعت کا فروغ ہوتا ہے، جیسے جیسے اقتصادی خوش حالی بڑھتی ہے ہم توقع کر سکتے ہیں ذ تفریق وامتیاز بھی بتدریج ختم ہو جائیں گے۔' اس کے بعد انھوں نے وہ نکتہ پیش کیا جو اہم ترین ال، جہاں جمہوریت نہیں ہے وہاں اقلیتوں کا مسئلہ مدارات خود اٹھ ہی نہیں سکتا۔ جہاں ریاست مستبد ہو یا شاہی ہو وہاں غالب با اختیاروں کی آواز بلند ترین ہوگی مگر جمہوریت میں ہر شعبہ دعوے دار ہوتا ہے اہم بات یہ ہے کہ وہ اپنی شناخت کی بقا اور اس کے تحفظ کا حق رکھتا ہے۔ اس لحاظ سے اقلیتیں

بنیادی طور پر جمہوریت کی ایک مظہر ہیں، جذب پذیری، حرکت، بھروسہ، اعتماد اور پھر ہندوستانی مسلم
نشوونما اور ترقی بھی وہی راہ اپنائے گی جو ہندوستانی جمہوریت اپنائے گی"۔

۱۵- اگست ۱۹۴۷ء کو ہندوستان کے وجود کو متعدد اقسام کے خطرات تھے۔ مگر پانچ نکتے
پر ہندوستان کے نقشے کو پھر بھی بدلا جا سکتا تھا۔ وہ ہندو اکثریت والی چھوٹی سی جوناگڑھ کی ریاست کا
ایک چالاک مسلمان حکمران تھا جو پاکستان جانا چاہتا تھا۔ آزادی ملنے کے چند مہینوں بعد ہی وہ اپنے کتو
(بیویوں کو چھوڑ کر) پاکستان چلا گیا - وہاں حیدرآباد کی بڑی ریاست تھی جہاں کی اکثریت ہند
و حکمران ایک ضدی اور مغرور مسلمان تھا اور جو خودمختاری کا دعوے دار تھا اور پاکستان میں ہوائی جہاز
سے لڑنے کے لیے تیار رہتے۔ چند ہی مہینوں میں انھوں نے بھی اپنی یہ اعلیٰ خواہش ترک کر دی۔ حیدر...
پڑوس میں ہی جنوب میں، تامل ناڈو میں ایک علیحدگی پسند تحریک شروع ہوئی۔ شمال میں سکھوں نے پ
اور اپنے ایک وطن کا مطالبہ شروع کیا۔ اور پنجاب کے شمال میں، ایک سیکولر کشمیر کا وعدہ اس وقت کھو
کا جب شکوک و شبہات اور بدنفسی اور بدنیتی نے مل کر شیخ عبداللہ کو جیل میں ڈال دیا

۱۹۶۳ء میں تامل ناڈو کے لوگوں نے علیحدگی پسندی کے اپنے خیالات کو چھوڑ دیا، اور ۶۷ء
ریاست پر خود اس مضبوطی کے ساتھ سرِ حکومت پر آئے کہ تا دمِ تحریر وہ اس پر سے ہٹے نہیں ہیں۔ ۱۹۶۶
میں سکھ لیڈروں نے بڑے جوش و خروش کے ساتھ اعلان کیا کہ سکھ اکثریت والے پنجاب کی تشکیل سے
مسائل حل ہو گئے!

۱۹۷۵ء میں شیخ عبداللہ نے مان لیا کہ کشمیر سے ہندوستان کا الحاق قطعی تھا اور ۱۹۸۲ء میں
انتقال ہو گیا۔ ہندوستان کی ایک ریاست کے منتخب شدہ لیڈر کی حیثیت سے ان کے جسد خاکی پر
کا ترنگا جھنڈا لپٹا ہوا تھا۔

مگر اس صدی کی آخری دہائی تک سوالات پھر سر اٹھا رہے ہیں۔ کشمیر میں مسلم رول کے لئے
ایک بار پھر دھماکا ہے، پنجاب میں بے مقصدیت اور شرارت نے ایک خطرناک شدت پسند جرنیل
بھنڈراں والا کو اس بات کی آزادی بخش دی کہ وہ صرف ملک ہی کو نہیں بلکہ ان سکھوں کو بھی نقصان پہنچا
جنھیں وہ آزاد و خودمختار بنانا چاہتا تھا۔ یہاں سے اب کہاں؟ کدھر؟ اس کا جواب ملے گا، جمہوریت
چلنے کے ڈھنگ میں، عوام کے تجربات میں اور اس بات میں کہ آیا ان کے غصے کو (جیسا کہ پانچویں دہ...

[ذ]ہنی میں ہوا تھا) جذب کیا جاسکتا ہے اور ان کے جذبات کے رُخ کو تعمیری کاموں کی طرف موڑا جاسکتا ہے۔ [ہ]ندوستان کو نظم و ضبط قائم کرنے والی قوتوں کے ذریعہ اس وقت تک قابو میں نہیں رکھا جاسکتا جب تک کہ [ج]و ہم خود نظم و ضبط کی حمایت نہ کریں اور نظم و ضبط کو قائم کرنے میں عملی طور پر حصہ نہ لیں۔ ابھی تک ناکامیوں کے [م]قابلے میں کامیابیوں کا پلڑا بھاری ہے۔ جہاں تک کہ مستقبل کا سوال ہے ایک ہی منظر کو دیکھنے کے ہمیشہ دو طریقے [ہ]وتے ہیں اور ایک ہی چیز سے دو راہیں ڈھونڈی جاسکتی ہیں۔

۱۹۴۹ء میں مولانا آزاد، خطبۂ جلسہ تقسیم اسناد دینے کے لیے علی گڑھ مسلم یونیورسٹی گئے۔ یہ وہی ا[دارہ] ہے جو پاکستان بنانے میں اتنے ہی حصے کا دعویدار ہوسکتا ہے جتنا کہ پاکستان بننے میں جناح صاحب کا ہاتھ [تھا۔] مولانا جنہوں نے ہندوستان میں اپنے پیدائشی حق کا سودا کرنے سے انکار کیا تھا کہا "میں نہیں جانتا کہ آ[ج] تمہارے ذہنوں کی حالت کیا ہے اور یہ بھی نہیں جانتا کہ مستقبل کی کیا شکل تمہاری نظروں میں ہے۔ کیا یہ تعمیر نہ ہونے ہوئے کواڑوں کا پیغام دیتے ہیں یا وا ہوتے ہوئے ان دروازوں کا جو تمہیں تجربات کی نئی راہوں سے متعارف کرائیں گے؟ میں نہیں جانتا کہ کون سے مناظر تمہارے سامنے ہیں مگر میں تمہیں یہ ضرور بتاؤں گا کہ م[یں] کیا خواب دیکھتا ہوں۔ فارسی زبان کے ایک شاعر کے الفاظ میں:

تفاوت است میانِ شنیدنِ من و تو
تو بستنِ در و من فتحِ باب می شنوم

۞

سید مرتضیٰ حسین بلگرامی
(علیگڑھ)

وصی احمد بلگرامی کی ایک نادر تحریر

مثنوی ابر کرم مصنف امیر مینائی، مطبع نظامی کانپور سے ۱۲۸۹ھ میں شائع ہوئی۔ اس کا ایک مطبوعہ [illegible] ناقص الآخر تھا، سید وصی احمد بلگرامی کی ملکیت تھا۔ انھیں اس کا ایک مکمل نسخہ ملا [illegible] اس سے اس ناقص [illegible] کے مثنوی کے اپنے نسخہ کی انھوں نے تکمیل کر لی یعنی اپنے ہاتھ سے اتنا حصہ نقل کر لیا۔

اس کی دلچسپ روداد اپنے مخصوص اسلوب میں وصی احمد صاحب مرحوم نے اپنے ایک [illegible] کے آخر [illegible] چند صفحوں میں لکھ دی ہے۔

یہ حکایت لطیف چونکہ ان کے اپنے خط میں ہے اور ان کا اپنا طرز اس مثنوی کے [illegible] میں بھی [illegible] ہے۔ اس لیے جی چاہا کہ یہ خدا بخش لائبریری جرنل کے ذریعہ اردو دوستوں تک پہنچ جائے۔ [illegible]

●●

یاد داشت از کاتب ان حروف بتاریخ ۳ دسمبر روز دوشنبہ سنہ ۱۹۳۴ء
وقت ۹½ بجے شب بمقام ڈالٹن گنج ضلع پلاموں ۔ ۲۴ شعبان سنہ ۱۳۵۳ ہجری

مثنوی ابر کرم مطبع نظامی کانپور میں ۱۲۸۹ ہجری میں شائع ہوئی۔
اسکا ایک کرم خوردہ اور نامکمل نسخہ مجکو اپنے گھر کی کتابوں میں ملا۔
اسکی دل آویزی نے مجبور کیا کہ اسکو آرہ سے ہم اپنے ساتھ لائیں۔
گم شدہ اوراق کا سراغ لگائیں ۔ چونکہ کتاب کو چھپے ہوئے ۶۴ برس ہو چکے تھے اور اس قسم کی کتابوں کو کوئی اب پوچھتا نہیں اور
امیر مینائی مرحوم کے باقیات الصالحات میں اسکا کہیں نام بھی نہیں
اسلئے خیال تھا کہ یہ کتاب ناپید ہو چکی ۔

of the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning warfare on land. The President, it is pointed out, has the authority to exclude proclaimed Japanese commodities by Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and to deprive Japan of most-favored-nation treatment by the Commercial Reciprocity Act of 1934. Finally, the most widely supported measure of this type, advocated most notably by the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression and the Committee for Concerted Peace Efforts, is Senator Thomas's amendment of the Neutrality Act. This amendment authorizes the President, with the approval of a majority of Congress, to apply an embargo on all articles or materials of use in war solely against the nation engaged in war in contravention of a treaty with the United States.

These measures are ingenious, but do they get by the inhibitory principles of American foreign policy? We must recall our finding that, aside from the principle of observing reasonable but undefined caution, only the doctrine of non-intervention itself has definitely survived elimination in the ultimate emancipation achieved by America's Far Eastern policy. Since none of the measures involves active intervention it is only the principle of observing the legal duties of the neutrals that must be used as criterion. Now the non-discriminatory measures, however different in effect, clearly entail no conflict with legal neutrality, in view of the convenient fact that neutrality demands only formal equality in the treatment of belligerents. The United States took advantage of this consideration in the first embargo of its history, of which Secretary of State Randolph wrote in 1794 that it was really directed against England and had been made general "merely because, if it had been partial against her, it would have amounted to a cause of war." Today there are Americans who dislike such dodges, either because they believe dodges immoral or because they think it impossible to get away with them. Others, however, consider the charge of immorality absurd when factual neutrality adds to the miseries of a victim of aggression. And they are unable to see how aggressor nations can protest against America's dodges when they are the original and champion dodgers, escaping all the limitations of international law by simply not giving the proper legal names to their acts.

کل شب کو اسی وقت مولوی سید عبدالرشید صاحب قانون گو
مقامی ڈالٹن گنج ہم سے عند التذکرہ فرمانے لگے کہ عام خیال یہ ہے کہ
مینائی نے صفائی زبان میں داغ کا تتبع کیا۔ ہمنے کہا کہ یہ
خیال ہے۔ اور ثبوت میں یہی مثنوی پیش کی اور چند حکایتیں
پڑھ کر سنائیں کہ دیکھئے سہل ممتنع اسکو کہتے ہیں۔
آج کچہری میں مولوی سید محمد یوسف علی صاحب ڈپٹی کلکٹر پنشن یافتہ
سہسرام ضلع شاہ آباد اتفاقیہ ہم سے ملنے آئے اور کچھ ذکر ایسا آیا کہ
ر جبل سید عبدالعزیز ساکن نیورہ ضلع پٹنہ وزیر گورنمنٹ صوبہ بہار
لق یہ کہا کہ وہ سخی ہیں اور قرینہ یہ ہے کہ حاتم کی امت سے
شر اللہ حساب کتاب شاید ہی لے۔ اس پر جناب موصوف نے فرمایا کہ
و۔ اللہ ہی کو معلوم ہے کہ کس سے حساب کتاب ہوگا اور کس سے نہیں ہوگا۔
سلہ میں انھوں نے فرمایا کہ امیر مینائی نے اپنی مثنوی ابر کرم میں
فرمایا ہے۔ ہمنے وہ جملہ ختم کرنیکی اجازت نہ دی اور ابر کرم کا
ہی کہا کہ کیا وہ مثنوی آپ کے پاس ہے؟ انھوں نے فرمایا کہ
ادر نہیں ہے۔ ہمنے کہا کہ للہ اوسکو دکھلا دیجئے۔ اونھوں نے
وہ مثنوی ہمنے اپنے بچپن میں اپنی ممانی صاحبہ کے پاس دیکھی تھی۔

اوسکے بعد پھر کہیں نہیں دیکھی ۔ تین چار سال ہوئے کہ اتفاقیہ کلکتہ میں
ایک کتب فروش کے یہاں پرانی کتابوں میں یہہ مثنوی بھی دیکھی۔
ہمنے خرید لی چنانچہ وہ مثنوی میرے ساتھ ہے ۔ ہمنے کہا کہ ہم اپنا چپراسی
آپ کے ساتھ کر دیتے ہیں ۔ ہمکو کتاب بھیج دیجئے ۔ ہم گم شدہ اوراق کی
نقل لیکر آپکو واپس کر دینگے ۔ چنانچہ جناب موصوف نے مثنوی ہمکو
بھیج دی ہے اور ہمنے اوسکی نقل لیکے یہہ یاد داشت لکھہ دی ۔ غور کی

بات یہہ ہے کہ جو شدہ با بندہ ۔ اللہ اپنے بندوں کی خواہش
پوری کرنے پر آتا ہے تو یوں پوری کر دیتا ہے کہ مولوی حبیب محمد یوسف علی
صاحب کو دھکے مار کر سید وصی احمد بلگرامی کے پاس بھیج دیتا ہے
اور پھر روز محشر اور حساب کتاب کا تذکرہ اوسکی زبان سے
کراتا ہے ۔ اور پھر مولوی سید محمد یوسف علی صاحب سے کہتا ہے کہ
تمام دنیا کو بھول جاؤ اور دنیا کی تمام کتابوں کو بھول جاؤ ۔
اسوقت صرف مثنوی ابر کرم کا نام لو ۔ اللہ رے انتظام
اور پیش بندی ! سچ کہا ہے سعدی شیرازی نے ؎

دیدم گل تازہ چند دستہ	بر گنبدے از گیاہ بستہ

گفتم - چہ بُوَد گیاہ ناچیز تا در صفِ گل نشیند او نیز
بگریست گیاہ و گفت خاموش صحبت نکند کرم فراموش
گر نیست جمال و رنگ و بویم آخر نہ گیاہِ باغ اویم
با آنکہ بضاعتے ندارم سرمایۂ طاعتے ندارم
من بندۂ حضرت کریمم پروردۂ نعمت قدیمم
او چارۂ کارِ بندہ داند چون ہیچ وسیلتش نماند

یعنی کسی گنبد پر ایک گلدستہ تھا - دیکھنے والے نے گھاس سے
کہا کہ تیری کس شامت تو ہیں آئی ہے ؟ اپنے کو دیکھ - اور
پھولوں کو دیکھ - اور پھولوں کی صف میں اپنا بیٹھنا دیکھ !
گھاس نے آب دیدہ ہوکر کہا کہ خاموش ! تم نے ہمکو ابھی پہچانا
ہیں - یہ صحیح ہے کہ میرے پاس رنگ ہیں - بُو ہیں - حُسن ہیں -
اور یہ بھی صحیح ہے کہ میرے پاس کوئی پونجی ہیں - سرمایہ ہیں -
اطاعت کیلئے کسی نہ کسی پونجی کی ضرورت ہوتی ہے - تو میرا نام ہی
گھاس ہے جس سے بڑھکر ناچیز شاید ہی کوئی ہو - مگر بات یہ
ہے کہ ہم اوسی باغ کی مولی ہیں جس باغ میں پھول اپنی بہار
دکھلاتے ہیں - اور ہمکو اوسکی کنیزی کا فخر ہے جو بہت

بڑا کریم ہے اور جسکی نعمتوں نے ہمیشہ میری پرورش کی
میرے مالک کی شان یہہ ہے کہ وہ اپنے غلاموں اور کنیزوں
کو دیکھتا ہے کہ ان غریبوں کا کوئی وسیلہ ہیں۔ تو وہ
غیب سے وسیلہ پیدا کردیتا ہے۔ چنانچہ اوس نے جب
گل باغ میں بادشاہی کررہے ہیں اور گھاس پاؤں کے
روندی جارہی ہے تو اوس مسبب الاسباب نے گھاس کو
عروج دینے اور گلاب کا سر جھکانے کیلئے ایک شگوفہ
شگوفہ یہہ کہ پھولوں کے دل میں یہہ آرزو پیدا ہوئی کہ کا
کوئی گلدستہ بناکر اپنے پاس رکھتا اور ہمارے حسن وجمال
رنگ وبو کا نظارہ کرتا۔ پھولوں کے دل میں یہہ خواہش
ہوئی تو سوال یہہ چھڑ گیا کہ گلدستہ بندھے تو کسطرح بندھے
ریشم کا تاگہ باوجود اپنی خوبیوں کے پھولوں کیلئے پھانسی
ہے۔ سونے اور چاندی کا تار کتنا ہی باریک اور ہلکا ہو
ذبح کر ڈالے گا۔ آسمان اور زمین کے بیچ میں کوئی
ہیں ہے جس سے پھولوں کا گلدستہ باندھا جاسکے۔ الا

گھاس کے جو ابتک پامال ہونے کیلئے وقف تھی -
چنانچہ اللہ نے گھاس کو اسی بہانہ سے اور اسی وسیلہ
سے پھولوں کی صف میں پہونچا دیا - اور اب بادشاہ سلامت
اپنے غلاموں کی زنجیر میں جکڑے ہوئے ہیں اور دم نہیں مار سکتے -
اللہ جب مشکل آسان کرنا چاہتا ہے تو یوں آسان کرتا ہے -
کس نے کہا تھا کہ امیر مینائی کی مثنوی ابر کرم کانپور سے
سہسرام جائے اور مولوی محمد یوسف علی صاحب کی ممانی اوسکو
پڑھا کریں - کس نے کہا تھا کہ محمد یوسف علی اپنے بچپن میں
اوسکو دیکھیں - اور پھر پچاس برس کے بعد ایک کتب فروش کی
دکان میں اوسی کتاب کو دیکھیں - اور کس نے کہا تھا کہ وہ
اوس کو خرید بھی لیں - اور خریدی تھی تو پھر اون سے کس نے
کہا تھا کہ ڈاسن گنج آتے وقت زمانہ بھر کی کتابوں کو چھوڑکر
وہی کتاب سہسرام سے لائیں - اور لائے بھی تھے تو اون سے
کس نے کہا تھا کہ آج ہم سے ملنے بھی آئیں - اور آئے بھی تھے تو اون سے
کس نے کہا تھا کہ دنیا جہان کی کتابوں کا تذکرہ چھوڑ کر صرف

اسی کتاب کا نام لیں گے۔

اسکو کہتے ہیں بندہ نوازی اور مشکل کشائی ۔ عالم ا

آج پچاس برس پہلے سے یعنی میری پیدائش کے پہلے سے سامان

تھا اور برابر کرتا رہا محض اسلئے کہ آج کے دن مثنوی ابر کرم

کے پانچ گم شدہ صفحوں کی زیارت ہمکو نصیب ہوجائے اور اوسکی نقل

لے سکیں۔ خدا کرے ابرکرم پھر سر پر اسیطرح عالم نزع ا

صف محشر میں بھی موتی برسائے ۔ شگون اچھا ہے ۔ آمین

سید وصی احمد بلگرامی

سرسیّد

• پریم چند سرسید کے علیگڑھ میں

—— • مکتوب پریم چند، ۱۳۴ر

• سرسیّد پر پریم چند کا ایک مضمون

—— • پریم چند کی باکمالوں کے درشن سے

پریم چند سر سیّد کے علی گڑھ میں

علی گڑھ میں دعوتیں کھانے کے سوائے اور کچھ نہ ہوا ہماری اسکیم کو لوگوں نے پسند تو بہت کیا۔ مگر ان دنوں یونیورسٹی بند تھی۔ اور اولڈ بوائز ایسوسی ایشن old Boys Association کے جلسے ہو رہے تھے۔ اس لئے کچھ ہوتے کا اوسر نہ ملا۔ ہاں ان لوگوں نے جس طرح میرا سواگت کیا، اس سے میرا چت بہت پرسن ہوا۔ مجھے آشچریہ ہوا کہ وہاں کتنی ہی مسلم لڑکیاں پردہ نہیں کرتیں اور وہ سب میری نئی سے نئی اردو پرکاشت کتاب 'غبن' پڑھ چکی تھیں۔ میں نے پلاؤ اور گوشت کھایا، انھیں کے دسترخوان پر اور یہاں آکر دو تین دن Nux Vomica کھانا پڑا۔

مکتوب پریم چند، بنام جینیندر کمار، مورخہ ۳ اپریل ۳۴ء

ماخذ: مدن گوپال، پریم چند کے خطوط

پریم چند

سر سید پر پریم چند کا ایک مضمون

کیا بہ حیثیت مدبّر، کیا بہ حیثیت مصنّف، کیا بہ حیثیت مذہبی پیشو
معلم اور کیا بہ حیثیت خادمِ قوم، سر سید احمد کو جو شہرتِ دوام حاصل
وہ ہندوستان کے دنیائے اسلام میں شاید ہی کسی بزرگ کو حاصل ہو
ے ہر ایک کا فرض ہے کہ ہم اس بزرگ کے سوانح زندگی کو غور
مطالعہ کریں اور تحقیق کریں کہ ان میں وہ کیا خوبیاں تھیں جن کی
وہ اس قدر اعزاز و امتیاز حاصل کر سکے اور قوم کی ایسی خد
کر سکے۔ اُن کی انگریزی استعداد بہت کم تھی۔ وہ گھر کے مال
قوم میں بھی ان کے حامیوں کی تعداد اُن کے مخالفوں سے زیا
لیکن باوجود ان سوانحات کے انھوں نے دنیائے علم و ادب
عمل میں لا فانی یادگاریں چھوڑیں۔ یہ شخص خدمتِ قوم کا جوش
جس نے ساری دشواریوں پر فتح پائی۔

سید احمد ۱۷ اکتوبر ۱۸۱۷ء کو دہلی میں پیدا ہوئے۔ بچپن
اُن کے قوائے جسمانی غیر معمولی طور پر مضبوط تھے لیکن ذہنی اعتبار
شمار عام طلبا میں تھا۔ اُس وقت کون یہ پیشین گوئی کر سکتا تھا کہ ایک
آئے گا جب یہ لڑکا اپنے ملک اور قوم کے لئے باعث فخر ہوگا۔ اُن
عام مسلمان بچوں کی طرح قرآن شریف سے شروع ہوئی۔ اُن کی استانی ایک
پردہ نشین خاتون تھیں۔ اس سے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ اُس زمانہ میں بھ

The discriminatory measures, however, present a more difficult problem. By virtue of their very principle they are in conflict with the duties of neutrality; but now there arises the question whether in the present case these duties apply. In the absence of any formal declaration of war many ask slyly, like Secretary Morgenthau upon extending America's financial agreement with China, "Who's at war?" On the other hand, a jurist as eminent as Professor Borchard holds that war, and therefore the duties of neutrality, can exist without any formal declaration of hostilities. This legal logic seems reasonable, but the fact is that the gap between the traditional legal theory and the present practice of war has precluded any consensus on the question. In any event, there is a quite distinct consideration which fully reconciles economic reprisals against an aggressor nation with the traditional foreign policy of the United States. This is the fact that all the restrictive principles of non-intervention are suspended when there is any occasion for acting in defense of serious and legally justified national interest. Moreover, if American reprisals against Japan were to be based not upon the exasperating charge of some felonious treaty violation but merely upon the misdemeanor of economic discrimination against Americans, the danger of war or even of seriously strained relations would not be any greater than that of America's recent reprisals against Germany.

In sum, the "measures short of war" to which the President has directed attention are not transgressions of the basic principles of America's foreign policy. Whether any of these measures will actually be adopted in the present situation depends, however, upon contingencies, ranging from China's continuation of a hopeful fight to the ability of American legislators to withstand an isolationist filibuster. Even if none is adopted, the ground already covered by action and disposition will probably not be retraced in retreat, but will provide an advanced point of departure in future issues. In any event, the progress achieved by America's policy toward the Sino-Japanese conflict imparts an important lesson. Without any sacrifice of the essentials of traditional caution, the potentialities of America's matured Far Eastern policy extend to action effective for both national interest and international justice.

Baltimore, April 1939

میں بچوں کی تعلیم استانیوں ہی کے سپرد کی جاتی تھی۔ آج یورپ میں
کی ابتدائی جماعتوں میں بالعموم عورتیں ہی پڑھاتی ہیں۔ اپنی خلقی نرم دلی، تحمل
محبت کے باعث وہ فطرتاً بچوں کی تعلیم کے لئے موزوں ہوتی ہیں۔
سید احمد خاں نے قرآن ختم کرنے کے بعد فارسی اور عربی شروع کی۔ اٹھارہ
برس کی عمر میں انھوں نے پڑھنا چھوڑ دیا۔ مگر کتابوں کے مطالعہ کا شوق
مدت العمر رہا۔ اُس وقت دہلی کی سلطنت کا صرف ایک شاہ ہونا شان
تھا۔ بادشاہ قلعہ دہلی میں کسی سجادہ نشین کی طرح رہتا تھا اور انگریزی
کا وظیفہ خوار تھا۔ بابر اور اکبر کی اولاد اب قریب قریب دہلی میں قید
احمد کے والد شاہی دربار میں ملازم تھے۔ لیکن اُن کے انتقال کے بعد تنخواہ
گئی اور سید احمد خاں کو معاش کی فکر پیدا ہوئی۔ انھوں نے انگریزی
ر کی ملازمت قبول کر لی اور ۱۸۳۹ء میں کمشنری آگرہ کے نائب منشی
ہوئے یہاں انھوں نے اتنی جانفشانی سے کام کیا کہ دو ہی سال میں اُن کی ترقی
کے عہدہ پر ہو گئی اور مین پوری میں تعینات کئے گئے۔ اسی زمانہ میں انھوں نے
ہور کتاب آثار الصنادید لکھی جس میں قدیم شاہی عمارتوں کے حالات
سیل اور تحقیق سے قلمبند کئے گئے ہیں۔ یہ تصنیف زبان اردو کے
لم میں شمار ہوتی ہے۔
۱۸۵۷ء کے غدر میں سید احمد خاں بجنور میں منصف تھے۔ یہ وہ
ب زمانہ تھا جب کہ انگریز افسر اور اُن کی بیویاں اور بچے باغیوں
ف سے جائے امن تلاش کرتے پھرتے تھے۔ باغی کمال بیدردی سے
انگریز کو پا جاتے قتل کر ڈالتے تھے۔ اُس وقت باغیوں کی مرضی کے
ف کوئی کام کرنا خود اپنی جان خطرہ میں ڈالنا تھا۔ لیکن سید احمد خاں نے

اُس وقت بھی حق کی حمایت سے دریغ نہ کیا اور مظلوموں کی حمایت میں سینہ سپر ہو گئے جو انسان کا اخلاقی فرض ہے۔ اُن کی کوشش سے کتنے ہی انگریزوں کی جان بچ گئی۔ باغیوں کو اُن پر شک ہوا۔ انھوں نے آپ کے مکان کا محاصرہ کر لیا انھیں طرح طرح کی دھمکیاں دیں یہاں تک کہ اُن کا مکان اُن سے جبراً خالی کرا لیا اور اُن کا اثاثہ بھی لوٹ لیا۔ سید احمد خاں نے استقلال کے ساتھ یہ ساری مصیبتیں جھیلیں مگر جنھیں پناہ دی تھی انھیں باغیوں کے حوالے نہ کیا جب غدر فرو ہو گیا اور سرکار کا تسلط دوبارہ تسلّط ہوا تو باغیوں کے جرم کی تحقیقات کے لئے ایک کمیٹی مقرر ہوئی۔ سید احمد خاں اُس کمیٹی کے ممبر بنائے گئے۔ اُس وقت اِس کا بڑا اندیشہ تھا کہ گنہگاروں کے ساتھ بے گناہ نہ پس جائیں، حملہ کرنے والوں کے ساتھ اپنی محافظت کے لئے شمشیر بکف ہونے والے اشخاص پر بھی عتاب نہ نازل ہو جائے۔ سید احمد اِس نیک ارادہ سے کمیٹی میں شریک ہوئے کہ حتی الامکان بیگناہوں کی حفاظت کریں۔ ذاتی مفاد یا کسی صلہ کی انھیں مطلق تمنا نہ تھی۔ چنانچہ جب ایک باغی مسلمان رئیس کی جائداد کثیر ضبط کر لی گئی اور سرکار نے اُسے سید احمد خاں کو اُن کی خدمات کے صلہ میں دینا چاہا تو انھوں نے اُسے شکریہ کے ساتھ واپس کر دیا۔ ایک مصیبت زدہ بھائی کی تباہی سے مستفید ہونا اُنکی باحمیت اسلامی فطرت نے گوارا نہ کی۔

دو سال بعد سید احمد خاں نے "اسباب بغاوت ہند" نامی ایک رسالہ شائع کیا۔ اُس میں انھوں نے دلائل اور واقعات سے ثابت کیا کہ یہ غدر ملکی بغاوت نہ تھی، نہ جنگ آزادی، نہ کسی قسم کی سازش۔ بلکہ سپاہیوں کی عدول حکمی تھی اور وہ بھی بوجہ جہالت اور توہمات۔ جو

یہ خیال تھا اس خدمت کو بعد میں کرنا ہی ہے زمانہ کا
بھی تھا کہ مسلمانوں کے سر سے یہ الزام دور کر دیا جائے اور
شک نہیں کہ سید احمد خاں کو اس مقصد میں کامیابی حاصل ہوئی۔
اس رسالہ کو گورنمنٹ آف انڈیا اور پارلیمنٹ میں بھیجا، اور
کو ان کی خیر خواہی اور وفاداری پر کامل یقین تھا اس نے ان اسباب
گورنمنٹ نے دل سے غور کیا اور جو شکایتیں اُسے صحیح معلوم ہوئیں
دور کرنے کا وعدہ بھی کیا۔ سید احمد خاں کی اس اخلاقی جرأت
لفظوں میں تعریف کی جائے۔ جس زمانہ میں کہ سرکار سختیوں کی
تل تھی، اور کسی کی زبان کھولنے کی ہمت نہ پڑتی تھی کہ مبادا اُس پر
کا شبہ کیا جانے لگے اس وقت گورنمنٹ کے طرزِ عمل پر نکتہ چینی
کی بے عنوانیوں کا پردہ فاش کرنا بیش بہا ملکی اور قومی خدمت تھی۔
سید احمد خاں کو جو خدمت عطا ہوئی تھی اُسے دل و جان سے انجام
ے۔ وہ اس مقولہ کے پابند تھے کہ جو کام کرنا ہو اُسے دل سے
بنے۔ بیدلی سے یا بیگانہ سمجھکر وہ کوئی کام نہ کرتے تھے۔ وہ
آباد میں تھے جب امساکِ باراں نے فصل تباہ کر دی اور ملک میں
پڑ گیا۔ سرکار نے وہاں ایک محتاج خانہ کھولا اور اُس کا انتظام
خاں کے سپرد کیا۔ اُس وقت جتنی تندہی سے انھوں نے
ون کی امداد کی، پردہ نشین مستورات اور سفید پوش مفلسوں
انسانیت اور ہمدردی کے ساتھ دستگیری کی وہ تعریف سے
ہے۔ کسی فرقہ یا مذہب کا آدمی کیوں نہ ہو اُن کی ہمدردی
ساتھ یکساں تھی۔

آج کل تو مذہبی مباحثوں کا زور کچھ کم ہو گیا ہے لیکن اُس ز
عیسائی مشنری عیسائیت کی منادی کے جوش میں ہندو اور مسلمان
پر علانیہ اعتراضات کیا کرتے تھے۔ اور چونکہ اُس وقت علما اور پنڈتوں
صلاحیت نہ تھی کہ وہ مذہبی احکام اور روایتوں کی معقولیت ثابت کر
کر سکیں اور الفاظ کے پردہ میں چھپے ہوئے معانی کو واضح کر سکیں،
عیسائی مشنریوں کے سامنے وہ لاجواب ہو جاتے تھے اور اس کا عوام
پر اثر پڑتا تھا۔ سید احمد خاں نے مشنریوں کے اس حملہ سے اسلام کو بچانے
کے لئے یہ ضروری سمجھا کہ عیسائیوں کے اعتراضات کا دندان شکن جواب
جائے اور قرآن اور بائبل کا موازنہ کر کے دکھایا جائے کہ دونوں کتابوں
کس قدر یکسانیت ہے۔ اسی ارادہ سے انھوں نے بائبل کی تفسیر لکھنی ش
کی مگر یہ کتاب پوری نہ ہو سکی۔ لیکن ملازمت سے پنشن لینے کے
جب انھیں زیادہ یکسوئی ہوئی تو انھوں نے اس خیال کو ا
معرکتہ الآرا تصنیف تفسیر القرآن کے ذریعہ پورا کیا۔ اسلامی تعلیم
پر فلسفہ سے پیدا ہونے والے اعتراضات کے انھوں نے بڑی تمیز
سے جواب دئے۔ ہندو اور مسلمان دونوں ہی عام تعلیم نہ ہو
کے باعث عام مذہبی احکام اور شریعت کو آنکھ بند کر کے ما
آتے تھے۔ ان احکام کی معقول تشریح وہ کیا کرتے۔ اُن کے دل میں شبہ
ہی نہ پیدا ہوتے تھے۔ کیونکہ شکوک تو تعلیم اور تفتیش کی برکات ہیں
وہ لوگ بزرگوں کی تقلید میں ہی خوش تھے یہ مذہب محض ایک رسمی
اور روایتی چیز ہو گئی تھی، گویا جسم سے جان نکل گئی ہو۔ یہی باعث
کہ ہندو اور مسلمان تعلیم یافتہ نوجوانوں کو اپنے مذہب سے بے اعتقادی

ہونے لگی تھی۔ انگریزی تعلیم کے ابتدائی دور میں کتنے ہی تعلیم یافتہ ہندو
عیسائی ہو گئے۔ آخر راجہ رام موہن رائے کو ایک ایسے فرقہ کی بنیاد ڈالنی
ضروری معلوم ہوئی جو کلیتہً فلسفیانہ دلائل پر قائم ہوا اور اس میں وہ سب
ہی آسانیاں اور آزادیاں حاصل ہوں جو لوگوں کو عیسائی ہو جانے پر آمادہ
کرتی تھیں۔ اس نئے فرقہ کا نام برہم سماج رکھا گیا۔ برہم سماج میں سے ذات
پات، چھوت چھات، تیرتھ اشنان، مورتی پوجا اور شرادھ اور وہ جملہ
رسوم جن پر عیسائیوں کے اعتراضات ہوا کرتے تھے نکال دئے گئے،
یہاں تک کہ عبادت کا طریقہ بھی تبدیل کر دیا گیا۔ اور اس میں کوئی شک
نہیں کہ اس فرقہ نے ہندوؤں میں عیسائیت کے سیلاب کو بہت کچھ
روک دیا۔ اس کے بہت عرصہ بعد سوامی دیانند سرسوتی نے آریہ سماج
کی بنیاد ڈالی جس نے مغربی ہند میں تقریباً وہی کام کیا جو برہم سماج نے
مشرق میں کیا تھا۔ تفسیر القرآن بھی اسی ارادہ سے لکھی گئی تاکہ نوجوان
مسلمانوں کے دل میں اسلام کی جانب سے جو شکوک پیدا ہوں اُن کی تشفی
کر دی جائے۔ مگر مسلم علما اس کتاب کے شائع ہوتے ہی سید احمد پر
کفر کا فتوے لے کر دوڑ پڑے، اُن پر دہریہ اور ملحد اور نیچریہ ہونے کا الزام
لگایا۔ ملک میں ایک سرے سے دوسرے سرے تک آگ لگ گئی اور جوابی
کتابوں کا سلسلہ شروع ہوا۔ مصنف پر طرح طرح کے بیجا اور بے معنی الزامات
عائد کئے جانے لگے۔ بعضوں کا تو یہ بھی خیال ہوا کہ سید احمد خاں ولایت جا کر
عیسائی ہو آئے ہیں اور اسلام کو تباہ کرنے کے لئے یہ کتاب لکھی ہے۔ بہت
دنوں کے بعد یہ شور و غوغا فرو ہوا اور آج تفسیر القرآن متلاشیانِ تحقیق کے
لئے مشعل کا کام کر رہی ہے۔

سید احمد خاں کی زندگی کا سب سے بڑا کارنامہ مدرسۃ العلوم علی گڑھ ہے

جو اب مسلم یونیورسٹی کی صورت میں اُن کی لازوال یادگار ہے۔ مسلمانوں میں افلاس اور بے روزگاری کی بڑھتی ہوئی رفتار کو روکنے کے لئے مغربی تعلیم کی سخت ضرورت تھی۔ اور مدرسۃ العلوم نے اس ضرورت کو کما حقہٗ پورا کر دیا۔ مگر اُس وقت لوگ مغربی تعلیم سے ایسے بدظن ہو رہے تھے کہ انھیں خوف تھا مبادا ہمارا مذہب بھی ہاتھ سے جاتا رہے اور وہ کہیں کے نہ رہیں۔ مگر سر سید اپنے ارادہ میں مستقل تھے۔ اس غرض سے انھوں نے ولایت کا سفر کیا تاکہ وہاں کی قدیم یونیورسٹیوں کے نظام کا مطالعہ کریں اور اُسی نمونہ پر ہندوستان میں مدرسۃ العلوم کی داغ بیل رکھی جائے۔ یکم اپریل ۱۸۶۹ء کو سر سید ولایت روانہ ہو گئے۔ لندن میں جس شان سے اُن کا استقبال کیا گیا اور اُن کی جتنی خاطر و تواضع کی گئی اُس نے سر سید کو ہمیشہ کے لئے انگریزوں سے متحد کر دیا۔ وہ تقریباً دو سال تک ولایت کے کالجوں کے انتظام کا مطالعہ کرنے کے بعد ہندوستان واپس آئے اور مدرسۃ العلوم کے افتتاح کی تیاریاں کرنے لگے۔ اس ارادہ کی تکمیل اور نیز مسلمانوں میں صحیح ادبی اور علمی مذاق پیدا کرنے کے لئے انھوں نے تہذیب الاخلاق نامی ایک ماہوار رسالہ جاری کیا۔ مگر طبقہ علما نے اس رسالہ کی مخالفت شروع کی اور مدرسہ کی تحریک سے عوام میں بدگمانی پیدا کرنے لگے۔ شاید کچھ لوگوں کا خیال ہوا ہو کہ وہ انگلستان سے اپنا مذہب کھو کر آئے ہیں۔ لیکن سر سید نے ہمت نہ ہاری اور متواتر پانچ سال کی شبانہ روز سعی کے بعد ۱۸۷۵ء میں مدرسۃ العلوم کا علی گڑھ میں افتتاح ہوا۔ اس میں کوئی شک نہیں کہ مدرسۃ العلوم کے قیام

سے مسلمانوں کو جتنا فروغ ہوا وہ اور کسی طرح ممکن نہ تھا۔ آج مسلم یونیورسٹی مسلمانوں کی قومی یادگار ہے اور اسکے طلبا ہندوستان کے ہر ایک گوشہ میں اسکے علم بردار بنے ہوئے ہیں۔

سیّد احمد خاں محض اِن وجوہ سے ہندوؤں سے بدگمان ہو گئے تھے کہ ۱۸۶۷ء میں ہندوؤں کی جانب سے یہ کوشش ہوئی کہ اِس صوبہ میں ناگری کو عدالتی زبان بنایا جائے۔ سیّد احمد خاں نے اسے ہندوؤں کی زیادتی سمجھی، حالانکہ یہ کوشش محض عوام کی آسانی کے خیال سے جاری ہوئی تھی۔ ظاہر ہے کہ جس صوبہ میں ہندوؤں کی آبادی ۹۰ فیصدی سے زیادہ ہو اور اُس میں بیشتر لوگ دیہات کے رہنے والے اُردو سے ناآشنا ہوں وہاں اُردو کا عدالتی زبان ہونا صریح بے انصافی ہے اور تھوڑے سے اُردو داں اشخاص کے فائدے یا آرام کے لئے آبادی کے بہت بڑے حصّہ کو زیر بار کرنا کسی طرح قرینِ مصلحت نہیں۔ اور نہ اِس تحریک کا منشا یہ تھا کہ اُردو ایک سرے سے فنا کر دی جائے لیکن سر سیّد کے دل میں یہ شبہہ جاگزیں ہوا کہ ہندو مسلمانوں کو زک دینا چاہتے ہیں۔ ممکن ہے بعض ایسے اسباب اور بھی پیدا ہو گئے ہوں جن سے اِس خیال کو تقویت ہوئی ہو کہ ہندو مسلمانوں کا اتفاق اور اتحاد ممکن نہیں ہے۔ اِن دونوں قوموں میں تاریخی اور مذہبی اختلافات پہلے ہی سے موجود تھے۔ مغل سلطنت کی تباہی اور انگریزی عملداری نے اِن اختلافات کو مٹانا اور پرانے زخموں کو بھرنا شروع کیا تھا کہ یہ نئے اختلافات پیدا ہو گئے اور متحدہ قومیت کی منزل ایک عرصہ دراز کے لئے نظروں سے دور ہو گئی۔ مذہبی فرقوں کے اختلافات کا عملی عنادی صورت میں منتقل ہو جانا کتنا آسان ہے۔ یہ ہم آئے دن آنکھوں سے

دیکھ رہے ہیں۔ آج ذرا ذرا سی فروعی باتوں پر آپس میں خونریزیاں ہو جاتی ہیں اور ملکی طاقت کا ایک بڑا حصہ باہمی ناچاقیوں کی نذر ہو جاتا ہے۔ ایسا کوئی سال نہیں جاتا کہ دو چار مقامات میں ہولناک شر و فساد نہ ہو جاتے ہوں۔ ہائے افسوس ہے کہ اس زمانہ میں فریقین کی تنگ خیالیوں نے اُس رواداری اور باہمی مصالحت میں رخنہ ڈال دیا جس کی بنیاد پر متحدہ قومیت کی عمارت کھڑی ہو سکتی ہے۔ ممکن ہے سر سید نے مسلمانوں کے لئے سابق حکمرانوں کی روداد کی حیثیت سے کسی قدر امتیاز ضروری سمجھا ہو مگر ہندو مساوی سے زیادہ کسی قسم کی رعایت کے لئے آمادہ نہ تھے۔ اگر سر سید نے اس وقت فراخدلی سے کام لیا ہوتا تو آج ہندوستان کی حالت کچھ اور ہوتی۔ لیکن اُنھوں نے وقتی اور قریبی فوائد کو دائمی اور قومی اغراض پر مرجح سمجھا۔ موجودہ حکمرانوں سے اتحاد اُس سے کہیں زیادہ نفع بخش تھا جتنا محکوم ہندوؤں کے ساتھ۔ انگریزی گورنمنٹ کے ہاتھ میں اختیار تھا۔ مناصب تھے۔ ترقی کے غیر محدود ذرائع تھے۔ ہندوؤں کی دوستی میں بجز باہم مل کر رونے کے اور کیا رکھا تھا۔ سر سید کے خیالات میں یہ تغیر اُس وقت سے اور زیادہ نمایاں ہو گیا جب وہ ولایت گئے۔ وہاں اُنھوں نے جو کچھ دیکھا اُس سے وہ اسی نتیجہ پر پہونچے کہ مسلمانوں کا مفاد انگریزوں سے موانست اور اتحاد میں ہے۔ اس طرح اس طرز عمل کی بنیاد پڑی جو روز افزوں خوفناک صورت اختیار کرتی جاتی ہے۔ یہاں تک کہ اُس نے باہمی ارتباط کو محال ہی نہیں کر دیا

...ل کی فضا کو مسموم کر دیا ہے۔ ملک دو مخالف حصوں میں
...ہو گیا ہے اور اُس کے تباہ کن اثرات کُشت و خون کی صورت
...ہوتے رہتے ہیں اور ہر دو فریق ایک تیسرے فریق کا
...دار ہونا اپنے اپنے وجود اور بقا کے لئے ناگزیر سمجھتے
... جیسے ذی اثر اور بیدار مغز بزرگ قوم نے اگر متحدہ
...یت کی حمایت کی ہوتی تو آج ہندوستان کہیں سے کہیں پہونچا
...مار کے جراثیم اس قدر سخت جان ہوتے ہیں کہ ایکبار
...یت پاکر پھر ناقابل ہلاک ہو جاتے ہیں۔ چنانچہ اُس وقت
...اب تک اتحاد کی جتنی کوششیں کی گئیں وہ سب ناکام ہوئیں
...اتحاد کی منزل اب بھی اتنی ہی دور ہے۔

...ر سید بڑے مردم شناس تھے۔ اور جس شخص سے انھیں ایکبار
...ظن ہو جاتا پھر اُس کے خلاف کوئی شکایت نہ سُنتے تھے۔
...کی محنت کا یہ حال تھا کہ وہ تنہا جتنا دماغی کام کرسکتے تھے اتنا کئی
...مل کر بھی نہ کرسکتے تھے۔ بہت ہی زندہ دل، بامروت، فیاض طبع اور
...بیان بزرگ تھے۔ اُن کی تقریر میں جادو تھا۔ سامعین محو حیرت
...ہو جاتے تھے۔ اُن کا قول تھا کہ کسی بڑے کام کی تکمیل کے لئے
...لیاقت کی اتنی ضرورت نہیں ہے جتنی تجربہ اور موقع شناسی
...مخالفین بھی اُن کے سامنے جاکر معاون بن جاتے تھے۔ اُن کی ذہانت
...ت سے متأثر نہ ہو جانا غیر ممکن تھا۔

سر سید نے اُردو زبان کی جتنی خدمت کی اُس کی تعریف
...الفاظ میں کی جائے۔ یوں کہو کہ اُردو نے اُن کے زمانے میں

پرورش پائی۔ اُس وقت تک اُردو میں شاعری کا بازار گرم تھا۔
ادبیت اور شعر گوئی شعرا کے تذکروں تک محدود تھی۔ اس میں نہ
گہرائی تھی نہ بلندی۔ دقیق مسائل اور سنجیدہ مطالب کے ادا کرنے کی
صلاحیت نہ تھی۔ تاریخی، تنقیدی، اور علمی موضوعات پر اُسے
اقتدار نہ تھا۔ سرسید نے اِن موضوعات پر تہذیب اخلاق میں
جو مضامین لکھے وہ اُردو زبان کے کلاسک ہیں۔ اُن کے ایک
ایک لفظ سے دقیق مطالعہ، وسیع تجربہ فطرت انسانی کے غائر
مشاہدہ اور علمی مسائل کی عالمانہ تحقیق ٹپک رہی ہے بیان میں
اتنی سلاست ہے کہ تھوڑی استعداد کا آدمی بھی بے تکلف سمجھ سکتا ہے
نہ پیچیدہ ترکیبیں ہیں، نہ اُلجھے ہوئے جملے، نہ مشکل الفاظ۔ مشکل سے مشکل
مطالب کو وہ اِتنی بے ساختگی سے ادا کرتے ہیں کہ حیرت ہوتی ہے۔
اگرچہ یہ مضامین سب کے سب طبع زاد نہیں ہیں، بیکن اور اڈیسن اور بعض
دیگر ادیبوں کے خیالات کا چربہ لیا گیا ہے مگر اندازِ بیان اُن کا اپنا ہے
اور اِس انداز نے مضامین میں جدت پیدا کر دی ہے۔ اُن کی ادبی اور
قومی خدمات کے صلہ میں گورنمنٹ نے انھیں سر کا خطاب عطا کر کے
قدر دانی کا ثبوت دیا۔

عمر کے آخری ایام میں سرسید مسلسل بیماریوں سے بہت نقیہہ
ہو گئے تھے۔ مگر اُس وقت بھی یہ فنافی القوم بزرگ خدمتِ قوم میں
ہی منہمک تھا۔ آخر ۱۸۹۸ء کی ۲۷ مارچ کو پیامِ اجل آپہنچا اور اُس نے
اپنی زندگی کی لازوال یادگاریں چھوڑ کر عالمِ فانی سے رحلت کی۔

"باکمالوں کے درشن" از پریم چند

AGAINST A FAR EASTERN MUNICH

ALFRED MAX

WHEN it became clear, in the summer of 1937, that Japan intended to proceed with its continental expedition until it had overthrown Chiang Kai-shek's Government, while on the other hand China was determined to fight to the very limit of its capacity for resistance, foreign observers generally assumed that, whatever the outcome of the conflict, foreign rights and privileges in China would undergo considerable change if not outright cancellation. It was predicted moreover that if Japan were victorious, not only would the Open Door principle and extraterritorial rights in China vanish into thin air, but whatever remained of an Asiatic balance of power would be so considerably upset as to endanger the immediate future of such foreign possessions in the Far East as Hongkong, Indochina, Netherlands India, or the Philippines.

At that juncture the United States was probably not the Power with the greatest interests at stake. Yet in a number of previous crises in that part of the world it had taken the lead in formulating policies, and had conspicuously done so at the time of the Manchurian affair. Besides, the situation in Europe was such that unless the United States should join in, no move could be contemplated by France or Great Britain that might antagonize Japan to such an extent that they would have to divert toward Asiatic shores even a small part of their armed forces. The attention of every statesman and student of international affairs was focused therefore on the reaction of the United States Government to Japan's new challenge.

In the United States the Sino-Japanese conflict was primarily a means for President Roosevelt to gain for himself, through popular approval, a freedom of action in the field of foreign affairs which Congress tended to deny him. This became apparent as early as August 1937, when the Administration had to decide whether or not to apply the Neutrality Act. In two previous instances, the

جمـــاعـة احمـــديـــه

شته اشاعت میں هم مولوي حکیم نورالدین صاحب رئیس جماعة
ہ کے انتقال کی خبر درج کرچکے هیں جو رسالے کے مرتب
کے بعد پہنچی تھی ' اب جو واقعات شائع هوے هیں اسسے
هوتا ہے که اس جماعت میں مسئلۂ خلافت اور تکفیر و عدم
مسلمین کی بنا پر باهم اختلاف و نزاع پیدا هوگیا ہے -
نک عرصے سے اس جماعت میں مسئلہ تکفیر کی بنا پر دو
یں پیدا هوگئی تهیں - ایک گروہ کا یہ اعتقاد تھا کہ غیر احمدي
ن بهی مسلمان هیں گو وہ مرزا صاحب کے دعوؤں پر ایمان
ے هوں - لیکن دوسرا گروہ صاف صاف کہتا تها کہ جو لوگ
صاحب پر ایمان نہ لائیں وہ قطعی کافر هیں : ان لله و انا الیه
ں - آخري جماعت کے رئیسؔ صاحبزادہ بشیر الدین محمود هیں -
گروہ نے انهي کو اب خلیفه قرار دیا ہے ' مگر پہلا گروہ تسلیم
کرتا -
مولوي محمد علی صاحب ایم - اے نے اس بارے میں جو
ر شائع کی ہے ' اور جس عجیب و غریب جرات اور دلاوري
ابه قادیان میں رهکر اظہار راے کیا ہے جہاں زیادہ تر پہلے گروہ
ؤسا هیں ' وہ فی الحقیقت ایک ایسا واقعہ ہے جو همیشہ اس
کا ایک یادگار واقعہ سمجها جائیگا !
اس جماعت کا بیان ہے که انکي تعداد کم از کم تین لاکھ ہے '
، مسلمانان عالم کي تعداد آج چالیس کرور تک اندازہ کي
، ہے -
پس اگر غیر احمدیوں کو کافر سمجھ لیا جاے تو اس نئي
م شماري کي بنا پر چالیس کرور میں سے انتالیس کرور
وے لاکھ کي تعداد نکال دیدي پریگي - پهر افسوس اس دین
ں پر جس کا درخت خدا نے لگایا ' پر آج اسکي شاخوں میں
ـت تین هي لاکھ پهل باقي رهگئے هیں !! (الہلال، ۲۲/۲/ ۱۹۱۴)

جناب فرخ جلالی
علی گڑھ مسلم یونیورسٹی
علی گڑھ

تاریخ مجمل مفصل مخطوطہ خدابخش

سوانح جان جاناں پر نئی روشنی

خدابخش اورینٹل لائبریری میں ایک کتاب قلمی ہے جس کا نام فہرست میں تاریخ مجمل مفصل ہے۔
الٰہی محمد براری ہے اوراق ۱۴۴ نمبر شمار ۴۰۲۸ ہے۔

مصنف نے سنہ خمس وستین والف ہجری (۱۰۶۵) میں یہ کتاب لکھی۔ اب جس کتاب کا سنہ تصنیف جو ۱۰۰۹ھ میں کیسے لکھی جاسکتی ہے۔ اصل میں یہ ۱۰۹۰ھ ہوگا جو اس نے اس زمانے کے مخصوص طرز کتابت اور نو کے درمیان دو صفر لکھ دیئے۔

کتاب کا مصنف محمد براری اپنے پردادا کا نام مجنوں خاں قاقشال لکھتا ہے جو عہد اکبری کے امیر تھے۔ بات یہ ہے کہ مظہر جان جاناں کے جد کا نام مجنوں خاں قاقشال بتایا جاتا ہے۔ مصنف نے اپنا شجرہ یوں لکھا ہے الٰہی ابن محمد حبشیہ ابن جباری خاں ابن مجنوں خاں قاقشال۔ مرزا مظہر جان جاناں کے شجرہ میں یہ نام کتاب میر سید حبیب اللہ ہیں۔ شمس الدین حبیب اللہ مرزا مظہر کا نام بتایا جاتا ہے۔ ۱۰۹۰ھ میں مرزا معہ ہوئے ہیں۔ کہیں مرزا مظہر کے والد کا نام تو حبیب اللہ نہیں ہے۔ مرزا مظہر کے والد کی فرضیت مرزا جان ملوں بتائے جاتے ہیں۔ دراصل یہ کتاب نامکمل ہے۔ ورق ۱۴۴ کے بعد کے اوراق گم ہوگئے۔ جو ایک ورق مل گیا وہ آخر میں لگا دیا گیا۔

اسی مصنف محمد براری الٰہی بن محمد حبشیہ ابن جباری خاں قاقشال کی ایک اور کتاب ہے جس کا موضوع بہت دلچسپ ہے۔ اصل میں علوم ہے اور کتاب نے پٹنہ بلاد عظیم آباد میں نواب کے حکم سے لکھی ہے۔ یہ کتاب مشہور کتابوں کے عاشق مظفر حسین ۱۲ھ کے کتب خانہ کی ہے ان کی مہر موجود ہے۔ لکھنؤ گئی اور واپس پٹنہ آگئی بہت دلچسپ کتاب ہے اور شاہجہاں کے عہد میں تصنیف ہوئی۔

فنر امام (شری لنکا)

کچھ سر علی امام کے بارے میں

"سر علی امام کو میں نے لڑکپن میں دیکھا تھا اور ان کے ارشادات
یاد ہیں۔ اس سلسلہ میں یہ عرض کرنا ضروری ہے کہ سر علی امام
یں بلکہ کرائے پر سرائے ضلع پٹنہ میں پیدا ہوئے تھے جو عظیم آباد پٹنہ
ب مشرق کی جانب تقریباً بیس یا پچیس میل پر واقع ہے۔ یہاں
ر کی آبادی تھی جس کی خاک سے ممتاز ہستیاں پیدا ہوتی رہیں
سر علی امام کے آبائی گھر میں بلکہ یوں کہئیے کہ ان کے دادا
کے گھر میں میر قاسم بھی جنگ آزادی کے زمانے میں ٹھہرا کرتے تھے۔
مداد صاحب اثر کرائے پر سرائے میں نہیں بلکہ ۱۶ اگست ۱۸۴۳ء
لا پور ضلع پٹنہ میں پیدا ہوئے تھے اور بیوں گرانمایہ تصانیف
۱۱ اکتوبر ۱۹۳۴ء میں آبگلہ میں سپرد خاک ہوئے۔ موجودہ شہر گیا
ت بھنگو کے اس پار آبگلہ اب بھی موجود ہے۔ میں تقریباً ۔ سال
میگدھ سے آبگلہ جایا کرتا تھا اور نواب صاحب مرحوم یعنی اپنے بڑے
یہاں ٹھہرا کرتا تھا۔ پھر چند دنوں بعد وہاں سے رخصت ہوتا تھا۔ خود
یہال تھا، مولد نہیں تھا۔ سر علی کے بارے میں ایک جواب کا ذکر
نامناسب نہ ہوگا۔ پٹنہ میں نواب امداد صاحب بلکہ درحقیقت پٹنہ سٹی
کے ابتدائی دور میں طبابت کیا کرتے تھے۔ جب سر علی نے ہوش سنبھ
صاحب کے حقیقی چھوٹے بھائی یوسف امام صاحب یعنی ... دادا نے
تعلیم کے لئے اپنے بھتیجے کو بانکی پور بھیجا جہاں ان کا داخلہ ... T.K

اسکول میں ہوا۔ وہیں پڑھتے رہے۔ چھٹیوں میں کرائے پر سرائے جایا کرتے تھے
جب انٹرنس میں داخل ہوئے تو دل لگا کر پڑھتے رہے مگر خلاف امید فیل
ہو گئے۔ اپنے والد ماجد سے ملنے کے بعد جو ان کا معمول تھا کرائے پر سرائے
اور چچا کو سنایا کہ بدنصیبی سے وہ فیل ہو گئے ہیں۔ چچا نے کہا اس میں غمگین ہونے
کا سوال ہی بے معنی ہے۔ اگلے سال پھر امتحان میں بیٹھنا۔ اسی اثنا میں ہمارے دادا
مرحوم نے خواب میں دیکھا کہ ایک بزرگ سفید ریش اور گیسو دراز تشریف لائے
اور کہا کہ یوسف اپنے بھتیجے کو ولایت بھیج دو تاکہ اس کا ستارہ چمکے۔ یوسف
صاحب مرحوم کی مالی حیثیت اپنے بڑے بھائی سے کہیں زیادہ تھی۔ انہوں نے
بھتیجے کو بلا کر خواب بیان کیا۔ لائق بھتیجے نے فوراً جواب دیا "سرکار" (سر علی آخر
تک جب بھی اپنے والد ماجد یا چچا سے ملتے تھے تو سرکار سے مخاطبت کیا کرتے تھے)
ولایت ضرور جاؤں گا۔ اس وقت لندن میں بیرسٹری کے داخلہ کے لئے انٹرنس
شرط نہ تھی۔ ہمارے دادا خود بمبئی تک اپنے لاڈلے بھتیجے کو خدا حافظ کہنے گئے تھے
جب بیرسٹری کی سند لیکر واپس ہوئے تو پھر وکالت شروع کر دی تھی اور
نے دیکھا کہ وہ کہاں تک پہنچے۔ ان کے چھوٹے بھائی حسن امام کو ان کے والد
نے اپنی آمدنی سے ولایت روانہ کیا تھا۔

سر علی کو میں نے خود دیکھا ہے کہ کرائے پر سرائے میں چچا کے سامنے
چوکی پر جس پر قالین بچھی رہتی تھی پاؤں لٹکا کر بیٹھے ہیں اور چچا سامنے وہیں گاؤ
تکیہ سے ٹکے ہوئے نیم دراز ہیں۔ یوسف امام صاحب ناس لیا کرتے تھے اور حقہ
ناک صاف کرنے کے بعد کھکھار کی نوبت آتی تو سر علی (جبکہ وہ حیدر آباد میں صدر
تھے) فوراً اٹھے اور اگالدان اٹھا کر بڑھا دیا۔ پھر ایک مرتبہ کا ذکر ہے کہ حیدر آباد سے
استعفا دے کر جب پٹنہ آئے تو اولین فرصت میں چچا کو سلام کرنے کے لئے حاضر
ہوئے۔ میں اس وقت میٹرک میں پڑھتا تھا خود سر علی کو کہتے سنا کہ سرکار،

ملازم ہو کر حیدر آباد گیا تو مجتہد دین شیعہ سمجھ کر (کیونکہ نواب امداد
ب جوانی میں لکھنؤ اور رامپور کے زیر اثر شیعہ ہو گئے تھے) حضرت
ف طنزیہ جملے کہنے لگے۔ میں نے کہا کہ اگر حضرت عمرؓ کو امیر المومنین اور
ں تسلیم کرتے ہیں تو پھر جو اسلامی جہاد ایران پر ہوا وہ جہاد نہیں بلکہ
ثیت محض لوٹ مار کی سی تھی۔ ہاں پھر یہ بھی تو قابل غور بات ہے کہ
ت عمر کو خلیفہ تسلیم نہیں کرتے تو پھر جہاد ایران کے بعد جو مال غنیمت
کو ملا وہ مال غنیمت نہیں بلکہ ناجائز ہی متاع تھی۔ اور پھر شہر بانو کی
بارہ جاتی ہے جسے حضرت عمرؓ نے امام حسین کی زوجیت میں دیا تھا۔
کے بعد سادات بھی صفر ہو کر رہ جاتے ہیں۔ یہ باتیں سر علی نے چچا کو
نے کے لئے نہیں کہی تھیں بلکہ ہم لوگ جانتے تھے کہ وہ حنفی المذہب سُنی
ہماری چچی لیڈی امام صاحبہ کی وفات کا وقت قریب آیا تو انہوں نے
ں اپنے پیر شاہ بدر الدین علیہ الرحمۃ کے گورستان میں دفن کیا جائے
سال ہوئے جبکہ میں پھلواری شریف گیا تھا تو چچی مرحومہ کی قبر پہ فاتحہ
افر ہوا تھا۔

سر علی کو درباری سازشوں نے چین سے بیٹھنے نہیں دیا۔ بلکہ یہ بھی ایک
سانحہ ہے کہ زہر دے کر انہیں نڈھال کر دیا تھا۔ اور پٹنہ آنے کے بعد
ہی سال زندہ رہ سکے۔ یہ بھی ہم لوگوں کو معلوم ہے کہ زہر دینے میں کس
ا۔ مگر مصلحت کا تقاضا یہی ہے کہ دامن بچا کر گذر جاؤں۔

سف امام صاحب مرحوم کے یہاں جب سر علی آیا کرتے تھے تو پورے گاؤں
تہلکہ سا مچ جایا کرتا تھا اور زمینداری کے گماشتے بھی سلام کرنے کے
ہوا کرتے تھے۔ ان گماشتوں میں ایک سن رسیدہ راجپوت بھی تھے۔
ے ہمارے سامنے اپنی ٹھیٹھ مگدھی زبان میں کہا کہ سرکار فلاں جگہ ایک بڑا

علاقہ بک رہا ہے اسے خرید لیا جائے۔ تعجب اس بات پر ہے کہ سر علی۔
میں کہا ما بو پر میشر سنگھ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ پھر اسی زبان میر
ناک بر بر با چو ان سے ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔ ۔"

میں خود کرائے پر سرائے میں پیدا ہوا تھا مگر علیگڈھ کی تعلیم ۔
بھول گیا تھا۔ وہ یعنی سر علی عربی بقدر ضرورت ہی جانتے تھے مگر فار
لہجہ اور انگریزی انگلستانی تلفظ سے بولتے تھے۔ اردو تو دھلی ہوئی ز
لی تھی۔ کیا مجال کہ اردو میں انگریزی الفاظ ٹھونسے جائیں۔

ایک اور واقعہ قابل ذکر ہے جسے سر علی آبدیدہ ہو کر یاد کرتے۔
کہ جب گول میز کانفرنس میں شرکت کے لئے سمندری جہاز سے جا رہ
بحر احمر سے گذر کر سوئز کا رخ آ رہا تھا تو میں زار و قطار رونے لگا۔ ڈیک پر
اقبال آئے اور پوچھا کہ علی خیر تو ہے روتے کیوں ہو ؟ میں نے جواب
دیا حبیبؐ ہم سے چھوٹ رہا ہے۔ یہ سنتے ہی اقبال بھی گلے لگ
گئے۔ اللہ اللہ یہ تھا عشق رسولؐ جس دولت سے سر علی اور اقبا
دونوں بے حد مالا مال تھے۔

سید یوسف الدین بلخی صاحب نے "بہار اردو لغت" ۔
عنوان ان تمام علاقائی الفاظ اور محاورات کو الف بائی طریقہ پر ۔
ہے جسے خدا بخش لائبریری " جرنل" نے ۲۸ ر شمارہ میں شائع ۔
ایک لائق تحسین کام ہے۔ اردو ہند و پاک کے مسلمانوں کی مشترکہ
کی ہے جس میں مشرقی پاکستان بھی شامل تھا۔ اردو بولنے والوں
کی اردو پر قہقہے لگائے اور یہ نہ جانا کہ اس زہر خند سے وہ زبان کی ست
میں گناہ کبیرہ کے مرتکب ہو رہے ہیں۔ اس کا رد عمل نفسیاتی طور پر
بنگلہ دیش میں اردو کا جنازہ نکلا۔ علیگڈھ میں ابتدائی جماعتوں سے یہ

ں نے تعلیم پائی ہے۔ اسکول کے بچے اگر بنگالی ہم سبق کی اردو پر ہنسیں
ب حد تک قابل معافی ہے۔ مگر جب گریجویٹ اس بد زبانی کا ہمنوا ہو
ہے کہ اردو کے حق میں کانٹے بو رہا ہے۔ ہمارے اردو کے اساتذہ
لمی سطح پر دو قابل ذکر ہیں۔ ایک تو حضرت مولانا احسن مارہروی او
ے رشید احمد صدیقی صاحب۔ مولانا احسن اپنے طلباء کا دل بڑھاتے
اہ وہ بنگالی ہوں، بہاری یا گجراتی۔ مگر رشید صاحب یوپی کے سوا
ی طلباء کو ہمیشہ اہل زبان سے گرا ہوا فرد سمجھتے تھے۔ معین دردائی مجھ
ہ تھے اور اردو کے پرستار تھے مگر ان کے ذوق شفیق کو رشید
ب نے قابل اعتنا نہ سجھا۔

میں امام

ام برادران کے متعلق مشہور ہے کہ وہ لوگ شیعہ تھے حالانکہ وہ ایک
رے کے چشم چراغ تھے اس میں کوئی شک نہیں کہ ان کے والد نواب
اثر کا تعلق بھی ایک محترم سنی گھرانے سے تھا لیکن جب وہ نواب رامپور
نے بیٹے کو شیعہ مذہب اختیار کرلیا اور حضرت عمرؓ کے خلاف ایک
بھی لکھ دی لیکن ان کے دونوں بیٹوں علی امام اور حسن امام کے متعلق زمانہ
اسے جو واقعات سناتے ہیں ان سے ایک نتیجہ نکالا جاسکتا ہے ڈاکٹر احمد
ت میں سفیر رہ چکے ہیں اور سری لنکا یونیورسٹی میں شعبہ عربی کے صدر تھے
ے کہا کہ ایک مرتبہ ہمارے رشتہ داروں میں شادی ہورہی تھی سر علی امام اور
دونوں شادی میں شریک تھے میرے خاندان کے افراد شیعہ بھی ہیں اور
نے نکاح پڑھانے کے لیے شیعہ علماء بلائے گئے شیعہ علما کے نکاح
حسن امام نے علی امام سے کہا کہ بھائی جان قانون میں سے بھی پڑھوات

• اور آپ نے بھی شیعہ علما نے جو نکاح پڑھایا اس میں براہ راست ...
قبول نہیں ہوا اس لیے نکاح نہیں ہوا سر علی نے ان کے خیال کی تائید
کے بعد سنی علما بلائے گئے اور نکاح پڑھایا گیا۔ سر علی امام خانقاہ مجیبیہ
سلیمانیہ پھلواری شریف کے بہت معتقد تھے اور صاحب خانقاہ کی ...
فیض اٹھاتے۔

ایک مرتبہ حسن امام راجہ صاحب محمود آباد کے یہاں قیام پذیر ...
نے راجہ صاحب سے موٹر طلب کی تا کہ دیوا شریف تشریف لے جائیں ...
کو جب معلوم ہوا تو انھوں نے کہا کہ ہم لوگ شیعہ ہیں دیوا شریف سے ...
تعلق حسن امام نے کہا کہ ہم چار بانوں کو تسلیم نہیں کرتے اس کے علاوہ ...
ہیں۔ انھوں نے کہا کہ متعہ کو ہم زنا (FORNICATION) سمجھتے ہیں ...
(HYPOCRACY) اور تبرا کو ناشائستگی (INDECENCY) خیال کر ...
بلت اختر امام سے پھر دریافت کروں گا۔

President had managed to use the embargoes provided for in the Act less as a means of keeping the United States out of war than as an unobtrusive complement to League sanctions—in the case of Abyssinia—and to the export restrictions decreed by the London Non-Intervention Committee—in the case of Spain. In 1935, neither Italy nor Ethiopia had declared war. But since the application of the Act was dependent upon a "finding" by the President that there was a state of war, Mr. Roosevelt had justified his action by saying on November 11th: "We are acting to simplify definitions and facts by calling war 'war' when armed invasion and a resulting killing of human beings takes place." Yet, on August 23, 1937, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Pittman, who may be assumed to have been expressing the views of the Administration, said that there was no war in China since neither party to the conflict had declared war, and that therefore the Neutrality Act could not be invoked. Such contradictions made it clear that the fiction of the non-existence of a state of war was a mere pretext: the President of the United States did not want to apply the Neutrality Act to the Far Eastern situation. Why not?

Although the question of the ultimate effects on the two belligerents of the application of the Neutrality Act was highly controversial, many observers were convinced that embargoes on arms and ammunition would have caused greater harm to China than to Japan, which was able to manufacture its own war materials from imported raw materials; and they assumed, naturally enough, that the Administration had no desire to help the aggressor nation as against the victim.

It was also felt in Administration circles that application of the Act would have entailed useless suffering—useless, since by no stretch of the imagination could the peace of America appear to be threatened—for large sections of the country, especially for California, where it would have played havoc with oil exports, ruined the shipping trade and dealt a severe blow to the aircraft industry. Such economic considerations were closely intertwined with electoral strategy. Who could forget that President Wilson had been re-elected in 1916 largely through the failure of Charles Evans Hughes to realize the importance of a few thousand California

[illegible]الدین بلخی

نیپال میں عربی فارسی و اردو کے مخطوطات

مخطوطات کی یہ فہرست فصیح الدین بلخی (م ۱۹۶۲ء) نے ۱۹۵۶ء میں نیپال میں اپنے قیام کے دوران تیار کی تھی

نیپال میوزیم میں عربی و فارسی اور اردو زبانوں کے متعدد مخطوطات محفوظ ہیں۔ کچھ مخطوطات ذاتی کتب خانوں [illegible] ہیں۔ دارالمطالعہ اندرا چوک کاٹھمنڈو میں فارسی کے درج ذیل مخطوطات محفوظ ہیں:

(۱) "قواعد التاریخ" مصنفہ طفیل اللہ (۲) "مفتاح العلوم" مصنفہ محمد حیات۔ (ان مخطوطات کے اوراق میں رد [illegible] مسیات سے متعلق اہم اطلاعات ملتی ہیں) (۳) "تزک تیموری" مصنفہ شاہ تیمور مرقومہ ۱۲۴۴ھ (۴) "مکاتیب [illegible] مرزا افضل" مرتبہ عبدالصمد افضل (بھتیجا ابوالفضل) سال کتابت درج نہیں لیکن یہ لگ بھگ دو سو سال پرانا نسخہ ہے۔ (۵) "[illegible] المجاہدین" مرقومہ ۱۱۲۳ھ۔ اس مخطوطے کا پہلا صفحہ غائب ہے۔ اس کتاب میں اسلامی فلسفہ سے بحث کی گئی ہے۔ (۶) "[illegible] بنگالہ" مرقومہ ۱۲۰۸ء۔ اس تاریخ میں شہنشاہ اورنگ زیب سے لے کر نواب علی وردی خاں، ناظم بنگالہ اور سراج الدولہ [illegible] شہادت کے حالات ملتے ہیں، یہ ایک نادر نسخہ ہے۔ اس مخطوطے کے چند ہی نسخے موجود ہیں، جن میں برٹش میوزیم اور [illegible] ایشیاٹک لائبریری قابل ذکر ہیں۔ اس کے مصنف سلیم اللہ ہیں۔ موجودہ نسخہ کے نقل نویس راج محل کے گوپال لال [illegible] کے باشندہ ہیں۔ (۷) "بادشاہ نامہ" اس تاریخ میں شہنشاہ شاہجہاں کے دور حکومت ۱۰۶۵ء سے لے کر ۱۰۶۵ء تک کے حالات ملتے ہیں۔ اس کا پہلا اور آخری صفحہ غائب ہے (۸) "جواہر التفسیر" قرآن حکیم کی تفسیر ہے۔ یہ نہایت ہی قدیم اور اہم مخطوطہ ہے اس پر مغلیہ حکام کی مہر بھی ہے۔ اس کی نمائش پانچ موقعوں پر ہندوستان کے علماء کے سامنے کی گئی اور یہ مخطوطہ ۹۰۱ھ میں شہنشاہ اکبر کے دور حکومت میں مکمل ہوا۔ (۹) "دیوان شوکت" [illegible] ادیب و شاعر شوکت کے مختلف اصناف شاعری پر مشتمل ہے۔ اس کے مرتب لطعات خاں ہیں جو اعلیٰ عہدے [illegible] فائز تھے۔ یہ نسخہ ۱۱۴۸ھ میں مرتب ہوا۔ (۱۰) "سکندر نامہ" نظامی گنجوی مرقومہ ۱۲۵۹ھ۔"

[illegible] مخطوطات کے نام ملاحظہ فرمائیں جو ایک نیپالی باشندہ حکیم حسن شاہ (باغ بازار کٹھمنڈو) کے ذاتی کتب خانے [illegible] موجود ہیں

(۱) "انیس العاشقین" ایک پرانا اور نادر مخطوطہ جس میں تصوف کے رموز و نکات پر بحث کی گئی ہے یہ مخطوطہ ۱۰۳۰ھ میں مرتب ہوا جو شہنشاہ جہانگیر کا آخری عہد حکومت تھا (۲) "شرح [illegible] الصحیح" [illegible]

عبدالعزیز طاہر" ایک قدیم مخطوطہ ہے۔ جس میں اخلاقی و مذہبی پہلوؤں پر بحث کی گئی ہے۔ (۲) "بیا
واقعہ" مرقومہ ۱۲۱۴ھ ایک نادر مخطوطہ ہے جس میں شاعر کے فارسی و اردو کے کلام ہیں۔ اس کے علاوہ
سوہجان اور کلاسیکی گیت ہیں جو ہندی اور اردو میں ہیں۔ (۴) کتاب لامعلوم الاسم۔ (۵) ایک
مخطوطہ جس میں لذیذ کھانا بنانے کے طریقے بتلائے گئے ہیں جس کے اوّل اور آخر کے صفحات غائب ہیں۔ سا
ہی کتاب نہایت خستہ حالت میں ہے (۶) "کنز الرقیق" مرتبہ نظر اللہ بن محمد بن حمید۔ یہ مخطوطہ
اورنگ زیب کے پینتیس سالہ عہد حکومت میں مرتب ہوا۔ اس میں فلسفہ کے موضوعات پر بحث کی گئی ہے۔ مؤلف
نے سلطنت مغلیہ کے مختلف شہنشاہوں کے عہد حکومت کے حالات لکھے ہیں۔ (۷) "اصل المعرفت" مرقومہ
۱۲۱۱ھ ایک نادر مخطوطہ ہے جس کا پہلا صفحہ غائب ہے۔ اس مخطوطہ میں کئی دیگر مخطوطات بھی شامل ہیں۔
مثلاً صوفی طریقت شاہ تراب علی ابن محمد کاظم قلندر کی "مطالب رشیدی" اور انھیں کی دوسری تصنیف
جس میں مختلف تاریخی واقعات درج ہیں ——— (۸) "شرح مثنوی مولانا روم" از
ہدایت اللہ ابن عبدالفتح حسین ایک مشہور صوفی کی شرح، جو مکمل، مفصل اور قابل تحسین ہے (۹)
"سلامت الزیب" دفتر دوم، ایک قدیم مخطوطہ جس میں اسلامی فلسفہ کو بیان کیا گیا ہے۔ (۱۰) "انشائے مانق"
جس میں مکتوبات نگاری کے طریقے بیان کئے گئے ہیں۔ اس کو نواب میر قاسم نے اپنے بچہ کی تعلیم کیلئے ۱۱۸۴ھ
میں لکھا تھا۔ (۱۱) "بیاض خصوصی یا ملفوظات خواجہ سید عظیم الدین بدخشانی" اس بیاض پر جس قدر
آخری تاجدار اودھ واجد علی شاہ نے اپنی جائداد کو بیچا ہے۔ اس کی تین مختلف روداد اس میں ملتی ہے
(۱۲) "تاریخ حسن بن عبدالرسول شہوا" جلد اول۔ یہ کشمیر کی تاریخ ہے۔ جس میں مفصل حالات ملتے ہیں۔ یہ
۱۲۱۰ھ میں مکمل ہوئی۔ مؤلف نے تاریخ لکھنے کے سلسلے میں مختلف ذرائع کا سہارا لیا ہے جس میں لگ بھگ پچاس
کے حوالے ہیں (۱۳) "شرح سراج ایک مرکز" مؤلفہ قاضی شہاب الدین مرقومہ ۱۱۶۷ھ۔ اس
میں اسلامی تصوف پر روشنی ڈالی گئی ہے۔ (۱۴) "رسالہ وجیہ الحفاظ" مرتبہ لطف اللہ، مرقومہ ۱۲۲۲ھ
(۱۵) "کتاب ادائے عبادت"

پیش کش: ڈاکٹر اسیہ
پٹنہ سیٹی

●

votes? Moreover, possible retaliation by Japan might quite conceivably have extended these effects to other industries and other constituencies.

There was far more at stake, however, than mere economic or electoral issues. The question was whether President Roosevelt could resume full control of the foreign policy of the United States. He had been carrying on the traditional fight between Congress and the Presidency on that issue, which had again become acute in the last three or four years. Congress had begun by enacting a bill which Mr. Roosevelt could not but resent. Anyone, sound in mind and body, would resent being put into a straightjacket, even if told that it was all for his own good and would keep him out of trouble. The President had won the second round by diverting the law from its original purpose, turning it in two instances into an instrument of his own policy. Now the time had come, the President felt, to go forward frankly and openly instead of in a roundabout way. Mr. Roosevelt intended to cash in on American emotional feelings and sympathy toward China, on the moral sense of Americans as well as on their material interests in the Far East, in order to lead the United States toward more cooperation with the Western Powers for the curbing of Japanese imperialism, and, as a consequence, the imperialism of other totalitarian states as well.

Since there was, however, a very real danger that American ships entering the hostilities area or carrying arms and ammunition to China might be either bombed or searched and seized by the Japanese naval authorities, President Roosevelt found it necessary to make a gesture toward appeasing that section of public opinion which was crying out for immediate application of the Act and complete withdrawal of American troops and residents from China. On September 14, *à-propos* of the *Wichita* case, he therefore declared that henceforward Government-owned vessels would not be allowed to transport war materials to either belligerent and that private ships trading in arms would do so at their own risk, and urged American residents to withdraw from the danger zones. That this gesture was little more than symbolic could hardly be doubted, for the traffic in arms, far from being stopped, increased considerably, only an extremely small part of American naval and

یادداشتہاے ودود

قاضی عبدالودود

مکرم بندہ! ڈاکٹر صاحب

...کا عریضہ خدمت میں پہنچا ہوگا۔ آج تعطیل کے سبب شمارہ نمبر ۵۷-۶۲ کے صفحات ۱۷-۱۸ ...معلوم ہوا کہ تا حال اس Table میں سہوِ کاتب کے سبب بعض سنین وغیرہ کی اغلاط باقی ہیں۔ اس ...ذریعہ ارسال خدمت کر رہا ہوں۔ اگر آپ مناسب خیال فرمائیں تو گزشتہ عریضے کی سطر ۱۸ یعنی "۱۲ یوم ...یہ صاف فرما لیا جائے تاکہ جدول میری دانست ناقص میں ایک حد تک درست ہو جائے اور شمارہ ...نے والے حضرات مغالطے کا شکار نہ ہوں۔

...۱۰ خانہ ۱۲ یعنی ابو النصر مجاہد الدین احمد شاہ کا سال وفات ۱۰ شعبان ۱۱۶۷ھ دیا ہوا ہے۔ یہ تاریخ ...احمد شاہ کو نابینا کرنے کا ہے نہ کہ اس کی وفات کا۔ احمد شاہ کی وفات کا درست سن ۲ شعبان ۱۱۸۸ھ ...ہے نیز مدت سلطنت تقریباً چھ سال اور تاریخ جلوس ۱۱۰۶ھ کے بجائے ۱۱۶۱ھ ہے۔

...نمبر ۱۶ کے خانہ ۱۲ میں علی گوہر شاہ عالم بادشاہ کے سال وفات کے خانہ میں صرف ۷ رمضان دیا ہوا ہے۔ ...۱۲۲۱ھ ہونا چاہیے۔

...نمبر ۱۸ خانہ ۵ میں ابو النصر معین الدین محمد اکبر شاہ کی ولدیت کا خانہ خالی ہے۔ یہ شاہ عالم کے شہزادے ...بہادر شاہ ظفر کی ولدیت اکبر شاہ ثانی ہونی چاہیے جو خالی ہے۔

...۱۵ میر ابن شاہ کے سلسلے میں عرض ہے کہ ان کا سال وفات ۸۱۰ھ ہے "خدیو بزم تنا" مادہ کی رو سے ...پسند فرمائیں تو اس مادہ کو پچھلے عریضہ کی سطر ۱ (سال ولادت نہ مل سکا) کے بعد جوڑ دیں فقط والسلام۔

نیازمند

عبد الرؤف خاں

حرفے چند

لقمان سے سعدی تک، سعدی سے اشو فوکو تک، خود ہمارے زمانے تک ہر عصر کی دانش کا نچوڑ
مقولوں کی شکل میں ملتا رہا ہے۔ یہ مقولے آج بھی ایسے ہی کار آمد ہیں جیسے اس وقت تھے جب یہ پہلی بار کہے یا
لکھے گئے تھے، اور وہی قدر و قیمت رکھتے ہیں، شاید کچھ زیادہ ہی، جو قدر و قیمت ان کی اس وقت تھا جب پہلی بار کسی
نے انہیں سنا یا پڑھا تھا!

نام "حکمت و دانش" ہی ہمارے لیے کافی تھا۔ مجھے پتہ چلا یہ کہ ہمارے عظیم دانشور قاضی صاحب (قاضی عبدالودود)
انہیں یہ بہت پسند تھے۔ موقع موقع سے بعض مقولوں کو دہرایا بھی کرتے تھے (خاص طور سے شکریہ والا مقولہ)،
اور ان کی اشاعت کے لیے کئی بار فرمائش کر چکے تھے۔ اب وہ تو ہمارے درمیان نہیں مگر ان کی یاد میں بہت سے
کام ہوتے چلے جاتے ہیں۔ کیسا مبارک کیسا مقبول بارگاہ رب ہو گا اللہ کا وہ شریف النفس بندہ، جس کی محض یاد بھی [illegible]
کا موجب ہے۔ اللہ انہیں اپنی جنتوں میں سکھی رکھے!

حبیب احمد [illegible] کی اشاعت سے اس حکمت کی بازیافت کی طرف ایک قدم اور بڑھ جائے گا، جسے مومن
کی گمشدہ میراث کہا گیا ہے۔

——— حبیب

military forces in China were recalled, and if later in the year a great many American residents quietly withdrew, it was due not to any pressure on the part of the Government but rather to the simple fact that business under the new conditions prevailing in China had ceased to be profitable.

While this bone was being thrown for the isolationists to gnaw, foreign Powers were gathering at Geneva and considering the possibility of acting jointly and calling a conference to put an end to the Far Eastern conflict. This—not the internal dissatisfaction over Justice Black's appointment—determined the timing of the President's "clarion call"—the Chicago speech in which probably for the first time since he had assumed the Presidency Mr. Roosevelt spoke his own mind on foreign problems. "Let no one imagine that America will escape through mere isolation or neutrality," he said. Only "concerted efforts of all peace-loving nations" could effectively uphold those "laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure." Finally, "when an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joints in a quarantine of the patients."

The reception of the speech by the country at large was decidedly cool Indeed from all parts of the continent letters came to the White House expressing doubt and even anxiety as to the possible consequences of "concerted action" and quarantine of aggressor nations. Middle Western papers branded Mr. Roosevelt's speech as "the most warlike statement a President of the United States had ever made." One or two Congressmen even spoke of possible impeachment of the President. The immediate results of the speech showed therefore that public opinion was not yet prepared for the type of action which the President advocated. In a "fireside chat" a few days later Mr. Roosevelt had to retreat a long way. The Brussels Conference, he asserted, would not attempt coercion of Japan; it would merely try to conciliate both sides. The instructions given to the United States delegates to the Conference were redrawn accordingly, and since Great Britain had made it known that it would go just as far as the United States, "never falling behind" but never getting ahead, it was obvious to anyone even before the Conference met that it would fail.

لارومش فوکو کے مقولے

ایک تعارف

ڈاکٹر نظیر صدیقی

مقولے نہ صرف غیر معمولی مشاہدے اور تجربے پر مبنی ہوتے ہیں بلکہ حیرت انگیز اسرار بھی۔ مثال کے طور پر کچھ مقولے دیکھئے جن کے مصنفین لامعلوم ہیں۔

"جس شخص کو سب سے زیادہ آسانی کے ساتھ دھوکا دیا جاسکتا ہے وہ اپنی ذات۔"

"آپ کے خالی اوقات سے متعلق سب سے بڑا مسئلہ یہ ہے کہ دوسروں کو ان کے استعمال سے روکا جائے۔"

"اگر آپ کو حق بجانب ہونے کا یقین ہے تو آپ خاموش رہ سکتے ہیں۔"

"ہر خود غلط آدمی کہیں نہیں پہنچتا کیونکہ وہ اپنے خیال میں پہلے سے وہاں موجود ہوتا ہے جہاں ہونا چاہیئے۔"

"یا تو ایسی چیزیں لکھو جو پڑھنے کے قابل ہیں یا ایسے کام کرو جو لکھنے کے قابل ہیں۔"

"مجرمانہ زندگی اختیار کرنے کی ضرورت ہی کیا ہے جبکہ بے ایمانی کے سو قانونی طریقے ہیں"

مقولے بالارادہ نہیں لکھے جاتے۔ عام طور پر لکھنے کے دوران کہیں کہیں ایسے جملے آجاتے ہیں جن میں مقولے کی تمام خوبیاں پائی جاتی ہیں۔ زیادہ تر مقولے صاحب طرز نثر نگاروں کے ہاں مقولہ نگاری عام نثر نگاروں کے بس کی بات نہیں۔ ایک اچھے مقولے میں ایک اچھے شعر کی خوبیاں پائی جاتی ہیں۔ ایک اچھے شعر کی طرح ایک اچھے مقولے میں ایجاز بیان بھی ہوتا ہے اعجاز بیان بھی۔ انگریزی ادب میں شیکسپیئر کے منظوم ڈرامے بھی بصیرت آمیز اور حکمت آمیز ایک بہت بڑا خزانہ ہیں۔ پھر انگریزی ادب میں لارڈ بیکن (۱۵۶۱ — ۱۶۲۶) ایک ایسا انشا پرداز جس کا ہر مقالہ مقولوں سے پُر نظر آتا ہے۔ ڈاکٹر جانسن جو انگریزی کے دو ایک عظیم ترین میں شمار کیا جاتا ہے اس کی گفتگو (جسے اس کے سوانح نگار بوزویل نے محفوظ کیا ہے) کے سے جملوں میں مقولوں کی لطافت اور تکمیل (PERFECTION) موجود ہے۔ عہد حاضر کے میں برنارڈ شا اور چسٹرٹن نہایت منفرد نثر نگاروں میں سے تھے۔ ان دونوں کی تحریروں میں کثرت مقولے ملتے ہیں۔ لیکن میرا ذاتی خیال یہ ہے کہ انگریزی ادیبوں میں سب سے بڑا مقولہ نگار

...۱۱) تھا جس کا نام فرانسیسی ادب کے مقولہ نگار لاروشِ فوکو (۱۶۱۳ — ۱۶۸۰) کے
جا سکتا ہے۔

...فوکو (LA ROCHEFOUCAULD) دنیا کا واحد ادیب ہے جس نے مقولوں کے سوا کچھ نہ لکھا۔
...جو اپنے ۶۴۱ مقولوں کی بنا پر گزشتہ تین سو سال سے زندہ ہے اور ہمیشہ زندہ رہے گا۔ اردو ادب
...وشِ فوکو کا ذکر تقریباً نہ ہونے کے برابر رہا ہے۔ اس لئے نامناسب نہ ہوگا اگر اس مضمون میں
...حالاتِ زندگی اختصار کے ساتھ بیان کر دیئے جائیں۔ اور نمونے کے طور پر اس کے کچھ مقولے
...دیئے جائیں۔ اس کے مقولوں کے انگریزی ترجمے کا جو نسخہ اس وقت میرے پیش نظر ہے وہ
...ٹینکوک (L. W. TANCOCK) کا مرتب کردہ ہے۔ ٹینکوک نے لاروشِ فوکو کے "اقوال" (MAXIMS)
...کیا ہے اور لاروشِ فوکو کا "تعارف" بھی لکھا ہے۔ میں اسی 'تعارف' سے ایسے حصے پیش کر رہا
...لاروشِ فوکو کے حالاتِ زندگی، ادبی پس منظر اور 'اقوال' کی تصنیف سے متعلق ضروری باتوں
...روشنی ڈالتے ہیں۔

...روشِ فوکو فرانس کے ایک نہایت معزز خاندان کا فرد تھا۔ اس کی رسمی تعلیم برائے نام تھی۔ اس...
...متضاد عناصر کا حامل تھا۔ ایک طرف وہ شرمیلا اور خود فکر کا عادی تھا جس کی وجہ سے اس
...ہی فیصلے اور بے رحمانہ کارروائی کی صلاحیت مفقود تھی۔ دوسری طرف اس کے کردار میں معاملہ فہمی
...اور سازش پسندی کے عناصر تھے جنہوں نے اسے ہر طرح کی منصوبہ بازی اور ریشہ دوانی میں
...لیکن چونکہ اس کے مزاج میں ایثار و قربانی اور زیردستوں کی حمایت کے جذبات بھی موجود
...جس کے زیر اثر اس نے کمزوروں، مظلوموں اور بدنصیبوں کے لئے بااثر لوگوں کی عداوت مول لی

...منصوبوں اور آرزوؤں میں ناکام رہا۔ چالیس سال کی عمر میں وہ مالی اعتبار سے تباہ و برباد ہو...
...اس کی صحت خراب ہو گئی۔ اس کی محبوبہ نے اس سے بے وفائی کا ثبوت دیا۔ اس کے لئے
...کیریر کا کوئی امکان باقی نہ رہا۔ اس کی زندگی کے تجربے نے سے بتایا کہ عسکری جاہ و جلال محض
...ہے۔ سیاسی زندگی مفاد پرست انسانوں کا جنگل ہے۔ مذہب ریاکاری ہے یا فرار۔ عورت سے
...دھوکا ہے اور انسانی ایثار و کردار کی تہہ میں جو محرکات کار فرما ہوتے ہیں وہ یا تو خود بینی ہے یا
...لیکن دوستی اور وفاداری پر کچھ اعتماد باقی رہ گیا تھا کہ زندگی کے آخری حصے میں جب
...سالی حالت دونوں خستہ ہو چکی تھی اسے مہربانی اور محبت وہاں سے ملی جہاں سے ملنے کی

کوئی توقع نہ تھی۔ اس کا ایک ملازم تھا جس کا نام تھا گورویل (GOURVILLE) جو اس کا سکر
چکا تھا اور اس کی ملازمت کے دوران دولت مند بن گیا تھا۔ اس نے اپنی احسان مندی اور شر
ثبوت دیا۔ گورویل کے مشوروں اور مالی مدد کی بدولت لاروش فوکو کی تنہائی اور تلخی کے ایام کی
کم ہوگئی۔ گورویل ایک جاں نثار اور وفادار دوست ثابت ہوا۔

۱۶۵۹ء میں جب لاروش فوکو پیرس واپس آیا تو (MME DE SABLE) سے ملنے ا
سے اس کا گہرا تعلق پیدا ہوگیا۔ یہ خاتون اس کی زندگی میں دوسرا عظیم نسوانی اثر ثابت ہوئیں۔ ان
ساٹھ سال کے قریب تھی۔ وہ اپنی پسندیدہ شخصیتوں کے ماحول میں ایک پاکیزہ معاشرتی زندگی بر
تھیں۔ ان کی بزم کا ایک رکن لاروش فوکو بھی تھا۔ ان کے حلقے کا سیاست سے کوئی تعلق نہ تھا۔ ان
بات و ذاتی گفتگو ہوتی تھی یا ادبی۔ جو موضوعات انہیں اور ان کے دوستوں کو پسند تھے ان کا تعلق
ادب اور لسانیات سے تھا۔ بیان میں صفائی اور اظہار میں وضاحت انہیں بہت مرغوب تھی۔ ان
احباب لاروش فوکو کے لئے صحیح ماحول ثابت ہوا۔ اندرونی طور پر وہ ایک ماہر انسانی فطرت
شناس اور انسانی طربیہ والمیہ کا ایک خاموش گواہ تھا۔ وہ اپنی زندگی کے بیس سال لاحاصل
میں ضائع کرچکا تھا۔ فوجی اور سیاسی میدانوں میں شہرت کے حصول کے لئے جو کوششیں اس نے
وہ بے سود ثابت ہوچکی تھیں۔ اب فرانسیسی ادب میں ایک شاندار اور منفرد مقام حاصل کرنے

فرانس میں (MME DE SABLE) کے جیسے حلقوں سے سترھویں صدی کے نصف اول میں
ادب، زبان اور فکر کو بڑے فوائد پہنچے۔ سترھویں صدی کے نصف آخر کے بعض عظیم ترین
نسل کی ذہنی پرورش انہی حلقوں میں ہوئی تھی۔ مجرد خیالات کے اظہار میں فرانسیسی۔ بیان
صفائی، صحت اور پاکیزگی کے لئے مشہور ہے وہ انہی حلقوں کے اثرات کا معجزہ ہیں۔ ان حلقوں
کا مقصد دلچسپ اور پاکیزہ گفتگو سے لطف اندوز ہونا ہوتا تھا۔ اس لئے وہ سیاست اور مذہبی
موضوعات سے احتراز کرتے تھے کیونکہ ان موضوعات پر گفتگو میں عموماً تلخی آجاتی ہے۔ کوشش
معاشرے میں انسانی طرز عمل سے متعلق عام موضوعات پر بات چیت کی جائے۔ مرد اور عورت
رشتہ ہے خصوصاً اس طرح کے موضوع پر گفتگو پسند کی جاتی تھی کہ کسی مرد اور عورت
باہمی دلچسپی کا آغاز کہاں سے ہوا اور دو دل جیسے کن راستوں سے گزر کر شعوری محبت
کی دلچسپیاں اور شخصی خاکے لکھنے کا رواج عام تھا۔ شخصی خاکوں میں بھی ناخوشگوار

سے پہلو تہی کی جاتی تھی۔ ۱۶۵۸ء میں اس طرح کے خاکوں کا ایک مجموعہ شائع کیا گیا جس
ش فوکو کا اپنا لکھا ہوا ذاتی خاکہ بھی تھا۔

اس طرح کے صفتوں کی نشستوں میں دوسری جس چیز کو فروغ حاصل ہوا وہ انسانی اطوار کے بارے
ں کی سی تیسیم تھی۔ اس طرح کے اقوال میں جس کمال کا مظاہرہ کیا جاتا تھا وہ یہ تھا کہ کم سے کم لفظوں
سے زیادہ صفائی اور صداقت کو اس طرح جمع کر دیا جائے کہ سننے والا یا پڑھنے والا اسے آسانی
رکھے۔ غرضیکہ اقوال سازی ایک مجلسی مشغلہ بن گئی تھی۔ اراکین حلقہ اقوال کو زیادہ سے زیادہ
، پُر معنی اور پُر اثر بنانے کے لیے کاٹ چھانٹ کی اجتماعی کوششیں کرتے تھے۔

ش فوکو کے "اقوال" چھ سات سال کی صبر آمیز موشگافی، دقیقہ سنجی اور نفاست آفرینی کے
۔ ان چھ سات برسوں میں (MME DE SABLÉ) کا حلقہ اسے بار بار اپنے مشوروں اور تنقید سے
لاروش فوکو انسان اور انسانی اطوار پر اپنے افکار کو اپنے ادبی دوستوں کے سامنے بحث و تمحیص
ش کر کے انہیں آہستہ آہستہ نکھارتا رہا۔ لاروش فوکو کے اقوال میں اس کے احباب نت
پیدا کرتے رہے۔ لفظوں کو زیادہ سے زیادہ معنی خیز بناتے رہے اور کسی بات پر ضرورت سے
نے پر اپنی ناپسندیدگی کا اظہار کرتے رہے۔

ء میں جب لاروش فوکو نے اپنے اقوال کو شائع کرنے کا فیصلہ کیا تو یہ وہ زمانہ تھا جب
(MME DE SABLÉ) کے حلقے کی ایک دوستی اس کی آخری محبت کا رنگ اختیار کر چکی تھی۔ یہ محبت
ب پر زبردست اثر چھوڑ گئی۔ لاروش فوکو کی محبوبہ (MME DE LA FAYETTE) اس سے
رنی تھی۔ دونوں ایک دوسرے سے قریب رہتے تھے۔ اگرچہ (FAYETTE) جوان سال تھی
کی صحت خراب رہا کرتی تھی۔ لاروش فوکو بھی پرانا مریض بن چکا تھا۔ جوں جوں سال گزرتے
۱۶۷۰ء کے بعد جب لاروش فوکو کی بیوی وفات پا چکی تھی اور لاروش فوکو گٹھیا کا مریض
نہ کرسی کے سہارے چلنے لگا تھا دونوں محبت بھری دوستی کی پُرسکون زندگی بسر کرنے لگے
(FAYETTE) کے احساس ترانن، مادرانہ توجہ اور مضبوط فہم و فراست نے لاروش فوکو کی تنہائی
ں تھی اور اس کے "اقوال" کے بعد کے ایڈیشنوں میں بعض بیانات کو نرم بنانے میں بڑا اہم
بعض بیانات کی درشتی کو معتدل کرنے سے یہ ظاہر کرنا مقصود تھا کہ لاروش فوکو تمام انسانوں
ست نہیں گردانتا اور غالباً اس کا قاری ایک استثنا ہے۔

جس طرح (MME DE FAYETTE) کی ذات سے لاروش فوکو مستفید ہوا اسی طرح لا
کی ذات سے بھی (FAYETTE) کو بڑے فائدے پہنچے۔ وہ سولہویں صدی کی تاریخ پر تحقیقی کام کر رہی تھی۔ لا
کے مشورے ہی سے (FAYETTE) کی تحقیقات نے ایک شاہکار (PRINCESSE DE CLEVES)
کی شکل اختیار کی جسے فرانسیسی ادب کا پہلا عظیم ناول کہہ سکتے ہیں۔

• "اقوال" لاروش فوکو کی واحد تصنیف ہے جسے اس نے خود شائع کیا۔ اس کی زندگی میں اس کتاب
پانچ ایڈیشن (۱۶۶۵ء۔ ۱۶۶۶ء۔ ۱۶۷۱ء۔ ۱۶۷۵ء اور ۱۶۷۸ء) شائع ہوئے۔ ۱۶۷۸ء کے ایڈ
تصحیح لاروش فوکو نے کی۔ ایل ڈبلیو ٹینکرک نے اسی ایڈیشن کا ترجمہ انگریزی میں کیا ہے۔ مختلف ایڈ
میں "اقوال" کی تعداد گھٹتی بڑھتی رہی۔ پہلے ایڈیشن (۱۶۶۵ء) میں کل ۳۱۷ اقوال تھے۔ اب ان کی تعد
۶۴۱ ہے۔

لاروش فوکو نے اپنے دوستوں کے مشوروں کی روشنی میں اپنے اقوال کی کاٹ چھانٹ پر کئی سال صر
کیے۔ اس کی ریاضتوں اور کاوشوں کا مقصد یہ تھا کہ وہ انسانی فطرت سے متعلق جو حقائق پیش کرے
سے ہر زمانے کے تمام لوگ پورے طور پر سمجھ سکیں۔ اس مقصد کے حصول کے لئے اس نے اپنے ذخیر
کو سادہ اور صاف لفظوں کی محدود ترین تعداد تک محدود رکھا۔ چونکہ مقامی تلمیحات، صنائع و بدائع
ہوئی زبان، استعارے، فنی اصطلاحیں غرضیکہ وہ تمام چیزیں جو زمان و مکاں پر منحصر ہوتی ہیں
جن کے بارے میں یہ امکان ہے کہ وہ آسانی کے ساتھ کسی زمانے کے کسی طبقے کی سمجھ میں نہ آسکیں
استعمال سے احتراز کیا گیا اور رفتہ رفتہ ایک ایسی زبان پیدا کی گئی جو رنگ، ذائقے اور بو سے عا
ایک آلۂ اظہار ہے جس کی واحد خوبی مفہوم و منشا کو قواعد کے اعتبار سے صحیح ہونا ہے۔ ان دو
لاروش فوکو اور دوسرے فرانسیسی کلاسیکی فن کاروں نے لفظوں کے صحیح انتخاب اور ان کی صحیح
ترتیب پر بے انتہا محنت کر کے مکمل طور پر واضح ہونے کے نصب العین کو حاصل کیا۔

لاروش فوکو کے اقوال گزشتہ تین سو سال سے کیوں زندہ ہیں اس سوال کا جواب دیتے ہوئے
•والٹیر (۱۶۹۴ء — ۱۷۷۸ء) نے اپنی ایک کتاب میں لاروش فوکو کے اقوال کو ان کتابوں
کیا ہے جنہوں نے فرانسیسی قوم کے ذوق کی تشکیل میں سب سے زیادہ حصہ لیا ہے اور جنہوں نے
موزونیت (APTNESS) [illegible] (PRECISION) کا احساس عطا کیا ہے۔

[illegible] اس احا

ی نیکیاں دراصل ہماری وہ برائیاں ہیں جنہوں نے بھیس بدل لیا ہے۔
اپنے جذبات کی پائیداری میں آتنا ہی دخل ہے جتنا کہ اپنی زندگی کی پائیداری میں۔
ب لوگوں میں اتنی طاقت ضرور ہے کہ دوسروں کی مصیبتوں کو برداشت کر سکیں۔
یبی کے مقابلے میں خوش نصیبی کو برداشت کرنے کے لئے عظیم تر خوبیوں کی ضرورت
۔

اپنے اندر عیب نہ ہوتے تو دوسروں کے اندر عیب دیکھنے میں ہمیں اتنا مزہ نہ ملتا۔
لوگ مساوی طور پر مغرور واقع ہوئے ہیں۔ فرق صرف یہ ہے کہ اظہارِ غرور کے طریقے
ہیں۔
لوگ کبھی اتنے خوش نصیب یا بدنصیب نہیں ہوتے جتنا کہ ہم فرض کر لیتے ہیں کہ ہم ہیں۔
ض اوقات ہم اپنے آپ سے بھی اتنے ہی مختلف ہوتے ہیں جتنا کہ دوسروں سے مختلف
ہے۔

زور مخلص نہیں ہو سکتے۔
پن کا علاج ممکن ہے لیکن کج فہمی کی اصلاح ممکن نہیں
ر کے بغیر قابلیت ممکن ہے لیکن تھوڑی بہت قابلیت کے بغیر وقار ممکن نہیں۔
جذبات ہمیں غلطیاں کرنے پر مجبور کرتے ہیں لیکن محبت سب سے زیادہ احمقانہ غلطیوں کی ذمہ دار
۔

نے متعلق ہمارے دشمنوں کی رائیں ہماری رائیوں سے زیادہ صحیح ہوتی ہیں۔
امتناعی جنگ جیتنے سے زیادہ جنگ میں شریک نہ ہونے کو مفید سمجھتا ہے۔
الی حسن کے بغیر کچھ حاصل کر پاتی ہے نہ حسن جوانی کے بغیر۔
ت ہمیں دوسروں پر شک کرتے ہیں اور اس سے بھی زیادہ خود ہمیں اپنے آپ پر۔

We always dread the sight of th
person we love when we have been coquet
ting elsewhere.

We ought to console ourselves for ou
faults when we have strength of min
to confess them.

To be confident of pleasing is often a infallible means of displeasing.

There is a kind of revolution of s general a character that it changes th mental tastes as well as the fortunes o the world.

We like to divine others, but we d not like to be divined ourselves.

Preserving the health by too strict regimen is a wearisome malady.

The generality of women yield througl weakness rather than through passion Hence it is that enterprising men succee generally better than others, althougl they may not be the most amiable.

Coldness in love is a sure means of bein beloved.

Yet in the long run the Chicago speech had been fruitful. It had for the first time clearly raised the issue between cooperation with the Western Powers for the maintenance of peace and common interests—which in a milder form Mr. Hull later defined as a policy of parallel action while preserving independence of judgment—and neutrality or isolation; an issue which had become very much confused as a result of the passing and later application of the Neutrality Act. The Chicago speech therefore had an educational value; it encouraged many Americans to think the problem over and to reconsider their attitude in the light of recent events in various parts of the world. Despite bitter criticism, Mr. Roosevelt steadily pursued his policy of continuing commercial intercourse with both belligerents and of keeping American armed forces in and near China. Pacifists in Congress and elsewhere expressed the fear that this policy would lead to an incident comparable, in its possible consequences, to the blowing up of the *Maine*, which had started the Spanish-American war.

When, therefore, this incident did occur, on December 12, with the sinking of the gunboat *Panay*, it could have been hailed by pacifists and isolationists as a vindication of their repeated warnings to the Administration. But by a masterly stroke the President turned it into an occasion both for securing almost unanimous support at home for his foreign policy, and for proving to the Western democracies, so much blamed in the United States for their feebleness in the face of totalitarian blackmail, that by standing solidly on one's own rights it was possible to uphold principles of international law and morality and safeguard one's interests, without recourse to force.

Public opinion had not been unduly stirred by the incident and Congress insisted that nothing should be done to inflame chauvinistic passions. "The Americans," said Senator Ashurst, "are just as excitable as the French." But Mr. Roosevelt chose to dramatize the situation as a national emergency. While he was using strong language to Japan, the Administration saw to it that the full meaning of what was going on was conveyed to every single American citizen through the press, the radio and the cinema.

In mankind is not found any grea
excess either of good or evil.

Those who are incapable of committin
great crimes do not easily suspect othe
of them.

The pomp of funerals is more interes
ing to the vanity of the living than t
the memory of the dead.

Men more easily set bounds to their gra
tude than to their hopes or their desires

We do not always regret the loss
friends in consideration of their mer
but in consideration of our wants, a
of the good opinion they entertained
us.

To be always good others must belie
that they can never appear wicked to
with impunity.

The most subtle folly is produced by ıe most subtle wisdom.

Great souls are not those which have ss passion and more virtue than common ɔuls, but those only which have greater esigns.

Kings do with men as with pieces of ıoney—they give them what value they ɔlease, and we are obliged to receive them ıt their current, and not at their real value.

Natural ferocity makes fewer cruel people than self-love.

There are some crimes which become innocent, and even glorious, by their renown, their number, and their excess. Hence it is that public robberies become proofs of talent, and seizing whole provinces unjustly is called making conquests.

experience at the good fortune of friends does not always arise from goodness of our nature, nor from friendship we have for them. It is often a result of self-love which flat us with the hope of being fortunat our turn, or of deriving some advan from their good fortune.

In the adversity of our best friend often find something which does not please us.

How can we expect another to our secret if we cannot keep it oursel

There are no people who are so trou some to others as the indolent; they have satisfied their indolence wish to appear diligent.

It is a proof of very little friend not to notice a cooling in that of friends.

Moderation is like temperance; we should wish to eat more, but are afraid of injuring our health.

Every one blames in his neighbour what the world blames in himself.

It is a kind of happiness to know to what extent we may be unhappy.

When we cannot find contentment in ourselves, it is useless to seek it elsewhere.

We must be able to answer for our fortune to be able to answer for our future conduct.

Justice in moderate judges is only love of their elevation.

When we are tired of loving we are very glad of some act of infidelity towards ourselves to disengage us from our own fidelity.

The first movement of joy which we

with it to work its own destructi
because, at the same time that it is ov
throwing itself in one place it is
establishing itself in another. When
suppose that it is relinquishing its pl
sures, it does nothing but suspend or v
them; and even when defeated, a
supposed to be annihilated, we find
triumphing in its own defeat. This is t
picture of self-love, the whole existence
which is nothing but one long and migh
agitation. The sea is a sensible image
it. and self-love finds in the ebb and fl
of the waves a faithful representation
the turbulent succession of its though
and of its ceaseless movements.

Moderation in good fortune is co
monly nothing but dread of the sha
which attends excessive elation, or f
of losing what we possess.

but which it pursues because it wills to
e them. It is whimsical, and often
ows its whole application into the most
volous pursuits; it finds its whole de-
ht in the most insipid, and preserves all
pride in the most contemptible. It is
sent to all states and in all conditions
life; it lives everywhere, it lives on
erything; it lives on nothing. It ac-
mmodates itself to advantages, and to
e deprivation of them; it even goes over
the side of those who are at war with
; it enters into their schemes, and, what
wonderful, it joins them in hating itself,
conspires its own destruction, it labours
r its own ruin. In short, it cares for
thing but its own existence, and, pro-
ded that it do exist, will readily become
own enemy. We must not be surprised,
erefore, if it unites with the most rigid
sterity, and enters boldly into league

cruel, timid and daring; it has variou
inclinations according to the various tem
peraments which affect it, and devote it
sometimes to glory, sometimes to riches, an
sometimes to pleasure; it changes them
according to the changes of our age, ou
fortune, and our experience. It is indiffer
ent to it, whether it has many inclinations
or only one, because it shares itself amon
many, or collects itself into one as may b
necessary or agreeable to it. It is incon
stant, and, besides the changes which aris
from external causes, there are an infinit
which spring from itself, and from its ow
resources. It is inconstant from incon
stancy, from levity, from love, from novelty
from weariness, from disgust. It is capri
cious, and we sometimes see it labouring
with extreme earnestness and with incred
ible toil, to obtain things which are by n
means advantageous, and even hurtful t

uch so, that one is tempted to believe
at each of our passions has a magic
eculiar to itself. Nothing is so close,
nd so firm as its attachments, which it
ainly endeavours to break off at the ap-
pearance of the extreme evils which menace
it. Sometimes, however, it accomplishes
in a short time, and without effort, what
it had not been able to effect in the
course of several years with all the efforts
in its power: whence we may conclude,
not unjustly, that its desires are excited
by itself, rather than by the beauty and
merit of their object; that its own taste is
the price which gives them value, and the
cosmetic which sets them off; that it is
only itself which it pursues, and that it
follows its own taste when it follows things
after its taste. It is a compound of con-
traries, it is imperious and obedient, sin-
cere and dissembling, compassionate and

is unable to recognise them, or cannot re-
solve to own them. From this darkness
which conceals it, spring the ridiculous
ideas it has of itself; hence come its errors,
its ignorances, its grossness, and its follies
with respect to itself. Hence it comes
that it fancies its sentiments dead when
they are only asleep, it thinks that it has
no desire to arise from its repose, and
believes that it has lost the appetite
which it has satiated. But this thick
darkness which conceals it from itself does
not prevent its seeing perfectly every ex-
ternal object — in this, resembling our
eyes, which see everything, and are only
blind to themselves; in fact, in its greatest
interests and in its most important affairs,
where the violence of its desires calls for
all its attention, it sees, it perceives, it
understands, it imagines, it suspects, it
penetrates, it divines every thing;

kes men idolise themselves, and would ke them tyrants over others if fortune re to give them the means. It never poses out of itself, and only settles on ange objects, as bees do on flowers, to tract what is useful to it. There is noing so impetuous as its desires, nothing secret as its plans, nothing so clever as conduct. Its pliancy cannot be dected, its transformations surpass those of id's 'Metamorphoses,' its refinements ose of chemistry. We cannot sound depths, nor penetrate the darkness of abysses. There it is concealed from keenest eyes, it goes through a thoud turns and changes. There it is en invisible to itself; it conceives, urishes, and brings up, without being scious of it, a vast number of loves d hates. Some of these it forms so nstrous, that when brought to light it

Since Japan did not wish to incur the risk of reprisals on the part of the United States while engaged in a very difficult expedition for which it needed every ounce of its available resources, the firm attitude of the United States had exactly the result which President Roosevelt had anticipated. It secured Japan's complete submission in regard to this particular incident, thereby increasing considerably the President's prestige both at home and abroad. In the United States, however, pacifists had become sincerely alarmed at Mr. Roosevelt's way of handling foreign affairs. They recalled Mr. Root's words: "He first shakes his fist and then raises his finger," but they feared that Mr. Roosevelt would not in this instance follow Mr. Wilson's example and that if another incident occurred similar to that of the *Panay*, he would be inclined to resort to stronger measures such as economic sanctions or even military reprisals, possibly leading to war with Japan. Seeking a way of checking his impetus they seized upon the Ludlow amendment, which if passed could be held as a strong disavowal by Congress of the President's foreign policy.

Because of this very fact the Administration had to pull together all its forces in order to defeat a proposal which, in other circumstances, would probably not have stolen the show. The margin by which it ultimately was defeated in the House of Representatives —210 to 188—was small. But it afforded the first and much-needed approval by Congress of the Administration's Far Eastern policy; it silenced critics of the non-application of the Neutrality Act; and it paved the way for further and bolder moves on the part of the President.

A huge rearmament program was passed by Congress without much trouble. The links with Great Britain were strengthened; the notes which France, Great Britain and the United States sent to Japan regarding the 35,000 ton battleship limit were identical. Three American men-of-war were present at the inauguration of the Singapore naval base. Exchange of information took place between the Admiralties of the two maritime Powers. The question of the Philippines was officially reopened; High Commissioner McNutt declared that if the United States withdrew from the islands in 1946 the Philippines would soon become an easy prey for Japanese

time ago amused himself with danci
on the scaffold on which he was about
be executed. Thus, though motives m
differ, they often produce the same effec
So that it is true that whatever dispr
portion there may be between great m
and common people, both the one and t
other have been a thousand times seen
meet death with the same countenanc
but it has been with this difference, th
in the contempt which great men sho
for death it is the love of glory whi
hides it from their view; and in comm
people, it is an effect of their want
intelligence which prevents their bei
acquainted with the greatness of the
loss, and leaves them at liberty to thi
of other things.

Self-love is the love of one's self, and
every thing on account of one's self;

It is flattering ourselves to believe that death appears to us when near, what we fancied it at a distance, and that our sentiments, which are weakness itself, are of a temper so strong as not to suffer from the attack of the harshest of trials. It is also but a poor acquaintance with the effects of self-love, to think that it can aid us in treating lightly what must necessarily destroy itself, and reason, in which we think to find so many resources, is too weak in this encounter to persuade us of what we wish. On the contrary, it is reason which most frequently betrays us, and instead of inspiring us with the contempt of death serves to reveal to us all that it has dreadful and terrible. All that reason can do for us is to advise us to turn away our eyes from death, to fix them on other objects. Cato and Brutus those illustrious ones. A lacquey a short

the shipwreck. To put a good face o
the matter, let us content ourselves wi
not discovering to ourselves all that
think of it, and let us hope more fro
our constitutions than from those feeb
reasonings which would make us belie
that we can approach death with indiffe
ence. The credit of dying with firmnes
the hope of being regretted; the desi
of leaving a fair reputation; the certain
of being freed from the miseries of li
and of no longer depending on the capric
of fortune, are remedies which we shou
not reject. But at the same time
should not believe that they are infallib
They do as much to assure us as a simp
hedge in war does to assure those who ha
to approach a place to the fire of whi
they are exposed. At a distance it a
pears capable of affording a shelter, b
when near it is found to be a feeble defen

lf in different shapes to their imagina-
n, and appearing more instant at one
e than at another. Thus it results that
er having despised what they knew
thing of they end by fearing what they
know. If we would not believe that
is the greatest of all evils, we must
oid looking it and all its circumstances
the face. The cleverest and bravest
e those who take the most respectable
retexts to prevent themselves from re-
ecting on it; but any man who is able
o view it in its reality finds it a horrible
hing. The necessity of dying constituted
ll the firmness of the philosophers. They
onceived they should go through with
good grace what they could not avoid,
nd as they were unable to make their
ives eternal, they had nothing left for
it but to make their reputations eternal,
and preserve all that could be secured from

opinion is never sincere. Every th
however has been written which co
by possibility persuade us that death
not an evil, and the weakest men as w
as heroes have given a thousand celebra
examples to support this opinion. Nev
theless, I doubt whether any man of go
sense ever believed it, and the pains m
take to persuade others and themsel
of it let us see that the task is by
means easy. We may have many caus
of disgust with life, but we never ha
any reason for despising death. Ev
those who destroy their own lives do n
reckon it as such a little matter, and a
as much alarmed at and recoil as muc
from it as others, when it comes upo
them in a different way from the one the
have chosen. The inequality remarkabl
in the courage of a vast number of bra
men arises from the fact of death presentin

ssion, without being so with the person
ey love.

Love, all agreeable as it is, is more
leasing from the manner in which it
isplays itself than from its own nature.

A small degree of wit accompanied by
ood sense is less tiresome in the long run
han a great amount of wit without it.

Jealousy is the greatest of all evils, and
the least pitied by those who cause it.

After having spoken of the falsity of so
many apparent virtues it is reasonable to
say something of the falsity of the con-
tempt of death; I mean that contempt
of death which the Pagans boast of de-
riving from their own strength, without
the hope of a better life. There is a
difference between enduring death with
firmness, and despising it. The first is
common enough, but the other in my

lightens them, and gives them views just as to make them suppress or d guise the least things which might condemned.

Young people on entering the wo should be either timid or giddy: a co posed and settled demeanour genera changes into impertinence.

Quarrels would not last long, if fault was only on one side.

It is of no advantage to a woman be young without being pretty, or to pretty without being young.

There are some persons so fickle frivolous, that they are as far from hav real faults as solid qualities.

There are some people so full of th selves, that when they are in love, t find means to be occupied with t

ese they cultivate with so much assiduity, at they become at length natural defects hich are no longer capable of correction.

One fact which lets us see that men are etter acquainted with their faults than generally thought, is, that they are ever wrong when they speak of their wn conduct; the same self-love which nerally blinds, on such occasions en-

to believe that it is false, or suppose
capable of crimes.

Men often proceed from love to amb
tion, but they seldom return from ambiti
to love.

Extreme avarice almost always mistak
itself; there is no passion which mo
often deprives itself of its object, nor o
which the present exercises so much pow
to the prejudice of the future.

Avarice often produces opposite effect
there is an infinite number of people wh
sacrifice all their property to doubtf
and distant expectations; others despi
great future advantages to obtain prese
interests of a trifling nature.

It would seem that men do not fin
enough defects in themselves; they au
ment the number by certain singul
qualities which they affect to put on, an

ins of a passion, we are more ready
eceive a new one than when we are
rely cured.

'hose who have had great passions find
mselves during the whole of their lives
h happy and unhappy at being cured
them.

There are even more people without
erest than without envy.

We have more indolence in the mind
an in the body.

The calm or agitation of our temper
es not depend so much on the important
ents of life, as on an agreeable or dis-
greeable adjustment of little things which
ppen every day.

However wicked men may be, they dare
t appear to be enemies of virtue; and
hen they wish to persecute, they pretend

imperialism: a sense of moral responsibility, he said, should induce the United States to find for the islands an intermediate status which, while conferring on the local Government the maximum degree of independence, would yet afford them the protection of the United States armed forces in the case of a Japanese onslaught. Severe notes were sent repeatedly to Japan protesting at every single violation of right or spoliation of interests committed against American citizens or property. In a vigorous campaign the President and his assistants roused the indignation of Americans against ruthless bombing of civilian populations; and before adjourning, Congress voted in June 1938 a resolution, presented by Senator Pittman, condemning these inhuman practices and requesting the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to investigate means to prevent the use of American material for such purposes. Granted the non-application of the Neutrality Act, this could only mean recourse to discriminatory embargoes against nations guilty of a breach of the rules of civilized warfare.

Thus it would seem that from the beginning of the conflict to the summer of 1938 Mr. Roosevelt had succeeded to a large extent in dragging Congress and public opinion along the road that led from the idea of neutrality in all cases to that of sanctions in a limited number of cases; an achievement which may be linked with a statement which President Roosevelt was said to have made a few days after the Chicago speech to a prominent visitor who asked him whether the United States were prepared to resort to sanctions toward Japan: "You are reading the book on page 252; I am only at page two."

The various statements in November and December 1938 by responsible Japanese statesmen, calling for a "new order" in China in complete disregard of foreign rights and interests, could not and did not come as a surprise to the President. Indeed, from the very beginning of the conflict the Administration's whole action had aimed precisely at preparing the ground for active resistance to such claims. Yet, although this action had been to a very large extent successful, it was quite clear that America would never stand for resistance alone amounting, as the popular saying goes, to "pulling other people's chestnuts out of the fire," since it was well

gentle are in general only of a w
character, which easily changes i
asperity.

Timidity is a fault for which it
dangerous to reprove persons whom
wish to correct of it.

Nothing is so rare as real goodness
heart; even those who fancy they
possessed of it, have in general only c
plaisance or weakness of character.

The mind attaches itself from indole
and from constancy to whatever is
and agreeable to it. This habit al
sets limits to our knowledge, and no
ever took the trouble to enlarge and g
his mind to the extent of its capacitie

Men are more satirical from vanity t
from malice.

When the heart is still agitated by

e as is true love, true friendship is
arer.

ere are few women whose merit out-
heir beauty.

e desire of being pitied, or admired,
makes the greatest part of our con-
e.

r envy always outlives the happiness
ose we envy.

e same firmness which serves to resist
serves also to render it violent and
ble, and weak persons who are always
ted by passions are scarcely ever
y taken up with it.

agination cannot invent so many
ent contrarieties as naturally exist in
heart of every individual.

t is only persons of firmness that can
real gentleness; those who appear

Of all violent passions, that which sit least ill on women is love.

Vanity makes us commit more fault against our taste than reason does.

There are some bad qualities which make great talents.

Men never wish ardently for what they only wish for from reason.

All our qualities are uncertain and doubtful, as well in good as in evil, and they are almost always at the mercy of conjunctures.

In their first passions women love the lover, in the others they love love.

Pride has its oddities as well as other passions; men are ashamed to avow that they are jealous, and yet take a pride in having been and in being capable of becoming so.

There are many cures for love, but ne of them infallible.

We are very far from knowing all that ır passions make us do.

Old age is a tyrant, which prohibits l the pleasures of youth upon pain of eath.

The same pride which makes us censure he faults from which we fancy ourselves xempt, induces us to despise the good ualities which we want.

There is often more pride than goodness in our sorrow for the misfortunes of our enemies; it is to make them feel that we are superior to them that we give them marks of our compassion.

There is an excess of good and evil which passes our sensibility.

Innocence is very far from finding as much protection as crime.

In important affairs we ought not s much to apply ourselves to create oppo tunities, as to make use of those whic present themselves.

It would seldom be a bad bargain fo us to renounce the praise, on conditio of escaping the censure of the world.

Whatever disposition the world ma have to judge incorrectly, it more ofte shows favour to false, than injustice t true, merit.

We sometimes see a fool with wit, bu never one with judgment.

We should gain more by letting ou selves be seen such as we are, than b attempting to appear what we are not.

Our enemies come nearer the trut in their judgments of us, than we do i our judgment of ourselves.

Propriety is the least of all laws, and e most obeyed.

A well-regulated mind has less difficulty submitting to ill-regulated ones than governing them.

When fortune surprises us by bestowing a us an important office, without having nducted us to it by degrees, or without ur being elevated to it by our hopes, it almost impossible that we should sustain urselves in it with propriety, and appear orthy of possessing it.

Our pride is often increased by what e retrench from our other faults.

There are no fools so troublesome as hose who have some wit.

There is no man who thinks himself any of his qualities inferior to the man e esteems the most in the world.

that it is insipid when they have once tasted of love.

In friendship, as in love, we are often more happy from the things we are ignorant of, than from those we are acquainted with.

We endeavour to make a merit of faults that we are unwilling to correct.

The most violent passions leave us some moments of relaxation, but vanity always agitates us.

Old fools are more foolish than young ones.

Weakness is more opposed to virtue than vice is.

What renders the pangs of shame and of jealousy so acute is, that vanity cannot help us to support them.

roofs of their friendship, but we alway
we sensibility to their misfortunes.

Fortune and humour govern the world

It is more easy to become acquainted
with men in general, than with any man
in particular.

We should not judge of a man's meri
by his good qualities, but by the use h
can make of them.

There is a certain lively gratitude whicl
not only acquits us of the obligations w
have received, but by paying what we ow
them makes our friends indebted to us.

We should desire few things ardentl
if we had a perfect knowledge of what w
were desiring.

What causes the majority of wome
to be so little touched by friendship is

with friendship, and the generality of devotees disgust us with devotion.

We easily pardon in our friends those faults which do not concern ourselves.

Women who love more readily pardon great indiscretions than little infidelities.

In the old age of love, as in that of life we still live for its evils, but no longer for its pleasures.

Nothing so much prevents our being natural as the desire of appearing so.

To praise good actions heartily is in some sort to take part in them.

The truest mark of being born with great qualities is being born without envy.

When our friends have deceived us, we owe nothing but indifference to the

owards suffer themselves to be killed hrough fear of defending themselves.

Confidence contributes more than wit to conversation.

All the passions make us commit faults, but love makes us commit the most ridiculous ones.

Few people know how to be old.

We often take credit for faults opposite to those we have; when we are weak we boast of being obstinate.

Penetration has an air of divination, which flatters our vanity more than all the other qualities of the mind.

The grace of novelty, and long habit, however opposite they may be, equally prevent our perceiving the faults of our friends.

The generality of friends disgust us

known that some other nations had far greater interests than the United States in the maintenance of the *status quo ante* in the Pacific area. Therefore any action on the part of the United States was conceivable only if these nations had a common will to resist Japanese encroachments.

Of all these nations, Great Britain had the largest interests at stake, not only because of its economic ties with China, not only because the prosperity of Shanghai and Hongkong was wholly dependent on the free play of the Open Door, but also because a control of Asia by Japan would deal a deadly blow to Britain's policy of balance of power, and very rapidly endanger the security and integrity of its Empire.

This threat had never left Great Britain indifferent. It had strengthened defenses in the East, it had assisted Chiang Kai-shek's Government in a great many ways before the conflict started, and it continued this support afterwards, by large supplies of arms, by loans and by speeding up the completion of a strategic road from Burma to South China In the last months of 1938 and at the beginning of 1939, the parallelism between American and British efforts became increasingly apparent Financial assistance to Chiang Kai-shek's regime was made both more open and more substantial. A stiffening occurred in Great Britain's policy as a result of President Roosevelt's message to Congress on January 4. Yet Great Britain's policy in the Far East suffered from the same fundamental weakness as that of France, which was compelled to let Indochina swallow the bitter and perhaps deadly pill of the occupation of Hainan by the Japanese. both Powers can only wait and "muddle through" as long as war clouds hang ever thicker and darker over Europe.

It seems clear that if foreign rights and interests are to be safeguarded, and, what is more important, if Japanese expansion is to be thwarted and a Far Eastern Munich avoided, it will not be through mere verbal insistence on the sanctity of treaties and theoretical non-recognition of the "fait accompli." It can be only through joint action, but a joint action in which the United States, although not the Power with the greatest interests in the Far East, would of necessity assume the largest share of responsibility. In the past, per-

Our wit sometimes enables us to comm
follies with impunity.

The vivacity which augments with yea
is not far from folly.

In love, he who is earliest cured is alwa
best cured.

Young women who do not wish t
appear coquettes, and men of advance
age who do not wish to appear ridiculou
should never speak of love as a thing wit
which they can have anything to do.

We may appear great in an employmer
beneath our merit, but we often appe
little in one too great for us.

We often fancy that we have constan
in our misfortunes, while we have nothi
but depression of spirit; and we endu
them without looking them in the face,

The most dangerous weakness of old people who have been amiable is to forget that they are no longer so.

We should often be ashamed of our best actions if the world could see all the motives which produced them.

The greatest effort of friendship is not to show our own faults to a friend, but to make him see his own.

We have few faults which are not more excusable than the means we take to conceal them.

Whatever disgrace we have merited, it is almost always in our power to re-establish our reputation.

A man does not please long when he has only one species of wit.

Madmen and fools see only through their humour.

would be badly rewarded if we were no
very glad to purchase their absence.

It seems that nature has conceale
at the bottom of our minds talents, an
abilities of which we are not aware. Th
passions alone have the privilege of bring
ing them to light, and of giving us some
times views more certain and more perfec
than art could possibly produce.

We arrive complete novices at th
different ages of life, and we often wan
experience in spite of the number of ou
years.

Coquettes make a merit of being jealou
of their lovers, to conceal their being envi
ous of other women.

Those who are over-reached by ou
cunning are far from appearing to us a
ridiculous as we appear to ourselves whe
the cunning of others has over-reached u

ore above them than birth, dignity, or
ven merit itself.

There is merit without elevation, but
here is no elevation without some merit.

Elevation is to merit what dress is to a
andsome person.

Fortune sometimes makes use of our
ults in order to elevate us; and there
e some troublesome people whose merit

The first lover is kept a long time, when a second is not taken.

We have not courage to say, as general proposition, that we have faults, and our enemies have no go qualities; but, in detail, we are not from thinking so.

Of all our faults, that which we m readily admit is indolence. We persua ourselves that it cherishes all the pea ful virtues; and that, without entirely stroying the others, it merely suspe their functions.

There is a kind of elevation which d not depend on fortune. It is a cert air which distinguishes us, and seems destine us for great things; it is a p which we imperceptibly set on oursel By this quality we usurp the deferenc other men; and it [illegible] in gen

:n more easily renounce their in-
ts than their tastes.

›rtune never appears so blind as she
 to those on whom she confers no
ours.

Ve should manage our fortune as we
our health—enjoy it when good, be
ient when it is bad, and never apply
lent remedies except in an extreme
essity.

Rusticity is sometimes got rid of in the
mp, but never at the court.

A man may be more cunning than
nother, but not more cunning than all
thers.

We are sometimes less unhappy in
ing deceived by those we love than
being undeceived by them.

The desire of talking of ourselves, a
of making our faults appear in the lig
we wish them, constitute a great part
our sincerity.

We ought only to be astonished th
we are still able to be astonished.

Men are almost equally difficult
satisfy when they have very much lov
and when they have scarcely any left.

There are few people who are mo
often in the wrong than those who cann
endure to be so.

A fool has not stuff enough to be goo

If vanity does not entirely overthro
the virtues, at least it makes them
totter.

What renders the vanity of others i
supportable, is that it wounds our own.

demn every thing which is beyond
r range.

Envy is destroyed by true friendship,
l coquetry by true love.

The greatest fault in penetration is not
not reaching the mark, but over-
oting it.

We give advice, but we do not inspire
nduct.

When our merit gives way, our taste
ves way also.

Fortune displays our virtues and our
es, as light makes all objects apparent.

The constraint we put on ourselves to
ain faithful to a person we love is
ely better than an infidelity.

ur actions are like "bout rimes," which
y one makes refer to whatever he
es.

like hidden treasures, only safe becau
they are not sought for.

The violence we do ourselves to preve
falling in love is often more cruel th
the severity of the loved object.

There are few cowards who know t
extent of their fear.

It is almost always the fault of t
lover not to know when he is no long
loved.

The generality of young people fan
that they are natural, when they are on
ill-bred and coarse.

There are certain tears which oft
deceive ourselves, after having deceiv
others.

If a man fancies he loves his mistr
for her own sake, he is much mistaken.

Minds of moderate calibre ordinar
[illegible]

speak very little of our wives; but we not sufficiently know that we ought speak still less of ourselves.

There are some good qualities which generate into faults when they are tural, and others which are never perct when they are acquired. It must be ason, for instance, that should render s careful of our property and our conidence; and, on the contrary, it must be ature that should bestow on us goodness nd courage.

Whatever distrust we may have of the sincerity of those who converse with us, we always believe that they tell us more truth than they do to others.

There are few virtuous women who are not weary of their profession.

The generality of virtuous women are

haps, reasonings based on the suspicion that "John Bull expected every American to do his duty" may have been justifiable. But today it is only too obvious that Great Britain and France have to muster all their energy to meet the challenge of European dictatorships. In keeping their forces ready for a possible check on their growth perhaps they are in the long run doing a service to the United States itself.

The only question then is whether public opinion in the United States, which has already made such large strides toward a clear grasping of world affairs, will allow its Government, in view of the interrelations existing between the European and the Far Eastern situation, to take the moral and active leadership in a series of positive measures "short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere words." Of the three small groups of men who today so dangerously threaten Christian standards of civilization, probably the Japanese autocrats are the most vulnerable, because of the peculiar structure of Japanese economy. And the only alternatives to "measures short of war" are very likely to be either utter capitulation or war itself.

Paris, March 1939

Infidelities ought to extinguish love, and we should not be jealous, even when we have reason to be so; it is only persons who avoid causing jealousy who are worth being jealous of.

People suffer more in our opinion, from the smallest infidelities committed towards ourselves, than from the greatest towards others.

Jealousy is always born with love, but it does not always die with it.

The generality of women mourn the death of their lovers not so much from the love they bore them as to appear more worthy of being loved.

The violences that others do to us are often less painful than those we put on ourselves.

We know well enough that we ought

A man of sense may love like a madman, but never like a fool.

There are certain faults which, when turned to good account, gain more reputation than virtue itself.

There are some persons whom, when we lose, we regret more than we mourn; and others whom we mourn and scarcely regret.

In general we only praise heartily those who admire us.

Little minds are too much hurt by little things. Great minds perceive them all, and are not touched by them.

Humility is the true proof of Christian virtues: without it, we retain all our faults, and they are only hidden by pride, which conceals them from others, and often from ourselves.

Opportunities make us known to others, and still more to ourselves.

There can be no regulation in the minds nor in the hearts of women, unless their temperament is in unison with it.

We think very few people sensible except those who are of our opinion.

In love we often doubt what we most believe.

The greatest miracle of love is the cure of coquetry.

What makes us so sore against those who practise artifices upon us, is that they fancy themselves cleverer than us.

It is very troublesome to come to a rupture when we no longer love.

We are almost always wearied in the company of persons with whom we are not permitted to be weary.

When our hatred is too keen, it places us beneath those we hate

We feel our good and our bad fortune solely in proportion to our self-love.

The intellect of the generality of women serves more to fortify their folly than their reason.

The passions of youth are scarcely more opposed to safety than the lukewarmness of age.

The accent of a man's native country dwells in his mind and in his heart as well as in his speech.

To be a great man one must know how to profit by the whole of one's fortune.

The generality of men have, like plants, latent properties, which chance brings to light.

We forgive so long as we love.

It is more difficult for a man to faithful to his mistress when he is favou than when he is ill-treated by her.

Women know not the whole of tl coquetry.

Women never have a complete seve of demeanour except towards those who they dislike.

Women can less easily surmount the coquetry than their passions.

In love deceit almost always goes furth than mistrust.

There is a certain kind of love tl excess of which prevents jealousy.

It is with certain good qualities as wi the senses; those who are entirely d prived of them can neither appreciate n comprehend them.

t is only those who are despicable who r being despised.

Our wisdom is not less at the mercy of tune than our property.

In jealousy there is more self-love than ve.

We often console ourselves through eakness for evils in which reason is powerless to console us.

Ridicule dishonours more than dishonour.

We confess our little faults only to ersuade others that we have no great nes.

Envy is more irreconcilable than hatred.

We sometimes fancy that we hate attery, but in reality we only hate the anner of flattering.

our friends is not so much any distrus
we have of them as the distrust we have o
ourselves.

Weak persons cannot be sincere.

It is not a great misfortune to oblig
ungrateful people, but it is an unsup
portable one to be under an obligation t
a vulgar man.

We find means to cure folly, but non
to reclaim a distorted mind.

We cannot long preserve the sentimen
we should have for our friends and ben
factors if we often allow ourselves th
liberty of speaking of their faults.

To praise princes for virtues they d
not possess is to speak evil of them wi
impunity.

We are nearer loving those who hate
than those who love us more than we li

e from which it requires a degree of ...dness to extricate ourselves well.

If there are men whose weak point has ...ever appeared, it is because it has never ...een properly sought for.

The reason why lovers and their mis-tresses are never weary of being together is, that they always talk of themselves.

Why must we have memory enough to retain even the minutest details of what has happened to us, and not enough to remember how many times we have told them to the same person?

The extreme pleasure we take in talking of ourselves should make us fear that we give very little to those who listen to us.

What commonly prevents us from ...hibiting the bottom of our hearts to

Interest, which is accused of all c
crimes, often deserves to be praised
our good actions.

We seldom find people ungrateful
long as we are in a condition to ren
them services.

It is as honourable to be boastful
ourselves as it is ridiculous to be so
others.

Men have made a virtue of modera
to limit the ambition of the great, an
console people of mediocrity, for
want of fortune and of merit.

There are some people fated to be
who not only commit follies from c
but are compelled to commit the
fortune.

There happens sometimes accide

here are people enough who despise
th, but few who know how to bestow it.

is generally only in petty interests
we run the hazard of not trusting to
earances.

n whatever respect people may praise
they never teach us anything new.

We often pardon those who weary us,
we cannot pardon those whom we
ry.

THE NATURE OF GUERILLA WARFARE

R. Ernest Dupuy

Foredoomed as a result of generations of military and industrial unpreparedness, China's national armies were driven back by Japanese military superiority after a year and a half of resistance that amazed the world That this coordinated Chinese military effort should have lasted as long as it did is a tribute to the fighting men of China. Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, the defense of the Lunghai line and correlated conflicts, amongst which Taierchwang stands preeminent, proved to a somewhat incredulous world that Chinese soldiers, given leadership of sorts and partial training, can fight. This lesson was given once before, by the Ever Victorious Army of Frederick Townsend Ward, the American soldier of fortune, and his British successor "Chinese" Gordon, in the days of the Taiping Rebellion.

Japan now faces the secondary stage of conquest, the pacification of occupied territory, while Chinese resistance takes the form of guerilla warfare, a more or less disorganized effort quite distinct from the grand tactics of regularly constituted national armed forces. How far China's guerilla resistance may be prolonged, what effect it will have on Japan's self-assured hegemony in the Far East, remain to be seen. China fights on today; what of tomorrow?

Proponents of China repeat the words of Oom Paul Kruger, President of the Transvaal Republic, following Cronje's surrender at Paardeburg and the relief of Ladysmith: "The real war will begin now!" Comparisons are drawn, even, by wishful thinkers, between China's present situation and that of the Thirteen Colonies during the American Revolution. The realist is limited in his conjecture to a comparative analysis of guerilla warfare in the past. Before taking up other historical examples, it may be well to point out certain essential factors in the final success of the American Revolution which are entirely lacking in China today. These factors are three: the in-

The humours of the body have a st and regular course, which impels and perceptibly guides our will. They operate with each other, and ex successively a secret empire within u that they have a considerable part i our actions, without our being abl know it.

Gratitude in the generality of me only a strong and secret desire of recei greater favours.

Almost every one takes a pleasu requiting trifling obligations; many p are grateful for moderate ones; but is scarcely any one who does not ingratitude for great ones.

There are follies as catching as tagious disorders.

he merit of men has its season, as
s have.

t may be said of men's humours as of
y buildings, that they have divers
ects—some agreeable, others disagree-
e.

Moderation cannot have the credit of
mbating and subduing ambition—they
e never found together. Moderation is
e languor and indolence of the soul, as
mbition is its activity and ardour.

We always love those who admire us, and
e do not always love those whom we
dmire.

We are very far from being acquainted
ith the whole of our will.

It is difficult to love those whom we do
t esteem; but it is not less so to love
se whom we esteem more than our-
lves.

It is impossible to love a second ti
what we have once really ceased to love

It is not so much fertility of inventi
which presents us with several expedie
for attaining the same object, as it is w
of intelligence which causes us to hesit
at every thing which presents itself to
imagination, and prevents our discern
at a glance which is the best.

There are certain affairs and disea
the remedies of which only aggravate t
at particular times; and great abi
consists in knowing when it is dange
to apply these remedies.

Affected simplicity is a refined
posture.

There are more faults in the hu
than in the mind.

The approbation bestowed on those who e entering the world often arises from secret envy of those already established it.

Pride, which inspires us with so much ıvy, serves also to moderate it.

Some disguised falsehoods represent the :uth so well, that it would be bad judg-ıent not to be deceived by them.

There is sometimes as much ability in nowing how to profit by good advice as n arriving at a correct opinion ourselves.

Some bad people would be less dangerous f they had not some goodness.

Magnanimity is well enough defined by its name; nevertheless, we may say that t is the good sense of pride, and the most oble way of earning praise.

and increases great ones, as the win
extinguishes tapers and adds fury to fire.

Women often fancy themselves in lov
even when they are not. The occupatio
of an intrigue, the emotion of mind whic
gallantry produces, the natural leanin
to the pleasure of being loved, and th
pain of refusing, persuade them that the
feel the passion of love, when, in realit
they feel nothing but coquetry.

What makes us often discontented wit
negotiators is that they almost alwa
abandon the interest of their friends f
that of the success of the negotiatio
which becomes their own, from the cre
of having succeeded in their undertakin

When we dilate upon the affection
our friends, it is often less from gratitu
than from a desire to convey an opin
of our own merit.

Youth is perpetual intoxication; it is
: fever of reason.

Nothing ought more to humiliate men
io have deserved great praise than the
re which they still take to derive con-
juence from trifles.

Some people obtain the approbation of
e world, whose only merit consists in
e vices which serve to carry on the com-
erce of life.

The charm of novelty is in love what
e bloom is on fruits; it gives a lustre
iich is easily effaced, and which never
urns.

Good nature, which boasts of so much
sibility, is often stifled by the most
ty interest.

ibsence diminishes moderate passions

Readiness to believe evil without suffi cient examination is the result of pride an indolence. We wish to find people guilty and we do not wish to give ourselves th trouble of examining into the crimes.

We take exceptions to judges who ar in the least degree interested, and yet w are quite willing that our reputation an our fame should depend on the judgme of men who are all opposed to us, eith from jealousy, or from prejudice, or fro want of intelligence; it is only to indu them to decide in our favour that we pe in so many ways our repose and our liv

Scarcely any man is clever enough know all the evil he does.

Honour acquired is security for t [illegible]

misfortunes in those of others; it is a clever foresight of the evils into which we may fall. We succour others in order to engage them to succour us in similar circumstances; and the services we render them are, to speak properly, a good which we do to ourselves by anticipation.

Narrowness of mind is the cause of obstinacy—we do not easily believe what is beyond our sight.

It is deceiving ourselves to fancy that it is only the violent passions, such as ambition and love, which can triumph over the others. Indolence, all languid as it is, nevertheless is frequently their master; it spreads its dominion over all the designs and all the actions of life, and thus destroys and insensibly consumes the passions and the virtues.

Good taste springs more from judgment than from intellect.

The pleasure of love is in loving. We are happier in the passion we feel than in that we excite.

Civility is a desire to receive it in turn and to be accounted well bred.

The education commonly given to th young is a second self-love with whic they are inspired.

There is no passion in which self-lo reigns so powerfully as in love; and we a often more disposed to sacrifice the pea of the loved object than to lose our ow

What is called liberality is most oft only the vanity of giving, which we li better than the thing we give.

Pity is often a perception of our o

pride which abases in order to exalt itself; and though it transforms itself in a thousand different ways, it is never better disguised and more capable of deceiving than when it conceals itself under the garb of humility.

All the sentiments have a tone of voice, gestures, and countenances, peculiar each to itself; and this conformity, as it is good or bad, agreeable or disagreeable, causes people to be pleasing or displeasing.

In all the professions every one affects a particular look and exterior, in order to appear what he wishes to be thought, so that it may be said the world is made up of appearances.

Gravity is a mystery of the body, invented to conceal the defects of the mind.

fluence of allied sea power (French); the assistance of allied regular troops (French); and the unpopularity of the war amongst the enemy people (England).

We speak glibly of guerilla war in China. The term is broad. Perhaps the best study upon the subject and one which did most to crystallize thought upon it, so far as the rules of land warfare are concerned, is contained in a pamphlet prepared in 1862 by Dr. Francis Lieber,[1] at the request of Major General Halleck, then general-in-chief of the Army of the United States: *Guerilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War*. Lieber, tracing the word "guerilla" from its original Spanish definition of "little war" to its later and also at first Spanish definition of "A party of light troops for reconnaisance and opening the first skirmishes," and leaning particularly on the term as applied to the self-constituted bands which took fearful toll of the French in the Peninsular War of 1808-14 says:

> It is universally understood in this country at the present time that a guerilla party means an irregular band of armed men, carrying on an irregular war, not being able, according to their character as a guerilla party, to carry on what the law terms a *regular* war.

He enumerates all terms loosely associated with the expression, such as the partisan, the free-corps, the spy, the rebel, the conspirator, the robber, the marauder, the brigand and finally the *levée en masse* or so-called "arming of the peasants." The present Chinese resistance to Japan, being a sporadic national effort, falls squarely into this last category, but since in practically all guerilla warfare the other elements are also present, one may well first mention a few broad classifications and examples to clarify the situation.

The partisan, in military nomenclature for centuries past, has been recognized as a soldier—regular or volunteer—engaging in minor operations to assist the main effort of the government to which he belongs. In the American Revolutionary War "Light Horse Harry" Lee, Ethan Allen, Marion, Sumter and Morgan on the American side, and Tarleton and Ferguson on the British, were

[1] Francis Lieber—German-American lawyer, publicist, historian and political economist; born in Berlin March 18, 1800, emigrated to the United States 1827; died October 2, 1872.

Magnanimity despises everything to gai[n]
everything.

There is as much eloquence in the ton[e]
of voice, in the eyes, and in the air o[f]
a speaker, as in his choice of words.

True eloquence consists in saying al[l]
that is necessary, and nothing but wha[t]
is necessary.

There are some persons on whom thei[r]
faults sit well, and others who are mad[e]
ungraceful by their good qualities.

It is as common to see a change o[f]
tastes, as it is uncommon to see a chang[e]
of inclinations.

Interest brings into play every sor[t]
of virtue and every sort of vice.

Humility is often only a feigned sub-
mission, of which we make use to rend[er]
others submissive. It is an artifice

We often inconvenience others, when e fancy we can never possibly do so.

Nothing is impossible: there are ways hich lead to every thing; and if we had ufficient will we should always have sufficient means.

The sovereign ability consists in knowing thoroughly the value of things.

It is a great ability to be able to conceal one's ability.

What appears to be generosity is often nothing but a disguised ambition, which despises petty interests in order to reach greater ones.

The fidelity shown by the generality of men is only an invention of self-love to attract confidence—it is a means of raising ourselves above others, and of becoming depositaries of the most important affairs

It is not so dangerous to do evil to t
generality of men as to do them too mu
good.

Nothing flatters our pride so much
the confidence of the great, because we r
gard it as the result of our merit, witho
considering that it most frequently aris
merely from vanity or from inability
keep a secret.

We may say of agreeableness, as distin
from beauty, that it consists in a symmetr
of which we know not the rules, and
secret conformity of the features to eac
other, and to the air and complexion
the person.

Coquetry is the essential characteristi
and the prevalent humour of women; b
they do not all practise it, because t
coquetry of some is restrained by fear
by reason.

th so much obstinacy the most received
inions. They find the best places
ken in the good party, and do not like
put up with inferior ones.

We easily console ourselves for the dis-
race of our friends when it serves to
ignalise our affection for them.

It may seem that self-love is the dupe
of good-nature, and that it forgets itself
whenever we are labouring for the advan-
tage of others. Nevertheless, it is taking
the surest road to reach our objects; it is
lending on usury under pretence of giving;
it is in fact gaining over every one by a
subtle and delicate method.

No man deserves to be praised for his
goodness unless he has strength of character
to be wicked. All other goodness is
generally nothing but indolence or im-
potence of will.

really feel, they obstinately continue th
tears, their complaints, and their si
They assume a doleful demeanour,
labour to persuade others by all th
actions that their sorrow will only term
ate with their lives. This miserable
fatiguing vanity is generally met with
ambitious women. As their sex b
them from all the paths of glory, th
strive to render themselves celebrated
the display of inconsolable grief. Th
is yet another species of tears which ha
very petty sources, which flow easily, a
as easily are dried: we weep to acqu
the reputation of a tender heart; we w
to be pitied; we weep to be wept over;
fine, we weep to avoid the shame of
weeping.

It is more often from pride than f
want of intelligence that people op

r the living. I call this a species of hypo-
isy, because in this sort of grief we deceive
urselves. There is another hypocrisy
hich is not so innocent, inasmuch as it
nposes on all the world. It is the afflic-
on of certain persons who aspire to the
stinction of a striking and perpetual
rief. After time, which consumes all
ings, has put a stop to the sorrow they

Nothing is so contagious as examp
and we never do any great good or g
evil which does not produce its like.
imitate good actions from emulation,
bad ones from the depravity of our nat
which shame would keep prisoner,
example sets at liberty.

It is a great folly to wish to be exc
sively wise.

Whatever pretext we may assign
our afflictions, it is often only interest
vanity which causes them.

There are divers sorts of hypocrisy
grief. In one, under pretext of lamenti
the loss of a person who is dear to us,
lament ourselves, we lament the diminuti
of our advantages, of our pleasure, of
consideration. We regret the good opin
that was entertained of us. Thus the d
get the credit of tears which are only s

; is not all who fulfil the duties of ;itude who can on that account flatter mselves that they are grateful.

What causes such a miscalculation in :amount of gratitude which men expect the favours they have done, is, that : pride of the giver and that of the re-iver can never agree as to the value of e benefit.

Too great eagerness to requite an obli-ation is a species of ingratitude.

Fortunate people never correct them-lves. They always fancy they are in the ht as long as fortune supports their ill nduct.

Pride does not like to owe, and self-love s not like to pay.

The good that we have received from man should make us respect the evil t he does us.

enterprise for which they expose them-
selves.

Vanity, shame, and above all temper-
ament, are often the causes of courage
in men, and of virtue in women.

We are unwilling to lose our lives, and
we wish to acquire glory. This is the
cause of brave men having more tact and
ability in avoiding death, than intrigu-
ing people have in preserving their
fortunes.

There are very few persons who, in the
first decline of life, do not let us see the
points in which their bodies and minds
will fail.

Gratitude is like the good faith of
traders, it maintains commerce; and we
often pay, not because it is just to dis-
charge our debts, but that we may more
readily find people to trust us.

Perfect valour is to do unwitnessed
ıat we should be capable of doing be-
re all the world.

Intrepidity is an extraordinary strength
f mind, which raises it above the troubles,
he disorders, and the emotions, which
he sight of great perils is calculated to
xcite; it is by this strength that heroes
aintain themselves in a tranquil state
f mind, and preserve the free use of their
ason under the most surprising and
rrible circumstances.

Hypocrisy is the homage which vice
nders to virtue.

The generality of men expose them-
ves in battle sufficiently to save their
our, but few are on all occasions
ing to expose themselves as much as
necessary to [illegible]

partisan leaders. The Cossacks and peasant bands who broke Napoleon's *Grande Armée* in Russia were partisans also. In the Civil War Nathan Bedford Forrest, peerless leader of irregular horse; John Turner Ashby, John Morgan and Mosby may be thus classified. In the World War Lawrence, with his Arab bands, stands out.

Where organized main effort on his side lacks, the partisan seems to fall into the category of the free-corps—usually not recognized by the enemy as a legal belligerent. Here may be placed the French *franc-tireurs* of 1870-71, treated as brigands by the Germans just as were the earlier *freischutz* of Prussia by Napoleon. Operations of this type may be preliminaries to the *levée en masse*. The famous Death's Head Hussars—the Black Brunswickers of Germany—were originally an irregular unit organized in 1808 to harry the Imperial communications and raise the German populace to revolt; they represented the flame of Prussian regeneration following Napoleon's conquest. In the same category fall De Wet, Delarey and the other Boer leaders of irregular horse who set the British Empire by the ears for a year and a half after the national armed resistance of the Transvaal Republic and Orange Free State crumpled. Ranging from the partisan and the free-corps all the way to the *levée en masse* come the operations of the Russian Revolution and its sequels, which in this case led to the creation of the Red Army—a national army—as the outgrowth of guerilla fighting.

The spy and conspirator take part in all classes of warfare. The rebel is called a rebel when the opponent claims military jurisdiction by virtue of occupation or other cause. Given eastern Chinese puppet governments, both those in process of formation and those now set up, we find the Chiang Kai-shek Government becoming in Japanese eyes a rebel administration, and this is pertinent. Examples in the past are the Chouan and Vendée operations of the French Revolution, which make us recognize again the approach to the *levée en masse*.

The marauder, bandit, brigand and robber class, always associated with guerilla warfare, include such classic examples as the Cowboys and Skinners of the American Revolution, Quantrell and his kindred on the one side and the Kansas Jayhawkers on the other in the American Civil War, the Hunghutze of China and

fears; others suffer themselves to
carried away by general panics; othe
go to the charge because they dare n
remain in their posts. We find some
whom an acquaintance with petty dange
strengthens their courage, and prepar
them to expose themselves to great
ones. Some are brave when sword
hand, and yet dread the fire of musketry
others are steady under fire, and fear t
sword. All these different species
courage concur in this, that night,
augmenting fear and concealing good
bad actions, gives the privilege of bei
discreet. There is another species
discretion which is more general, for
never see a man perform as much in
encounter as he might do if he were s
of coming off safe; so that it is evid
the fear of death subtracts something fr
[illegible]

ers are often the causes of that valour
celebrated among men.

Valour in common soldiers is a danger-
s trade which they have adopted to
in their livelihood.

Perfect bravery and thorough cowardice
e two extremes which are seldom reached.
he space between the two is great, and
mprehends all other kinds of courage,
etween which there is as much difference
between countenances and dispositions.
here are some men who expose them-
lves readily at the commencement of an
tion, and are disheartened and dis-
uraged by its duration; some are con-
nt as soon as they have satisfied their
putation with the world, and do very
ttle beyond this. We see some who are
t at all times equally masters of their

If any one appears wise, it is only because his follies are proportioned to his age and fortune.

There are some silly people who know themselves, and make a clever use of their silliness.

He who lives without folly is not so wise as he thinks.

As we grow old we become more foolish and more wise.

Some people resemble ballads, which are only sung for a certain time.

The generality of people only judge of men by the fashion they are in, or by their fortunes.

Love of glory, fear of shame, the design of making a fortune, the desire of rendering our lives easy and agreeable, and the envious wish of lowering the fame of

much mistaken; but he who thinks at others cannot do without him is still ore mistaken.

Pretenders to virtue are those who disguise their faults from others as well as rom themselves. The truly virtuous now their imperfections and confess hem.

A truly virtuous man is he who prides himself upon nothing.

Severity of demeanour in women is a species of decoration and paint which they add to their beauty.

The virtue of women is often love of their reputation and of their quiet.

It is to be a truly virtuous man to wish to be always exposed to the view of virtuous people.

Folly pursues us in every period of life.

We easily forget our faults when th
are only known to ourselves.

There are some people of whom
should never have believed evil unl
we had seen it, but there are none
whom we ought to be surprised when
do see it.

We enhance the reputation of so
with a view of depreciating that
others: and sometimes we should n
praise the Prince de Condé and M. d
Turenne so much, if we did not wis
to blame them both.

The desire of appearing clever ofte
prevents our becoming so.

Virtue would not travel so far
vanity did not keep her company.

He who thinks he can find in hir
self the means of doing without othe

must successively lodge; and I doubt
nether experience would make us avoid
em if we were to travel the same road
second time.

When our vices quit us we flatter
urselves with the belief that it is we who
uit them.

There are relapses in the disorders of
he soul as well as in those of the body.
What we take to be our cure is most
often nothing but an intercourse or a
change of the disorder.

The faults of the soul are like wounds
in the body. Whatever care we take to
cure them the scar always appears, and
they are every moment in danger of re-
opening.

What often prevents our abandoning
ourselves to a single vice is, our having
more than one.

We do not despise all those who h
vices, but we despise all those who h
not a single virtue.

The name of virtue is as serviceable
interest as vice is.

The health of the soul is no more secu
than that of the body; and though
may appear free from passions, we are
quite as much danger of being carri
away by them as we are of falling si
when we are in health.

It would seem that nature has pr
scribed to every one from the moment
his birth certain limits for virtue a
vice.

It belongs only to great men to ha
great faults.

It may be said that the vices await
in the journey of life like hosts with who

There is a kind of inconstancy which ises from levity of mind, or from its akness causing it to receive all the inions of others. There is another nd, more excusable, which comes from tiety

The vices enter into the composition of e virtues, as poisons into that of medi-ines. Prudence collects and arranges hem, and uses them beneficially against he ills of life.

For the credit of virtue it must be dmitted that the greatest evils which efall mankind are caused by their crimes.

We confess our faults, to make amends y our sincerity for the harm they have one us in the opinion of others.

There are heroes in evil as well as in ood.

ing in the loved person new subjects for love, the other arises from our making a merit of being constant.

Perseverance deserves neither blame nor praise, inasmuch as it is merely the duration of tastes and opinions, which we can neither give nor take away from ourselves.

What makes us like new acquaintances is not so much any weariness of our old ones, or the pleasure of change, as disgust at not being sufficiently admired by those who know us too well, and the hope of being more so by those who do not know so much of us.

We sometimes make frivolous complaints of our friends to justify beforehand our own fickleness.

Our repentance is not so much regret for the evil we have done, as fear of its consequences to us.

There are various sorts of curiosity: one is from interest, which makes us desire to know what may be useful to us; another is from pride, and arises from a desire of knowing what others are ignorant of.

It is better to employ our minds in supporting the misfortunes which actually happen, than in anticipating those which may happen to us.

Constancy in love is a perpetual inconstancy, which causes the heart to attac itself successfully to all the qualities c the person we love, giving the preferenc sometimes to one, sometimes to anothe so that this constancy is nothing but a inconstancy, limited and confined to o object.

There are two sorts of constancy love—one arises from continually discove

Manchuria in recent times. In the borderland between partisan and outlaw come such murderous rapscallions as the Siberian White Cossack leaders Semenov, Kalmykov and Annenkov.

Finally we come to the *levée en masse* or "arming of the peasants." Among examples are the annihilation of Varus' legions by Arminius, the operations of Spanish guerillas or *partidas* in the Peninsular War, again those of the latter part of the Franco-Prussian War and the Boer War, the Cuban revolts against Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, all North African operations against the French and Spanish, the wide-spread fighting of the period 1918-22 in Russia, particularly in Siberia, and last but not least the recent Spanish civil war, in which there was a definite development, on the Republican side, of national forces from guerillas.

Of all these, the Siberian campaigns at first glance most nearly resemble the present Sino-Japanese situation, because of extent of terrain, lack of communications and the self-reliance imposed upon the defending side by lack of outside military assistance. This last is most important when we consider that Japan today holds nearly all Chinese seaports, industrial centers and rail communications. In the Siberian operations the Allies held all seaports and the Czech and Kolchak forces held the trans-Siberian Railway from the Urals to Vladivostok. In both cases flow of munitions from the outside was limited—only the German border being open to the Soviets at that time, while the Chinese National Government now has available only the two French Indochina routes (and even these are officially closed), the Burma road and the even longer road through Chinese Turkestan from Russia.

Another similarity at once appears to the soldier: in both cases the party reduced to guerilla operations exceeded the other side in potential man power. This merits thought, since thus far in military history the transition of Siberia from White to Red appears to be the sole instance of final success of guerilla operations unassisted by regular tactical movement of trained troops. Here the tempting comparison ends, for the White Russian armies in Siberia and the very small detachments of regular Allied troops with them—excepting the Czechs and Japanese—were themselves second-rate forces, while White leadership was both stupid and incompetent.

The world more often rewards th appearance of merit than does it meri itself.

Avarice is more opposed to econom than liberality is.

Hope, deceitful as she is, serves at leas to conduct us through life by an agreeabl path.

Indolence and timidity often keep u to our duty, while our virtue carries o all the credit of doing so.

It is difficult to determine whether a open, sincere, and virtuous action is th result of probity or artfulness.

The virtues are lost in interest, as river are lost in the sea.

If we examine well the different effect of ennui, we shall find that it makes u neglect more duties than interest does.

often confers more reputation than real merit.

There is an infinity of modes of conduct which appear ridiculous, the secret reasons of which are wise and sound.

It is more easy to appear worthy of employments which we do not, than of those which we do possess.

Our merit gains us the esteem of the virtuous—our star that of the public.

useful manner, and they would spoil all if they changed their conduct.

The glory of men should always be proportioned to the means they have employed to acquire it.

Flattery is a false coin, which only derives its currency from our vanity.

It is not sufficient to have great qualities; we must be able to make proper use of them.

However brilliant an action may be, it ought not to pass for great when it is not the result of a great design.

There ought to be a certain proportion between actions and designs, if we would draw from them all the results they are capable of producing.

The art of being able to make a good use of moderate abilities wins esteem, an

A refusal of praise is a desire to be praised twice.

The desire of meriting the praise we receive fortifies our virtue; and that bestowed on talent, courage, and beauty, contributes to augment them.

It is more difficult to avoid being governed than it is to govern others.

If we did not flatter ourselves, the flattery of others would be very harmless.

Nature creates merit, and fortune brings it into play.

Fortune corrects us of more faults than reason is able to correct.

Some people with great merit are disgusting—others with great faults are agreeable.

The only merit of some people consists in saying and doing foolish things in a

for ourselves even when we seem to be praising them.

We are not fond of praising, and never praise any one except from interested motives. Praise is a clever, concealed, and delicate flattery, which gratifies in different ways the giver and the receiver. The one takes it as a recompense of his merit, and the other bestows it to display his equity and discernment.

We often choose envenomed praises, which, by a reaction, expose faults in those we are praising that we should not dare to discover in any other way.

We seldom praise but to be praised.

Few people are wise enough to prefer useful reproof to treacherous praise.

There are reproaches which praise, and praises which convey satire.

easing or persuading others, to be so udious of pleasing oneself; and that tening well and answering well is one of e greatest perfections that can be attained in conversation.

A man of wit would often be embarrassed without the company of fools.

We often boast that we are not weary of ourselves. We are such braggarts, that we do not like to allow that we are bad company for ourselves.

As it is the characteristic of great wits to convey a great deal in a few words, so, on the contrary, small wits have the gift of speaking much and saying nothing.

It is rather by estimation of our own sentiments that we exaggerate the good qualities of others, than by estimation of their merit; and we wish to attract praise

There are people who would never hav been in love if they had never heard o love.

Men talk little when vanity does no prompt them.

We would rather speak ill of ourselve than not talk of ourselves at all.

One thing which makes us find so fe people who appear reasonable and agre able in conversation is, that there i scarcely any one who does not think mo of what he is about to say than o answering precisely what is said to him The cleverest and most complaisant peopl content themselves with merely showin an attentive countenance, while we can se in their eyes and minds a wandering fro what is said to them, and an impatienc to return to what they wish to say; instea of reflecting that it is a bad method o

Too great refinement is false delicacy, d true delicacy is solid refinement.

Coarseness is sometimes sufficient to otect us from being overreached by an tful man.

Weakness of mind is the only fault capable of correction.

The least fault in women who have bandoned themselves to love is to love.

It is more easy to be wise for others than for ourselves.

The only good copies are those which xhibit the defects of bad originals.

We are never so ridiculous from the qualities we have, as from those we affect to have.

We are sometimes as different from ourelves as we are from others.

We often do good, in order that we may do evil with impunity.

If we resist our passions it is more from their weakness than from our strength.

We should have very little pleasure if we did not sometimes flatter ourselves.

The cleverest men affect all their lives to censure all artifice, in order that they may make use of it themselves on some great occasion, and for some great interest.

The ordinary employment of artifice is the mark of a petty mind; and it almost always happens that he who uses it to cover himself in one place, uncovers himself in another.

Treacheries and acts of artifice only originate in a want of ability.

The true method of being deceived is to think oneself more cunning than others.

repays the confidence shown in him by an ardent and disinterested zeal, though, in the advice he gives, he has generally nothing in view but his own interest or fame.

The most subtle of all artifices is the power of cleverly feigning to fall into the snares laid for us; and we are never so easily deceived as when we think we are deceiving others.

A determination never to deceive often exposes us to deception.

We are so much accustomed to disguise ourselves to others, that at length we disguise ourselves to ourselves.

Men are more often guilty of treachery from weakness of character than from any settled design to betray.

The American Expeditionary Force in Siberia is exclud
analysis, since Major General William S. Graves, c
adhered to both the letter and spirit of the stringent \
ment directive of non-intervention in internal strug
most extraordinary temptation and all sorts of pressure.

To UNDERSTAND the problem facing both sides in Chir
must grasp the major objective of guerilla warfare i
adopting it. Lawrence, in *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, a
problem confronting him, hit the nail on the head as l
on how the Turks would defend the 100,000 square mile

> No doubt by a trench line across the bottom if we came
> with banners; but suppose we were (as we might be) an
> idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front and b
> about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-
> ished through long stems to the head . . . It seemed a re
> might be helpless without a target, owning only what he
> subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at.
>
> I figured out how many men they would need to sit on all
> to save it from our attack-in-depth, sedition putting up
> every unoccupied one of those 100,000 square miles . . . it
> would have need of a fortified post every four square mile
> could not be less than twenty men. If so, they would need
> to meet the ill wills of all the Arab peoples, combined wi
> hostility of a few zealots . . . Ours should be a war of det
> were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unk
> not disclosing ourselves until we attacked The attack might
> directed not against him, but against his stuff . . . We m
> velop a habit of never engaging the enemy. This would ch
> numerical plea for never affording a target.

In these words lies all the theory of guerilla warfare.
operations were an important contribution to the Allie
the Eastern front. But again we must avoid the temptat
at conclusions. Lawrence's operations were those of
assisting the main effort. "On his own" locally, he was
a component in a plan of regular warfare. This does n

The more we love a mistress, the neare
we are to hating her.

The defects of the mind, like those c
the countenance, augment with age.

There are some good marriages, bu
none that afford many delights.

We are inconsolable at being deceiv
by our enemies, and betrayed by o
friends; and yet we are often content
be so by ourselves.

It is easy to deceive oneself without pe
ceiving it, as it is difficult to deceive oth
without their perceiving it.

Nothing is less sincere than the meth
of asking and giving advice. The m
who asks it appears to have a respecta
deference for the opinion of his frie
while he intends to make him approve
his own; and he who gives the adv

near to be judged well of; others are never so well judged of as at a distance.

He is not a reasonable man who by chance stumbles upon reason; but he who derives it from knowledge, from discernment, and from taste.

To know things perfectly, we should know them in detail; but as this is almost infinite, our knowledge is always superficial and imperfect.

It is a species of coquetry to make a parade of never practising it.

The head cannot long play the part of the heart.

In youth the tastes are changed from heat of blood; in old age they are preserved from habit.

We give away nothing so liberally as advice.

produces all the effects attributed
judgment.

Every one speaks well of his heart, bu
no one dares to do so of his head.

Politeness of mind consists in th
conception of honourable and delica
thoughts.

Gallantry of mind consists in sayin
flattering things in an agreeable manner.

It often happens that things presen
themselves to our minds in a more complet
state than we could by much art mak
them arrive at.

The head is always the dupe of th
heart.

It is not all who know their heads wh
know their hearts.

Men and things have both their prop
points of view. Some require to be se

o console themselves for being no longer n a position to give bad examples.

Great names debase, instead of elevating, those who cannot sustain them.

The mark of extraordinary merit is to see those most envious of it constrained to praise.

A man may be ungrateful, and yet less blameable for his ingratitude than he who conferred the favour.

We are mistaken in supposing that intellect and judgment are two different things. Judgment is merely the greatness of the light of the mind; this light penetrates into the recesses of things; it observes there every thing remarkable, and perceives what appears to be imperceptible. Thus it must be allowed, that it is the greatness of the light of the mind which

proportion to the satisfaction we derive from them, and we judge of their merits by the kind of intercourse which they keep up with us.

Every one complains of his memory, and no one complains of his judgment.

In the intercourse of life we more often please by our faults than by our good qualities.

The greatest ambition has not the least appearance of it when it finds the absolute impossibility of reaching the height it aspires after.

To undeceive a man persuaded of his own merit is to do him as ill a service as that rendered to the Athenian madman, who fancied that all the vessels entering the harbour belonged to him.

Old men are fond of giving good advice

n exchange of good offices; in fact, it is nothing but a system of traffic, in which self-love always proposes to itself some advantage.

It is more disgraceful to distrust one's friends than to be deceived by them.

We often persuade ourselves that we love people more powerful than we are; and yet it is interest alone which produces our friendship. We do not associate with them for any good that we wish to do them, but for that which we would receive from them.

Our mistrust justifies the deceit of others.

Men would not live long in society if they were not the dupes of each other.

Self-love increases or diminishes in our eyes the good qualities of our friends in

Silence is the safest course for any ma
to adopt who distrusts himself.

The reason we are so changeable in ou
friendships is, that it is difficult to kno
the qualities of the heart, while it is eas
to know those of the head.

We can love nothing except with refe
ence to ourselves; and we are merely fo
lowing our own taste and pleasure whe
we prefer our friends to ourselves. It i
nevertheless, by this preference alone th
friendship can be true and perfect.

Reconciliation with our enemies is onl
a desire of bettering our condition,
weariness of contest, and the fear of sou
disaster.

What men have given the name
friendship to is nothing but an allian
a reciprocal accommodation of interes

It is with true love as with apparitions. very one talks of it, but few have ever en it.

Love lends its name to an infinite numr of connexions which are attributed to , and in which it has no more part than he Doge has in what goes on at Venice.

Love ot justice in the generality of men only the fear of suffering from injustice.

There is no disguise which can lon
conceal love where it does, or feign i
where it does not, exist.

Almost everyone feels shame at bein
loved when they love no more.

If we judge of love by the generality
its effects, it resembles hatred rather th
friendship.

It is impossible to meet with wom
who have never had an affair of gallant
but it is rare to find any who have h
only one.

There is only one sort of love, but
thousand different copies of it.

Love, like fire, cannot subsist with
continual movement; as soon as it ce
to hope and fear, it ceases to exist.

A clever man should regulate his in-
ests, and place them in proper order.
r avidity often deranges them by
ducing us to undertake too many things
once; and by grasping at minor objects,
e lose our hold of more important ones.

Grace is to the body what good sense
s to the mind.

It is difficult to define love. All that
we can say of it is, that in the soul it is
a passion for reigning; in minds it is a
sympathy; and in the body it is nothing
but a latent and delicate desire to possess
the loved object, after a good deal of
mystery.

If there exists a love pure and exempt
from the mixture of our other passions,
it is that which lies hidden at the bottom
of the heart, and of which we are ignorant
ourselves.

tells us of a Chinese translation of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* being used as text-book by the guerillas operating in the plains south of Peiping, one ponders on the possibilities latent in the vastness which is China.

For instance, in the Peninsular War the operations of Spanish guerillas so hampered the movements of the armies of Napoleon as to restrict the French to possession only of such terrain as they held by physical occupation. Forays, ambush of convoys and small detachments, crippling of communications with consequent shortages of food and munitions, contributed much to the final defeat of the French by the British in the open field. Never did the guerillas win in organized warfare. Nowhere is there an indication that, without the presence and tactical operations of regularly constituted British armies in Spain at that time, the Imperial armies could have been forced out. Yet in all this bickering France lost an estimated 100,000 men in battle casualties to the Spanish alone, and was forced to build a series of blockhouses along all principal channels of communication south of the Pyrenees, the garrisoning of which was a terrific drain on its effectives in Spain.

In the Franco-Prussian War the total defeat of the French armies and the investment of Paris brought about the collapse of the Empire and establishment of a provisional government. Gambetta called for *guerre à l'outrance*, and some 40,000 *franc-tireurs* commenced guerilla operations against the German lines of communications. The German troops in France at the opening of 1871 included 450,000 infantry, 50,000 cavalry and 1,000 guns, of which 150,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 80 guns, organized in a system of "station commands" along a railroad only 250 miles long, were necessary to maintain the line and the sixteen trains per day needed to supply the besiegers of Paris. Germany refused to recognize the *franc-tireurs* as belligerents and executed all prisoners after drumhead courtmartial. The guerilla warfare was futile.

In the Boer War, despite the statement of Kruger quoted above, and despite the skillful maneuvering of the wily and brilliant De Wet, the guerillas were forced to surrender after eighteen months of fighting. Britain put into the field in South Africa a force of 450,000 men; the Boer forces are sometimes put at a total of 95,000

depends as much on their humours as on fortune.

Sincerity is an opening of the heart: we find it in very few people; and that which we generally see is nothing but a subtle dissimulation to attract the confidence of others.

Aversion to lying is often an imperceptible desire to render our testimony important, and to give a religious respect to our words.

Truth does not do so much good in the world as its appearances do evil.

There is no kind of praise which has not been bestowed on prudence; nevertheless, however great it may be, it cannot assure us of the least event, because its subject is man—the most changeable in the world.

ecause we cannot deprive them of what ttracts the respect of all the world.

In order to establish themselves in the world, men do all they can to appear established there.

Although men pride themselves on their great actions, these are often the result, not of any great design, but of chance.

It would seem that our actions are regulated by lucky or unlucky stars, to which they owe a great part of the praise or blame bestowed on them.

There are no circumstances, however unfortunate, that clever people do not extract some advantage from; and none, however fortunate, that the imprudent annot turn to [illegible]

Fortune turns [illegible] ntage of her [illegible]

The happiness [illegible]

compensation of good and evil which renders them equal.

However great the advantages which nature bestows on us, it is not she alone, but fortune in conjunction with her, which makes heroes.

The contempt of riches among the philosophers was a hidden desire to revenge their merit for the injustice of fortune, by contempt of the very advantages of which she deprived them. It was a secret to secure themselves from the degradation of poverty: it was a by-road to arrive at that consideration which they could not obtain by riches.

Hatred of [illegible] is nothing el[illegible] than the [illegible]. The mortificatio[illegible] [illegible] and reliev[illegible] [illegible] those who [illegible] [illegible] our respec[illegible]

Our humour sets its price on everything e get from fortune.

Happiness lies in the taste, and not in ie things; and it is from having what 'e desire that we are happy—not from aving what others think desirable.

We are never so happy, or so unhappy, is we imagine.

Men who fancy they have merit, take a pride in being unfortunate, to persuade others and themselves that they are worthy to be the butt of fortune.

Nothing ought so much to diminish the good opinion we have of ourselves as to see that we disapprove at one time what we approve at another.

Whatever may be the apparent difference between fortunes, there is a certain

We have not strength enough to follow all our reason.

A man often fancies that he guides himself when he is guided by others; and while his mind aims at one object, his heart insensibly draws him on to another.

Strength and weakness of mind are badly named—they are, in fact, nothing more than the good or bad arrangement of the organs of the body.

The capriciousness of our humour is often more fantastical than that of fortune.

The attachment or indifference which the philosophers had for life was nothing more than one of the tastes of their self-love, which we ought no more to dispute than the taste of the palate, or the choice of colours.

view to our happiness, has also bestowed
us pride, to spare us the pain of being
aware of our imperfections.

Pride has a greater share than goodness
heart in the remonstrances we make to
those who are guilty of faults; we reprove
not so much with a view to correct
them as to persuade them that we are
exempt from those faults ourselves.

We promise according to our hopes,
and perform according to our fears.

Interest speaks all sorts of languages,
and plays all sorts of parts, even that of
disinterestedness.

Interest, which blinds some, opens the
eyes of others.

Those who bestow too much application
on trifling things become generally incapable
of great ones.

We have more power than will; and it is often by the way of excuse to ourselves that we fancy things are impossible.

If we had no faults ourselves, we should not take so much pleasure in remarking them in others.

Jealousy lives upon doubts—it becomes madness, or ceases entirely, as soon as we pass from doubt to certainty.

Pride always compensates itself, and loses nothing, even when it renounces vanity.

If we had no pride ourselves, we should not complain of that of others.

Pride is equal in all men; and the only difference is in the means and manner of displaying it.

It seems that nature, which has so wisely disposed our bodily organs with

inds; and that, with the exception of good deal of vanity, heroes are made ust like other men.

It requires greater virtues to support good, than bad fortune.

Neither the sun nor death can be looked at steadily.

We often make a parade of passions, even of the most criminal; but envy is a timid and shameful passion which we never dare to avow.

Jealousy is in some sort just and reasonable, since it only has for its object the preservation of a good which belongs, or which we fancy belongs to ourselves, while envy, on the contrary, is a madness which cannot endure the good of others.

The evil which we commit does not draw down on us so much hatred and persecution as our good qualities.

cuted affect sometimes a firmness and a contempt of death, which is, in fact, only the fear of looking it in the face; so that it may be said that this firmness, and this contempt are to their minds what the bandage is to their eyes.

Philosophy triumphs easily over past, and over future evils, but present evils triumph over philosophy.

Few people know what death is. We seldom suffer it from resolution, but from stupidity and from habit; and the generality of men die because they cannot help dying.

When great men suffer themselves to be overcome by the length of their misfortunes, they let us see that they only supported them through the strength of their ambition, not through that of their

ometimes from indolence, often from fear, nd almost always from all three together.

The moderation of fortunate people omes from the calm which good fortune ives to their tempers.

Moderation is a fear of falling into envy, nd into the contempt which those deserve who become intoxicated with their good ortune; it is a vain ostentation of the trength of our mind; in short, the moderaion of men in their highest elevation is a desire of appearing greater than their fortune.

We have all of us sufficient fortitude to bear the misfortunes of others.

The constancy of sages is nothing but the art of locking up their agitation in their hearts.

Those who are condemned to be exe-

but this is far from exact, as there were never more than a few thousand in the scattered commandos in the field at any one time.

To crush Boer resistance it was necessary to establish lines of mutually supporting blockhouses, from 100 to 1,000 paces apart, with a network of barbed wire and trenches, along the main railway lines, and to maintain in the field flying columns capable of guerilla fighting themselves, unhampered by the impedimenta of organized warfare. Even then the Boer commandos played hob with communications, ambushing troops and cutting the rail line almost at will. With all normal sources of supply closed, the Boers subsisted on British supplies, clothed themselves with the uniforms, rode the horses and armed themselves with the rifles and ammunition captured from the foe. This guerilla war was to some extent a "gentlemen's war." The Boers always released their prisoners after stripping them—they had no means for securing prisoners, of course—so that their operations, except for actual battle casualties, caused no diminution in the British forces. The British, on the other hand, took prisoners; but it was not until the establishment of concentration camps into which all non-combatants were gathered, and after an organized destruction of farms, livestock and crops, that the patriotic "will to win" was whittled down.

THE *levée en masse* is marked by certain definite characteristics, most important of which is the ability of the guerilla to assume at will the role of non-combatant. This facilitates both mobilization for sudden local raids and the subsequent disappearance of the raiders. Conversely, being a violation of the rules of land warfare which prescribe wearing of a uniform or distinctive mark, and the open bearing of arms as among the conditions for legitimate belligerency, this brings hostile severity and privation to the real non-combatant, and often misery and death to man, woman and child in the area involved.

Guerillas in the *levée en masse* can have no dreams of shattering enemy strength in open conflict, since the other side is already too strong for organized resistance. All that can be hoped for is harassment, embarrassment, continual bedevilment which may wear down the hostile morale rather than its strength. Fluidity is the keynote—

Whatever pains we may take to disguis our passions under the appearances of piet and honour, they always discover them selves through these veils.

Our self-love endures with greater im patience the condemnation of our tastes than of our opinions.

Men are not only prone to lose the re membrance of benefits and of injuries they even hate those who have obliged them, and cease to hate those who hav grievously injured them. The constan study to recompense good and avenge evi appears to them a slavery, to which the feel it difficult to submit.

The clemency of princes is often onl a stroke of policy to gain the affections o their people.

This clemency, of which men make virtue, is practised sometimes from vanit

The passions are the only orators that always persuade: they are, as it were, a natural art, the rules of which are infallible; and the simplest man with passion, is more persuasive than the most eloquent, without it.

The passions have an injustice and an interest of their own, which renders it dangerous to obey them, and we ought to mistrust them even when they appear most reasonable.

There is going on in the human heart a perpetual generation of passions, so that the overthrow of one is almost always the establishment of another.

The passions often engender their contraries; avarice sometimes produces prodigality, and prodigality avarice; we are often resolute from weakness, and daring from timidity.

made in the territory of self-love, there still remain in it many unknown tracts.

Self-love is more artful than the most artful man in the world.

The duration of our passions no more depends on ourselves than the duration of our lives.

Passion often makes a madman of the cleverest man, and renders the greatest fools clever.

Those great and brilliant actions which dazzle our eyes, are represented by politicians as the effects of great designs, instead of which they are commonly the effects of caprice and of the passions. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, which is attributed to the ambition they had of making themselves masters of the world, was, perhaps, nothing but a result of jealousy.

Maxims

La Rochefoucauld

London
Arthur L. Humphreys
1911

MAXIMS.

La Rochefoucauld

LONDON.
ARTHUR L. HUMPHREYS.
M.DCCCCII.

THIS WISDOM OF THE ANCIENTS

From Aesop to Sa'di, to La Rochefoucauld, to the wise of our own times, the intellectuals of every age have been imparting the sum total of the accumulated wisdom sometimes in the form of Fables, and at other times in Maxims.

Khuda Bakhsh Library, in this age of explosion of information, is bent upon reviving the wisdom of the ancients. The Fables/*Maxims are* being offered afresh, to the reader of the age of information, with a hope that such efforts may help strike a balance in *the minds of* men *breathing in* the air of 1991 and onward, and thereby bringing them closer to the wisdom that *is no more.*

A. R. B.

here today, there tomorrow; peaceful workers in the fields by day, jayhawkers and snipers by night, the guerillas strive to derail trains, block roads, ambush small detachments and convoys, burn bridges, raid stores. Their operations paralyze all commerce and production in the occupied area, foiling enemy plans to profit therefrom. If they are determined enough, the guerillas can only be conquered by resource to their own methods. Mobile flying columns, capable of travelling light and fighting under any and all conditions, harry the soil, burn property and crops, remove the population, make the land uninhabited and life not worth the living.

Having no organized base, guerillas can take no prisoners. They can release captives or kill them. Release means foregoing an opportunity to diminish the hostile manpower; killing prisoners means the loss at once of whatever remnant of legitimate belligerent status the guerillas may still hold in enemy eyes—usually not much to start with.

Naturally, the time element involved in suppression is a function of the methods of repression used by the party in military occupation. In the Franco-Prussian War, *franc-tireur* resistance was cowed in a few months by the rope and the firing-squad. British pressure in the Boer War, omitting this legalized murder and relying on economic strangulation, took four times as long. On the other hand French resistance ceased when the capital fell, whereas in the Boer War guerilla resistance flared with the fall of the capital.

In Cuba, the insurrection against Spain held out against 100,000 trained troops, most of them spread in the famous "Trocha," an earthwork system which cut the island in half but over which the *insurrectos* apparently found little difficulty in crossing. Garrotte and firing squad took full toll. However, it was not until Weyler introduced concentration camps, sweeping the insurgent districts of inhabitants and shelter for the rebels, that he began to make a good start, for Spain, toward pacification. The American declaration of war interrupted this.

That the question of prisoners will rise in the Sino-Japanese struggle is to be doubted, if newspaper accounts are to be believed. Attrition will accordingly occur not only in munitions and supplies, but also in manpower, bringing up the point before mentioned of

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the potential Japanese inferiority in this respect. To Japan, then, outside of economic reasons, the time element is all the more important. Therefore the grim question seems to be whether Japan can make conditions so terrible to the Chinese as to bring about peace at any price.

It is this question of self-preservation which has in the past so frequently marked the end of unsupported guerilla warfare. The enemy from within, composed of those who will fight no further for liberty, the "hands-uppers," add to the organized strength of the foreign enemy. The National Scouts of the Boer War, Boers in British service, played quite a part in hunting down the guerillas. Irregular native horse in British pay contributed much to the crushing of the Sepoy Rebellion. France, from the beginning, has organized natives for military service in North Africa. In the Philippine Insurrection, the Philippine Scouts aided the American campaign. So far, it would seem, the Manchukuo and Chinese levies in Japanese pay have not contributed much to the strength of Japan. Nevertheless they must be considered; their value to Japan will wax and wane in accordance with Japan's success, not despite it.

Railroads will be among the principal targets, if not the principal target, of guerilla operations. The object of the guerillas is interruption of rail transport; the more complete the better. In the American Civil War both the North and South found that simple uprooting of rails and ties meant only temporary delay, and that systematic burning of piles of ties upon which rails were placed to warp them was still only a temporary expedient. Ingenious methods of straightening out partly bent rails were soon invented. Only by actually putting a double twist in a rail can it be permanently put out of action, as it must then be re-rolled. So equally ingenious portable claws were then invented, to put such a corkscrew twist into a rai that it would be useless. Now it would appear that the Chinese hav added another refinement, by use of their manpower. Rails are car ried bodily off for several miles and buried.

For a long time the Chinese, while still in possession of th Canton-Hankow line, used their manpower to make almost immed ate repairs of destruction caused by aerial bombardment. The Jap nese today, by commandeering local populations, can effect almo

as speedy repairs, but the complication of rail disappearance is something not locally curable. Destruction of rolling stock, while quite serious, is not quite so important as permanent damage to the road-bed.

In 1870-71 the Germans in France solved the problem of railway-tampering by repressive measures in communities where outrages occurred, and also by placing hostages on the pilots of engines traversing suspect areas. Armored trains as a means of protection first came into use during the American Civil War, in the operations around Richmond in 1864; but it remained for the British to make full use of them during the Boer War. The weakness of the armored train is the necessity for constant support lest guerilla raids destroy the line behind it, immobilizing and isolating it.

Finally, what conclusions may we draw as to the effect, on the Japanese army, of the *levée en masse?*

To be brutally frank, the answer would seem to be: none, for a long time. But, like everything else, there may be an exception. The reconstitution of an active front is the significant token for which the trained observer is seeking. This, if it develops, may be expected to take the form of delaying actions on a wide front, necessitating further Japanese advances on the grand scale. Then, and only then, can it be said that Chinese national military regeneration has begun. And then, and only then, can the guerillas, operating as partisans on the flanks and rear of the enemy, make their presence a real menace. This was the way in which a Soviet army slowly developed in Siberia, out of "amateur" Red Guard bands. By constant pressure this new army crushed the Kolchak forces, while behind and on both sides of the trans-Siberian line armed peasants, maddened by the outrages of petty White despots, rose to wear them out and drag them down.

Fantastic and fearsome are the problems and possibilities of guerilla warfare such as rages in China today, with no quarter given by the Japanese, though it has been reported on good authority that the Eighth Route Army takes prisoners, treats them well, and sends them back to the Japanese lines in the hope of demoralizing the Japanese conscripts. The result in the long run depends not on mechanization, motorization, airplane or tank, but on the power

and weakness, the fortitude and fears, of the human mind, the human body and the human heart. Too much should not be expected of the zealot, the patriot and "the valor of ignorance." The lesson of military history is that the disciplined, trained professional soldier has always had an advantage over the amateur. The one thing an over-extended Japan must fear is that the Chinese guerillas will hold out long enough to allow a new trained professional army to be formed behind them. Should that day come, the Rising Sun will set.

West Point, January 1939

THE FAILURE OF CIVIL CONTROL IN OCCUPIED CHINA

B. Ward Perkins

No one wants another Germany, overcrowded and shut in, industrious, intensely patriotic, so self-centered as to be labelled stupid, with little humor and certainly a feeling of isolation and a sense of grievance. Yet as things are moving, we may easily see Japan a long way on that road in this generation. It was with the hope that the present "incident" would give opportunities to understand the real underlying Japanese attitude that the writer set out recently for the Far East A nation under stress will act to type and it might be possible to get behind proclamations, documents and speeches to discover the real motive power. Unless that is found, the menace above mentioned may enlarge.

One particular aspect of the "incident" stood out as worth study: the reactions of the Japanese to the civil population in China. It happened that the writer had, as a District Officer, been close to the methods used by the British in the occupation of Upper Burma half a century ago, and an attempt has accordingly been made to compare the two events. Since the details of Burma from 1885 onwards may not be well known, a brief account of them is set out. The parallels will indicate themselves.

It might be claimed that a lot of the troubles experienced by the British in the Annexation of Upper Burma could have been avoided if they had had a definite objective at the start. Lower Burma had been a part of the Indian Empire for 30 years. Its position had been accepted de facto by the King of (Upper) Burma, who indeed could do nothing else. In 1878 a new King succeeded, after a palace intrigue. He was weak, and the country was much disturbed. He attempted to strengthen himself by a strong foreign policy, and there was trouble with Lower Burma. Failing to get any satisfaction whatever, and knowing that King Thibaw was in-

triguing with the French, the British sent an expedition to enforce an ultimatum.[1] Mandalay was occupied in 1885, with no opposition, and Thibaw abdicated. It was then that the trouble started. It was not possible to withdraw the expeditionary force and leave a vacuum; it was not feasible to install any other effective Burmese Government, for there were no surviving scions of the royal family; and the local notables had not the authority to form what would now be called a puppet government. So, perforce, Annexation was decided on. This was far from the wishes of the British. Upper Burma was notoriously poor and was expected to be a liability and expense. The prosperity that was to come to Lower Burma from the Annexation was hardly foreseen.

Annexation implied administration, but before that could be really put in hand the country had to be pacified. As a legacy of Thibaw's rule the country was swarming with bandits known locally as dacoits. To these bands were added many discharged soldiers. Quite a number of Burmese including a large proportion of Thibaw's ministers and officials, came down on the British side. Many, especially in the Districts, sat on the fence. A few joined in opposition with the forces of disorder. The British had one great advantage: they had had experience of dacoity in Lower Burma, and they were known to the Burmese and had a good repute. They could call on the Indian Army, though the Government of India was not anxious for a long and expensive campaign. There were few towns, the country was predominantly agricultural, communications were poor, and of course there were no airplanes and motor transport. The original expedition set out in 1885, and took upwards of three years to reduce the country to regular administration.

One great asset the British took over in the village system. The whole of the country was found divided into village tracts, in each of which there was a headman. The villagers, through the headman, were responsible for all events in the tract. In their efforts to make contacts the British worked through existing headmen, the great bulk of whom were confirmed in their appointments and upheld in their responsibilities. The writer knew many of these headmen who

[1] Tennyson Jesse's *Lacquer Lady* (London, 1930) gives a readable account of the atmosphere of the Burmese court.

had lived through the annexation period, and has many happy memories of honest and capable men, with whom it was a pleasure to work.

The responsibility of the villagers was enforced in various ways, most of them taken over with the system. Generally the villagers would cooperate in the suppression of dacoity. One of the causes of Thibaw's unpopularity had been the unsettled state of the country, and after all the villagers were the chief sufferers. If a village did not do its duty it could be fined; extra police, paid for by the village, could be quartered; the village could be made to put up a strong and high fence, preventing the movement of bad characters; an unruly section of the village could be deported (this was used to deal with friends and relatives of local dacoits); the village could be ordered to put out patrols, a most useful method of stopping sabotage, on the railway for instance; in extreme cases the village would be destroyed (I hasten to say not with machine guns). In more normal times a most effective sanction was to prohibit all village festivals and theatrical performances.

These various methods were not applied indiscriminately. In all but petty cases a prescribed procedure was followed. The facts against the village were set out and a charge framed; a reply was allowed and a finding recorded, which could be appealed against. But the sentence when passed was enforced, and promptly. One effect of the public procedure was that the officials had a platform to reach the villager. Rarely was a punishment passed which was not recognized, at least by neighboring villages, as fair and deserved. On occasion an obstreperous village would be reduced to reason by the threat of proceedings.

There were one or two important points; the whole outfit was in the hands of the Civil Officer, the man who would later on be the administrator. He was under the control of and reported to his superiors, and thus it was known to the heads of the administration how many villages had been fined or otherwise dealt with. As for the Army, the instrument of the administration, it would be quite correct to say that the word "atrocity" did not exist. Kipling's "On the Road to Mandalay" gives a good idea of the attitude of Tommy Atkins, especially toward the women.

Some of the parallels and divergences in North China have perhaps been indicated. The possibilities of conciliation were certainly no less there than in Burma. The Japanese started with one less handicap: they had not outraged any local patriotic feeling (in any case not so strong as in Burma) by an openly notified annexation. The mass of the people of North China had endured a generation of warlord anarchy, and were certainly amenable to firm and just treatment. The Japanese Army had as good a reputation as the Indian; its exemplary conduct in 1900 was remembered, and the intention to cultivate friendship had been openly proclaimed. Compared with the British task in Burma, Japan's task was child's play.

In spite of their advantages the Japanese have definitely failed in their attempt (if ever they made it) to obtain from the North China peasantry the support that the British obtained in Burma. The local gentry and officials had generally migrated before the approaching armies. Those who stayed, and therefore were presumably not unopposed to cooperation, were bullied and browbeaten. The breakdown of government caused by the departure of the officials and other incidents of war led to disturbance and banditry This, as far as it affected the invaders, was met by arbitrary measures inflicted on innocent and guilty indiscriminately. No attempt at friendly approach was made, and overtures from the other side were repelled. Even in the ordinary day to day operations of occupying towns and villages the invaders suffered from a "Nanking complex." In particular, the treatment of women shocked all accepted Chinese standards, and resulted in making the women, ordinarily more terrified by war than the men, vehemently in favor of desperate resistance.

In a similar situation in the Lower Yangtze the result was increasing banditry till, as a local observer puts it:[2]

Insecurity and misery have bred a large part of the present insecurity; and the vicious circle will not be broken without unified, vigorous, and enlightened government. . . . Surely the facts themselves appeal to the present authorities, however constituted, to do their utmost in construc-

[2] Dr Lewis S. C. Smythe, *War Damage in the Nanking Areas*, published by the Nanking International Relief Committee.

tive aid to farmers. Such aid is not only a humanitarian necessity, but will strengthen the economic basis of the community and of the government itself.

That conditions as bad as those in the vicinity of Nanking did not arise in North China is not the fault of the Japanese.

There can perhaps be only one other way of dealing with a civil population in occupied territory: terrorism. And even here it is difficult to understand the methods adopted. The writer himself came across villages that had been visited twice, thrice and even four times by punitive forces. On each occasion the village was set fire to and a number of people killed. The fact that after the first visit the authorities had occasion to repeat the frightfulness is proof either that the method of terrorism is not effective, or that it was not carried out with sufficient punch. Of course the Japanese have not sufficient force to terrorize the whole of North China; but even on their lines of communication this method is not sufficient to enable them to impose their will. In this area the villagers regard the invaders as a rather bad plague of locusts; any policy of frightfulness has gone off half-cock.

The futility of the Japanese policy, or lack of policy, towards the civil population, is shown up by a comparison of the North China area with the Lower Yangtze That North China did not relapse to the condition of the country round Nanking is due to a great extent to the presence up North of the Eighth Route Army. A good deal has been written about the guerilla warfare run by this army; it is a subject that leads to bright descriptive journalism. It may be suspected that this publicity was not discouraged by the men in control, since it put up a smoke screen for their real object, for which time was essential. This may explain what at first sight struck the writer as the apparent innocuousness of the guerillas, not only as compared with their much advertised claims but even when put alongside similar efforts in Burma.

The dacoit "Bos" (pronounced Bō) who gave the British so much trouble in Burma would have had a wonderful field in North China. The railway would have been not merely torn up; the rails would have been bent so that it would not be possible for the Japa-

nese to boast a shorter repair rate than on the widely advertised Canton-Kowloon line; roads would have been destroyed, not damaged; local supplies would have been so controlled that foraging parties would have been necessary; parties led by all sorts of wild goose tales into prepared booby traps; dumps and supplies would have ignited mysteriously; the women would have taken an active hand in the preservation of their honor; and so on. It is not suggested that these things were not done; but certainly one or two ex-Bos of the writer's acquaintance would have put much more punch into it. The invaders really would have been hampered. But the comparison leaves out one important point: in Burma the resistance was local and unorganized, in North China the reverse. The men behind the organization in North China are men of great experience and ability. Of their ability there can be no doubt. They have character enough to admit the ghastly mistakes they made in Kiangsi; they have not only done this, they have got away with it with their soldiery, and imposed on them a method of cooperation with the countryside entirely the opposite to that those men were trained on. These leaders at least appear to know what they want: to quiet the countryside, to suppress or control banditry, to organize local and village government, seriously upset by the invasion, all as a means to an end—the departure of the invader.

Such operations take time, which the leaders evidently believe they have. Certainly they would not have got as far as they have, but for the Japanese playing into their hands by the policy or lack of policy outlined above. Already by the late spring of 1938, it was possible for an observer to record[3] "The Central Government might claim that its control of Hopei is even greater than before the war." The writ of the new Chinese Government runs; it is obeyed, as the writer saw, even by bandits and by men living inside Japanese garrison towns. If and when the time comes to direct the present opposition into more active forms, it is a safe prediction that the present guerilla warfare will be made to look tame. Till then, what is being done bloods the young men and helps on the anti-Japanese propaganda. If this is a correct view of the program, then there is

[3] London *Times*, 2 July, 1938.

no room in it for intensive dacoit activity yet. Anything of this nature would attract Japanese opposition prematurely, and in any case it would take energy from the process of mass organization.

THE DETAILS of that mass organization, the extent of its dependence on communist ideals, the promise it gives of a settled government after the "incident" is liquidated, though of interest to a student of administration, are not perhaps germane to the present enquiry. But the method or mainspring of that organization is important. It was not easy to obtain particulars of how the anti-Japanese cause is being preached in the villages. The school books had been withdrawn to be re-written, when the writer was there; the new versions, it was said, would put the previous books in the shade. From a long view the possibilities are alarming, as the world knows from bitter experience of such things as the toxic Latin-Teuton, Franco-German hate. Whether, with the settlement of differences with the invader, whenever that is, it will be possible to damp down the hates remains to be seen. The writer's fear is that since it is the women of China who have suffered most the hates will be passed on to the next generation. And nothing permanently constructive can be built on hate.

In Burma, a realist policy brought 50 years of peace and prosperity to the Burmese people and has led them to a position where they now have the right to real self-determination and expression. That policy was based on no openly proclaimed professions of affection, but it was actuated by British principles of tolerance and by the realization that fair dealing pays. In carrying out that policy the British depended on a system of control of their various officers, but the real success came from the fact that each officer, whether at the headquarters of government or in a lonely jungle post, had an instinct for carrying out the traditions of his people. It is hard to believe that the professions of affection for their Chinese brethren which, at the start of the incident were so common on the lips of Japanese, high and low, were anything but meant; but certainly the instruments for that end have been found wanting. It is not enough to will the end: the means must also be considered. The Japanese

are at times judged from a moral plane; the criticism of the writer is that their methods for carrying out their declared policy are futile and ineffective.

London, March 1939

THE WAR IN CHINA AND THE SOVIET PRESS

MARTIN R. NORINS

THROUGHOUT the course of the war in China there has been a tendency in the world press to assume that all countries except the Soviet Union are more or less neutral. Suggestions have recurred constantly that the Soviet Union will ultimately intervene on the side of China against Japan. Yet the expression "the world press" as commonly used still omits almost entirely the press of both the Soviet Union and China. It is particularly pertinent, therefore, to attempt a survey of the news about China and about the war that is presented to the Soviet public. By such a survey, for one thing, it may be possible to judge the views which readers of the Soviet newspapers are likely to develop. Perhaps more important, it may show whether there are any indications in the Soviet press that the U.S.S.R. might intervene in China's struggle against Japan.

It is no surprise to find in the Soviet press a special emphasis on the Eighth Route Army, the former Chinese Red Army.[1] The area which this army occupied when it came to terms with the National Government, just before the beginning of the Japanese invasion, has been greatly expanded since the beginning of the war. It now takes in a great part of North China into which Japanese columns have penetrated. This whole area, including its original nucleus organized under the Chinese Government as the Border Region of Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia, is referred to in the Soviet press as the Special Region.

On October 15, 1938, *Pravda* published a "Survey of the Chinese Press" dealing with this region, emphasizing that the Chinese are defending themselves, but also making it clear that, in this region at least, defense does not mean simply waiting for the Japanese to arrive. On the contrary, the aim and methods of the Eighth Route

[1] Accounts here cited have, unless otherwise indicated, been taken from *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*.

Army are based on constant attack on the invaders, and this principle of a perpetual and enterprising offensive has been successfully communicated to all the local movements which the Eighth Route Army has helped to train and to direct.

An account written by a partisan in the *New China News*, which was one of the chief outlets in Hankow for news from the former Communist region, describes the defense of a city in the west of Shansi Province. Because of the importance of defending this point, the partisans organized an outlying ambush before the Japanese could reach the city The first Japanese unit to appear was attacked in the rear and compelled to retreat in disorder, with great losses. The Japanese then attacked again, with heavy artillery, and at the same time burned whole villages. The result was unfortunate for them. The whole population joined the partisans (who by the initial encounter had demonstrated that the Japanese could be routed) and the result was that the invaders were not merely held up but compelled to withdraw This correspondent makes it very clear that the partisans did *not* simply quarter themselves on the people while fighting the Japanese, but showed all with whom they came in contact how to organize and to defend themselves. An important detail was care for the wounded, something in which the regular armies of China often have been appallingly deficient, according to a number of observers.

Unity of the people and the fighting forces is confirmed by the correspondent of another Chinese paper, the *Wuhan Times* (not a Communist paper), who visited Yenan, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army. "The streets of Yenan," he writes, "are filled with young students, workers, intelligentsia, artisans, men and women alike, who without loss of occupational work go through the course in war instruction. The academy for the training of the staff of the Eighth Route Army in Yenan seems to be the center of interest for the youth of all China. The superintendent of the academy is the famous commander of the 115th Youth Division of the Eighth Route Army, Comrade Lin Piao."

The correspondent of still another Chinese paper, the *New China Times*, describes the extraordinary measures taken throughout the Special Region to exterminate spies, traitors and Trotskyites. The

members of the Commission charged with this work are drawn from workers, peasants, artisans and students, who serve in addition to their regular occupations. Their efficiency is due partly to the way in which they maintain cells distributed throughout the common people, who elsewhere in modern China have, until very recently, been virtually denied political activity.

In the English edition of *The Communist International* for October, 1938, a writer called So Fei supplements these reports with additional information in regard to the special importance of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia special region in the defensive struggle against Japan. Only about half a million people inhabit this thinly settled area but "thanks to the untiring work of the Communist Party of China, they are an example for the struggle of the whole Chinese people." The article describes how the population of this region has been united in all kinds of organizations, including those for women. This makes possible an extraordinarily complete degree of mobilization, which has by no means been limited to military questions. In this relatively poor and unproductive region, the crop area has actually been increased, industrial production started, and educational and cultural work very much expanded. In this way it has been demonstrated that even so poor and backward a region can not only marshal the strength that it has but even increase the quantity and improve the quality of both its economic and its human resources.

The primary credit for the success thus won must go to the patriotic vision and organizing energy of the Chinese Communist Party; but the work has not been done in such a manner as to monopolize power or control in the hands of the Communists. All activities have been coordinated between the Eighth Route Army, the new armed forces that have arisen among the people of this territory, and the National Government. Consistently with this program and outlook the principle of unity and cooperation has been applied to the improvement of relations between the Chinese and the Mongols and Moslems, who form important minorities within this territory and on the edges of it. This trend is important in many ways and appears to have been directed at least partly against an essential policy of Japan: use of the Mongols and Moslems against the

Chinese. The Chinese Communists, in carrying out their program, have taken the lead in urging that the Kuomintang, the National Government and the supreme war command of the Northwest grant to the Mongols and Moslems the right of self-determination and self-government, and help them to achieve and to establish the right practice.

The *New China News* describes another side of organizing activity. Tremendous efforts are made to stimulate production of all kinds. One way of rousing enthusiasm is to organize competition between villages. The challenges exchanged between villages refer not only to the quantity of land to be sown and the need of completing the spring sowing, but to the necessity of improving quality. Afforestation and repair of the irrigation system have been emphasized, and the organization of women and young people in productive work has been making more manpower available. Work of this kind, it should be pointed out, has a special appeal to a peasant population; it means not only self-defense, but the improvement of peasant welfare, giving the people more of their own to defend. Education is part of the program of emancipating the people. This region of China has always been extremely backward, with a heavy proportion of illiteracy, but since the war the number of schools has actually been immensely increased The reports here quoted list 11,328 persons, organized in 1,312 groups, occupied in the primary work of "liquidating illiteracy."

A Soviet authority, A Kogan, writing on "Economic Measures of the Chinese Government," in *Tikhu Okean*, No. 3, May-June, 1938, states that in the Special Region:

> The Government has decreed exemption for soldiers participating in the anti-Japanese War and for their families. They and their families are completely freed from all taxes and duties imposed in the Special Region. The homes in which their families live are not held to their leases and the families of soldiers need not pay rent Soldiers and their families get a reduction in price on all commonly used goods and have the special privilege of being first in line to buy these goods when there is a shortage. If the families of soldiers are short of labor for cultivating their fields and getting in the harvest, they are helped by people who have voluntarily

pledged themselves to cooperate in this kind of work. As most soldiers in the Chinese Army are peasants, this decree obviously has great significance and influence.

In the same article Mr. Kogan cites a Chinese source for the statement that in 1937 the cotton harvest reached 19,600,000 piculs (one picul is approximately 133 pounds), an increase of 16 per cent over the harvest of 1936 The principal reasons for this increase, he states, are as follows·

. In the past two years there has been an increase in the crop acreage in every province, and especially in the Special Region. In 1934 (before the Chinese Communists reached the Northwest in their Long March) only 3 per cent of the cultivable land in the province of Kansu was actually cultivated, and only 7 per cent in the province of Shensi. The *Monthly Bulletin* of the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Agriculture published the results of a land inspection in January, 1937, dealing with 847 districts in 23 provinces. These figures showed that after the occupation of the Northwest by the Chinese Communists, the percentage of cultivated area had been raised from 3 per cent to 53 per cent in Kansu and from 7 per cent to 67.9 per cent in Shensi. In the same period, the total cultivated acreage in all China had increased from 7 per cent to 16 per cent of the cultivable land. The same investigation listed the total of waste land in all 23 provinces at 1,275,000,000 *mu* in area. (One *mu* is approximately one sixth of an acre, but the measure varies from place to place.) Of this it estimated 70 per cent as being mountainous, 8.6 per cent marshy and 20.8 per cent fully suitable for conversion into cultivated land.

The improvement of the condition of the peasant in the Special Region, Kogan points out, has had a strong influence on the growth of the peasant movement all over China, especially in the North. In the last two years the Central Government has taken important measures to limit the arbitrary rule of militarists and landowners in the levying of taxes and other exactions. The Government has established the principle that extreme assessment in the provinces, affecting the standard of living, should be submitted to the central authorities.

It is notable that the Government has been actively developing

peasant cooperatives—a measure strongly demanded by the United Anti-Japanese Front. Between August and December 1937 it created a central bureau of agricultural credit, capitalized at 60 million Chinese dollars, a central bureau of cooperatives capitalized at 10 million dollars and about 100,000 district cooperatives. The conference of peasant cooperatives and banks at Hankow of February 15, 1938, was typical of the response to this mobilization of resources. The conference requested that the Central Government reduce taxes and relieve the peasant, abolish all usurious speculation and revoke usurious interest on loans; that as early as possible it transfer all unutilized land to the peasants in order to extend the area sown to basic crops; and that it issue laws to make agricultural products available for all provinces, to promote free trade in agricultural products between provinces, and to provide better transportation of supplies. This conference voted for a permanent Peasant Council with three peasant representatives from each district to assist the Central Government in agricultural problems, and requested recognition of this Peasant Council by the Central Government.

Izvestia for October 8, 1938, published a dispatch about a notice issued at Hankow on September 29, the day when the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party opened its session at Yenan to discuss future Communist policy in China:

> The Chinese Government has approved the creation of political councils in each province All citizens, regardless of sex, who have average education and service of not less than two years in state or social organizations, and also persons known for their activity in cultural and economic organizations, may be members of the council. Sixty per cent of the membership is to be drawn from the populace and 40 per cent from cultural and economic organizations. A list of the membership is to be approved by the Supreme Council of national defense.
>
> The provincial political council has the right to send proposals to the provincial government, to receive reports from it and to place questions before it in sessions of the council. The members of the council are to be approved for one year. Each council is to have a permanent committee of from five to nine members, who are to serve between sessions. The law also allows political councils for the municipalities of large cities, candidates to be approved by the city government and the local committee of the Kuomintang.

As these accounts show, Soviet reports have been by no means restricted to a consideration of the activities of the Special Region of Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia and the corresponding development of peasant cooperatives and of political councils among the people; but *Pravda* has given much attention to the matter of Chinese friendship for and admiration of the Soviet Union. This is dominant in the dispatches referring to the celebration of the 21st anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia.

On November 6, 1938 *Pravda* published a dispatch from Chungking describing how widely the anniversary was to be celebrated. The celebrations were to include Soviet motion pictures, an exhibition of photographs of the U.S.S.R., and an address by the Soviet Ambassador. The Chinese newspapers were to devote a series of articles to the anniversary.

On November 7 *Pravda* printed a long article from V. Rogov, special correspondent in Chungking, describing the determination of the Chinese people to struggle on to victory and declaring that the example of the U.S.S.R. inspires the Chinese masses: "At the front and at the rear, commanders and soldiers alike continually ply me with questions about Comrade Stalin, about the Soviet Union, about the Red Army, about Voroshilov." Chinese partisans who have specially distinguished themselves, declares this correspondent, are known as "Chapaevs," after the name of the great Siberian revolutionary partisan. Rogov also speaks of the "affection" with which the profiles of Lenin and Stalin are now woven into silk in the small handicraft shops of Hunan province. He also recounts a conversation with a humble boatman who, when asked what he knew of the Soviet Union, began to tell a story which a student once had read to him. The story was Gorki's *Mother*.

The film "Lenin in October" was shown for a month in the remote city of Chengtu, where for 21 years less than 10 Soviet citizens have lived. A whole book of reviews of this picture was published, and Rogov quotes from it to show how the Chinese have learned from Lenin that "unification of all the people is necessary." Schools for teaching Russian have been opened in many cities; and in the mountainous province of Kueichou, where there are no railroads and gas for airplanes is carried by little pack ponies, this correspondent

listened to a caravan worker singing the air of a Russian so
quotes also from a letter written to him by Kuo Mo-jo, one
greatest living Chinese scholars:

The history of the new Chinese culture is very short, in all a
Into these years has been compressed a process which in other c
lasted for 300 years. In this time the U.S.S.R. has had an especial
influence on the culture of China. The heroic successes of the tw
Year Plans has inspired us, and Soviet literature and art have giv
brilliant example which we are trying to emulate. The Chinese
moving pictures, caricature, wood sculpture, music and certain co
rary short stories are influenced by Soviet culture In the course
war of liberation the speeding up of the national reconstruction o
is paralleled by the rebuilding of Chinese culture and art.

Declaring that the October Revolution had made a profou
pression on the world outlook of Sun Yat-sen, Rogov quo
father of the Chinese Revolution as saying that "The meth
Russia must be taken as a model." He states also that 41 out
books published by the Central publishing houses in Chin
the beginning of the present war have been about the U.S.S R
is an especial favorite, and a text book on the history of the
munist Party of the Soviet Union is being prepared.

On November 9, in listing foreign comments on the 21s
versary of the Revolution, the same newspaper put at the h
the list a dispatch from Chungking describing the celebration
Among the distinguished Chinese who took part were H. H.
Sun Fo, Yu Yu-jen, Chang Po-lin and Chou Lu. "Especially
was the ovation given by the gathering to that part of the sp
which Sun Fo pointed to the heroic proletariat of Petrogr
whose bravery the city was defended from the onrush
interventionists."

MORE recent reports in *Izvestia* have centered about the l
articles of R. Karmen, the journal's special correspond
China. Between November, 1938 and March, 1939 Karme
dispatches from Changsha, Chungking, Kweilin, and Sh
(Kwangtung), and appears to have been covering the southe

central war fronts. His articles present a number of significant conclusions, which may be epitomized roughly as follows:[2]

1) Extensive and rapid reforms are being conducted by the Chinese Government to ameliorate the living conditions of the common people.

2) There is tangible evidence that, from the merest youth to the mature man and woman, the Chinese as a whole are being welded into a fervent unity.

3) The resulting unity is based upon and is enhancing common loyalty and allegiance to the National Government, and deep-set opposition to any Japanese control in China, whether directly by the Japanese military or by the "marionette" governments set up by the Japanese.

4) Despite the appearance of Japanese successes, there are geographical, social, and military obstacles which are militating against permanent or continued Japanese victories henceforth

5) On the other hand, the overwhelming facts point to an ultimate Chinese victory.

These, it appears, are the basic conclusions which Mr. Karmen has thus far adduced. In obtaining them and in weighing them for the benefit of the Soviet public, he has produced journalistic accounts which in themselves are brief treatises worthy of serious contemplation. Typical of his work is the leading article, printed as telegraphed from Kweilin February 13, 1939, entitled "Kuangsi is ready to meet the enemy." He describes briefly the terrain and inhabitants of Kuangsi Province, and its capacity for resistance to Japan. (This province is the stronghold of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, who long resisted the control of the National Government, but during the war have served under Chiang Kai-shek with great distinction.) "The people of Kuangsi are naturally habituated to military service and even in peaceful times do not lay aside their weapons. Since the first day of the war Kuangsi has given the country the best of its sons. . . . Each village, each district has now been converted into a military unit. Never has war instruction been carried on in the villages as in these weeks during which there has been an ever-present expectation of an invasion by the enemy . . ." Karmen de-

[2] Izvestia, November 3, 1938, February 2 and 14, March 5 and 8, 1939

scribes Kweilin at the close of a tense day and tells of the great gatherings that view motion pictures treating of the war. He depicts a huge public theater and a musical concert given there by the youth of the community. The children's chorus loudly sings the partisan song *Ya-heil*

> We are partisans, *Ya-heil*
> Defending our native land, *Ya-heil*
> We are country rustics, *Ya-heil*
> Who wants to be a slave? *Ya-heil*
> We will expel the Japanese from our land, *Ya-heil*
> We will be free, we will be joyous, *Ya-heil*

The overfilled theater thunders with applause. Through the opened windows the singing escapes to the crowded masses thronging the streets. Passing outside the theater and attired in military uniform, the Kuangsi youth take up the air:

> We will be free, we will be joyous, *Ya-heil*

In a general way, then, the Soviet press does not present what is going on in China as a triumph of Communism or even as a state of affairs that will lead to the triumph of Communism in the near future. There is no attempt to build up the impression that China is a "natural ally" of the Soviet Union; nor is the Soviet reader led to expect that he will be called on to participate in or support forceful intervention against Japan and on the side of China. The Soviet reader is told with pride that the Chinese Communists have been in the very forefront of the Chinese resistance, and that their efforts and methods have been so successful that they are now being widely copied; but he is not told that this means that China is coming under Communist hegemony. He is told that the Chinese are getting to know more and more about the Soviet Union, that admiration of the Soviet Union is increasing; that the Chinese are aware of Soviet sympathy and are grateful for it; but the accounts are not worded in such a way as to lead the Soviet public to believe that China is becoming territorially a Soviet "sphere of influence."

The Soviet citizen who reads the news about China is not likely to underestimate the suffering and difficulties which China faces. Yet

he is not led to believe that the situation of China is "desperate." Far from it; he is given an analysis that is likely to convince him that China will triumph. This analysis is not solely based on military considerations. It emphasizes rather the release of latent economic resources and constructive social potentialities under the stress of war. In this work, he is told, the Chinese Communists have merged themselves; but in such a way that they have neither lost their identity nor their cohesion, nor attempted to impose their control over the country as a whole. Least of all is the Soviet public encouraged to believe that the sympathy of the Soviet Union is intended to achieve in China a Soviet triumph in "power politics" over the imperialism of Japan, either by the acquisition of territory or the extension of political influence.

It is remarkable how thoroughly the accounts sent back to the Soviet Union by Soviet special correspondents are in many ways confirmed by a series of articles which appeared in the London *Times* on July 25, 26 and 27, 1938. Apart from a few special articles of this kind in the world press, however, it must be conceded that the news given to the rest of the world deals more with the military aspects of the war and less with its political and social phases than does the news given to the Soviet public. Although upon reading the Soviet reports one can sense a "point of view," it is one which is to be expected and which does not detract from the informational value of the facts reported, which indeed ought to be more widely known.

This is a cardinal point. The Civil War in America was not only the record of a series of battles. It was the working out also of a broad historical process. The industrialism of which the Northern armies were the striking force was a significant characteristic of the sweeping trend which foredoomed the social and economic order of the Confederacy. Failure to realize this led many Europeans, particularly the British, to put their money on the Confederate forces. The result was an enormous and irrecoverable Confederate debt.

In the Far East it appears to be a process of liberation which underlies the present Chinese war of defense against the attempted Japanese conquest. Because a growing social, economic, and military efficiency appears inherent in this process, the course of history

would seem to be working for China. If only for its clear exposition of the details and general import of this process, and its lavish use of the Chinese press and Chinese sources, the accounts of this war given in the Soviet press deserve to be quoted more widely and to be recognized more generally than at present.

Berkeley, April 1939

REPORTS ON RESEARCH

NO. IV: CHINESE POPULATION PROBLEMS[1]

KURT BLOCH

THE study of Chinese population problems must be based on the understanding of the way China was conquered and settled by the Chinese.

China's history up to modern times is a sequence of defeats and conquests. Her empire was not a peaceful idyll under the rule of the sages, as eighteenth century writers, looking at China from afar, were inclined to assume.

China's first emperor, Ch'in Shih Huang-Ti (third century B.C.), shows dimly but clearly the features of a barbarian conqueror. Mongol conquerors again ruled the north of China long before the heirs of Jenghis Khan established themselves on the imperial throne of China as the Yuan dynasty. The Manchus again were northern barbarians.

But the greater part of China herself was conquered by the Chinese in historical times. While the imperial throne was occupied repeatedly by invading barbarians, China's boundaries steadily expanded. We have little reason to consider this growth of China as the peaceful spread of a superior civilization; its spread was probably less peaceful than the way the foreign settlers won the United States from the Indians, and certainly not more so. Up to the present day no friendship is lost between the Chinese generally and the so-called tribes of Lolo and Miao, driven by the spread of Chinese civilization into secluded mountains of western and southern China.[2]

In trying to gauge the growth of the Chinese population throughout the centuries, one should accordingly keep in mind that with the progressive expansion of the settlement area, China's population was steadily increasing, regardless of what census figures purport to show. Stagna-

[1] Reproducing the contents of a lecture under the auspices of the Social Science Division of the University of Chicago, on February 2, 1938. For its basic concepts, see the author's "Reflections on the Social Structure in China" (*Social Research*, vol IV, pp 490 ff), hereinafter quoted as SR, and his "Statistical Notes on the Census of the Chinese Population of the International Settlement held on October 23, 1935" (*Folia Medica Sinica*, vol. I, No 5, May 1936) and "Statistical Notes on the Structure of Urban Population Groups in China" (*Folia Medica Sinica*, vol. II, No. 4, April 1937), quoted hereinafter as FMS I and FMS II

[2] Cf. SR, p. 492 f.

tion of the growth of population for any considerable length of time, if shown by written sources, must be rejected accordingly for the periods of expanding settlement.

This guiding principle is all the more important because Chinese census figures, up to the second decade of the eighteenth century, were based on the assessment of taxation due to the viceroy directly, and to the Imperial Court indirectly. Local officials, accordingly, were not interested in reporting the increase of the total population subject to them, because the mere admission of such increase resulted in larger demands for tribute to be remitted to the provincial authorities.[3]

The basic difficulty in Chinese population statistics is due to the private nature of the Chinese family In the West births, marriages and funerals were subject to regulation and registration by the church—later to be replaced by the government authorities Chinese family affairs were private There have been attempts to make the family or rather the household an administrative unit for the police system Chiang Kai shek's *pao chia* system in the districts recovered from the Communists, later extended, was the latest experiment of this kind Some families have also kept registers of their own, most of them inaccessible to outsiders. But the administrative attempts have never been generally successful, nor were family registers kept by most poor peasant families. As a result, there has never been so solid a basis for vital statistics in China as the church registers in Europe, even before the affairs of life and death became subject to special civil authorities and registration.

When the poll tax, as basis for the Imperial tribute assessment, was merged with the land tax, the way was free in principle for truthful census reports. Under Ch'ien Lung (1736 96), we find accordingly a basic change, the local authorities being for the first time asked to report total population, instead of total taxable population [4] The change met with great difficulties How little credit the new census figures in the Manchu chronicles really deserve can be readily seen. We are told that China's population once increased by more than 10 per cent in a single year, and later by nearly 20 per cent, an impossible achievement.[5]

With the officials relieved of the fear of a rising poll tax tribute, the

[3] Cf SR for the fundamental importance of the tribute system for the structure of Chinese administration and Chinese society

[4] Cf. C P Fitzgerald, "Further Historical Evidence for the Growth of the Chinese Population," *Sociological Review* 1936, pp 267 ff for census tables from the chronicles of the Ming and Manchu Dynasties.

[5] Population total for 1741, 143,411,559. for 1742, 159,801,551; for 1774, 221,027,224. for 1775, 264,561,355. cf Fitzgerald, l.c., p. 272

former restraint on reporting population growth became unnecessary. On the contrary, such increase could now redound to an official's credit, as proof of the beneficial effects of his rule. A swelling population total could also serve to show how wonderfully the rule of the Manchu Emperors benefited the subject Chinese. No wonder that the Manchu census figures disclose a growth of the Chinese people at an incredible rate. The truth is that during this period the settlement area of the Chinese people expanded only very slowly. To what extent the census reports were influenced by considerations other than a supposed true count of the population is evidenced by a curious phenomenon occurring twice in the Manchu census figures, when the growth of the Chinese population appears to have been miraculously dependent on the health of the reigning emperor. In the last year of Ch'ien Lung, the population decreases by more than 5 per cent; in the first year of his successor Chia Ch'ing (1796-1821), it decreases by another 7 per cent, and in Chia Ch'ing's second year by 1½ per cent But afterwards, it increases again, though not in quite so spectacular a manner as during the reign of Ch'ien Lung. However, in the 24th year of Chia Ch'ing, the population drops once more by more than 15 per cent. Chia Ch'ing died in his 25th year of reign

The historical evidence of these figures does not seem to be worth much. It seems preferable, accordingly, to accept the figures mentioned to early Western missionaries by Chinese officials According to these figures, China's population totalled about 250 million under the Ming dynasty, ending in 1644,[6] and increased by about one-third between 1644 and the end of the eighteenth century [7]

It is generally assumed that the present total of the Chinese population is about 450 million The last Imperial Census, held in 1910,[8] gave a total of 316,917,750 Chinese, over 6 years old, with an additional estimate of 9 million children less than 6 years old, and 1,800,000 Mongols and 2 million Tibetans. This gives a rough total of only 330 million inhabitants of the Manchu Empire.

The authors of that census made an obvious mistake in their assumption as to the total of the children less than 6 years old. There are of course difficulties in accurately counting or estimating the Chinese

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[6] This is the figure given by Matteo Ricci, according to Father S Bernard of Zikawei. A similar figure was assumed under the reign of K'ang Hsi (1662-1723), by the Jesuit Fathers

[7] These assumptions follow those of Malthus in his *Essay on Population*.

[8] I am using the census figures according to Rockhill, in the *T'oung Pao*, Vol. XXIII, 1912, pp. 118 ff.

population by age groups, because of the way in which the Chinese count ages.[9] But we have a sufficiently impressive total of fairly reliable data enabling us to correct the census estimates. The percentage of children less than 5 years old has been counted in different localities and by different authors as follows:

CHILDREN LESS THAN 5 YEARS OLD, AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION

Nanking	9.5%[10]
3,100 middle-class families of Chekiang	8.4%[11]
C. M. Chiao, for rural families	13.5%[12]
Shanghai 1935	9.7%[13]
Chuyung Hsien	14.4%[14]
Hsiao Chi (Kiangyin Hsien), 1932	16.3%[15]

If we were to assume one of the high percentages (Chuyung Hsien), the estimate of the 1910 Census would have to be increased by no less than 44 million, making a total of 53 million children less than 6 years old. At the lowest percentage (of the Chekiang middle-class families), the estimate still would have to be increased by 20 million, making a total of 29 million children less than 6 years old. The total Chinese population, excluding Mongolia and Tibet, would accordingly be increased to somewhere between 345 and 370 million. This higher figure is inherently more credible. The low figure of the Chekiang sample census is not consistent with other figures of the same census, the authors of it having disregarded the Chinese manner of counting ages. The low percentages of small children of Shanghai and Nanking, again, are the result of the peculiar structure of these cities, which have grown suddenly as the result of "urbanization," as shown in the following tables:

[9] The difficulty has been fully explained by S. C. Hsü, "Vital Statistics of Chuyung Hsien (Ku)" in the *Quarterly Journal of Statistics* (Chinese), December 1935, pp. 1-25.

[10] *Official Report on Vital Statistics of Nanking*, 1935 (Chinese).

[11] *Quarterly Journal of Statistics* (Chinese), December 1936, No. 8. In 1934, the Chekiang Provincial Government carried through a "Trial Census" of 3,100 families, of middle-school students of both sexes. Seven *hsien* and Hangchow city were included. As these were families of middle-school students, they were of comparatively high economic and social standing (cf. FMS II).

[12] *Chinese Economic Journal*, Vol. XIV, "Rural Population and Vital Statistics."

[13] According to the 1935 Census of the International Settlement of Shanghai. (cf. FMS I)

[14] S. C. Hsü, *op. cit.*

[15] C. M. Chiao, Warren S. Thompson, D. T. Chen, *An Experiment in the Registration of Vital Statistics in China*, Oxford, Ohio, 1938 (Scripps Foundation for Population Research).

NATURAL INCREASE AND IMMIGRATION OF THE CHINESE POPULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT OF SHANGHAI (FMS I)

	Natural Growth Within		Net Immigration Within	
Quinquennium	5 Years	1 Year (Average)	5 Years	1 Year (Average)
1900–1905 .	10,000	2,000	98,000	19,600
1905–1910	11,500	2,300	23,500	4,700
1910–1915	13,500	2,700	118,500	23,700
1915–1920	17,500	3,500	122,500	24,500
1920–1925	19,500	3,900	30,500	6,100
1925–1930	22,500	4,500	137,500	27,500
1930–1935	26,000	5,200	124,000	24,800

NATURAL INCREASE AND IMMIGRATION OF NANKING'S POPULATION (FMS II)

By the End of	Nanking's Population	Hypothetical Natural Increase	Hypothetical Immigration
1927	460,000		
1928	498,000	2,100	135,000
1929	540,000	3,000	40,000
1930	577,000	3,200	34,000
1931	654,000	3,500	73,000
1932	660,000	4,000	2,000
1933 .	727,000	4,000	64,000
1934	796,000	4,400	64,000
1935 .	879,000	4,800	78,000

But there is still another correction necessary, not quite so easy to explain. The census of 1910 was arranged to show a rough outline of age and sex distribution. This count was not fully carried out, but results were published for sections of provinces and districts.[16] They are reproduced here, because comment would be incomprehensible without the actual figures.

SEX DISTRIBUTION, IMPERIAL CENSUS OF 1910

	Adult Population			Male
Region	Males	Females	Total	Ratio
Chihli	11,531,067	9,624,647	21,155,714	119.7
Shansi	4,528,445	3,400,719	7,929,164	113.1
Chekiang	7,004,082	5,908,237	12,912,319	118.4
Kiangsi	8,033,752	6,146,391	14,180,143	130.7
Szechuan	7,121,359	5,299,174	12,410,533	134.4
Kweichow	4,636,965	3,866,998	8,403,963	119.9
Kirin	2,685,066	2,096,700	4,781,766	123.3
Heilungkiang	810,042	637,496	1,447,538	127.2
Pekin .	500,819	256,638	757,457	195.2
Shuntienfu	1,991,096	1,743,620	3,734,716	114.2

[16] Rockhill, *op. cit.*

CHILDREN OF 6 TO 16 YEARS AS A PERCENTAGE OF ADULT POPULATION

Region	Adults	Children	Children in % of Adults	Children in % of Total[17]
Chihli	21,155,714	1,814,940	8 57	7 9
Shansi	7,929,164	493,707	6 22	5 86
Chekiang	12,912,319	1,030,336	7 97	7 39
Szechuan	12,410,533	1,338,330	10 78	9 73
Kweichow	8,403,963	862,951	10 26	9 31
Kirin	4,781,766	567,521	11 86	10 61
Heilungkiang	1,447,538	114,716	7 92	7 34
Pekin	757,457	47 653	6 28	5 92
Shuntienfu	3,734,716	327,895	8 76	8 07

The male ratio of the census of 1910 seems very high if compared with the ratio in more recent counts, as shown by the following tables.[18]

MALE RATIO OF CHINESE POPULATION GROUPS

Region	Ratio	Source
Among rural population (C M Chiao)	109	See note 12
3,100 middle-class Chekiang families	94 3	See note 11
Chuyung Hsien	116	See note 9
Lingan Hsien (Chekiang)	141	See note 19
Hsiao Chi (Kiangyin Hsien)	112 1	See note 15
Foochow	125	See note 20
Canton	131	See note 20
Wuchang	134	See note 20
Greater Shanghai	135	See note 20
Chinkiang	139	See note 20
Tientsin	141	See note 20
Hankow	143	See note 20
Nanchang	144	See note 20
International Settlement of Shanghai	146	See note 13
Hangchow	147	See note 20
Changsha	149	See note 20
Nanking	150	See note 10
Tsingtao	152	See note 20
Tsinan	157	See note 20
Peiping	159	See note 20
Sian	178	See note 20
Average for China	120 13	See note 21

There are special factors increasing the male ratio in cities, but most of the figures for rural districts, and the average ratio found by a Chinese authority for the whole of China,[21] do not seem to agree with the male ratio found by the census authorities.

[17] The last column has been added to Rockhill's figures

[18] FMS I.

[19] Cf *Rural Survey of Lingan Hsien* (Chinese)

[20] *Quarterly Journal of Statistics*, December 1935 (Chinese)

[21] Wang Shih-ta, in the *Chinese Year Book*, 1935-1936, p. 123.

The average percentage of children between the ages of 6 and 16 years in the districts covered amounts to only 9.2 per cent of the total of adults and children counted. This, if we consider the percentages given above for children below the age of 5, seems extremely small. In the five population groups referred to above, the ratio of children over 5 years old and under 15 years old, calculated as a percentage of the population, was as follows:

CHILDREN 5 TO 15, AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION

Nanking	16.7%[22]
5,100 Chekiang families	26.2%[23]
C. M. Chiao	25.1%[24]
Shanghai	14.8%[25]
Chuyung Hsien	29%[26]
Hsiao Chi (Kiangyin Hsien)	32.2%[26a]

Evidently the count of the 1910 census was not complete, for the percentage of children between 6 and 16 is unbelievably small. Combined with the extremely high male ratio shown by the census figures, there is one explanation, but it is insufficient. The Chinese are said to be reluctant to report girls of marriageable age. With the marriage age of women differing considerably according to region, it seems possible that a very large number of girls was not reported. But whatever the explanation, there is no doubt that the total of the 1910 census must be increased by 20 million at least, and possibly by as much as 60 million.

Combining the two corrective estimates, we arrive at the conclusion that the census of 1910 really indicates a Chinese population of no less than 365 million and no more than 430 million. In other words, if properly interpreted and corrected, the 1910 census would agree fairly well with the assumptions generally made at that time as to the size of the Chinese population, as well as with the current assumption of a present total of roughly 450 million. This allows for a total increase of say 50 million between the census of 1910 and the present, no less than 15 million being the increase of the Chinese population in Manchuria.

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[22] See note 10, above.

[23] See note 11. This figure seems scarcely reconcilable with the small total of children of less than 5 years of age.

[24] See note 12, above.

[25] See note 13, above.

[26] See note 9, above.

[26a] See note 15, above.

The above considerations would lead us to believe in an annual rate of population increase in China of roughly ½ per cent per annum, i.e., the figure estimated by the Chinese National Health Administration in an official booklet published in April 1936. It is quite likely that for the last 25 years the rate of increase has been higher than in the nineteenth century. During this period there has been large-scale emigration to Manchuria, and to Dutch, British and Japanese (Formosa) Far Eastern colonies During the same period, industrialization of China progressed. The population of Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin, Canton, Nanking and Hankow increased by a total of 5 to 6 million people.[27] In the neighborhood of these cities agriculture could be intensified, and all over China additional land was taken into cultivation, while cash crops were often substituted for subsistence crops.

A rate of annual population growth of ½ per cent in China seems to agree fairly well with what little is known, though some rural figures would indicate even higher rates of growth [28] The difficulty with such estimates seems to be that they are based on the assumption of "normal" conditions, leaving out of account the terrible toll taken by epidemics, famines, banditry and civil or foreign wars. Besides, emigration and the very high death-rates in unhealthy factories and mines do not seem to have been taken into account sufficiently.

WHEN Western observation of the phenomena of China's population and population growth began, the Chinese Empire had already attained its present dimensions. The great process of expanding

[27] H O Kung, "The Population of Large Cities in China" *The China Critic*, Vol XVI, pp 32 ff, Shanghai, 1937 C M Chiao et al, in their report on Hsiao Chi (Kiangyin Hsien, Ku), show that within the four years of registration, total net emigration from the district more than absorbed the natural increase. While the excess of births over deaths within four years totalled 550 persons, net emigration amounted to as much as 1,351 persons, leaving the population by the end of the period of four years reduced by 801 persons Thus, a natural increase of 6 4 per thousand and annum was accompanied by a net population loss through emigration of about 9 per thousand and annum

[28] Cf e g J L. Buck, *Land Utilization in China*, Chicago, 1937, p 395 The numerical result of the sample data collected would give a rate of natural increase per annum of 11.2 per thousand Buck himself qualifies this figure, though he is inclined to assume that during the survey period, there was a substantial excess of births over deaths. On the other hand, he stresses that in less uneventful years, such increase might be wiped out by famine, war and pestilence. The four-year registration data on Hsiao Chi give a fair approximation to such conditions and result to an average population increase by the excess of births over deaths of only 6.4 per thousand

southward settlement had been brought to a standstill by the rising political power of the Western nations along the southern borders of China. Manchuria, though closed for a long time to Chinese immigrants, was already considered a part of China. The southward spread of the Chinese could not be properly observed; but a Russian observer has described how the Chinese pioneers made their way into Siberia,[29] and probably the southward spread was very similar.

What the Chinese imported into eastern Siberia was the Chinese type of commercial penetration closely intertwined with usury. The natives of eastern Siberia entered the trap they were stripped by their creditors of all their material belongings, they were forced to sell their families to their creditors; they themselves were sold as slaves if they had not already been killed in an attempt at unlawful resistance against the lawful demands of their Chinese creditors Some of these tribes were extinguished in the beginning of the twentieth century, though the wives and daughters bore Chinese sons to Chinese families[30]

Pioneering, for the Chinese as for other peoples, was prevailingly the business of the male. He conquered for himself on the Chinese frontier not only a livelihood, and possibly a fortune, but also the women of the "barbarians" Accordingly, in a society that expanded without the help of railroads, for centuries and millennia, the male child enjoyed a definite preference. This preference has continued up to the present day, and its most remarkable result all over Northern and Central China and in large sections of Southern China,[31] has been the infanticide practiced on girl babies.[32] There is, of course, little statistical evidence of such practices, but the Rural Survey of Lingan Hsien, cited above, points to the existence of infanticide as not yet extinguished, and C. M Chiao also refers to it.[33]

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[29] W K. Arsenyew, *In der Wildnis Ostsibiriens* (Berlin 1924) and *Russen und Chinesen in Ostsibirien* (Berlin 1927)

[30] SR, p 493 f

[31] Chen Han-seng, an authority on rural conditions in China, told me that in certain still "semi-barbarian' sections of China, roughly comprising the southern half of Hunan, Kweichow, Yünnan, Kuangsi and parts of Kuangtung, infanticide was unknown, while it was very prevalent in Fukien In the former area a comparatively high degree of economic and social independence of woman seems to be a survival of "barbarian" usage

[32] In theory, of course, infanticide would be a crime according to China's modern Criminal Code; in practice there is no prosecution Bad treatment of little girls sometimes seems to amount to practices akin to actual killing Some such cases are brought from time to time before the courts in Shanghai, though probably even there only exceptionally

[33] *Chinese Economic Journal*, Vol XIV, p 328, cf also C M Chiao et al, on observations in Huao Chi, esp p 40

The registration of births in Chuyung Hsien seems to provide some evidence as to the extent of infanticide and related practices.[34] According to these figures, for each 100 girls there were 125.5 boys born in 1934, and 123.7 in 1935.

BOYS BORN IN CHUYUNG HSIEN, AS REPORTED PER 100 GIRLS REPORTED

	1934	1935
January	135	142
February	150	117
March	140	108
April	115	115
May	121	123
June	136	116
July	140	132
August	107	131
September	116	112
October	107	121
November	131	140
December	131	128

The official report points out that the birth reports were incomplete. Chinese parents are often afraid of the bad influence of evil spirits on their boys, and it would accordingly not be surprising to find under-reporting of the births of the precious boys, while under-reporting of the less wanted girls seems much less likely. Besides, the reported births of boys and girls fluctuate widely in the table given above. In some months they approach the figure of 109 male births for each 100 female births. This is the normal rate in Nanking, which is not far away. In other months, the ratio rises as high as 150. There is a regular emigration of males from Chuyung Hsien. They traditionally exercise the profession of barbers in a wide area of Central China. A surplus of females in Chuyung Hsien would therefore normally be expected. Yet there is in fact a male surplus. Nevertheless there are more women marrying outside the county than there are men bringing wives into the county from outside. Thus a comparatively large statistical surplus of men seems to be accompanied by an economic surplus of women. The fact is that the marriage customs of Chuyung Hsien require an outlay by the groom which exceeds the economic ability of so many men that even the artificially effected shortage of women does not suffice

[34] *Quarterly Journal of Statistics*, Dec. 1935, and *National Health Monthly*, Vol. II, No 2, August 1936. (Both in Chinese.)

to secure their absorption in marriage by the resident male population.[85]

These figures show how close is the link between infanticide, marriage customs and the historical growth of China's population. China's frontier required a surplus of males, and female infanticide produced that surplus; costly Chinese marriage customs debar a large proportion of Chinese men from marrying, adding to the available male surplus.

The single male is absorbed by Chinese society not only in pioneering or emigration.[86] Some stay in the villages, forming the lowest coolie stratum of society. Their literary monument is the "True Story of Ah Q," by the late Lu Hsun, describing the miserable life of the single, adult, casually employed coolie, living in the open or in the village temple, without a family and without friends, unable to read or write, so that finally, in court, he acknowledges the decree for his execution —for a crime in which he did not participate, though he would have liked to enjoy a share of its fruits—without knowing what it is all about, realizing his fate only when led to his death.

A large proportion of China's male surplus is drawn to the cities, as the above table of the male ratio in Chinese cities illustrates,[87] or works in mines and factories where many die prematurely, as a result of unhealthy working conditions and poor nourishment. There have

[85] In 1934 and 1935, 1,552 women and 1,298 men were reported as newly married. Since the bride goes to the home of the groom, and the marriage feast is held by the groom's family, it seems likely that the under reporting that clearly took place, referred more generally to marrying women than to marrying men Similarly in Hsiao Chi, women of 15-24 years of age leaving the district were more numerous than women of the same age entering. While the census gave a total of women in these ages of 1,740, net emigration from these groups totalled no less than 170 within 4 years, i.e., nearly ten per cent of the total, or relatively not much less than male emigration in the same age groups

[86] The male ratio is excessively high among all overseas Chinese

[87] Cf. FMS II:

MALE RATIO IN THE COUNTRY AND IN NANKING AND SHANGHAI, BY AGE GROUPS

Age Groups	C M Chiao for Rural China (See note 12)	Shanghai 1935 (See note 13)	Nanking 1935 (See note 10)
0– 5	109	113	106
5–15	121	119	141
15–20	118	175	150
More than 20	103	153	167

Both in Shanghai and in Nanking one can clearly see a "migratory excess of males" of working ages.

been in the recent past two other alternatives for the single male: banditry and the army.[38] It is pertinent to calculate the probable total of adult single men available as recruits. According to C. M. Chiao's material, already cited, roughly 24 per cent of the rural population are men between the ages of 15 and 44, 10 per cent of whom are single. Assuming a total rural population of 350 million people for China Proper (excluding Manchuria, Jehol and other outlying possessions), more than 8 million single men would be available as recruits. As has been shown above, however, in the instance of Chuyung Hsien, the economic surplus of men is much larger than the statistical surplus, so that the figure of 8 million may actually be too small. (The female economic surplus has, in the recent past, been absorbed partly by concubinage and prostitution, partly by factory labor.)

Nor does this figure take into account the large male surplus of the cities The Imperial census of 1910 found for Peking a proportion of two men to one woman, and similar figures are available for other Chinese cities of the old type[39] This is easily understood from the character of the old Chinese city, which primarily was a fortress, in which resided the county magistrate, representing the official hierarchy of tribute-collectors[40] Here also a garrison was stationed, and wealthy landlords, merchants and usurers maintained residences, secure from banditry and revolt. Here the arts and crafts flourished, to serve their luxurious wants. Because their economic interests were centered in the rural economy, however, they never developed into "citizens" of the Western kind. They were satisfied with being the only powerful and rich lobby at the seat of government. Their households employed large numbers of male servants and coolies. The ordinary sedan-chair, the traditional means of travelling, required no less than three bearers, a luxurious chair at least four. Similarly most industrial and shop employes were traditionally males. Most of these poor people were unable to earn enough to marry and to raise a family.

Fundamentally different is the modern Chinese city to which rapid industrialization has attracted both men and women. In shops and factories female employment, in competition with men, has grown rapidly, and fundamental changes of Chinese customs and usages are on their

[38] See article by Olga Lang, "The Good Iron of the New Chinese Army," PACIFIC AFFAIRS, March 1939

[39] A census of Canton in 1895 showed 337,500 men and 163,000 women. *T'oung Pao*, Vol VII, p 58.

[40] K. Bloch, "Warlordism· A Transitory Stage in Chinese Government," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLIII, pp 691 ff.

way. In these cities the Chinese have begun to feel themselves a nation, by contrast with the foreigners. They have also been deeply influenced by Western modes of life, and that influence has extended far beyond the upper fringe of society.

The figures of the 1935 Census of the International Settlement of Shanghai demonstrate this. They show that the fertility of Chinese women between 15 and 44 years was not much more than half of what would have been expected according to sample studies among rural population groups. Urbanization and industrialization, even in China, seemed to result in reduced population growth. This is confirmed by the two annual reports on the vital statistics of Nanking

Chuyung Hsien lies close to Nanking. Both for Nanking and for Chuyung Hsien fertility of married women has been calculated. As we have seen above, the figures for Chuyung Hsien understate fertility, since there can be no doubt that a comparatively large total of girl babies born has not been reported The total figure of births was probably at least 6 per cent higher than registered. Nevertheless the comparison of the fertility of married women in Nanking and Chuyung Hsien illustrates the differing trends of country and city in modern China.

FERTILITY OF MARRIED WOMEN, NANKING AND CHUYUNG HSIEN

Age Group of Married Women	Births Reported per 1,000 Married Women in Nanking	Chuyung Hsien
15-19	107 7	84[41]
20-29	169 0	208
30-39	101 2	172
40-49	20 1	62
Average	108 0	150

C M. Chiao in his sample study arrived at a figure of 202 births per 1,000 married women between the ages of 15 and 44 years But the decrease of the Chinese birth-rate in cities is clearly not only the result of conscious birth control, though the huge differences in the fertility of married women could scarcely be explained otherwise than by widespread birth control. It also follows from a rising marriage age, accompanying urbanization. The sample study of 3,100 middle-class families in Chekiang yielded the following figures:

[41] In Chuyung Hsien this group comprises also married women between the ages of 10 and 15 years; this explains why in this group fertility appears to be higher in Nanking than in Chuyung Hsien.

MARRIAGE AGE OF WOMEN IN CITIES AND IN VILLAGES

Married at Age	% in Cities	% in Villages
10-14	0.2	0.3
15-19	44.9	51.0
20-24	46.1	43.0
25-29	7.2	4.2
More than 30	1.6	1.3

The same tendency appears in the following figures:

PERCENTAGE OF SINGLE AND WIDOWED WOMEN

Age Groups	Chuyung Hsien	Nanking
20-29	3.4%	11.2%
30-39	5.3%	5.6%
40-49	19.3%	9.6%

Thus urbanization in China, with the increasing opportunities offered for gainful employment of women, seems to lead to results comparable with those observed in the West. At the same time, the figures of child population in Nanking and Shanghai seem to indicate decreased infanticide, although observation by foreigners naturally has been more careful there than in the country. Thousands of infants' bodies found each year on the streets of Shanghai have attracted more attention than hundreds of thousands of girl babies in Chinese villages.

This is only a rapid survey of contrasting elements characterizing the transition period through which China is moving today. Between semi-barbarian birth control through infanticide, reaching far into the future by reducing the potential number of the mothers, and modern methods of birth control, resulting from woman's economic emancipation and the conscious restriction of family size, there seems to be an abyss; yet it is only half an hour's drive between Nanking and Chuyung Hsien.

New York, December 1938

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

THE GUERILLA WAR IN CHINA

In view of the importance of understanding what kind of war is now being fought in China, we are planning to print a series of articles by experts. In this number we begin the series with a study by an established military expert. This has been shown in advance to correspondents who have special knowledge of the subject, as will be seen from the letters that follow. In our September issue we shall print another article, which also will be commented on by experts

O. L.

To the Editor of Pacific Affairs·

Sir:

As I have recently returned from China, where I made two long journeys through the area of guerilla warfare, the last one ranging from the extreme western flank all the way to Shantung in the east, I very much appreciate your letting me see an advance copy of Major Dupuy's article on the principles of guerilla warfare Major Dupuy has followed the sound method of studying the historical precedents as an approach to the analysis of the great contemporary guerilla war.

Having said this, I should add that Major Dupuy analyzes the situation from the orthodox military standpoint and that this is not an orthodox war. The human factor is of paramount importance in any war, but in this war it is of preeminent importance. Devotion to nation and family, and love of independence, are factors which must be carefully considered. China's object is to protract the war and to make the adventure exorbitantly costly for the Japanese The main striking force will be prepared to accelerate the withdrawal of the Japanese troops toward the coast when it begins. Railways are assets only when they tap a fertile hinterland. When the hinterland is self sufficient and refuses to produce for export, the railways become liabilities.

Above all, the Chinese have already clearly proved that they have not only a power of resistance, but a power of recuperation. They are really "going places" under their own power, and unless this is well appreciated all over the world, there is a dangerous possibility of mis

judging the situation. It is becoming more and more evident that the well thought out plan of a widely dispersed, mobile warfare, regarded not as a last and desperate kind of resistance, but as a definite prelude to a general offensive against the Japanese main forces, is *the* solution of China's military problem. From the beginning this was the idea of the Eighth Route Army leaders. The idea was welcomed early by General Li Tsung-jen of Kuangsi. The Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, who is the key figure in China, is now putting his weight entirely behind this concept of strategy The steady development of China, and its movement in the direction of better understanding and cooperation between the various political groups, is the most compelling drama in the world today

EVANS F CARLSON, Captain
U. S Marine Corps,
San Diego, California,
March 1939

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

SIR:

Thank you for showing me in advance Major Dupuy's article on guerilla warfare as seen by an expert military mind. Since I have recently returned from a visit to the Chinese guerillas, I should like to make several comments.

Major Dupuy's historical references to Napoleonic Spain, Lawrence's Arabia, revolutionary Siberia, and the Boers of South Africa clearly demonstrate that no two guerilla wars have had precisely the same strategy or objectives. Yet he proceeds to judge Chinese guerilla warfare on the basis of these precedents.

One erroneous deduction, it seems to me, is his assertion that "Railways will be among the principal targets, if not the principal target, of guerilla operations." It is precisely at that point that the Chinese guerillas have broadened the strategy of Lawrence whose plan of railway demolition, involving tons of guncotton supplied by the British navy, had a twofold objective to waste the enemy's money and materials by destroying rolling stock, rails, bridges, and war materials, and to force the enemy to withdraw troops from other fronts to garrison the railways. When the enemy was ultimately weakened by three years of demolition, the *coup de grace* was delivered by British regulars.

Fundamentally, Chinese strategy is the same—to wear down the enemy economically, then employ a regular army (Chiang Kai-shek's)

to drive out the Japanese. But railway demolition is a very small part of guerilla attrition; necessarily so, because the Chinese have no prodigal supply of guncotton.

The first objective of the Chinese guerillas is to occupy and garrison all territory between the Japanese communication lines, and to reorganize the village councils. In North China this process is almost complete, bringing 70 per cent of the population under control of the guerillas, while 30 per cent remain under the Japanese

The guerilla territories are then used as weapons for economic sabotage: (1) the Japanese can collect no taxes; (2) no Japanese goods are allowed to enter; (3) no raw materials, especially foods, cotton, wool and coal, are exported to Japan, (4) Chinese national currency is legal tender among the guerillas whereas Japanese scrip is used along the railways, making trade almost impossible; (5) a quarter million Japanese soldiers are employed in garrisoning the North China railways, which produce no profits, and (6) the theft of Japanese rails and telephone supplies by the guerillas, the derailment of trains, and the occasional capture of Japanese transport units drain both money and materials.

Orthodox military men have for some time been criticizing the Chinese guerillas for their failure to stop Japanese trains, but given their present limitation of resources, it is possible that the Chinese have developed a strategy equal to that of Lawrence, however different in method. In dollars and cents the two plans cannot yet be weighed

Major Dupuy devotes an inordinate amount of space to the legal status of the guerillas; whether they are or are not "legal belligerents." The point is belabored in a war where the invader denies that he is a belligerent and has on occasion violated every duty of a belligerent by massacring civilians, executing prisoners, bombing unfortified cities, demolishing schools, hospitals and churches

If legality must be considered, I can confirm from personal observation that both the guerillas and the Chinese Central Armies are taking prisoners and treating them well But the success of guerilla warfare will be revealed not by dusty legal volumes, but rather in Japanese economic indices for steel, currency reserves, foreign trade, and industrial raw materials.

Major Dupuy is correct in believing that the effect of guerilla war will be slow in appearing. Didn't Lawrence wait three years before launching his counter attack?

HALDORE HANSON
New York, March 1939

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS:

SIR:

In view of current discussions as to the effectiveness of Chinese resistance and the stability of Japan's position, your readers may be interested in some remarks in the December 1938 issue of *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. The article in question, "*Militärische und seelische Kräfte im Fernen Osten*" ("Military and Spiritual Forces in the Far East"), is by Dr. Karl Haushofer, one of the editors of the magazine, who is known as a careful student of Far Eastern affairs and one of the leading supporters of Nazi Germany's pro-Japanese policy. This was the leading article of the issue, and is particularly significant because the *Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik* is the organ of the German geopolitical school of historical interpretation, which through emphasis on such factors as size of population and "need for space" has helped to establish a theoretical foundation for German expansion abroad. Consequently, Haushofer's remarks are in no sense the personal views of one man, but have a much wider significance.

Haushofer introduces the subject by asking a few questions concerning Japan's present position in China and the world in general. He inquires whether Japan's leaders of an older period,

> the Yamagatas, Itos, Katsuras, Togos, Nogis, Oyamas and Okumas today would push ahead or sound a warning Would they find that the military forces in the Far East are on all sides set for the attainable or the unattainable, that time and space work for or against Japan, that the development of the Far Eastern war (hardly any longer to be called a "condition of the absence of peace" or an "incident") is or is not serving the prestige of Japan and the extension of its influence in the long run?

He adds significantly:

> That these questions can be raised, that it is precisely one who knows Japan well who must raise them, indicates how tremendous the responsibilities are that, in the development of this "incident," weigh upon the Showa era, the era of "shining peace."

Haushofer apparently fears that, in the course of the war in China, Japanese policy has escaped from control. Thus, after suggesting the desirability of a "continental attitude of mind" rather than an "insular" one (neither term is defined), he asks again·

> Has the forceful leap forward in 1937 (which, though unwanted from above, began at the Marco Polo Bridge) been led from above

through world-political initiative marked by a genuine continental spirit, or has, on the other hand, an insular attitude from below swept the charted continental policy into the paths of chance?

He then quotes the proverb found in both China and Japan, "He who rides on a tiger cannot dismount," and adds:

How much more so in the case of one tiger that rides upon another: the violently erupting Japanese national feeling on top of the reawakened Chinese national consciousness, which it has aroused.

What, then, are the possibilities of Japanese conquest in China? To this Haushofer replies.

We do not believe that a process of conquest and fusion, as under the Mongol Dynasty or under the much more closely related Manchus, can be repeated today . . . The 450 millions of China, despite their terrible blood-letting, are too wide awake for this, as are the 360 millions of India who sympathize with them unreservedly. *Therefore a compromise will be unavoidable,* but it becomes more difficult from day to day, the more the battle is waged against the only forces in China that can guarantee a peaceful issue. (Italics in the original)

Haushofer does not by any means say that Japan has suffered a military defeat. On the contrary, he declares that Japan's land, sea and air operations have surprised critics. As he states it, the chief military operations are over, but much else remains·

Now, however, the leadership faces the task of restoring the overrun land and people. In Tokyo it is understood that this is not to be achieved through any borrowed or self-developed technique alone, but only through *Geist und Gemut* (spirit and soul), through feeling one's way into a strange national element, a national soul that is infinitely more friendly toward that of Japan than is suspected by many who superficially look at racial maps of the Far East—a soul with a deeply wounded ancient national pride, that has reawakened with a force that was unexpected even in Japan

He sums up his remarks in these words:

In military campaigns up to now, nothing has been amiss anywhere that we have been able to observe Japanese closely in battle There remains the difficulty of the political organization, through culture and economics, of the victory already won in space, of the establishment of tenable political objectives through statecraft, of care for a successful "winning of the peace."

Though Haushofer's article provides a rich basis for discussion of German Far Eastern policy, it is necessary here only to point out that

it does not signify any wavering on Germany's part in its alliance with Japan. Since German policy today is based upon expansion and expansion requires allies, the Berlin-Tokyo axis is to be regarded as fixed.

Germany may, however, occasionally express disapproval or fear of specific lines of Japanese action, and that is the case here. Haushofer is clearly disturbed at the course of the war in China. Though he speaks, at the end, of the military part of the war as being over, he is careful, at the beginning, to state explicitly that he is discussing "the Far Eastern war," not a "condition of the absence of peace" or an "incident." He is furthermore afraid that Japan will attempt the conquest of all China, a policy which he plainly declares to be impossible In opposition to this he urges that "a compromise will be unavoidable" and suggests the adoption of "tenable political objectives"

Equally significant is the fact that, though guerilla warfare is nowhere mentioned, it is apparently referred to in the paragraphs on "feeling one's way into a strange national element" and on "the difficulty of the political organization, through culture and economics, of the victory already won in space" The phrases are curiously formed, but the essential meaning emerges Japan controls a large part of China in a nominal sense, but is not yet able really to control it politically or economically. This is but a manner of hinting at the presence and successful operation of guerilla fighters, just as Haushofer's emphasis on "winning the peace" simply indicates that it is really the war which is yet to be won.

LAWRENCE K ROSINGER
New York, March 1939

NEW ZEALAND'S SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS·

SIR.

Since your March issue the case of those who plead inaction on grounds of British Commonwealth "defenselessness" against Japan might seem to have been strengthened by recent Japanese moves. First, the occupation of Hainan, followed by seizure of the Spratly Islands, provides Japan with excellent potential air and naval bases against the Philippines, Borneo, Netherlands India and British Malaya. Secondly,

Navy Minister Yonai announced on March 6 that the new naval program was "aimed at making the Japanese navy supreme in the western Pacific and that the United States and British naval expansion was being taken into account." These moves certainly strengthen Japan's striking power in the western Pacific. But when examined in relation to the total military and political situation in the Far East they bear a very different significance.

The immediate security of Australia and New Zealand from actual attack and from severance of vital trade communications depends on Singapore. The effectiveness of Singapore now in turn depends on the nature of a possible Japanese advance. As you rightly emphasize, the actual subjection even of Singapore and Netherlands India would require large *military* forces, no matter how superior might be Japan's naval power. Any such threat to Singapore would be countered by the immediate dispatch of reinforcements from Australia's already formidable air force and small but well-trained army. To undertake even this venture Japan would have to abandon the South China campaign. Given the present concentration of Japan's best troops on a tense Manchurian-Russian border as a fixed factor in Japanese policy, and Japan's *increasing military difficulties in China*, any *immediate attempt* to "conquer" Australia proper would be suicidal.

There is an alternative, however, which was discussed at some length by Commander Rawson: a roving naval attack on south Pacific trade routes, shipping and key ports, aimed at paralyzing British and Dutch centers of resistance. Admittedly such a tactic is in the program of the Japanese "navalist school" of Pacific expansion. Commander Rawson thinks the fact that the Japanese navy would have nine or ten capital ships at its disposal, whereas at present there are no British battleships based at Singapore, *is decisive for the successful outcome of such* strategy. No final answer can be given, simply because there are so many unknowns in the picture. If the maneuver begins soon Britain *may* find it difficult to release the capital ships needed for adequate supplementing of the not inconsiderable striking power of the present combined British forces in the Pacific. But by 1940 there will be four *new* 35,000 ton battleships completed, in addition to the *King George V*, already launched. In the suggested emergency several capital ships could then be sent out to Pacific waters, even allowing for a permanent crisis, and perhaps actual hostilities, in the Mediterranean and home waters.

Commander Rawson also attaches great weight to the destructive power of Japanese bombing raids on key strategic and industrial centers.

But such effectiveness in turn depends very largely on Japan's ability to seize and hold, *with unbroken communication lines*, suitable bases. As far as Australia's vulnerability is concerned these would have to be found somewhere in south-east Netherlands India or New Guinea. Given Australia's present air strength of over 200 first-line planes (and mass production plants now beginning operation) and the raiding capacity of cruisers and aircraft carriers for attack on such Japanese bases, one may well doubt whether Japanese air strategy would demoralize Australian resistance.

Omission, however, of the *political* consequences of a possible Japanese drive to the south is, I think, the real weakness of Commander Rawson's analysis. Anglo-American cooperation in the early stages of the present war on China admittedly was not much in evidence. But Japanese naval expansion, involving as it must direct attack on Borneo and Malaya if not the Philippines, would almost certainly compel the United States to join Britain in naval resistance. Apart from the vital effect of such a Japanese move on the whole Pacific balance of power, the United States could not tolerate the loss of access to essential supplies of the raw rubber, tin and other minerals drawn from Malaya and Netherlands India.

None of these considerations, however, can bring any settled peace of mind to Australians confronted with Japan's present southward thrust. On the contrary they serve only to strengthen the conviction long entertained by the present Labor Government of New Zealand that to tolerate aggression, whether on grounds of "defenselessness," "appeasement" or "isolationism," merely hastens the day when the aggressor, enormously strengthened strategically at least in the meantime—will *have* to be resisted in sheer self-preservation by those who are threatened. At Geneva, repeatedly, as at the Brussels Conference, New Zealand's representative has strongly urged collective diplomatic and economic action to restrain Japanese aggression. The ultimate effectiveness of such action, in cooperation with the United States, is not disputed by any serious student of Japan's present economic and military situation.

In 1937-38 any imposition of sanctions, together with the securing of "parallel" action by the United States, clearly depended on the willingness of the British Government to give a lead. The lead was not given. One justification for the conciliatory policy adopted toward Japan during the first year at least of hostilities was fear of Japanese military reprisals in the absence of a strong British fleet in the Pacific. If the above analysis is at all accurate it is extremely doubtful whether Japan

could have risked any more arbitrary interference with British rights in the Far East than it has already. The significant feature of the argument is surely that the Mediterranean crisis, which kept British battleships away from Singapore, was the direct outcome of British refusal to concert firm measures against both Italian aggression in Ethiopia and the Italian-German invasion of Spain.

It is not yet too late to profit from past mistakes. Already in the United States public feeling and Secretary of State Cordell Hull's plea after the bombings of Canton last summer have ended the export of aircraft to Japan. Much more important is the movement, gathering strength throughout the country as well as in Congress, for a Government embargo on all war materials to Japan. At this time the most substantial contribution to Australian and New Zealand security and to the future peace of the Pacific would be a clear lead by the British Government for the severance of diplomatic and trade relations with Japan on the part of the members of the British Commonwealth, France, the Netherlands and the United States

IAN F G. MILNER
New York, March 1939

AGRARIAN TENDENCIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS:
SIR:

In your December, 1938, issue you published a letter from the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, taking issue with some facts appearing in my article, "Agrarian Tendencies in the Philippines," in your issue of March, 1938.

First, let me point out that my article dealt with tendencies of agrarian development in the Islands and that only in passing did I make some references to the holdings of Tabacalera. I did not charge them with running a cantina on their holdings at which they exacted usurious rates, nor did I refer to them specifically in describing the feudal practices which are prevalent in many agrarian regions of the Philippines.

As to the specific facts which I cited and which Tabacalera seek to dispute: I referred to the Hacienda Luisita as "comprising 24,000

hectares, mostly sugar lands." Tabacalera now contends that the estate is only 10,392 hectares, of which 7,200 are devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. My figure is based on a report of the Department of Labor, which completed a special investigation of the land relationships in this area in June, 1936 On checking further into the figures, I found that the Provincial Treasurer of Tarlac in December, 1938, reported the Luisita estate at over 21,000 hectares and also reported additional scattered holdings by Tabacalera in the province of Tarlac. The Department of Labor, the Provincial Treasurer, Tabacalera and the Department of Internal Revenue should be able to settle this controversy among themselves

Again using as my authority the Department of Labor report of June, 1936, I gave wages of workers on the Tabacalera sugar fields at 30 centavos a day. Tabacalera now proudly contends in its letter dated August 9, 1938, that wages vary from 50 to 70 centavos a day During my recent visit to the Philippines I had occasion to investigate labor conditions on the sugar estates at Tarlac In the fall of 1938, wages were as follows: women, 50 centavos for an 11 hour day; men, 60 centavos for an 11-hour day, plowhand, 70 centavos, children, from 35 to 40 centavos for an 11-hour day Wages in the central ranged from 30 to 90 pesos a month, depending on the type of labor I further discovered that during the last two years wages had increased, not because of the paternalism of the company, but because of the nation-wide movement for a higher minimum wage, which had been encouraged by President Quezon's enlightened attitude on labor problems. In any case, the wages now paid on the Tabacalera estate are still much below the minimum wage of one peso daily, which now prevails in the Government enterprises and in a growing number of private undertakings. In Government enterprises minimum wages are now being raised to 1.25 pesos daily and legislation is being considered to establish the one-peso minimum throughout Philippine industry and large-scale agriculture.

The Tabacalera spokesman denies that the Company holds a monopoly in tobacco. "Our purchases of tobacco," he writes, "are made in competition with several other buyers for export, resale or for cigar factories." While it may be technically true that the system of buying is competitive, there is no doubt that Tabacalera does have the monopoly on the tobacco crop. This is common knowledge in the Philippines and I am surprised that the Company spokesman should attempt to deny it. In his Report of August 11, 1936 ("Remedial Measures Sought for the Tobacco Industry"), Governor Fort. M. Bulan of Isabela, the

chief tobacco-producing province, showed how this monopoly maintained itself by means of advances to the planters and by the ownership of practically all warehouses. He recounted how the large buyers were able to disrupt the cooperative associations which the planters attempted to establish in 1932 and 1935, by appointing as agents members of the associations, by offering lower prices for the crops of the association members or by refusing entirely to buy these crops. Governor Bulan reports the daily wage-equivalent of a tobacco planter and his family at 21 centavos a day, from which must be deducted interest and wear and tear on the implements and land, and the cost of the seedlings.

In passing, it may be mentioned that Tabacalera owns 15,000 hectares in Isabela province, and that its two sugar centrals (Bais and Tarlac, with a combined daily capacity of 9,500 tons) are among the largest in the Philippines. While Tabacalera may not be the greatest of the monopolies operating in the Islands, it certainly holds an important position among them.

In any case, the Tabacalera contentions do not contradict the main point which I attempted to prove in that portion of the article where the references were made to their holdings "The establishment of centrals on Luzon has been accompanied by the concentration of land ownership and the emergence of large landed proprietors closely associated with the central."

JAMES S. ALLEN
New York, February 15, 1939

RELATIONS OF CHINA AND JAPAN

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS:
SIR:

In his review of *Relations de la Chine et du Japon,*[1] Mr. Jones disputes my characterization of the "friendly" policy of Japan toward China between 1874 and 1889; but the fact is that there were no hostilities during this period. He also assumes that I gave the year 1905 as the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War; whereas the fact is that I referred to 1905 because that was the year of climax. Another misinterpretation is the assumption that the French word *commandant* means

[1] See below, pp. 205-206.

that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance *compelled* Japanese intervention in the World War. The French word means "to direct," as well as "to compel." Compare the expression *les leviers de commande.*

Mr. Jones stretches what I said about Japanese shipping to make it apply to competition with British and American shipping; but the subject of the book is relations between China and Japan.

In criticizing my interpretation, Mr. Jones himself underestimates Fascist influence in China and emphasizes, instead, the influence of Communism. That Fascist tenets have affected the Chinese Nationalist Government is, however, the opinion of M. Escarra, advisor to the Chinese Government and a weighty authority See his recent book, *L'honorable paix japonaise,* also H H K'ung's speech in Berlin, July 9, 1937. As for Russian Communist influence, let me point out again that my book is about Japan and China, not about the U.S.S.R. and China. In the particular question of agrarian reform, I did not "underestimate," but merely pointed out that the movement is not well known.

As for the closing of the sea-routes—the situation today bears out what I wrote a year ago. Similarly my reticence about both the Yunnan railway and the Turkistan route is justified by the fact that it was then already plain that if France did not curtail transport, the Japanese would bomb the railway; while the Turkistan route has, as I said, proved inadequate for large scale supply. I did not say that *nothing* could be supplied through Turkistan.

I appreciate the corrections of the slips and printer's errors and errors of transcription with regard to Ieyasu, the date 1847, which should be 1874, and the name of Mr Wakasaki where Mr Wakatsuki was meant.

ROGER LÉVY
Princeton, December 1938

WOULD CANADA SUPPORT BRITAIN?

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS:

SIR:

Soon after its publication I read Professor F. R. Scott's *Canada Today* with the keen interest one feels in anything he has to say. I have now had the opportunity of checking my own impressions of the book with Mr. Ian F. G. Milner's sympathetic review in the March number of PACIFIC AFFAIRS. With much that Mr. Milner says I find myself in

thorough agreement. Every one familiar with Professor Scott's writings knows that he is a man of wide knowledge and usually sound judgment, and that he has, as Mr. Milner says, "the gift of condensed and lucid statement coupled with a power of pithy characterization." If one must quarrel with his point of view it is that he does not, or so it seems to me, always succeed in being as objective as it is, presumably, his wish to be. His opinions, clear and concise and expressive as they are, are still the opinions of Professor Scott, and not necessarily also the opinions of any large body of Canadians. And it is just because I do not believe that in this book he speaks for more than a comparatively few of his fellow-countrymen that I venture to put in a mild demurrer.

Professor Scott, as Mr. Milner says, is a member of the National Council of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. A not unfair indication of the strength of C.C.F. sentiment in Canada is the fact that there are at present six members of that party in the Canadian House of Commons, out of a total membership of 245. In a debate on foreign policy recently, Mr. Woodsworth, the leader of the C.C.F., expressed in almost identical language the views of Professor Scott as to the supposedly dangerous results of Canada becoming involved in any war entered into by the British Government. The leaders of the two major parties, Mr. Mackenzie King and Dr. Manion, representing an overwhelming proportion of the people of Canada, did not share Mr. Woodsworth's alarm. They, on the other hand, made it abundantly clear that Canada would stand with Great Britain and the other Dominions in resisting the aggressive designs of the dictatorships.

Mr. Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Justice in the Dominion Cabinet, who probably more than any other man represents French-Canadian opinion, was if anything even more emphatic than Mr. King or Dr. Manion in insisting that Canada could not remain neutral in a war involving other parts of the British Commonwealth. "Canadians," he said, "would not tolerate the necessary implications of neutrality, seizure of her ships, internment of her soldiers and sailors, and in reality separation from the Empire."

A few days ago a similar debate on foreign policy took place in the legislature of Ontario, the largest and most influential province of the Dominion. The debate resulted in the unanimous adoption of a resolution "in support of any action which it may be necessary for the Imperial government to take," and expressing the view that the Dominion should have power to "mobilize the wealth and manpower of Canada in defence of our free institutions." Sentiment in the French province of

Quebec has so far taken the form of demanding that conscription should not be applied in Canada, and that is rather like tilting at a windmill as both Mr. King and Dr. Manion are in complete agreement with Mr. Chamberlain that conscription is not an acceptable policy.

Canadian isolation from the rest of the Commonwealth has, I believe, very little support anywhere in Canada. No government, Dominion or Provincial, advocates anything of the kind, and in its only logical meaning, separation from the Commonwealth, it is not the policy of any Canadian political party. As a sentiment it is confined to a few individuals. Nor can one feel that what Mr. Milner describes as Professor Scott's "pithy characterization" of the feeling of Canadians towards the British Commonwealth and the United States respectively—"the Commonwealth provides the Sunday religion, North America the week-day habits, of Canadians," is a particularly happy or just aphorism.

LAWRENCE J. BURPEE
Ottawa, March 1939

BOOK REVIEWS

NIPPON KOKKASHUGI NO HATTEN (Evolution of Japanese Nationalism). *By Dr. Tetsuji Kada. Tokyo. Keio Shobo.* 1938. *pp. ix* + 390. ¥1.80.

JAPANESE nationalism, as one of the influences in the nation's political and economic life, has had an important bearing on the shaping of Japan's Continental policy In a considerable number of books this subject has been dealt with, but unfortunately few of them have been free from such wartime shortcomings as hasty writing, dogmatic treatment and self-complacence The present book stands out as almost the first contemporary attempt at an objective historical approach. Although by no means a big ambitious study, it is well balanced and fairly comprehensive, describing how nationalism was born in Japan, how it has since evolved and what factors underlie its recent remarkable resurgence and multiplied force. The author dispassionately reflects on the turbulent current of political thought that has run through Japan since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, and offers many a suggestion as to the basic attitude with which the nation is to face the difficult problems that lie before it.

The 1868 Restoration, marking the end of the feudalistic social system in Japan, was brought about by two major factors, first, the collapse of agrarian economy resulting from the feudalistic exploitation, coupled with the increased importance of commercial capital accumulated among city merchants, and second, the ruthless onslaught of Western capitalism against feudalistic Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate. The first task under the Restoration was to bring the country up to the level of Western nations as far and as speedily as possible. The result was a wholesale importation of Western civilization, which inevitably involved certain evil effects. The first emergence of ultra-nationalism was a reaction to this tendency.

Almost simultaneously, a "people's rights" movement began to gain strength against the bureaucratic tendency of the Government, which was monopolistically dominated by the Satsuma and Choshu factions. Those Government leaders naturally preferred the Prussian type of state powers and suppressed the popular movement; though they firmly adhered to their policy of speedy Westernization and followed weak-kneed policies towards the Western Powers. Against these trends arose

a new school of what the author terms "progressive" nationalism. He attributes its rise to the fact that by about 1890 the manufacturing industries in Japan had developed enough to demand protection against foreign competition. The Three-Power Intervention that followed the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 rallied support for Japanese nationalism, and thus was born another school of nationalism which he calls "Nipponism." Its aim was to arouse a national consciousness of Japan's destiny on the Asiatic Continent. This movement encountered a formidable obstacle in Japan's then steadily growing capitalism. The progressive elements, who believed the growth of capitalism to be the major prerequisite to Japan's national development, got the upper hand and checked the new-born "Nipponism."

Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) restored and more deeply impressed upon the Japanese the idea of a national destiny on the Asiatic mainland; but Japan still had to exert every effort to reach the Western level of national development. Britain, then Japan's ally, was naturally chosen as a model. To be the "Britain of the Orient" was the goal of national aspiration. Every effort was made to do away with any obstacle that stood in the way of capitalistic development, and the liberal tendency became more conspicuous in national life.

With the World War, the allied Powers' propaganda for democracy found favorable conditions prevailing in Japan, where the political parties had rallied enough force to shake the dominant military-bureaucrat combination. During this period Japan had its first Cabinet based on a political party. The war boom brought higher costs of living and a wave of labor disputes. The working masses were awakened to such political consciousness as had never been witnessed before. Both the democratic and labor movements gathered momentum. Toward the end of the War, socialism first began to influence these movements, as the result of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions. The socialist group bitterly criticized the advocates of democracy, and finally won the day. All schools of socialism were introduced to the Japanese public, but Marxism alone survived as a practical political movement. With the development of the Bolshevik Revolution, Dr. Kada points out, Russian Communism gained in influence over all social movements and political thinking during the decade after 1923. This created the troublesome "thought problem" of the time.

Dr. Kada then turns to the first revival of nationalism, represented by the reactionary nationalist groups, in the midst of this period when the Marxist movement was at its zenith. In his view, what distinguished

this new nationalist force was that it gave serious consideration to concrete steps to realize its objectives, the earlier schools of nationalism having hardly gone beyond abstract theory. Kazuteru Kita and Seikyo Gondo were the two outstanding thinkers of this movement The former advanced practical programs in his famous *Nippon Kaizo Hoan Taiko (Outlines of a Program for the Reconstruction of Japan)*, while the latter elaborated his theory of national reconstruction in his *Jichimimpan (People's Code of Autonomy)*, both published in 1919. Kita's program for national reconstruction included a detailed argument for Japan's need for expansion abroad Gondo based his theory on an agricultural society. Both books were Bibles of the nationalist groups for the years that followed, especially Kita's

The author then traces the successive emergence of advocates of "intensive" nationalism, agrarian nationalism, state socialism and the more positive and progressive nationalism that began to flourish after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, up to the present "Renovationist" group. He notes that these later schools all placed emphasis on national economic programs as well as social reform and that they were an outgrowth of Japan's internal and international situations after the World War, reflecting the social unrest caused by the world depression and the mounting tension in Sino-Japanese relations which was created by the anti-Japanese movement and which later led to the Manchurian Incident. He tersely summarizes the position of the political parties in this period by stating that they, no longer able to maintain their liberalistic stand, had completely lost sight of any guiding principles of their own In his opinion, the underlying cause of this tendency was the high degree of monopoly economy which had by that time developed in Japanese economic life. Since free competition was now possible only under this economic system, party politics came to be regarded as an inefficient political form of free competition Indeed it was the tragedy of party politics in Japan that the parliamentary system—a product of liberal capitalism—had been brought into being at a time when the capitalist system had already reached the stage of monopoly.

The latest form of nationalist movement—the "Renovationist" school—derived its origin from the military group. As in other countries, the decline of the middle class has spurred the nationalist movement. Dr. Kada points out that the majority of officers in the Japanese fighting services belong to this class, just as the lower ranks come from the rural community. The decline of the class to which they belong and the growing international tension drove home to these officers of the

middle and lower ranks the acuteness of the situation. On top of this the "corruption" of the political parties and the "privileged classes" made the internal situation appear alarming to them, and these sentiments were widely shared by the victims of urban and rural depression. The "Renovationist" movement, aiming to reform the country's political and economic life, was bound to gain the sympathy of these people.

The author concisely deals with religion—Buddhism and Christianity—and the nationalist movements, especially in their early stages, and also discusses the effect of Western thought in molding modern Japan. In the midst of the present outburst of nationalist sentiments he rightly recalls the progressive attitude of leaders of the Meiji period toward Western civilization and thoughts, and stresses the necessity at this particular moment of re-examining them in relation to the future course of the present nationalist tendencies.

In Part II Dr. Kada makes a historical survey of the positions in Japanese politics of the bureaucrats, the political parties, the capitalists and the military group He points out that the aggravation of international tension and the growing need for national expansion have been mainly responsible for bringing about the increased importance of the military group As the propelling force of the more recent nationalist movement, their demands are not confined to the strengthening of armaments but extend to many social reforms and the renovation of national life from the viewpoint of "National defense in the broader sense," meaning the stabilization of the people's life This, he points out, responds to the social awakening of the masses in Japan

After reviewing the conspicuous political and social trends in Japan as reflected in a series of "incidents" in the past several years, the author sees two main factors in them· Japan's expansion abroad, and the stabilization of the nation's livelihood. Japan has already paid dearly for them, in the assassination of a number of political leaders. In the opinion of this author, it is likely that more sacrifices will be demanded in the course of future efforts to tackle these questions. He also traces the development of Japan's Continental policy from its very beginning, vis-à-vis the international situation and particularly the Far Eastern policies of the Western Powers. He devotes considerable space to a comparison between the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and the present Sino-Japanese conflict. This seems a little too long and somewhat out of place, though it gives a highly informative interpretation.

Part III comprises more than a score of short articles dealing with various questions, political, economic and social, of the last few years.

They range from "Japanese Views on the Westerners, Past and Present" to "Contemporary Views of the Military Group" and "The Mental Attitude of the National United Front." Throughout these articles may be observed his objective criticism of the trends of the times, full of his sincere warning that no amount of mere emotional haranguing would promote the cause of the nationalist movement. He stresses the point that it must be fully subjected to dispassionate criticism and scientific scrutiny before it can hope to be a complete system of thought upon which could safely be based fundamental political and economic changes. Dr. Kada, who was instrumental in introducing Guild Socialism to Japan nearly two decades ago, is in no sense a nationalist himself nor can he be regarded as particularly sympathetic toward the nationalist cause. However, the present work is notably as free from cynical criticism as it is from emotional advocacy of the nationalist cause Dr. Kada has demonstrated an attitude which is sorely required at this crucial moment from students of social science

NAGAHARU YASUO
New York, March 1939

EDITORIAL JOTTINGS. *By Inazo Nitobé. 2 Vols. Tokyo Hokuseido.* 1938.

THESE two artistic volumes contain several hundred brief meditations penned during the last three years of his life by one of the most elevated and brilliant personalities modern Japan has produced. That they were often written under pressure, for the English section of the daily *Osaka Mainichi*, does not appear in their cameo-like finish They range over many fields of human interest, but perhaps the most frequently recurring themes are personal conduct, international relations and literature. While not to be compared for weight and scholarship with his well-known *Bushido* and *The Japanese Nation*, these fragments contain interesting revelations of a cosmopolitan Japanese spirit.

Successively a student in America and Europe, a teacher and administrator in Japanese universities, and assistant secretary-general of the League of Nations from 1920 to 1927, Dr. Nitobé's mind was enriched by all the realms through which it coursed. He was always an internationalist but none the less a patriot, for, as he wrote:

The antithesis of patriotism is not internationalism or even cosmopolitanism, but Chauvinism. Internationalism is the extension of patri-

otism. If you love your country, you must needs love other countries without which your own country cannot exist and loses its *raison d'être*. If you love the world, you must, perforce, love best that part of it which is nearest to you.

He is a poor patriot who would glorify his country by making her the enemy of other nations. Equally poor is the patriot who can find no fault with his own country; for a self-righteous nation can never improve

His faith in the League of Nations survived Japan's withdrawal. On April 6, 1933, he wrote·

A New York correspondent has recently said that the Liberals of Germany lay the rise of Hitler to the victor nations, whose treatment of the country the whole population resents To the disinterested outsider the present situation looks very much like a "logical outcome of foreign persecution."

The world may yet learn what an unwise thing the states belonging to the League have done in their gross ignorance of the situation in the Far East (Manchuria).

Much as I stand for the principle of the League, I regret that a grave mistake and wrong were committed by it. It has evidently forgotten it is a political and not a legal institution. Its policies should be guided by political wisdom and not by a narrow and technical construction of the Covenant.

But the League will learn, and as it learns it will grow stronger.

On June 20, he added· "Our denial of the League's authority does not diminish its utility and importance"

He defended Japan's course in the Manchurian affair of 1931, but he pled for the Open Door there

There is every evidence that Manchuria will in a few decades be one of the greatest melting pots of the nations Evidence of this hits us in the face wherever we go in that country.

Here lies the need of "the Open Door" for capital and its agencies.

Unless the doors are opened wide, the pot will never boil, its contents will never melt and mingle, and the land will freeze as it has frozen for centuries.

Dr. Nitobé evinces sincere admiration for the Chinese people.

We meet among the people of China men of the greatest parts—of towering intellect, profound spiritual insight, of lofty moral character The race is virile and versatile. It is genial and ingenuous. It is hardy and hardworking. What may not a people like this accomplish—if only they unite in a common task?

One of the latest comments, in September, 1933, ventures this forecast of Hitler's regime:

According to a report in a newspaper, Hitler is a great admirer of Cromwell. We can all see superficial resemblances between the actions of the two men. . . .

In a couple of decades, if not sooner, shall we not witness the same event in Germany that followed the English Commonwealth after the Protectorate—the Glorious Revolution of 1688?

GALEN M. FISHER
San Francisco, September, 1938

THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN *By Kenneth Scott Latourette. Fourth Edition with New Material New York Macmillan.* 1938. $2 50.

THIS book of 250 pages, originally published in 1918 and once more brought up to date, is an effort "to present a summary of the development of the nation, its people, its civilization, and its problems and policies, which will give the essential facts and at the same time be of sufficient brevity to be covered in the six weeks usually assigned to Japan in the average course on the Far East" It achieves this task with rare impartiality In Great Britain there are unfortunately few courses yet in existence for which it can be used as a text, but it can be recommended to anyone who is beginning his studies on the subject and who has not the time to tackle Sansom and Murdoch.

While not free from a number of common Western misconceptions of Japan, the book is unusual in its emphasis on our need to study Old Japan, the curious originality of its people, the relatively high standards of its traditional way of living except in time of famine or trade depression, the peculiar Japanese conceptions of "loyalty" and the fulfillment as well as the breaking of promises. The short bibliography is useful, but it is surprising to find that the Asiatic Society of Japan, which was founded in 1872, only four years after the Meiji Restoration, is credited with an output of 20, instead of 65 volumes.

N SKENE SMITH
Birmingham, England, January 1939

THE JAPANESE CANADIANS. *By Charles H. Young and Helen R. Y. Reid; with a Second Part on* ORIENTAL STANDARDS OF LIVING, *by W. A. Carothers. Toronto University of Toronto Press.* 1938. *pp.* xxx + 395. *Ill., maps.* $2.25.

THE two studies included in this volume complement each other. One was initiated as part of the international research program

of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The first and larger section results from the interest of the Canadian National Committee on Mental Hygiene in the foreign-born, an interest which a few years ago brought forth an exceedingly interesting volume by the same authors on *The Ukrainian Canadians.* It is a general survey, with a brief history of Japanese migration to Canada and an appraisal of various proposals for dealing with unsolved problems in the relations between Japanese and White-Canadians.

The situation which creates these problems and keeps them alive is similar to that in the United States—with the important difference that under the Gentlemen's Agreement between the Dominion and Japan a small trickle of immigration continues, emphasizing the foreign element in a population group which, as a whole, has shown its assimilability. This connection with a foreign country and a foreign culture is, in fact, the only genuine source of trouble; no reasonable people in Canada pretend that citizens of Japanese descent are undesirable on grounds of inherited group characteristics

As in other countries, the objection to residents of the Japanese race arises in the main from the fact that they tend to congregate in closed communities instead of distributing themselves over the land. However, when neither in Canada nor in Continental United States even those of the third generation of American residence follow the advice to better themselves by moving from the base of their cultural and racial affinity, it would seem that the matter is not so simple. Perhaps it takes more than three generations for members of an ethnic group with a fully developed culture of its own to feel happy as individuals, if cut loose from it, perhaps the very forces that make racial decentralization desirable in the interest of individual success and happiness actually militate against the psychological practicability of such a movement by increasing fear.

The study also shows that anti-Japanese feeling is constantly being re-inflamed by a repetitive process. as soon as one vocational opportunity is stopped for the members of that group, their ambition leads them to concentrate effort upon another until that also is proscribed.

The same peculiar situation gives a semblance of substance to the charge that Oriental residents undermine the standard of living. While it is true that most of them come from poor sections and poor classes in their respective home countries, the point to remember is that they have come away from conditions which would be intolerable to American workers because they also found them intolerable. Neither Chinese

nor Japanese are in the habit of refusing better conditions of life and labor; if they do not attain them, surely the fault lies with those who persistently refuse them not only the opportunity to rise from the lower to the better paid occupations, but also the opportunity of organizing for better terms in the more humble occupations.

Limitation of the range of employment is the only real handicap of the Canadian of Oriental ancestry. There are, of course, those who support their families overseas, but each year, as more of the first generation of immigrants die out this cause of wretched living conditions diminishes. The adoption of Western food standards, in fact, is rather rapid, considering how conservative most people are in the matter of diet. The Japanese, who bear the brunt of anti Oriental feeling, actually assimilate more rapidly to Western standards than do the Chinese—chiefly because they are the younger group and, through their children, have more direct contacts with Western life

These Canadian studies again show that the subject of Oriental immigration and assimilation in North America is far from being settled, and that a just and generous treatment of their Oriental minorities is one of the tangible contributions which Canada and the United States can make to the appeasement of international conflict in the Pacific

Bruno Lasker

San Francisco, March 1939

Relations de la Chine et du Japon *By R. Lévy. Centre d'Études de Politique Etrangère Section d'Information Publication No 8. Paris· Paul Hartmann 1938 pp 135 10 frs.*

This book, by the Secretary-General of the Comité d'Études des Problèmes du Pacifique, gives the French public the salient points in Sino-Japanese relations. The main emphasis is on events leading up to the present conflict. Despite the documentary material and secondary sources upon which it is based, there are some errors which so well-informed an authority as M. Roger Lévy would have put right had he had sufficient time. The Japanese seclusion edict of 1636 was not issued by Ieyasu, who had been dead for 20 years, but by his grandson, Iemitsu (p. 18). The Japanese expedition to Formosa was in 1874, not 1847 (p. 26, footnote), though this is obviously a printer's error. A Japanese treaty with Korea in 1883 is mentioned; but there was an earlier one in 1876, six years before the first Western treaty with that

country—concluded by Commodore Shufeldt on behalf of the United States in 1882—so that the Japanese got a political and especially a commercial lead. The Li-Ito Convention of 1885 did not recognize Korean independence. In point of fact it was followed by a tightening of Chinese suzerainty, with Yuan Shih-k'ai as Resident at Seoul until 1894. To describe Japan as pursuing "une politique amicale" toward China and Korea between 1874 and 1889 is somewhat strange in view of the Japanese annexation of the Liuchiu Islands, tributaries of China, and the Japanese-inspired coup d'état at Seoul in 1884. The Russo-Japanese War began in 1904, not 1905 (p. 33). The Anglo-Japanese alliance can hardly be said to have compelled (*commandait*) Japanese intervention in the World War (p. 40). Japanese shipping in the China trade was not a serious threat to British and American traffic before 1895 (p. 93).

It is also doubtful how much "fascist" tenets have affected, as suggested, the Chinese Nationalist Government and philosophy; on the other hand some mention might have been made of the very real influence of Borodin in the reorganization of the Kuomintang and the structure of the National Government. The Chinese Communist program is quite rightly differentiated from the Russian program but M. Lévy certainly underestimates its importance as a scheme of agrarian reform (p 65, n.). The affair of May 30, 1925, at Shanghai did begin with trouble in a Japanese cotton mill, but the chief incident was the firing on the mob ordered by a British inspector of the Municipal Police and the agitation and boycott which followed were mainly directed against Great Britain, which bore the brunt of the Communist-inspired attack during 1925-27, and initiated the policy of conciliation. The Ministry in which Baron Shidehara served as Foreign Minister was that of Mr. Wakatsuki, not Mr. Wakasaki (p. 52). The sea routes to China were not "closed" by the Japanese Navy (pp 121-2), except by the occupation of Chinese ports, because since China and Japan are not technically at war, Japan cannot effectively interfere with the shipping of third parties. The entry of munitions into China, chiefly by way of Hongkong, was an important factor in the first phase of the war. It is curious that in the reference to routes from Indo-China (p. 122), nothing is said about the Yunnan railway. The Turkistan route should not be dismissed as impracticable, as some supplies have come by this way, while a good many military aeroplanes have been flown in via Urumchi, Lanchow and Sian. The value of a later edition would be enhanced if these matters were set right.

F. C. Jones

London, November 1938

Das Bergland der nord-westlichen Mandschurei (The Mountain Land of Northwestern Manchuria). *By Bruno Plaetschke. Petermanns Mitteilungen Erganzungsheft Nr.* 232. 1937. *pp* 101 *with maps. RM* 16.

Few parts of Manchuria are so little known as the northwestern border along the Argun and the Amur. The Chinese Eastern Railway crosses the Great Khingan (Hsingan) Mountains in latitude 49°, and to the west traverses the Barga Steppe past Hailar to the Soviet frontier at Manchuli. The mountains are part of a maturely dissected mountain land with northeast-southwest structures which continue to Lake Baikal. North of the railroad, a corner of the Mongolian plain projects between the mountains and the political boundary along the Argun.

In 1932 and in 1934, the author travelled north from Hailar, almost to the Amur, and south to the Arshan hot springs. The chief area of settlement in the north is the Three Rivers District along the Gan, Derbul, and Chaul, about 100 miles above the railway. As early as 1864 the region was surveyed by Kropotkin, and from early times nomadic Tungus tribes have visited it. Russian settlement followed the Revolution, with the arrival of Cossacks from Transbaikalia. In 1933, the Russian population in the three valleys numbered 5,519.

Within the Three Rivers District are some 300 square kilometers of grassland, mostly in the valleys The hills, especially on the north slopes, are covered with birch forest. Some 10,000 hectares are cultivated for wheat, rye, barley, oats, and buckwheat, but the principal occupations are cattle raising and hunting for furs. The cattle numbered 14,264 in 1933, and there were 13,640 sheep The frost-free season extends only from mid-May to mid-September, so that cultivation is precarious The precipitation is low, but is largely concentrated in the summer; July often has half of the yearly total. Since average annual temperatures are below freezing, much of the subsoil is permanently frozen. Although the surface melts during the summer, there is no underground drainage so that the ground is swampy.

Northwestern Manchuria includes two diverse environments, the mountainous Khingan and the Barga plain. The Khingan is an old range, largely igneous, with maximum elevations of 1,600 meters. Most of the area from 1,500 down to 1,000 meters is forested, except south of the railway. The population is very sparse, chiefly Tungus tribes, and the only products are furs. The Barga Steppe is a grassland projection of the Gobi which forms a triangle with its apex 100 miles north of

Hailar. Except in the Three Rivers District, the population is largely the nomadic Mongols and Buriats, with Chinese and Russians along the railway. There is no cultivation. The total population of Barga is about 30,000, and Plaetschke estimates that the number might be increased to 100,000. To the reviewer, who has travelled in the southern part of Barga, this figure seems over-optimistic. An interesting account of the area in English is Miss E. J Lindgren's "North-Western Manchuria and the Reindeer-Tungus," in the *Geographical Journal* for June, 1930 (LXXV, 518-536).

Plaetschke's chief contribution to our understanding of this sensitive boundary between the Soviet Union and Japan is to emphasize the undeveloped and inaccessible character of the Khingan Mountains. His route did not touch the border at any point, but it is obvious that large scale military operations must be limited to the Barga plains.

GEORGE B. CRESSEY
Syracuse University, February 1939

UNCONQUERED. *By James Bertram. New York John Day. 1939. pp.* 340. $3.00.

THE DRAGON WAKES A REPORT FROM CHINA. *By Edgar Ansel Mowrer. New York Morrow. pp.* 242. $2.00.

BOTH of these books disprove the superstition that China is a weird country, where no rules hold, reason is at a loss, and a special kind of instinct or second sight is required for the understanding of events. James Bertram wrote his *First Act in China,* one of the best accounts of the detention of Chiang Kai-shek, when he had been in China only a few months. He has continued to work hard to understand what goes on in China, why it goes on, and who takes part. He is now one of the three or four real experts writing in English on the guerilla war in North China. *Unconquered* is a remarkably accurate account of this war Bertram's exposition of tactics and strategy is admirable, but of even greater value is the way in which the military account is integrated with a description of the land and the people of this part of China· the environment and the society of this guerilla war—not the suppositious guerilla war of some theorist or other, but this particular guerilla war. This is a book by a man who knows what he is talking about, and should be read by editors and military experts who tend to discount China's power to resist, and to convert resistance into a successful aggres-

sive campaign. It is also very well written. This may not help the book as it should; there will be people who suspect that so logical an account must be the product of wishful thinking.

Mowrer's book is not nearly so well written. For this very reason it may have a wider effect in opening people's eyes to the all important fact that this war is not just a collision between a quantity *x*, of fixed value, and another quantity *y*, also of fixed value. The truth is that *x*, the strength of Japan, is diminishing, whereas *y*, the strength of China, is increasing, and also getting better organized.

Mowrer makes a lot of mistakes of fact (most of them not very important). With a number of his estimates of the character and value of important individuals I should disagree. Yet precisely because I can spot a lot of his mistakes, and think of arguments that go against his judgment of individuals, I am sure that Mowrer is very much a man to respect. Like a few other top-flight newspaper men whose technique has been seasoned with a great deal of experience, he has the knack of dealing with problems which he does not altogether understand in such a way that his errors largely cancel out against each other, instead of being cumulative.

He is also an honest man. One of the best parts of his book is the self-catechism at the end, in which he tries to find out whether his hunches have been unduly influenced by sympathy for China He finally sticks to the main point. Japan cannot win. With reporting like this — and more of it is being done by other correspondents—how long, I wonder, will the editors in the "neutral" countries continue to underestimate China and overrate Japan?

O L.

Grinnell, Iowa, March 1939

JAPAN IN CHINA: HER MOTIVES AND AIMS. *By Kiyoshi Kawakami. New York· Wilson.* 1938. *pp.* 257

CHINESE-JAPANESE WAR, 1937- . *Compiled by Julia E. Johnsen. London Murray.* 1938. *pp* xviii + 188 5s.

CHINA FIGHTS FOR HER LIFE. *By H. R. Ekins and Theon Wright New York and London· McGraw-Hill, pp.* xix + 335 $2 75.

WRITERS of theses on propaganda, a good many years hence, may perhaps distinguish between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" propaganda. Mr. Kawakami has been a valuable Japanese publicist for

many years, because he manages to convey the impression that both China and Japan are partly in the wrong and partly in the right—but that China is more wrong than right, while Japan is more right than wrong. Such an approach convinces many that such a writer must be honest, and thus predisposes them to accept his conclusions.

It is all the more significant that in this book Mr. Kawakami hammers hardest and longest on the gong of "Bolshevik" alarm. It is the wicked Communists who prevent the Chinese from recognizing and admitting that China is a little more wrong than right, and Japan a little more right than wrong (an equation which, of course, would justify spelling Manchuria as Manchukuo, and establish the ethical grounds for similar alterations of spelling in other parts of China). When so able a spokesman as Mr. Kawakami begins to turn shrill instead of persuasive, can it be because the old arguments have ceased to convince?

Miss Johnsen's book reveals both the strength and the weakness of what is usually called "impartial" presentation. The case for China and the case for Japan are presented with a minimum of editorial exposition, and documented with a wide selection of excerpts from books and articles. It is thus a handbook for debaters. It does not set out to "prove" the case, either way; but alas, what it does prove is the inadequacy of the old faith that if only knowledge is wide enough, truth will become apparent. For this careful balancing of debaters' arguments against each other makes it quite clear that *deeper* knowledge is even more necessary than *wider* knowledge. How can the unprejudiced enquirer, who wants to form his own opinion, possibly select constructively from such a list of excerpts unless he also has other kinds of information? For such a book to be truly educative it is necessary to know who the author of a book or article is. What are his qualifications and experience? Are his books or articles his only way of making a living? Does he speak for himself only, or for a group or organization? In the case of articles it is equally important to know who publishes the periodical, and what kind of audience it is expected to reach and influence. It might be difficult to edit such a book without seeming to abandon impartiality: but how much more nourishment "public opinion" would get from the book!

H. R. Ekins, once an able United Press Correspondent in China, returned there briefly to "cover the war" in 1937. He and his collaborator have made an interesting attempt to assemble the record of the years that led up to the war, not as historians with any theory of history, but as newspaper men whose business it is to keep up with a story as it unfolds. The technique is that of going back over old files and com-

pressing the day-by-day account which they preserve into book form, with the minimum of editorializing. The result is interesting and vivid but not quite convincing enough, because it is almost impossible to keep the method from stumbling and bumping itself between what should be the reporter's job and what should be the editor's job.

Here once more we have the phenomenon of the trained reporter who observes the facts pointing inexorably toward the defeat of Japan's ambitions, but the reporter's work is toned down and discounted by the editor. It is all the more curious in that the reporter is in this case himself partly responsible for the editing. The most significant passage in the book is a description of how the Chinese Red Army broke away from encirclement and annihilation by the Nanking troops, to begin the Long March, in 1934.

> The flight of the Communists from Kiangsi was accomplished so swiftly and with such mechanical strategy that the Red Army had smashed through the concrete defense line . . before Chiang Kai-shek was aware they had started . . . Chiang had an army of more than 1,000,000 men at his disposal . . . to stamp out the Reds. He had scores of high-speed pursuit planes, unlimited supplies of ammunition, and equipment for swift transportation of troops. The Reds had ancient guns, a few planes wrested from the warlord of Kuangtung . . . a handful of homemade bombs, and their supply trains were drawn by mules. . . . The hardships and dangers through which the army moved seem insurmountable. . . The Red Army . . . was beyond question the greatest fighting force, man for man, in China and perhaps in the world. (Pp. 137-140.)

Mr. Ekins and his collaborator, though they hedge pretty heavily, believe on the whole that China's resistance to Japan is hopeless (p. xviii). Yet consider the account just quoted. Consider that the Communists then were a fractional minority of the Chinese people. Consider that the odds on Nanking then were certainly as great as the odds on Japan now; probably greater. To hesitate at the conclusion that what the Communists could do then a united China can do now, seems inept.

Perhaps the hiatus between Ekins the reporter and Ekins and Wright the editors can be explained by undue emphasis on the importance of Chiang Kai-shek the individual. This makes it look as though Japan had shattered Chiang's one-man dictatorship, and as though the United Front were a flimsy substitute, although the reporter-avatar of the partnership, still a jump ahead of the editor-avatar, perceptively suggests that Chiang "has been absorbed by the China he had created."

(p. 279.) It will be interesting to see if Mr. Ekins and Mr. Wright bring out a new edition of their book, or a new book to bring the record up to date, and to see whether their editorial caution catches up with their reportorial acumen.

O. L.

Grinnell, Iowa, March 1939

CHINESE WOMEN: YESTERDAY AND TODAY. *By Florence Ayscough* *Boston Houghton Mifflin Co* 1937 *pp* xiv + 324 $3 50.

THE table of contents of this book looks very promising. The first 135 pages deal with such aspects of women's life as childhood, girlhood, marriage, education, professions, in old and modern China. There follow some general remarks about the progress of Chinese women since the establishment of the republic Part Two discusses remarkable women like the famous revolutionist Ch'iu Chin (executed in 1907), the poets Li Ch'ing-chao and Chu Shu-chen (Sung dynasty), the calligraphist Mme. Wei (Chin dynasty), the painter Mme. Kuan (Yuan dynasty), the painter Ma Ch'uan (Ch'ing dynasty), the famous woman warrior Hua Mu-lan and some other women warriors; educators and moralists like Pan Chao (Han dynasty) and some others. To this part logically belong also the characteristics of the three Soong sisters (wives of Sun Yat-sen, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Minister of Finance, H. H. Kung). These are the only women of modern China Mrs. Ayscough found worthy of a special sketch Part Three contains abstracts from Lu Hsien-wu's *Kuei Fan*—a famous selection from the women's biographies in the Chinese annals, serving as standards of behavior for women of Old China.

The book is written by a specialist on literature, especially poetry, whose outstanding gift is her power of poetic interpretation. (Mrs Ayscough has published several valuable books on Chinese poetry) This explains both the strength and weaknesses of the book. The strength is in the remarkable selection of Chinese poems, folksongs and essays which give a penetrating insight into the life of Chinese women. The translations are done mostly by the author herself, with a skill second to none. The characteristics are very well and vividly written and, like the book as a whole, make very good reading. Unfortunately Mrs. Ayscough, in her representation of the position of Chinese women, takes the part as representative of the whole, which is often very suc-

cessful in poetry, but does not work so well in a study of sociological character. Thus the title, *Chinese Women*, merely distracts attention from the fact that the book actually deals almost exclusively with Chinese ladies.

This leads to many omissions and distortions. In the part about girlhood, the problem of the unequal treatment of boys and girls in the family is approached in only a perfunctory way. The striking fact that infant mortality among little girls in China is much higher than among boys is not even mentioned. This is only true, it should be pointed out, in poor families, which often are unable to feed both boys and girls and prefer to feed boys, who are more useful.

The part about marriage gives the impression (p 63) that marriages in the new style, freely concluded by individuals, are now more frequent than the traditional marriage decided by parents. This is largely true for women of the upper class, especially in the treaty ports and large cities. There are also a few "new-style marriages" among workers and clerks in Shanghai, Canton and some other large cities But this type of marriage practically does not exist in rural China, even now, and is an exception among the majority of the urban population in the interior. Still more untrue, from the point of view of 90 per cent of the population, is the statement that "divorce is now the simplest matter imaginable." (p. 72) To say that "the daughter of the masses must often approach her husband's home in the old style chair, but her hopes are set on a modern motor car—one as smart as possible" (p 30) creates an entirely wrong impression of China. How many "daughters of the masses" in China have ever seen a smart modern motor car?

In the chapter on women's professions the author speaks at length about educators, doctors, nurses, lawyers, mentions even such rare female professions as banking, the police and broadcast announcing, but manages to overlook the work of women in agriculture and home industry, and the women industrial workers. In such industries as textiles, most workers are women, but all Mrs. Ayscough says is that "though wages are low, hours long, conditions in many cases bad," many girls throng the factories because "even limited economic independence is sweet." (p. 29.) Mrs. Ayscough might never have heard of contract labor in China!

It is not easy (though by no means impossible) to find material about the work of the women of the poorer classes in China's past; but for modern China there is plenty of information If Mrs Ayscough, who lived so long in China, did not observe the life of farmer women and factory

workers for herself, she could go to the written sources. Modern fiction (which she totally neglects, together with the classical Chinese novels), modern periodicals and especially women's magazines, provide penetrating descriptions of the life of working women in the country and in the cities. There is also a lot of very valuable material in the modern Chinese sociological literature on marriage, the family, the legal position of women, their professions, etc., which no foreigner seriously tackling these problems has a right to overlook.

The use of this literature would also help to make the interesting picture of the "Chinese ladies, yesterday and today," more differentiated and realistic. Her almost exclusively literary and folkloristic sources did not allow Mrs. Ayscough to pay enough attention to the unequal treatment of women in both civil and criminal law, and its implications; the hardships inflicted, by concubinage, on legal wives and on concubines and their children; the pressure used to prevent widows from remarrying, etc. It would be perhaps too troublesome to dig up information about these questions directly from the legal codes and encyclopedias, dynastic histories and similar sources, but it is easy to read such Chinese books as T'ao Hsi-sheng's *Marriage and Family*, Chao Feng-chieh's *The Legal Position of Chinese Women*, T'an Yen-chin's *Divorce in China*, to quote only a few examples in which full use of primary source materials is made.

As a whole, the book can be recommended as a good collection of material, to be used in addition to more essential information, which is to be looked for elsewhere.

OLGA LANG
New York, April 1938

LA BELGIQUE ET LA CHINE: *relations diplomatiques et economiques* 1839-1909. *By J. M. Frochisse. Bruxelles. Edition Universelle, pp.* 475. *B fr.*76.-

"LEOPOLD II et la Chine" might as well have been the title of this interesting volume, which is really a story of the activity of this merchant-king in respect of China, for which he failed to arouse any interest either among the big bankers or industrialists or among the Belgian senators. As the writer remarks, "he astonished many but convinced no one!" With the persistency which was characteristic of him he nevertheless succeeded in carrying out his various plans and thereby in

giving to Belgium an important part in the opening up of China, especially in railway construction and industry.

The writer covers two periods; from 1839 to 1882, and from 1885 to 1909. Although he had all the archives at his disposal, the first period is the least important as far as Belgium is concerned, because it merely proves that all attempts to secure a place in the trade with China side by side with England, France and Germany were futile. Although a small nation with no political ambitions, and in spite of the semi-official help afforded by England, Belgium did not gain any advantage by the treaties concluded. The passive resistance at home could not be overcome; no one was interested in China.

It was not until after Li Hung chang's visit that there was any noticeable change of opinion, presumably because this influential Chinese realized how very important Belgium was in mining and in the iron industry. The heavy industries (including the firm of Cockerill) sent a mission to Hankow and negotiations were begun for the railway from Peking to Hankow Leopold hoped to create in the province of Kansu a Belgian sphere of influence similar to the concessions and settlements of the Great Powers along the coast, for it was believed that there was great mineral wealth in Kansu All efforts in this failed, however, owing to the unsolvable problem of transport

The king was more fortunate in his railway plans, in a moment of inadvertence on the part of the English, Emile Francqui, his representative, later a well-known financier, succeeded in concluding a credit agreement and a building contract with a preference clause for the construction of the Canton Hankow line, in case the negotiations which were then being carried on with Americans should break down By a clever manipulation he managed to make his position more secure and despite the fact that the contract with the Americans forbade transfer to a third party, he succeeded in directing his interests under the American flag. Owing to discord among the partners and intrigues of the other powers he failed to achieve his object and had to give up his plan, but not until the Chinese had paid to Leopold about six times the amount which he had invested in the undertaking. For the construction of the Peking-Hankow railway, Jean Jadot, who later became Governor of the Société Générale de Belgique, was sent to China as engineer in charge of operations. It is a remarkable fact that the king veiled his operations in China with the flag of the Belgian Congo.

In Brussels opposition to him continued In 1903, under the leadership of Van der Velde, a fierce campaign in Parliament was directed against

TABLE 2

DISPUTE PRONENESS AS A FUNCTION OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDI

Experimental Factor	coeff (t-stat)
Power Distribution	−0 0013
	(−7 30)
Error Range	−0 0062
	(−12 30)
Reparations	0 083
	(1 09)
$WarCost_{max}$	0 116
	(5 50)
Likelihood of Victory	0 005
	(1 11)
Constant	8 39
	(10 02)
R^2	0 71

of power tended to depress the frequency of disputes while the costl war fighting increased it Neither reparations nor the shape of the lik of victory curve had any apparent effect

The contribution of error to minimizing systematic dispute pronen accordance with the experimental results reported by Bremer and (1977, p 334) They concluded that an increase in inaccuracy on the decision makers tended to promote the appearance of 'caution' in th ity levels with respect to decisions for one or another form of aggress havior diminished in experiments with relatively greater error The q effect of greater inequality at the beginning of the system seems c intuitive However, the effect itself may be the manifestation of d generated in the early phases of system evolution by this initial co weaker states are more speedily eliminated thus quickly bringing mo erful states into geographical contact with each other and thereby dim the relative opportunities for war-making The positive effect on disp quency of more burdensome war costs may reflect the trap into which n victims but perpetrators of war are drawn into within this kind of syste ticipation in war being more costly, those that participate in it, even win, will be relatively weaker This increases the opportunities for ot tential aggressors to initiate disputes against weaker states

Once a dispute has occurred what determines whether it will esc

tal factors do account for a significant amount of the variance in this outcome but that a perhaps more interesting interpretation is provided when one takes into account what can be described as "contextual" conditions. Table 3 provides the results of three regression analyses of the deterrence outcome. In a specification that includes only the five experimental factors, approximately 52% of the variance in average deterrence can be accounted for. Again, higher error rates in decision making and greater disparities in the initial power distribution are associated with a process that minimizes war-making. The cost of war operates in a parallel fashion to the way it did in the process of generating disputes—it tended to lower the chances of deterrence, thus adding to the process of system destruction. In this specification, reparations appear to have a significant impact on deterrence chances and act in a way corresponding to the war cost term by diminishing the likelihood of deterrence. Again, the shape of the likelihood of victory curve has no apparent effect.

The other two regression analyses reported in table 3 help bring to light the impact of some contextual factors on the process of deterrence. Thus, in the second equation, a variable representing the success rate that target states in disputes achieved in acquiring allies to counterbalance the power of an aggressor is included. There is an appreciable improvement in the fit to the data

TABLE 3

THREE BASES FOR SUCCESSFUL DETERRENCE

Experimental Factor/ Contextual Condition	I coeff (t-stat)	II coeff (t-stat)	III coeff (t-stat)
Power Distribution	0.059	0.037	0.010
	(2.46)	1.60	0.86
Error Range	0.616	0.638	0.040
	(9.59)	10.67	0.77
Reparations	19.4	2.17	7.87
	2.01	(0.21)	1.54
War Cost$_{\mathrm{W.O.}}$	22.4	10.79	9.19
	(2.38)	(1.15)	1.90
Likelihood of Victory	0.025	0.44	0.065
	(0.05)	0.10	(−0.28)
Target Alliance Bid Success Rate	–	5.31	0.350
		(4.00)	(5.10)
Initiator Alliance Bid Success Rate	–	—	−1.373
			(15.93)
Constant	14.951	33.865	112.173
	(5.58)	(2.72)	(10.06)
$\bar{R}^2$	0.52	0.57	0.89

Interestingly, all but one of the experimental variables, that being the degree of error in decision-making processes, lose statistical significance while the impact of the target's success rate is both significant and indicative of a deterrent influence It should be noted that this variable appears not to have been appreciably influenced by variation in any of the experimental factors (see table 4).

When a second contextual variable, the success rate with which initiators acquire allies when they choose to build countercoalitions, is taken into account, an even greater improvement in the fit to the data is achieved One major consequence of this alternative specification is that the direct effects of all the experimental factors are reduced to statistical insignificance In effect, the "balancing" and "counterbalancing" processes appear to be the critical direct determinants of deterrence with the former enhancing and the latter diminishing its chances of occurring Interestingly, while no large correlation obtains between the experimental factors and the success that targets achieve in "balancing" power, error in decision making comes through clearly as a strong correlate of failure in "counterbalancing"

One final point should be addressed about the process underlying the evolution of the system This relates to the curious fact that while the shape of the likelihood of victory curve stands out as the most significant determinant of system endurance, it seems to play no role in shaping two critical processes at work in the reduction of system size during the first half of the average tenure of the system Indeed there seem to be very few grounds upon which to expect that it should directly affect the frequency of disputes or the likelihood of successful deterrence within a dispute However, its long-term impact within the evolutionary workings of the system clearly seems to be critical

One might catch a glimpse of how this comes to pass by examining the way in which it actually shaped war outcomes Figure 5 provides information on

TABLE 4

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL FACTORS AND ALLIANCE SUCCESS RATE INDICATORS

Experimental Factor	Target Alliance Success Rate	Initiator Alliance Success Rate
Power Distribution	0 21	-0 11
Error Range	-0 07	-0 79
Reparations	-0 40	0 13
$WarCost_{Max}$	-0 29	0 05
Likelihood of Victory	-0 01	-0 02

FIGURE 5

SUCCESS IN WAR AND THE POWER ILLUSION

this by summarizing across all of the wars that took place in the 96 experiments the rates of success that initiators had in achieving victory when they were able to forge fundamentally different power positions vis-à-vis their targets in a war. For both likelihood-of-victory curves the success rates of the initiators are displayed for four different relative-power configurations between the initiator's coalition and the target's coalition: (1) initiator's side had less than 75% of the power available to the target, (2) initiator's side had at least 75% but less than 100% of power available to target, (3) initiator's side had at least 100% but less than 125% of the power available to target, (4) initiator's side had at least 125% or more of the power available to target. The flatter curve produces an appreciably lower success rate in the power configuration seemingly most favorable to the initiator (4). This configuration is most likely to obtain in later periods of the model run when some states have managed to achieve disproportionately large power accumulations. The chances, then, of such states suffering setbacks in drives toward hegemony are greater and the overall effect would be to increase the likelihood of significant redispersions of power.

In its broadest sense this means that where a state achieves victory it accumulates power and thus is afforded greater opportunity to engage in the process of further power accumulation. If, however, it is fixed in a situation whereby it is operating on an assumption regarding how much power it needs

to successfully build upon its past success that is far away from the real principle that determines such an outcome, then the state is trapped in a process whereby success leads to failure The implication of this is to suggest that the greater the illusion under which aggressors operate in their calculations about the power required to enhance their chance of gaining an imperium, the more likely the system is to swing back and forth between short-term episodes of significant power accretion and power dissolution The consequence should be to lengthen the time required for the final rise of a hegemon

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to illuminate some of the central arguments found in Realist thought regarding the sustainability of anarchic multistate systems Employing a large scale computer simulation model of one of the major images of the balance of power, the "automatic stabilization" theory, an extensive experimental study was conducted to evaluate the implications of these arguments These experimental results provide some interesting insights into this model of power management The model is clearly sensitive to alternative specifications of the values of theoretically interesting parameters Sensitivity of this form helps impart confidence in the model (cf Richardson and Pugh, 1981) In addition, the broad ranging character of this study and its results tend to support Bremer and Mihalka's (1977) cautionary conclusion that some rather "unique" circumstances seem required for this version of Realist power management to manage power in the way expected

In the preliminary experimental analysis reported here, it has been possible to employ the model in the task of answering a theoretically interesting question about power management in anarchic systems The results substantiate some of Bremer and Mihalka's earlier conclusions and also extend our understanding of the significance of various conditions and policies that Realist thought suggests as being important in the preservation of multistate systems

Specifically, using the model we have been able to explore the effects of five environmental conditions and policy characteristics on the sustainability of a multistate system wherein the selfish pursuit of power typifies every actor All of these reflect concerns manifest in Realpolitik thought and all are conjectured to directly influence either the likelihood of war or the destructiveness of individual wars These, in turn, are represented as having an effect on the survival chances of states and thus the durability of a multistate system Of these five conditions and characteristics, four were found to have a significant impact on the durability of the system These included, the role of chance in the determination of war's victor, the distribution of power, the extent to which decisions are subject to erroneous estimation efforts, and the punitiveness of victors in postwar settlements Surprisingly, the dominant influence was the role of chance, equally surprising was the apparent lack of influence of the general costliness of war involvement

Further analysis of the results generated by the model helped to clarify the processes by which system destruction takes place. Substantial variation in the occurrence of disputes can be produced by altering assumptions regarding the initial distribution of power in such a system or the degree to which decision makers are prone to error in their assessments of power. The effect that the distribution of power works is not straightforward, but, nonetheless, appears to contradict the "parity-peace" school of thought. Greater proneness to error on the part of decision makers also appears to inhibit the dispute-proneness of the system. The ameliorative effect of error, one which has been argued to be a basis of cautious behavior, also works in the process of inhibiting dispute escalation. While variation in this and other manipulable factors in the model seem important in providing the basis for the kind of deterrence or balancing that Realists argue to be important, it is clear that context specific decisions by states play a great role in the process of dispute escalation. Finally, an apparently critical element in the destructive process of this kind of multistate system appears to be the "power illusion" that entraps states when they act upon an erroneous assumption regarding their chances of success in warmaking.

In a separate paper (Cusack and Zimmer, 1985) we have laid out some rather extensive plans for further work based on this model. Our major efforts, however, will be to extend and enrich the present model by incorporating a variety of processes, dealing with both internal and external dynamics, into the representation of the state elements.[17] Our objectives include the aim of integrating the extensive empirical knowledge now extant on the dynamics of war, the exploration of the implications of alternative representations of decision-making processes, and, finally, the evaluation of alternative Realpolitik theses about interstate relations.

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[17] A study of the relative success of rational and more primitive decision making processes has recently been completed in collaboration with Richard Stoll (Cusack and Stoll, forthcoming). Further studies using the model have been undertaken and each of these has required extensions to its basic structure. One major development has been the inclusion of alternative modes of power management on the parts of states within the system. This entails the representation of varying proportions of the states within the system being committed to "laissez-faire," "balancer," and "collective security" principles (Cusack, forthcoming). Another extension of the model has been to represent decision making by states in the form of expected utility theory. Finally, a set of mechanisms has been introduced to allow for the potential of empire disintegration. Included here are policy decisions regarding the allocation of power resources for empire maintenance and empire expansion, and disintegration mechanisms whereby insufficient regard to the costs of retaining conquests can lead to the dismemberment of a multi-unit actor. Reports on experimental studies dealing with the expected utility-based model and the extended model that incorporates disintegration are under preparation.

APPENDIX

DURATION OF SYSTEM UNDER ALTERNATIVE EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS

Exp	Duration	I	II	III	IV	V	Seed
1	238	10	10	0 1	1	0 1	0
2	253	10	10	0 1	1	0 1	1,023
3	299	10	10	0 1	1	0 1	2,047
4	244	10	10	0 1	1	0 2	0
5	230	10	10	0 1	1	0 2	1,023
6	303	10	10	0 1	1	0 2	2,047
7	366	10	10	0 1	3	0 1	0
8	293	10	10	0 1	3	0 1	1,023
9	238	10	10	0 1	3	0 1	2,047
10	350	10	10	0 1	3	0 2	0
11	264	10	10	0 1	3	0 2	1,023
12	500*	10	10	0 1	3	0 2	2,047
13	205	10	10	0 2	1	0 1	0
14	188	10	10	0 2	1	0 1	1 023
15	209	10	10	0 2	1	0 1	2,047
16	209	10	10	0 2	1	0 2	0
17	221	10	10	0 2	1	0 2	1,023
18	231	10	10	0 2	1	0 2	2,047
19	268	10	10	0 2	3	0 1	0
20	222	10	10	0 2	3	0 1	1,023
21	277	10	10	0 2	3	0 1	2,047
22	500*	10	10	0 2	3	0 2	0
23	392	10	10	0 2	3	0 2	1,023
24	355	10	10	0 2	3	0 2	2,047
25	284	10	50	0 1	1	0 1	0
26	247	10	50	0 1	1	0 1	1 023
27	263	10	50	0 1	1	0 1	2,047
28	279	10	50	0 1	1	0 2	0
29	234	10	50	0 1	1	0 2	1 023
30	323	10	50	0 1	1	0 2	2,047
31	404	10	50	0 1	3	0 1	0
32	388	10	50	0 1	3	0 1	1,023
33	358	10	50	0 1	3	0 1	2,047
34	485	10	50	0 1	3	0 2	0
35	291	10	50	0 1	3	0 2	1,023
36	500*	10	50	0 1	3	0 2	2,047
37	247	10	50	0 2	1	0 1	0
38	224	10	50	0 2	1	0 1	1 023
39	223	10	50	0 2	1	0 1	2 047
40	215	10	50	0 2	1	0 2	0
41	209	10	50	0 2	1	0 2	1,023
42	210	10	50	0 2	1	0 2	2 047
43	500*	10	50	0 2	3	0 1	0
44	259	10	50	0 2	3	0 1	1,023
45	309	10	50	0 2	3	0 1	2,047
46	269	10	50	0 2	3	0 2	0

Appendix (*continued*)

47	306	10	50	0 2	3	0 2	1,023
48	267	10	50	0 2	3	0 2	2,047
49	316	25	10	0 1	1	0 1	0
50	297	25	10	0 1	1	0 1	1,023
51	260	25	10	0 1	1	0 1	2,047
52	292	25	10	0 1	1	0 2	0
53	230	25	10	0 1	1	0 2	1,023
54	265	25	10	0 1	1	0 2	2,047
55	372	25	10	0 1	3	0 1	0
56	377	25	10	0 1	3	0 1	1,023
57	421	25	10	0 1	3	0 1	2,047
58	344	25	10	0 1	3	0 2	0
59	326	25	10	0 1	3	0 2	1,023
60	362	25	10	0 1	3	0 2	2,047
61	210	25	10	0 2	1	0 1	0
62	225	25	10	0 2	1	0 1	1,023
63	282	25	10	0 2	1	0 1	2,047
64	204	25	10	0 2	1	0 2	0
65	282	25	10	0 2	1	0 2	1,023
66	235	25	10	0 2	1	0 2	2,047
67	314	25	10	0 2	3	0 1	0
68	325	25	10	0 2	3	0 1	1,023
69	340	25	10	0 2	3	0 1	2,047
70	302	25	10	0 2	3	0 2	0
71	331	25	10	0 2	3	0 2	1,023
72	264	25	10	0 2	3	0 2	2 047
73	310	25	50	0 1	1	0 1	0
74	296	25	50	0 1	1	0 1	1,023
75	324	25	50	0 1	1	0 1	2,047
76	242	25	50	0 1	1	0 2	0
77	317	25	50	0 1	1	0 2	1 023
78	263	25	50	0 1	1	0 2	2 047
79	451	25	50	0 1	3	0 1	0
80	500*	25	50	0 1	3	0 1	1,023
81	361	25	50	0 1	3	0 1	2 047
82	431	25	50	0 1	3	0 2	0
83	423	25	50	0 1	3	0 2	1,023
84	361	25	50	0 1	3	0 2	2 047
85	256	25	50	0 2	1	0 1	0
86	272	25	50	0 2	1	0 1	1,023
87	282	25	50	0 2	1	0 1	2,047
88	257	25	50	0 2	1	0 2	0
89	256	25	50	0 2	1	0 2	1 023
90	296	25	50	0 2	1	0 2	2 047
91	365	25	50	0 2	3	0 1	0
92	355	25	50	0 2	3	0 1	1 023
93	352	25	50	0 2	3	0 1	2,047
94	356	25	50	0 2	3	0 2	0
95	343	25	50	0 2	3	0 2	1 023
96	370	25	50	0 2	3	0 2	2,047

curity the Chinese farmer will live, as the Nanking men are proving. But the conditions are trying. The chief problem is lack of security.

Under existing conditions there are various authorities (and in some sections none), the more important of which are so closely concerned with military and political operations, and are receiving so little of regular revenue from the localities concerned, that relatively small efforts at relief have been made. Constructive aid to the farmer is not only a humanitarian necessity, but will strengthen the economic basis of the community and of the government itself, and will be of infinitely more value than political propaganda in securing the good will and coopera tion of the people

Add to this the endemic banditry of China, and the departure by migration of the officials and the petty gentry, and put on top of it the actual damage done to the people in the operations. The losses of life were heavy—as great in proportion as in the 1931 floods, with the dif ference that those did cease and there was a government to act; while the losses now are largely of the wage earners, not the old people and children The losses of property amounted on an average to three quar ters of a year's income, a most serious blow to an agriculturalist There is great difficulty in obtaining cattle, timber, seed, etc , to repair losses

It must be remembered that the losses in the Nanking area, spectacular as they are, could be paralleled in many other centers in China No matter what the result of the present conflict, there will be an enormous problem of relief and rehabilitation, one where any help from outside will be useful The present survey, followed up as it will be by further enquiries, will be of considerable help in putting that help on the right lines.

B W. P

CHINA BODY AND SOUL *Edited by F. R Hughes London Secker and Warburg* 1938 *pp* 166. 13s *net.*

THIS book is made up chiefly of essays on various aspects of Chinese civilization, which in their combined effect give a general por trayal of its essential characteristics Laurence Binyon writes on the genius of Chinese painting, which to him consists in a liberation from the petty routine of everyday existence and from the crudities and savagery of warfare. Selections from the works of the late Roger Fry lay stress on those elements in Chinese art and architecture in which he perceived a fundamental similarity to the classical tradition in Western art. The essay on the "Village and Its Scholar," by E. R. Hughes, is a

particularly interesting and valuable contribution on the part played by the representatives of the *literati* in the villages, their position as leaders of the local community, and their great, but often unrecorded achievements in guiding it through the political turmoils which so often afflict China. "The Little God," by Eileen Power, is a pleasant tale which reveals the half reverential, half familiar attitude of the Chinese towards their numerous deities

The proceeds of sale are to be devoted to the fund for the relief of distress in China In their sympathy for the present plight of China and condemnation of Japanese aggression some of the authors are inclined to overrate the influence of the pacific theories of Confucianism and to forget that in practice, Chinese dynasties from the Ch'in to the Ch'ing were created by, and very largely rested upon, the power of the sword Professor Laski's article on "China and Democracy" strikes a controversial note out of harmony with the more objective tone of the other essayists.

F C JONES
London, 1938

THE IMPORTANCE OF LIVING. *By Lin Yutang New York Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc pp* 459 $3 00

READERS of Dr Lin's *My Country and My People* will look in vain for further discussion of shifting social values or of China's internal struggle Here he is concerned only with the individual's efforts to enjoy life and to find his own satisfactions With his Chinese heritage and his Western education Dr Lin is well equipped to find his way to the best in each civilization's culture To him the successful man is one who views life with detachment, realizing the limitations of this world yet conscious of the essential dignity of human beings He makes no claim of superiority for the Chinese mind, the most essential qualities of which are realism and a high sense of humor If there is one great difference between Eastern and Western culture, Dr Lin believes it lies in the realistic versus the idealistic approach to life He has chosen his own formulas to portray various nationalities, based on proportion of idealism, realism, humor and sensitivity When a nation as a whole is too idealistic it is easily led by fanatics who offer the people hope of reaching some dreamed of state In this volume Lin's primary concern is with the individual's search for happiness

POLLY EGGLESTON
Chicago, August 1938

THE FAR EAST AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY. *By Harold S. Quigley and George S Blakeslee Boston World Peace Foundation.* 1938 *pp* 353.

PROFESSOR BLAKESLEE has amplified his *The Pacific Area,* first published in 1929, condensing parts of it and supplying new chapters on the most important developments up to the outbreak of hostilities in July 1937 His emphasis is on events since 1929, primarily on Sino Japanese relations and the attitude of the Powers concerned The wide range covered prevents anything more than an outline of the main course of events The value of the book is its fresh and lucid presentation of a judicious selection from the welter of data on Far Eastern politics In particular the chapters on Sino Japanese relations in Manchuria, foreign relations in Manchukuo, international efforts to settle the Manchurian crisis, and tariffs and customs control in China give a clear picture of what are by no means simple problems.

In some chapters, however, I feel that by comparison with the general scope of the book there is a disproportionate amount of detail. More than one fifth of the work is devoted to four chapters dealing with the different phases of treaty rights in China, 20 pages going to a study of the diplomatic negotiation for abolition of extraterritoriality Obviously this and related questions are vital, but since the proposed emphasis is on Sino-Japanese relations since 1929, some of this detailed diplomatic history might have been condensed to provide room for a fuller discussion of Japan's interests and real aims in Manchuria, and the forces motivating the other Powers One cannot expect, in so brief a work, a comprehensive interpretation, in addition to exposition of the facts But on occasions, for example in discussing the Anti-Comintern Pact, naval rivalries in the Pacific, the position of the Philippines, Professor Quigley does find space to suggest some very pertinent interpretations On the other hand, Britain's attitude to China is dismissed in a couple of pages, without attempt to sort out the dominant influences making up the complex of British Far Eastern policy.

Similarly, in the opening chapter, seven brief pages go to "Political Conditions in China and Japan" It does seem to me that any understanding of Far Eastern foreign relations requires a fuller preliminary picture than this of the internal political and economic forces which so largely determine those foreign relations A bare paragraph on the Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927 and the significance of the Chinese Communist movement is liable to give a very distorted view of the

subsequent development of national unity Perhaps this tendency to overlook broad social forces leads Professor Quigley to dismiss the Sian affair as essentially a coup staged by "adventurous" generals, to which Chiang Kai-shek himself, it is suggested, may have been "privy" (p 99) A fuller reading of the evidence now available convinces one that the Sian coup was rather the expression of an irresistible popular sentiment for national unity, which is one of the key factors determining modern Sino-Japanese relations

Again in the few pages on Japanese politics almost exclusive concentration on the survival of the feudal power of the military results in the misleading remark that "the army, and to a lesser degree the navy, have taken over the whole power of government without protest from the people" Evidence of very definite "protest from the people" apart, this omits the all important dynamic of monopoly capitalist interests and their changing relations with the military, in the formation of Japan's expansionist policy

One or two errors of detail may be pointed out The chapter on autonomy movements is confusing because of wrong dates given for the formation of the East Hopei Anti Communist Autonomous Government (Nov 1933 is given instead of 1935) and of the Hopei Chahar Political Council (again 1933 for 1935) The general associated with Chang Hsueh-liang at Sian was Yang Hu-Cheng, not "Yang Fu cheng" And on p 29 we read that "*Soviet Japanese* relations in Manchuria fluctuated between war and close military alliance" The latter condition refers obviously only to Tsarist Russia, in regard to the 1907 16 treaties with Japan

These suggested criticisms detract little from the timely value of Professor Quigley's work His book is at once an interesting and lucid introduction to modern Far Eastern relations, and a handy reference book for Far Eastern studies, especially on account of the admirable selection of 60 pages of source material in the appendices

Ian F G Milner

New York, December 1938

Problems of War and Peace in the Society of Nations By *E D Dickinson et al Berkeley University of California Press* 1937. *pp viii* + 155. $1 50

These six lectures were delivered in the autumn of 1937, by members of the faculty of the University of California

Dean Dickinson of the Law School traces the development of the community of nations and of international government through what he terms the "age of discovery"; the "age of integration"; and—growing out of the Industrial Revolution—the "age of construction." The constructive effort toward producing new law, new institutions, new attitudes, and new methods is followed. Dean Dickinson recognizes the present day challenge which threatens to dispel all constructive effort, but ends optimistically Professor Carl Landauer, an economist, deals with socialism in relation to war and peace He dismisses the claim that the motives leading to war are likely to disappear automatically with a change in the economic system, but emphasizes the contribution which socialism makes toward the attainment of world peace through seeking a better life for mankind

Professor Robert A. Brady, also an economist, considers Fascism in relation to war and peace He places Fascism, Nazism, "Fascist-oriented" states, such as Japan, and the "Fascist inclined" elements in liberal-democratic countries in pretty much the same category. Fascism has maintained, in entirety, capitalistic institutions and methods, has concentrated economic power in fewer and fewer hands; and keeps heavy industry at work on public works and armaments programs, these armaments being employed to secure economic expansion abroad Nothing is done to remedy the conditions making for unrest on the part of the masses, on the contrary, their lot is far worse than before the advent of Fascism The entire nation operates for military ends, and war becomes inevitable because of the necessarily expansionist program of Fascism and because Fascism makes revolution—which is war itself—certain. The only hope of avoiding a general war lies in a swift mobilization of the forces of democracy against Fascism.

Professor Charles G Haines holds that any constitutional government, to endure, must be based on a living law rather than on one bound by mechanical formula Professor Malbone W. Graham discusses the problem of world organization He attempts to discover the reasons for the present breakdown of international organization The British, after 1918, true to their traditions of an unwritten constitution, clashed directly with Wilson's belief in a written covenant with limited responsibilities but with almost plenary powers. The resulting compromise brought with it a deconcentration of international authority. An amendment embodying racial equality as a cornerstone of the Covenant was rejected; secession was permitted; nullification was accepted, as indicated by the refusal of some member states to take part in League sanctions

against Italy in 1935; the rule of unanimity was allowed, permitting in some cases disastrous veto, such as that of October 1937 when two adverse votes blocked all League action in checking aggression in Spain

Professor George M Stratton, from the viewpoint of psychology confidently asserts that world peace is attainable He examines the forces working for war—the struggle for existence, "human nature," national prejudices, patriotism, racial prejudice—and gives ample reason to believe that these can be overcome

Each author is an authority in his own field and it seems clear that each agrees that progress in the Society of Nations will be attained only through international cooperation, backed by some sort of collective force on the side of law

Edwin Clough
Chicago, July 1938

Foreign Affairs, 1919-1937 *By F L Hudock New York Macmillan*, 1938 *pp* xvii + 347 $2 50

Two modifications to the title of this volume should be made It is a history of domestic almost as much as foreign affairs, and it omits the British Commonwealth There are five chapters on central Europe, western Europe, eastern and northern Europe, Asia and Africa, and America. Up to a point it is a useful handbook of the principal events and issues in the countries covered, but it is not written in a style to appeal to the general reader and is not accurate enough for the student The section on the United States will amaze those who have any knowledge of that country, for it appears as a land of gangsters and money grabbers Happily the sections on other countries show more insight

G deT Glazebrook
Toronto, March 1939

The Colonial Problem *A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs London, New York, Toronto Oxford University Press* 1937 *pp. xii* + 448 $8.50.

The question of how colonial wealth is distributed today, and how it should be distributed tomorrow, is considered by many the key

problem around which cluster other international problems. This volume destroys the myth of the overwhelming importance of the colonial problem. Eight distinguished authorities endeavor to prove that the international aspect of colonial questions has been overemphasized. The focus is readjusted and the real problem, which is mainly one of relationships between ruling and ruled, is presented in the light of a scientific and disinterested approach

The heart of the problem is in the quarrel between the "satisfied" and "dissatisfied" nations Various advantages derived from colonial rule are analyzed, and the significance of military, economic and other reasons (prestige) underlying the acquisition of colonies is taken into account While there remains a large question mark on the economic balance sheet, the study group dwells on the fact that disputes over colonial possessions are and often have been potential causes of war, and that grievances against the colonial monopoly of certain powers have served to conceal the "naked struggle for power and prestige and markets."

Colonial powers are faced not only with the envy of non-colonial powers, but also with the increasing dissatisfaction of the subject peoples Thus the "satisfied" powers must act on two fronts Their "dual mandate," in the carefully weighted words of the study group, is to "prove to other powers that their policy is not to exercise monopoly rights for themselves, but rather to administer colonial resources in the general interest, and they must prove to peoples in the colonies that the protection and the administration they offer is a fair return for the taxation and the other obligations they impose and is directed to insure local prosperity." A silent gentlemen's agreement between the individual holders of great colonial wealth is suggested by the members of the study group, who feel that each colonial power suffers from the other's mistakes and that one instance of monopolistic exploitation or maladministration may be made use of for general denunciation of the colonial system.

At the bottom of the intriguing complexity of the colonial problem is the twofold division between the great "satisfied" powers which happen to be democratic, and the most active "dissatisfied" nations which are totalitarian Difference in ideologies, however, does not explain the existing contrasts in the colonial policies of democratic powers, most of whom hesitate for obvious reasons to accord to their colonies the liberties of the metropolitan country The study group's minute presentation of the colonial labor problem is a valuable contribution to

the knowledge of the intricate relationships between colonial rulers and subject peoples. They do not flinch from revealing hard facts about certain colonial administrations, including the Dutch and the Portuguese. Starting from the fact that colonial exploitation demands a supply of wage earners with a reasonable continuity in the personnel and that, ordinarily, there is no such class to be found in primitive communities, the study deals with the difficulties encountered in creating and maintaining a wage-earning working population. Forced labor and indirect compulsion to work are symptomatic of the unnatural and speedy transformation of an agricultural and barter economy into an economy based on the circulation of money.

The natural limits and the amount of friction brought about by any such system of force and exploitation lead to the final stage: the decolonization of colonies. While the progress toward assimilation of various forms of responsible government is advancing more or less rapidly in different parts of colonial empires, the "most gigantic experiment in decolonization" is in India, whose 350 million people constitute a particularly heavy responsibility. Acute problems of colonial administration, in Palestine and parts of the British Empire proper, are dealt with in a way which stresses the crucial points in recent developments. There is a fair and detached representation of American colonial policy; the authors state that "no country has more honestly sought to reverse a policy of domination than the United States," and the history of Philippine independence is of special interest in the light of the Far Eastern crisis.

Satisfactory settlement of outstanding difficulties *within* colonies is imperative. The present tendency to sidetrack the problem into competition between satisfied and dissatisfied powers is dangerous and unjustified. The study is the best recent contribution to a discussion which continues to extract new arguments from either side. The study group was composed as follows: Hon. Harold Nicolson, *C.M.G.*, *M.P.* (Chairman), Sir John Hope Simpson, *K.B.E.*, *C.I.E.*, Mr. G. L. Hubbard, Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, Mr. F. W. Paish, Sir Cecil Rodwell, *G.C.M.G.*, Sir Richard Winstedt, *K.B.E.*, *C.M.G.*, Miss Margaret Bryant (Group Secretary).

ERNEST O. HAUSER
New York, December 1938

PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION. *By Gottfried von Haberler. Geneva League of Nations New York International Documents Service Columbia University Press.* 1937. *pp.* 363 $2.00.

AN ECONOMIST of international reputation here deals with the business cycle—the recurrence of periods of prosperity and depression As a first step in a broad inquiry undertaken by the League of Nations, Professor Haberler has made a systematic analysis of existing business cycle theories and sought to weave them into a general synthesis.

The League investigation has been designed, not to elaborate a new and complete theory of the cycle, but with the object of sifting the theories which already exist and subjecting them to the test of fact Professor Haberler's synthesis attempts to create a coherent theory on the basis of the knowledge at present available His final chapter, dealing with the international aspects of the trade cycle, will be especially welcome to students of international affairs.

W W L

LE MARCHÉ DU RIZ D'INDO-CHINE *By Yves Pégourier. Paris Librairie Technique et Economique* 1937.

THIS book is timely and painstaking rather than a revelation of any new trends in Indochina's economic policy It follows the pioneer work of P Bernard, Yves Henry and Touzet, developing their ideas to logical conclusions, studied from the social as well as commercial angle. Since the depression it has been obvious that Indochina is being turned away from its natural economic and geographic setting in the Far East, and moving toward incorporation within the French imperial framework, being artificially stimulated thereto by favoring tariffs and an assured market.

M. Pégourier happily avoids platitudes regarding the primordial role of rice in Southeastern Asia, the uncertainty of the Far Eastern rice and silver markets, and the danger of monoculture to the colony's economy. He shows that the depression in Indochina took the form of a rice crisis so acute that the colony was only saved from ruin by timely governmental action. The administration was thus led to take stock of weaknesses in the organization and financing of production, but more important were its attempts to assure stability through acquiring permanent markets. No longer did it suffice to develop as far as possible the cultu-

vated surface, to produce a good quality of rice, and sell as much as possible to famished neighbors—heretofore the synthesis of Indochina's rice policy.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the competent discussion of the lack of credit organization and the potentialities of the port of Saigon-Cholon. In all of this the administration plays a role astonishingly large to readers unfamiliar with the octopus-like state control which characterizes the French colonial set-up. One might wish that Pégourier had further developed the reorientation—albeit groping and tentative as yet—of French thinking in terms of an imperial viewpoint, as witnessed by the wheat-versus-rice struggle in the home market. But this book performs a useful task in bringing out in clear relief the important and relatively recent shift in emphasis from production to distribution, in both the internal and external rice markets.

VIRGINIA THOMPSON
New York, December 1938

DIE ZUKUNFTSENTWICKLUNG DER JAVA-ZUCKERINDUSTRIE UNTER DEN EINFLUSS DER SELBSTABSCHLIESSUNGSTENDENZEN AUF DEM WELTMARKT (THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAVA SUGAR INDUSTRY IN THE FACE OF THE CURRENT TREND TOWARD NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY) *By Arno von Gebhardt. Volkswirtschaftliche Studien Vol. 56, pp. xv, 235. Berlin: Emil Ebering, 1937.* RM 9.60

TO MOST readers in democratic countries much in this volume will sound strange if not actually distasteful. Few will subscribe to the German view of international economics here presented, or the author's conviction that the Era of Economic Liberalism is past and that the Era of the Primacy of the State, of controlled economy, has dawned. Few, therefore, are ready to proceed with that vigorous reorganization of both economic ideology and policy which the recognition of this epochal change would necessitate.

The author insists that most attacks on autarchy miss the mark. As he sees it, the battle is not between those willing to trade internationally and those eager to shut themselves off, but between those who still believe in private, *laissez-faire*, international capitalism, and those who have adopted the creed of the primacy of the State and are convinced that economic considerations must be subordinated to the political *rationale*. He quotes with approval a statement, credited to Friedrich

List, that a country cut off from international trade is like a house without windows He calls on Hjalmar Schacht to support his argument that self-sufficiency is not desirable in itself, but is at best a necessary evil, to which some nations caught in a fateful dilemma must submit for the sake of security, if not of survival.

The analysis of the Java sugar industry is more or less subordinated to this analysis and appraisal of modern ideological trends The author sees the world engaged in a revolutionary process of political and economic realignment Through this it is hoped to overcome that institutional lag which is so generally recognized as the greatest obstacle to post-war stabilization The author believes that all efforts which, like the Chadbourne Plan, stem from economic liberalism are condemned to failure, and that only a reconstruction which takes full cognizance of twentieth century political and economic realities can bring about lasting solutions He advises the Java sugar industry to develop to the utmost the home market of the Dutch East Indies and to assure by political action foreign outlets for a surplus of perhaps 1,000,000, at the most 1,100,000 tons Such political action would take the form of bilateral treaties which take full account of the "organic" needs of the two parties involved.

There are minor flaws in the treatment of the sugar industry. Thus the motives behind the Brussels Sugar Convention of 1902 are not adequately developed. The spirit of the American sugar policy, in my opinion, is falsely interpreted as if it reflected something akin to totalitarian State *rationale* rather than the play of pressure group politics. In general, insufficient attention is given to the economic and political implications of the Great Depression. A closer acquaintance with English and American literature might have enabled the author to judge some points more competently. Apart from such minor flaws the book deserves attention as a reasonably well-documented and up-to-date analysis of the world sugar situation, especially as it affects the Java sugar industry.

Erich W Zimmermann
University of North Carolina

POLYNESIEN, DAS SEELENBILD EINER MEERESKULTUR. *By Emil Reche. Leipzig· Max Mohring* 1938. *pp.* 88 *Ill.*

DR. RECHE gives his interpretation of the thought-world of the Polynesians, as a "classic example" of a sea people. He focuses the

vast difference in modes of thought between the Polynesian and the European in the concepts of time and space and opposes the two outlooks as conditioned by a sea and a continental environment He points out how Polynesian navigation, built up without the use of instruments is evidence of a time-conditioned world view which has conquered the concept of space. His description of the Polynesian ideology as a highly developed philosophical system, in which the essence of the world is the will toward harmony, is the result of an attempt to probe into the fundamental psychological set of a preliterate people and as such is stimulating, whether or not his conclusions are accepted

Dr Reche conceives of the Polynesian world view as a survival of a high spiritual and moral Polynesian *Urkultur*, developed in prehistoric times on a subsequently submerged Pacific continent This explanation must be rejected as based on uncritical methods of historical reconstruction Moreover, it is unnecessary, inasmuch as the development of Polynesian culture can be explained by the simple culture building processes of diffusion, adaptation, and invention without recourse to a cosmic catastrophe hypothesis, for which no convincing geological evidence has been discovered.

LAURA THOMPSON
Honolulu, August 1938

LEVELS OF LIVING IN THE ILOCOS REGION *By Horacio Lava Published under the auspices of the Philippine Council, Institute of Pacific Relations* 1938 *pp* 91

THIS presentation of a sub subsistence level of living covers income and expenditures for 93 Ilocano peasant families, with data for the "representative" family, supplemented by pertinent descriptions of food, clothing, houses and living conditions In the Ilocos region living conditions are as bad as at any of the sites of recent agrarian rebellions It supplies the majority of Filipino laborers emigrating to Hawaii and other parts of the United States, also the majority of plantation laborers elsewhere in the Philippines

Combined account and questionnaire methods were used, with an inventory of family property, household furniture and equipment, food on hand, clothing, cash, and debts The author evaluates clothing expenditure by estimating yearly wear and tear, based on a five year life In the United States, existing studies indicate a complete replacement of garments at shorter intervals Houses were estimated to have a ten year life

No annual expenditure was computed for furniture and household equipment, although an inventory of the existing supply was taken. For comparison with other studies the same method followed in the case of houses and clothing should have been followed for these items.

Food accounts for 62 per cent of the total annual expenses, estimated at 257.59 pesos ($128.80), with the great majority of families spending from .025 to .035 centavos (1¼¢ to 1¾¢) per person per meal. The author finds that the regular Ilocano diet has an energy value of about 1,400 calories per adult. The only food scale that is used in arriving at this figure is to consider children equal to half an adult. The age limits are not indicated. If families had been converted to an adult male basis, using a more elaborate food consumption scale, it is probable that the caloric consumption per adult male in this study would have been somewhat higher. Family composition of the 93 families surveyed is omitted, preventing recomputation of calories on an adult male basis.

The average yearly income is 280 pesos, about one third in goods and two-thirds in money. Average value of property is 1,104 pesos. This includes a half-hectare farm (one and one fourth acres), a house of bamboo and nipa (palm leaves), a 300 peso lot, a carabao, a plow and harrow, and other productive equipment with a total value of about 75 pesos, furniture valued at 72 pesos, a little clothing; and cash of 60 pesos. Lacking are beds, comfortable chairs, silverware, radios, or phonographs. There is no provision for disposing of wastes, no medical service, medicines, hospitalization, or dental care, vacations, magazines or newspapers, sports, movies, and the like, are completely lacking in the lives of these people.

The author concludes that the majority of families suffered from lack of food, as well as from a poor distribution of nutrients.

> The rural worker in the Ilocos lives far below the subsistence level. The farm he cultivates, having an average size of less than half a hectare, is not sufficient to produce even the rice that his family consumes during the year. His productive equipment is crude and must, therefore, result in very low production per unit of human labor. No matter how hard he drives himself and his family the income he can derive from such meager equipment must of necessity be slight.

On the other hand, he comments that the ownership of real estate engenders a feeling of distinction, property becomes of such importance that the Ilocano peasant will enslave himself merely to own land.

This study gives a vivid picture of living conditions of Ilocano peasants, of value not only to those in the Philippines interested in a clearer under-

standing of their agrarian and labor problems, but also to those studying the adaptation and manner of living of emigrant Filipinos in the United States and elsewhere.

EDNA C. WENTWORTH
Honolulu, February 1939

AN ISLAND COMMUNITY: ECOLOGICAL SUCCESSION IN HAWAII. *By Andrew E. Lind. University of Chicago Press. 1938. pp. xxii + 337, with 56 diagrams and tables. $3.00.*

THE aim of this book is to trace the changing relation between man and the land in Hawaii from the discovery of the islands by Captain Cook in 1778 to the present day. The chapter headings include: Land Alienation, New Uses of Land, The Invasion of Trade, The Plantation and Capital Investment, Labor Control, Occupational Succession, and The Maturation of Island Civilization.

The chief value of the work lies in the excellent charts and statistical tables dealing with every aspect of the subject. The letterpress for the most part merely expresses this information in another form, with the result that study of the mass of facts—especially since several of them are repeated more than once—is somewhat laborious. Many interesting problems are touched, such as the gradual rise of immigrants up the social ladder and the operation of race prejudice.

The impression left is that the statistics might have been left to speak for themselves, and the space at present devoted to their restatement given instead to the full discussion of the human issues involved. That the author is capable of doing this is indicated by the excellence of, for example, his account of land tenure under primitive conditions. Moreover, the value of the book would have been considerably enhanced if a chapter had been added to draw some general conclusions.

H. IAN HOGBIN
Department of Anthropology, University of Sydney

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW ZEALAND: AN HISTORICAL STUDY. *By J. C. Beaglehole. New Zealand Council for Educational Research.* 1937. *pp. xiv* + 431. 12s 6d.

WHATEVER else it has done or may do the New Zealand Council for Educational Research has made itself responsible for a remarkable series of studies examining with candor and insight various as-

pects of the Dominion's educational organization. Mr. Somerset's *Littledene*, recounting the experiments in adult education in a country district, and Mr. Leicester Webb's excellent study of the administrative control of education[1] set a high standard Dr. Beaglehole makes the University's story reflect the sociological development of a new country The reader should, however, note that Dr Beaglehole has written the history of the University, not of the Colleges He deals therefore with the external control of higher education, not with the actual processes of teaching and research The New Zealand University indeed has had almost no other real function than the devising of syllabi and the conduct of examinations In spite of this, individual teachers in the Colleges have managed to fire their students with zeal for scientific research and the humanities This is evidence also of the unusual proportion of ability that is thrown up by a selected population in a favored environment

Dr. Beaglehole has rightly allowed former critics to tell his story for him in large measure but his own philosophy of education, particularly in the restrained final chapters in which tentative conclusions are allowed to emerge, has survived It cannot fail to influence educational thought and practice in the Dominion

J. B. Condliffe
London, 1938

The Far Eastern Policy of the United States *By A Whitney Griswold New York Harcourt, Brace & Company* 1938 *pp* 530 $3 75

Appearing at a juncture when the frustration of America's objectives in the Far East compel their reconsideration, this book performs a timely service by revealing the fundamental motives and methods of American twentieth century Far Eastern diplomacy, by candidly appraising its ends and means, and by explaining with penetration its failures. In addition important scholarly contributions are rendered by Dr Griswold in this well-documented and careful study, which not only fills in the lacuna in historical literature between the period covered by Dennett's *Americans in Eastern Asia* and the present, but also utilizes the Rockhill Papers to cast much new light on the background of Hay's Open Door diplomacy

The reader's impressions of 40 crowded years of diplomacy are uni-

[1] H C D Somerset, *Littledene* and Leicester Webb, *The Control of Education in New Zealand* both published by the New Zealand Council for Educational Research

fied by Dr. Griswold's emphasis on the extent to which one elusive objective figured as the chief dynamic of American efforts This persistent end, introduced by Hay's second Open Door note, was the preservation of the territorial and administrative entity of China Before 1900, America's principal aim in the Orient had been equality of commercial opportunity, and its methods, except for cooperation in the protection of nationals, had been in accord with traditional American isolationism. But the Far Eastern policy underwent a profound transformation when a novel flurry of imperialism, having led to the annexation of the Philippines, quickened American commercial ambitions in China at the very time when China was seriously jeopardized by world imperialism Whereas previously the ideal of China's territorial integrity had been imposed by the United States only upon itself, as a means of gaining China's acquiescence in commercial equality, Hay was led by his desire to protect the Open Door to try to impose this political principle on others. After Hay's substantial failure, what had originally been a means to the Open Door became an end in itself, nourished by political as well as commercial considerations

Otherwise, however, the recurrent efforts of the United States to preserve China's territorial integrity are seen by Dr. Griswold as following the same pattern as Hay's diplomacy—an ironical cycle of advance and retrenchment Subsequent statesmen outdid Hay's note writing by increasingly far-reaching intervention and cooperation, ranging from T R Roosevelt's attempts to influence the European balance of power in China's interest to Stimson's cooperation with the League Yet all were compelled sooner or later to retreat to the more modest of Hay's objectives, the Open Door. Dr. Griswold's explanation of the failure stresses chiefly the basic divergence of interests between the United States and European powers, particularly Great Britain, whose primacy of interests elsewhere caused them to withhold the needed and expected cooperation in China

It is Dr Griswold's disheartening conclusion that America's attempt to maintain China's territorial integrity has not only failed in itself but has injured the Open Door policy for the sake of which it was undertaken He draws the warning moral that, while the United States need not run away from its Far Eastern destinies, it should understand those destinies "in their true proportions." These judgments are set forth with due tentativeness, but, in conjunction with the emphases of the whole narrative, they will undoubtedly leave many readers with the belief that history has furnished an irrefutable proof of the isolationist thesis

While with respect to the moral validity of ends history never proves anything, the record here does suggest at least that America's methods of pursuing its ends in China have not been proved very practicable by the results. On the other hand, it is easy to exaggerate the failure, and perhaps Dr. Griswold, or the impression he creates, does so. The failure is distinctly mitigated by the fact that there were periods of calm as well as of disturbance, that aggressions against China were lessened even when not prevented, and that America could retreat in peace even when not victorious. Moreover, America's aims in China have become linked with its generalized espousal of international order and law, and in the world in general, as also in China, the game is not yet up.

Most important of all, what has failed is not, as the uncritical reader of Dr. Griswold may infer, a policy of full-blooded participation in world politics It is a participation sicklied o'er with the pale cast of isolationist thought, an isolation evident not only in the periods of retrenchment but even in those of advance. Intervention was generally only diplomatic, and cooperation was usually of concurrent rather than joint or collective character and was always without commitment to force That the United States escaped from isolationism at all was due largely to the fact that, though some insisted that China was nothing but the theater of European politics, others accepted Mahan's thesis that the Orient presented distinctive conditions warranting a relaxation of the reserve developed in relation to Europe

The United States escaped from isolationism only sufficiently to form a policy which is without the best merits of either isolation or its antithesis Dr Griswold does well to puncture the over-optimism and smugness often attending this "sane" middle-of the road policy. If he errs it is only in not pointing out that its danger lies largely in just its cautious element and that while pure isolation may well be preferable to this adulteration, it is not a necessary alternative. Half-way intervention acts as an irritant without inspiring fear, and half-way cooperation entangles America's interests without giving its allies the confidence which, despite partial divergence of interests, might prevent their defection. Perhaps bolder remedies are now ruled out, if not by the advanced stage of international disorders at least by the unreadiness of American public opinion. But until American policy has given collective action a fair test America's destinies or potentialities in the Far East cannot be known.

ALBERT K. WEINBERG
Baltimore, January 1939

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THE PROBLEM OF SANCTIONS IN THE FAR EAST

ELIZABETH BOODY SCHUMPETER

THERE ARE two main groups of opinion on the feasibility of enforcing economic sanctions against Japan. One group—by far the larger—believes quite sincerely that an official embargo on the sale of materials to Japan and a refusal to admit Japanese imports would stop the war in China within a relatively short time with little or no danger of serious economic reprisals or of an extension of the conflict. Another much smaller group is convinced that weak sanctions would not be effective and that strong sanctions would lead to war. Prominent and active in the first group are representatives of organized labor, the Christian missionaries in China, a number of Western journalists and writers, and friends of Soviet Russia, and in a more passive role the general public. In the second group are a smaller number of journalists actually stationed in the Far East, a small group of scholars at work on Far Eastern problems, responsible government officials in the foreign or diplomatic service of their countries, isolationists in the Congress of the United States, and a much smaller proportion of the general public. There are, of course, other groups and various positions between the two extremes. Some people believe in multilateral but not in unilateral sanctions. Some advocate sanctions only if they are likely to stop the war, whereas others would employ them as a moral gesture whatever the consequences. To discuss this problem with any clarity it is necessary to define the object in view as well as the nature and extent of the sanctions contemplated.

For simplicity economic sanctions may be defined as an official boycott on imports or an official embargo on exports or both together. There are also proposals for discriminatory duties and the cutting off of credit and port facilities, but these would reduce Japan's ability to buy raw materials and industrial equipment in a less drastic manner than a complete boycott and embargo. It is obvious

that success would depend on the completeness of the boycott or embargo, the length of time during which sanctions were energetically imposed, the number of countries participating, and the vulnerability of those countries to economic, military, or naval reprisals. The exclusion of oil, for example, in the case of Italian sanctions because of the fear of reprisals on the British navy in the Mediterranean doomed that movement to failure. The fact that Japan has large quantities of war materials in storage for the expected war with the Soviet Union automatically rules out the possibility of success within a few weeks or months. The non-participation of the Netherlands might be fatal because the Netherlands Indies are in a position to supply oil to Japan.

The supporters of economic sanctions against Japan at this time are by no means unanimous as to what they hope to accomplish, but, for the most part, they would employ sanctions for one or more of the following three purposes:

1. To stop the war in China.
2. To prevent or retard Japan's industrial development and keep it from becoming a first class industrial nation.
3. To show disapproval and moral indignation.

There is no answer to the people who advocate sanctions as a moral gesture because they are prepared to face economic loss for their fellow countrymen and even the possibility of war. This is a strong and unassailable position. It is, however, not the position of most people who favor economic action. There are also people who believe that firm and prompt action by the League of Nations and all the signatories to the Nine Power Treaty might have stopped Japan in 1931, or that concerted action at the time of the Brussels Conference in the autumn of 1937 might have been effective, but that now it is too late. They believe that Japan is now too deeply involved to withdraw from China under this type of pressure and that it may succeed in securing a measure of economic and strategic security within the Yen Bloc, though at a tremendous cost.

There is a very real difference of opinion between the experts on the one hand and the general public and propaganda groups on the other hand as to whether or not sanctions would stop the war in a

relatively short time and with no special risk. As this article is being written in June, the newspapers bristle with demands from various organizations that economic action be taken by governments to end the war in China. It has been suggested that Great Britain respond to the blockade of its Tientsin concession by closing British ports to Japanese shipping or by an outright boycott on imports, but the Cabinet's Foreign Policy Committee on June 19, 1939 decided against any economic or financial reprisals for the present. It is impossible to predict now the outcome of this controversy. The Chinese Council for Economic Research in Washington, D. C., released to the press on June 10 a statement that 85 per cent "of the imported sinews of war without which Japan might be unable to continue her invasion of China" came from the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and their dependencies. The United States alone, it was claimed, supplied 57.07 per cent of the Japanese imports of essential war materials in 1938. The American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression made public on June 17 an appeal to Congress by 69 prominent American clergymen, asking that the United States Government stop the sale to Japan of materials for military use. This request differed from most in that it did not request a general boycott or embargo. It raised the question of the definition of a war material, which is by no means easy to settle. The *New York Times* of June 19, summarizing a report issued the previous day by the Foreign Policy Association, emphasized the importance of the United States as a source of Japan's war materials. "Noting that about three fourths of Japan's war supplies[1] come from Britain and the United States, the report indicated that Japan would be in an exceedingly precarious position if these were cut off." For months writers in newspapers and magazines and various organizations interested in China have worked incessantly on the American public, calling the United States "Japan's partner in war guilt" and insisting that the war could not go on without American assistance.

[1] It is quite possible that the author, T. A. Bisson, stipulated "imported" war materials, but there was no qualifying adjective in the *Times* summary. This is typical of the confusion which exists in connection with this particular problem when the experts are quoted by others.

The results of this campaign are reflected in a recent survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion. These surveys based on a cross-section of the population have been extraordinarily successful in the past in forecasting elections and in showing the trend of public opinion in the United States. When the present poll is compared with the one taken in September 1937, it shows a growing sympathy for China and a desire to exert some form of economic pressure on Japan. The poll submitted inquiries as to a private boycott or an embargo on arms but did not raise the issue of a general official boycott or embargo. Of the people interviewed, 74 per cent were sympathetic to China and 24 per cent had no feeling for either side. In September 1937, 47 per cent sympathized with China and 51 per cent had no feeling for either side. Two-thirds of the people interviewed expressed a willingness to join in a boycott against Japan as against [illegible] per cent in September 1937. There was a substantial sentiment in favor of an official embargo on the shipment of arms and ammunition to both Japan and China with 72 per cent of those interviewed opposing such shipments to Japan and 4[illegible] per cent opposing similar shipments to China. Despite the genuine sympathy for China, it has been [illegible] of the American people in the various voluntary and private boycotts against Japan. Very few American women, for example, are wearing lisle or rayon stockings instead of silk. The American Government has already succeeded in stopping shipments of arms and ammunition to Japan without the necessity of a formal act of Congress, or invoking the neutrality legislation. *Practically no orders* for arms, ammunition, or implements of war have been placed by Japan in the United States since the beginning of [illegible] and very few between July and December, 1938.

There is no doubt that the sympathy of the peoples and of the governments of England, France, and the United States is with China in its present struggle against Japan and that this has been so from the beginning. It would be so even if they did not feel that their rights and privileges in China were being violated. There is, however, a very real doubt that the peoples of these countries would be willing to help China in ways which would lead to becoming involved in a war with Japan, there is a very real doubt whether it is

within the power of these governments to stop Japan by measures which do not entail the danger of serious reprisals and even of war The responsible people in the various governments realize this and prefer not to precipitate an incident or a crisis if it can be avoided without too much loss of face A time may come when the risk must be taken, but it will be a risk, and it is folly to misrepresent the situation and to minimize the danger.

The British Cabinet hopes fervently that the Tientsin episode may be settled without resort to drastic economic or military action at a time when all of Britain's strength must be concentrated in Europe The French Government found it prudent to curtail shipments of war materials into China by way of French Indochina Early this year the Australian Government forced the waterside workers to abandon their attempts to prevent the shipment of pig iron to Japan because such action might be dangerous and could not be contemplated except in conjunction with other countries The American Government has shown clearly that it would like to help China but has not ventured beyond diplomatic protests, refusal to invoke the Neutrality Law so that arms and munitions could be shipped to China, a thinly disguised political loan to China, and an embargo on exports of airplanes and parts enforced not by law but by the moral suasion of the State Department Some sections of this government obviously appreciate the possible danger of the kind of action urged by various pressure groups in a state of constantly mounting emotional tension

THE GENERAL public does not understand this reluctance because it is given a partial and unbalanced picture of the situation by writers and speakers who are themselves in some cases the victims of "wishful thinking" and in other cases merely badly informed Some of the most competent and able of them have been prophesying a financial collapse and a social revolution in Japan within six months ever since the outbreak of the China Incident in the summer of 1937. Now after two years of war, competent observers on the scene say that the situation is difficult but by no means desperate and that there is no immediate danger of an internal collapse[2] This is typical

[2] See W H Chamberlain "Japan at War" in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1939, and also Hugh Byas, *New York Times* June 18, 1939.

of the inadequate treatment of Japan's economic strength and weakness. In no case has there been a careful and scholarly analysis of the possible vulnerability of Japan to sanctions in the literature available to the public. This does not mean that there is not a perfectly good case for sanctions as a possible weapon against Japan, but it is time that we stopped pretending that it would be a relatively short and simple affair to end the war in China.

The following statement, for example, is issued by one of the best and most high-minded of the organizations interested in enforcing sanctions against Japan:

> Despite her violation of treaties with us we are today "Japan's Partner," supplying more than half of the sinews of war which she must have from abroad in order to continue her aggression against China. The least we can do is to *stop arming Japan!* Without our help her task will be hopeless. The risks involved in such a stoppage are slight compared to the mounting threat of successful militarism in Asia and throughout the world![8]

After reading this appeal and many reports of the type already commented on in the current news, the general public comes to believe that Japan obtains most of its war materials from the United States and Great Britain and that without these imports it would be helpless. The ordinary reader does not notice the qualificative "imported" in connection with these large percentages because little or nothing is said about the extent to which Japan can produce these materials at home, in Korea, and in Manchukuo or obtain them from regions in Southeastern Asia, which its navy is able to control at present. There is no emphasis as a rule on amounts of essential materials in storage. Where an embargo on "war materials" alone is advocated, the difficulties involved in defining such materials are usually ignored. Almost every raw material may be useful in carrying on a war; on the other hand even in time of war every such material has wide uses of a purely peaceful nature.

If economic sanctions are ever to become a useful method for maintaining collective security, the problem must be treated in an objective manner. It is natural for the Chinese and their missionary

[8] From a printed appeal for financial assistance sent out on March 28, 1939 by the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression.

friends to minimize the difficulties because they are so anxious to obtain assistance which will not be forthcoming if the risks seem considerable. Before the Western nations can come to any intelligent decision as to the vulnerability of Japan to sanctions, it is necessary to consider not only imports of raw or war materials but also the following five points.

1 Production in Japan and Japanese controlled territory
2 The amounts of essential materials in storage
3 Alternative sources of imports
4 The possibilities of substitution
5 The extent to which these materials are necessary for carrying on the war in China, and the extent to which they are being used to expand productive capacity

It is, of course, impossible to cover these points adequately in a single brief article, but an attempt will be made to block out the main arguments. The detailed statistical information upon which these arguments are based will be soon available in print in a study of The Recent Economic Development of Japan undertaken by four economists under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research at Harvard University and Radcliffe College.

Many people who would be opposed to a general embargo, would like to see an embargo on arms, ammunition, and "war materials." They are not aware that Japan is almost entirely self sufficient in arms and ammunition or that the United States, for example, is not now exporting to Japan any arms, ammunition, or implements of war.[4] Under implements of war are included all types of aircraft, aircraft engines and parts. The export of articles in this category must be licensed by the State Department, and no such licenses were issued during the first five months of 1939. As far back as July, 1938, the Department stated that it disapproved of the export of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries whose armed forces bombed civilian populations. By the end of the year it had succeeded in convincing the American manufacturers that they did not want to apply for licenses to export these articles to Japan. On the other hand, the Department continues to license the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to China, and the Export-

[4] Except very small amounts for which licenses were issued in 1938

Import Bank lent China $25,000,000 with which to purchase trucks to use in transporting military supplies over the new Burma Road. The State Department has stopped the sale of war supplies to Japan by the voluntary action of manufacturers and without the necessity of enacting legislation. Between July 1, 1937 and May 31, 1939, the Department issued licenses for the export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to China in the value of [illegible] and to Japan in the value of [illegible].

The problem involved in stopping the sale of the so-called "war materials" to Japan is a much more complicated one. There is practically no raw material which is not useful in carrying on a war. The United States Department of Commerce recently designated seventeen important groups of exports to Japan as possible war materials. A war material might be anything utilized in the manufacture of arms, ammunition, warships, and airplanes, or in transporting troops, or in feeding and clothing the fighting forces. This would include almost the entire list of Japanese imports. For Germany in the Great War, food was an important war material which England tried to exclude by every possible means, some of which involved the violation of neutral rights on a considerable scale.

For Japan the war materials most often stressed are scrap iron, other metals, petroleum and its products, machinery, automobiles, and airplanes. Scrap iron is simply one of the raw materials of the iron and steel industry; it is no more a war material than iron ore, pig iron, coke, or limestone. Fuel oil and gasoline are needed for battleships and bombers, but they are also used by the farmer, the factory owner, and the fisherman. Farmers and fishermen have been complaining recently that they were experiencing difficulty in obtaining sufficient oil for their agricultural machinery and fishing boats. The machinery is being used to equip factories for many purposes. The many industrial chemicals may produce fertilizer for the farmer, explosives for the munitions maker, or important raw materials for the rayon, glass, paper, and dyeing industries. The iron and steel industry produces material which is used in the equipment of every other industry. Airplanes are put in a different category (implements of war), are not now being exported to Japan, and present an entirely different problem.

It is possible to define arms, ammunition, and implements of war, but any definition of "war materials" must necessarily be an arbitrary one War materials are usually identical with raw materials Once you deny countries access to food or raw materials on any scale, you are warring on civilian populations; you are employing the very tactics you deplore Certain political areas are rich in raw materials and certain others are poor The rich areas include the United States, the Soviet Union, and the British Empire with the French and the Netherlands Empires in second place In most cases these political areas have gained control over their raw materials in the past by methods which now shock us They wish to prevent other countries from following their example; and this may be a praiseworthy ambition depending on the means used If the rich countries starve or threaten to starve[8] other countries by denying them the right to buy raw materials, this strengthens the position of those who feel that it is necessary to control territory in which they will have access to strategic raw materials This gives a kind of moral justification to what would otherwise be a campaign of pure aggression.

It will be urged by those who do not agree with this thesis that the well-endowed democracies will use this weapon only in a righteous cause This may be their intention but the maintenance of a balance of power or of the status quo is not necessarily the ultimate good in a dynamic world This is not to be interpreted in any way as a justification of the Japanese invasion of China It is merely an effort to point out some of the moral and practical difficulties in connection with an attempt to place an embargo on war materials or raw materials as distinguished from arms, ammunition, and implements of war

The group of American clergymen mentioned earlier recognize this moral problem although they do not see the ambiguity in the concept of war materials They are quoted as follows

> We are not asking in this petition for a general boycott of trade with Japan We do not desire to harm in any way the Japanese people who are controlled in their relation to China by the domination of a military

[8] An industrial population is starved in the sense of being deprived of its means of livelihood even if, as in Japan's case, there are no supplies of food to cut off

party We do not ask for any military intervention on the part of the United States

But we do protest against the participation of America in the aggression of Japan in China made possible through provision of the materials for war by the people of the United States [*]

It is impossible to cut off supplies of iron, copper, oil, cotton, and machinery which would be used in the war industries without cutting off supplies which might be used in fertilizer, rayon, and agricultural implement factories A large but unknown proportion of imported materials is being used at present to increase the nation's productive capacity and is not being blown up in China

The Manchurian Five Year Plan and the Japanese Four Year Plan for increasing the nation's productive capacity are being pushed energetically along with the war in China Many new factories are now being built and equipped in Japan and Manchukuo to increase the home supply of iron and steel, light metals pulp, synthetic oil and gasoline chemicals, machine tools, and vehicles, and several of the new plants are already in operation Some effort is also being made to develop the resources of Korea and North China It is impossible to state how much of the imported machinery and metals is being used for the purpose of industrial expansion and how much for carrying on the war To some extent, of course, the two uses are related but there has been a tendency to exaggerate the purely wartime needs This can perhaps be brought out more clearly by comparing the exports and imports of certain classes of goods for the last three years

EXPORTS FROM AND IMPORTS INTO JAPAN

Values in millions of yen

	Exports			*Imports*		
	1936	*1937*	*1938*	*1936*	*1937*	*1938*
Ores and Metals	103	125	111	375	901	662
Metal Manufactures	76	99	110	10	12	8
Scientific Instruments, Fire Arms, Vehicles, and Vessels	93	118	111	62	84	77
Machinery and Parts	82	110	156	92	159	236
Total	354	452	488	539	1156	983
Net Imports				185	704	495

[*] *New York Times* June 18, 1939

The exports of machinery and instruments exceeded in value the imports of the same articles in 1936 and were about 90 per cent of the imports in 1937 and 1938. If we compare the imports and exports of this entire group of strategic materials and manufactures, we find that the exports were about 50 per cent of the imports in 1938. These exports went largely to Manchukuo, Kuantung Leased Territory, and China as part of the program of industrialization which is to make the Yen Bloc self-sufficient by 1942 in iron and steel, coal, light metals, zinc, soda, sulphate of ammonia, pulp, rolling stock, motorcars, and shipping. The total value of the domestic production of machinery and instruments (scientific instruments, vehicles, vessels, fire arms, machinery, parts, and accessories) was 1,716 million yen in 1936 and 2,557 million yen in 1937. Imports were less than 10 per cent of the domestic production and were almost balanced by exports.

It is obvious, therefore, that Japan is now in a position to produce most of the machinery it uses and that recent heavy purchases have been to a large extent in connection with the equipping of new plants and factories. It is true that certain types of machine tools, automobiles, and automobile parts are still imported on a large scale, but the relative dependence is decreasing. In 1936 Japan produced 79 per cent of its machine tools and imported 21 per cent. In view of what is known of Japan's preparedness for a war against Soviet Russia, it is reasonable to believe that the army has in reserve sufficient supplies of special tools and parts to take care of emergencies. An embargo on exports of this type would undoubtedly slow up the various plans for industrial expansion because it would be necessary to curtail non-military manufacturing use. It could hardly have very much effect on military operations in China. It is sometimes urged that efforts should be made to limit Japan's industrial development with a view to curbing its future economic and military power. It might be possible to do this at considerable risk and loss of trade for a short time, but it is a difficult undertaking to keep any vigorous determined nation bottled up for a long period. The great example of conspicuous failure in such an attempt is the case of Germany in the twenty years after the Treaty of Versailles.

There has been so much emphasis on the lack of raw materials in Japan that too little attention has been paid to the elements of strength in the situation, and to the potential supplies of raw materials in Korea, Manchukuo, North China, and the South Seas. Between 1926 and 1936 Japan became self sufficient in foodstuffs with the assistance of Korea and Formosa and developed a substantial domestic chemical industry, which made it independent to an increasing extent in the heavy chemicals used in the manufacture of fertilizers, munitions, rayon, paper, glass, and soap. It has made considerable progress with synthetic nitrates, producing large quantities of calcium cyanamide and ammonium sulphate. Japan is second only to Germany in the output of ammonium sulphate and to the United States in the output of sulphuric acid. The domestic supply of soda ash and caustic soda, which increased fifteen fold in ten years, is just about adequate, and there is a small export surplus of bleaching powder. The value of home production of explosives and related products increased from about 8 million yen between 1927 and 1932 to 25 million yen in [illegible], whereas imports of explosives declined in value from 5 million yen in [illegible] to one million yen in 1935 and 1936.

The domestic supply of ammonium sulphate (rising from 1 300,000 tons in [illegible] to 1,5[illegible] tons in [illegible]) is supplemented by annual imports of from 2[illegible] to 3[illegible] tons because of the heavy demand from the fertilizer and munitions manufacturers. The imports come largely from Kuantung and Germany. Salt for the chemical industry is imported from Formosa, Kuantung, Manchukuo, North China, and Africa. Japan now exports large quantities of cheap coal tar dyes and imports small quantities of better dyes. The use of nitrates and coal tar products in the manufacture of explosives lends a certain strategic significance to the recent rapid expansion of the chemical industry in Japan. An established chemical industry is also valuable from the standpoint of synthetic materials and substitutes.

In 1935 and 1936 Japan was a net exporter of steel products although it was still importing certain special steels and steel products. In 1936 the exports of machinery, tools, and vehicles from Japan were greater in value than the imports to that country, but the

imports consisted largely of the more delicate and complicated types of machinery and machine tools. It is no longer possible to state, as one careful and well-informed writer did in 1930, that Japan can never become a manufacturing nation of major importance because of the lack of fuel and iron, which are essential in peace as well as war.[7] Japan has become a major manufacturing nation. The rise of the heavy industries has been the striking development of recent years. Before the depression it was the textile industries, food preparation, pottery, and paper manufacturing which predominated. In 1935 just under half and in 1937 about 55 per cent of the total value of industrial production was accounted for by the metals, chemicals, machinery, and engineering products. This meant that Japan was no longer dependent on the outside world for a large part of its steel, fertilizer, arms, ammunition, and machinery, though it still had to import raw materials. It produced its own ships and many of its own airplanes, but imported automobiles and parts.

It is a mistake to think of a country's supply of raw materials as being fixed and unalterable. Japan's position with respect to the supply of essential materials has changed with the development of industrial and chemical technique, and with its control over Manchukuo. Changing technique has made possible and even profitable the exploitation of many supplies of low-grade minerals. Gasoline and fuel oil are now being produced from coal and shale, abundant water power may be a substitute for steam power, nitrates for fertilizer and explosives are produced synthetically. The production of rayon from pulp has changed the position of both cotton and raw silk, the light metals are of increasing importance; and the possibilities of substitutes and synthetic materials appear to be almost infinite. In the iron and steel industry the use of scrap makes possible the utilization of worn out or obsolete equipment in the manufacture of new steel materials so that the demand for pig iron may be reduced by as much as 50 per cent.

The statement is made frequently that since Japan must import scrap for its war industries and can obtain it in sufficient quantities only in the United States, an embargo on American scrap would stop the war in China. This theory is based on a mistaken idea of the

[7] John E. Orchard, *Japan's Economic Position* (New York, 1930), p. 482

nature and importance of scrap, it also ignores a considerable domestic supply supplemented by reputedly large amounts in stock piles. Scrap and pig iron may be used in varying proportions in the production of open hearth steel. No scrap at all can be used in production by the Bessemer process, and up to 100 per cent scrap may be used in electric furnace production. In Japan in 1936 approximately equal amounts of scrap and pig iron were used. Scrap iron may consist of discarded equipment, or it may be a by-product of steel production in the form of croppings from ingots, billets, and other rolled products, clippings from plates and sheets, borings, and defective products. As soon as a country becomes industrialized and begins to manufacture steel on any scale, scrap of both kinds is accumulated. The United States in 1937 used 12 million tons of collected scrap and 16 million tons of by-product scrap. The Japanese steel industry is now yielding fair amounts of by-product scrap and will yield more as it increases in size. In 1936 Japan produced 5,500,000 tons of raw steel and 4,500,000 tons of steel products. A little more than half of the scrap consumed was of domestic origin and about one third imported from the United States. The figures follow:

SCRAP IRON IN JAPAN
In thousands of tons

Year	Consumption	Imports	Imports from the United States
1935	3,1[illegible]	[illegible]	1,[illegible]
1936	3,[illegible]	1,44[illegible]	1,[illegible]6

The imports of scrap iron from the United States rose to 1,912,000 tons in 1937 and fell again to [illegible] tons in 1938. Imports of all kinds of raw materials were very heavy in 1937 even before the outbreak of the China Incident because supplies were being accumulated for industrial expansion. There was nothing abnormal about the 1938 imports though steel production was probably expanding. It is said that a good deal of scrap is being salvaged from the areas of conflict in China and that large stocks have been piled up in Japan. Under these circumstances, the cutting off of American exports would retard industrial expansion but would scarcely stop the war. It might result for a time in a larger proportional consumption of pig iron in open hearth production. In time,

if present plans are carried out, Japan will have ample supplies of domestic scrap

The iron ore used comes mainly from Japan, Korea, Manchukuo, China, and Malaya In 1936 about 3 million tons of iron ore were produced within the Japanese sphere of influence[6] (Japan and Korea each 600,000 tons and Manchukuo 1,800,000 tons) and about 3.8 million tons were imported from foreign countries, the imports from China amounting to 1.3 million tons The Four-Year Plan calls for a great increase in Korean and Manchurian output and some increase in imports from China to take care of a much larger steel industry Of the pig iron consumed in 1935 and 1936, less than a quarter was imported from foreign countries, and these countries were India and Russia In 1937 and 1938 the United States took the place of Russia, exporting [illegible] tons in 1937 and 316,000 tons in 1938. No Japanese figures are available since 1936, but it is clear from the 1935 and 1936 figures that foreign imports play a minor role in pig iron

PIG IRON IN JAPAN

(In thousands of tons)

Year	Total Supply	Domestic Production	Imports from Colonies	Imports from Manchukuo	Imports from Foreign Countries
1935	2,998	[illegible]	131	382	[illegible]
1936	[illegible]	[illegible]	123	[illegible]	[illegible]

There is space for only the briefest mention of petroleum and its products in the Japanese war economy The lack of petroleum is undoubtedly Japan's greatest strategic weakness Before the China Incident, Japan and Manchukuo consumed about 3.3 million tons of petroleum products annually, and the consumption is now higher despite strict rationing of gasoline for ordinary use, the compulsory mixing of alcohol with gasoline, and the use of charcoal gas engines in buses Japan produced at home about 10 per cent of the petroleum consumed and another 5 per cent in its concessions in Russian Sakhalin, while Manchukuo produced about 100,000 tons of oil from shale. For several years past there has been active experimentation with many methods for obtaining oil from shale and coal

[6] This does not include China.

including the hydrogenation process by which Germany now obtains half its supply of airplane gasoline. Though there are very large reserves of shale and coal in Manchukuo, actual manufacture began only last year except for the shale oil already mentioned. This may constitute an important supply in the future, but the quantities obtained at present are probably not large.

Japan has been importing crude and heavy oil from the United States and refined products from the Netherlands Indies. In 1936 about half the petroleum products consumed in Japan was refined at home; Japan's refining capacity has increased very rapidly from 1929. Before the outbreak of the China Incident the commercial companies were obliged to keep a six months supply of petroleum in storage. Since then, storage capacity has increased considerably, but information is not given out for strategic reasons. The Chinese Council for Economic Research believes that Japan may be accumulating a large reserve for a possible conflict with major navies in the Southern Pacific. It is certain that it has a large reserve against a possible war with Russia.

In the event of an embargo by the United States, Japan could utilize its own resources (including those of Manchukuo), draw upon storage, and turn to the Netherlands Indies and after a time to Mexico. This supposes that the Netherlands does not join the embargo because of the vulnerability of the Netherlands Indies to an attack by the Japanese navy. The production of petroleum in the Netherlands Indies has risen steadily from 4,[illegible] tons in 1931 to 7,26[illegible] tons in 193[illegible]. It is sometimes stated that these wells are giving out, but output has risen a little in each of the last eight years. The difficulty with Mexican oil at present is that there is no cheap way to transport it from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast. It is reported that the Mexicans wish to improve the railroad across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec or even to build a pipe line across the Isthmus at a cost of $[illegible]. If Japan were cut off from cheap California crude, something of this kind might be done.

The objection that Japan can obtain gasoline with a very high octane rating (used in long distance flying) only in the United States is not serious unless Japan wishes to attack at very great distances from its bases. Moreover, Japan is now using German

machinery in the hydrogenation process and Germany has been producing high test airplane gasoline for some time. There is also the problem of tankers. According to a statement made to the Diet in March, 1939 by Admiral Yonai, the Navy Minister, there were 35 tankers with a total capacity of 350,000 tons owned by private interests and 8 more were then under construction. Nothing was said about tankers belonging to the navy. When all these factors are taken into consideration, it is by no means certain that Japan would have to withdraw from China if American supplies were eliminated.

Within the last three or four years many new mineral resources have been discovered in Korea and Manchukuo, and some have been exploited. The production of magnesium and aluminum has made great strides, though the aluminum is as yet dependent on bauxite imported from the Netherlands Indies. The output of tungsten in Korea has increased rapidly and is now an appreciable percentage of the world's supply. Known reserves of iron ore have increased significantly. In the Netherlands Indies and in Malaya, there are supplies of petroleum, rubber, tin, bauxite, and iron ore.

It was suggested earlier that the vulnerability of Japan to sanctions cannot be decided on the basis of import figures alone, but that it is necessary to consider production in Japan and Japanese controlled territory, the amounts of essential materials in storage, alternative sources of imports, the possibilities of substitution, and the extent to which imported materials are being used to expand productive capacity rather than for purely war purposes. This has been done all too superficially with machinery, scrap iron, and petroleum — the weaknesses most emphasized by the advocates of sanctions. In the case of machinery and the raw materials of the iron and steel industry, the imports from the United States or even from the United States and Great Britain are important but not predominant. In the case of petroleum there are large reserves and alternative sources of supply.

An official boycott, by further reducing Japan's supply of foreign exchange, and an official embargo, by making it necessary to abandon part or all of its program of industrial expansion, could injure Japan very much. But it does not seem likely that these measures could stop the war in China without great danger of retaliation on

the part of Japan. Economic retaliation would injure Great Britain, the United States, India, and Australia, but there is also the possibility of military retaliation. Cut off from markets and raw materials but with raw materials near by in the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, French Indochina, and the Philippines, who can be sure what the Japanese Army and Navy would do under such circumstances? Economic sanctions have not yet proved themselves an effective method "short of war." Partial sanctions will not stop a nation prepared to make every sacrifice for what it looks upon as its national existence. Strong sanctions applied after a nation is deeply involved will, in all probability, lead to war. Strong sanctions are simply another weapon in warfare.

Bureau of International Research
Harvard, June 1939

POLITICS AND STRATEGY OF CHINA'S MOBILE WAR

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

THE history of China in this century has revolved about the struggle for national independence, political democracy and economic reform. The first great upsurge came in 1911, when a republic replaced the empire, the second in 1924-27, when greater political unity was secured, and the country saw full sovereignty and fundamental rural and factory reforms within reach, and the third in 1937, when a national front was built against Japanese invasion.

The chief problem before China at the beginning of this third upsurge was to decide what military and political strategy offered the greatest chance of ultimate victory. Despite recent progress, it was clear that China's transport system, factories and resources could not long support a large modern army engaged in a struggle for positions. Besides, many of the scars of civil war remained, the allegiance of certain provinces was questionable, and family and local loyalties were still strong rivals of national feeling. Within the Central Government itself an important faction opposed resistance, and the Chinese army was plainly inferior to that of Japan in training and equipment.

China had, however, important potential sources of strength: a population over seven times greater than that of Japan proper, a store of undeveloped mineral resources and underdeveloped farm land, and a vast area within which to retreat and maneuver. In addition, its decentralized, predominantly agricultural economy made it possible for the interior regions to survive on their own resources, even though cut off from each other and the foreign coastal trade.

Japan, on the other hand, might in the long run show significant weaknesses. The conflict would further strain its already tense international relations, particularly in view of the world economic

situation and the fact that the other nations were either at war or clearly preparing for war. Equally important, the great cost of maintaining a new continental army, the necessity of drawing on diminishing gold reserves to buy essential raw materials abroad, the possibility of popular or governmental boycotts of Japanese goods, and the weaknesses inherent in Japan's semi-feudal agriculture and extreme concentration of wealth might all, given sufficient time, produce serious internal unrest.

In order to allow the long-term factors full opportunity to develop, China would have to extend the war in time—and therefore in space. A protracted war could be kept up if, using rapid movement both in attack and retreat, the Chinese forces chose the occasion and field of battle most favorable to themselves and did not insist on the maintenance of fixed positions. In such a mobile conflict, Japan would gradually extend its armies and lines of communication along a thousand vulnerable fronts and often find it difficult to bring superior training and equipment into play.

The use of such tactics was not a theoretical question, for it was precisely by mobile and guerilla strategy that, during the previous decade of civil war, the Chinese Communists had preserved their own forces and constantly defeated or eluded central armies superior in every technical respect. This experience the Communists brought with them into the national united front. Besides, for the past six years in Manchuria Chinese guerilla fighters, with a well-organized army based on the mountainous and well-forested sections, had constantly attacked communication lines and Japanese troops and property.

These tactics are unfortunately often misunderstood because the overlapping terms, *mobile warfare* and *guerilla warfare*, are considered identical. Strictly speaking, *mobile warfare* is a blanket phrase for the strategy already described, whether carried out by a well-trained, well-armed regular force of fifteen thousand or by twenty, fifty or a hundred irregular peasant volunteers. In practice, however, because of the difference in the scale of the action, the nature of the objectives, the location of the field of battle and the character of the forces, the term *mobile warfare* is generally used of the larger forces (wherever they may operate) and *gue-*

rilla warfare of the smaller. In guerilla conflict, the operation is almost always behind the enemy front, and lines of communication and supplies are attacked more often than enemy troops. The purpose is usually to harass or inflict a comparatively minor loss, and the guerillas themselves generally come directly from the local population. In the words of one Chinese general, guerilla warfare is "People's self-defense against oppression."[1]

In developing a war of mobility, China had to decide what relative weight mobile, guerilla and positional warfare should have. On this point it is important to examine the views of the Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, who discussed the subject in an interview with Edgar Snow a year before the war began and expanded it in a "Discussion of Protracted War," delivered in Yenan (North Shensi province), May 26-June 3, 1938.

Mao stated that in the war as a whole mobile warfare should be primary, with varying stress on guerilla and positional action according to the stage of the conflict. Thus during the advance of the Japanese armies, which would mark the first stage, mobile strategy would be most important and the two other forms secondary. (Though favoring a reasonable defense of important cities, he disapproved of the extended Chinese struggle at Shanghai and the general initial emphasis on positions.) In the second stage the Japanese, ceasing to advance, would try to consolidate their political and economic power within the areas already invaded; and China, to counteract this, would place primary stress on widespread, harassing guerilla tactics in the enemy's rear, with mobile warfare as an auxiliary and positional tactics given little importance. Should China, as a result of its own resistance, international aid, and internal unrest in Japan, succeed in exhausting the invader, a third stage would follow, marked by gradual Japanese retreat under Chinese attack. Mobile warfare would again be primary, with positional strategy slowly assuming the chief position, while guerilla warfare would be far less important than before.[2]

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[1] Peng Teh-huai, as quoted in A. L. Strong, *One-Fifth of Mankind*, New York, 1938, p. 122.

[2] Mao Tse-tung, "Lun Ch'ih-chiu-chan" (Discussion of Protracted War) in *Chieh Fang* (Liberation), No. 43-4, July 1, 1938, pp. 2-41 (Chinese).

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GUERILLA strategy is important, but in China the program is far more significant. This involves, degrees, the political and economic mobilization of the people behind the Japanese lines and has reached its h north under the Hopei-Shansi-Chahar Border Governm functioning Chinese administration controlling 95,000 squ and 14 million people These facts, in conjunction with t tinued existence and development of the regular Chinese G ment in uninvaded territory, and the use of guerilla methods ply is one part of a many-sided plan of resistance, all suggest China's mobile war is quite different from the sporadic, irregu partisan warfare found in invaded areas in other times and pla Therefore, except in so far as they stress the incomparably su military and political position of China today, analogies with past are likely to be very misleading

The civil program is the heart of a successful protracted strug against Japan, because mobile and guerilla warfare will be sh lived and ineffective unless the people, both in the invaded uninvaded areas, are aroused by economic reform, education organization In China economic reform means first of all fun mental agricultural change, for the country's overwhelmingly ru population labors under a land system that is marked by mic scopic holdings, high rents, considerable tenancy, antiquated met ods, a tremendous debt burden with universal usury, powerful tax oppression by local governments, and a frequent extreme concer-

[illegible]ion of the functions of landlord, merchant, usurer and local [illegible]cal

To redress these peasant grievances at least in part, and yet not drive the gentry into the arms of Japan, requires great skill and [illegible]. The first steps in this direction were taken by the Chinese Communists when in the summer of 1937 they abandoned the [illegible] of expropriating landlord property and replaced the Ch[illegible] Soviet Republic by the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Special Dis[illegible] which then became an integral part of the national territory. Discrimination against landlords ceased, elections were held in [illegible] classes voted equally, and a universal, graduated, con[illegible] was fixed with the poorest peasants exempt. As a re[illegible] previous policies, most peasants already had their own l[illegible] cooperatives were widespread, and interest rates were [illegible] were not excessive but local business flourished. All [illegible] been accompanied by the formation of mass organiza[illegible] extensive [illegible] and the closest cooperation between the [illegible] and the people.[8]

This area has not been invaded so far but from it the Eighth Route Army (formerly the Chinese R[illegible] Army) was dispatched by the National Government to help defend the northern provinces. When it entered Shansi province, it found burnt and empty villages, pro-Japanese Peace Maintenance Committees and general demoralization, but its organizers gave direction to existing spontaneous guerilla groups and revived morale and local administration. Popular organizations were established, a guerilla force was formed to attack communications and small Japanese groups, and a local, unarmed Self-Defense Corps was raised to perform such functions as patroling roads, carrying information and helping care for the wounded. The people were instructed and aroused to resistance through schools, plays, speeches, songs, dances and wall newspapers. Economic conditions were improved, but every effort was made to moderate class friction. The army received daily political and cultural education; simple, friendly relations existed between officers and rank-and-file; and all were trained to have

[8] J Bertram, *Unconquered*, New York, 1939, pp 125 27

This formal division into stages and strategies is useful in analysis, but there is in practice considerable overlapping. Large mobile forces always operate with guerilla support, and guerilla units never undertake any serious military action except in conjunction with regular troops. In the war's first stage, moreover, China's significant victories (e.g., Pinghsingkuan and Taierhchuang) resulted from a skillful combination in time and space of the three types of strategy. Similarly, although this stage apparently ended with Hankow's fall in October 1938, it continued on a minor scale with the taking of Nanchang in late March 1939, and it may be revived more fully by a drive on Sian and Lanchow.

GUERILLA strategy is important, but in China the guerilla civil program is far more significant. This involves, in varying degrees, the political and economic mobilization of the Chinese people behind the Japanese lines and has reached its height in the north under the Hopei-Shansi-Chahar Border Government, a fully functioning Chinese administration controlling 95,000 square miles and 14 million people. These facts, in conjunction with the continued existence and development of the regular Chinese Government in uninvaded territory, and the use of guerilla methods simply as one part of a many-sided plan of resistance, all suggest that China's mobile war is quite different from the sporadic, irregular partisan warfare found in invaded areas in other times and places. Therefore, except in so far as they stress the incomparably superior military and political position of China today, analogies with the past are likely to be very misleading.

The civil program is the heart of a successful protracted struggle against Japan, because mobile and guerilla warfare will be short-lived and ineffective unless the people, both in the invaded and uninvaded areas, are aroused by economic reform, education and organization. In China economic reform means first of all fundamental agricultural change, for the country's overwhelmingly rural population labors under a land system that is marked by microscopic holdings, high rents, considerable tenancy, antiquated methods, a tremendous debt burden with universal usury, powerful tax oppression by local governments, and a frequent extreme concen-

tration of the functions of landlord, merchant, usurer and local official.

To redress these peasant grievances at least in part, and yet not drive the gentry into the arms of Japan, requires great skill and flexibility. The first steps in this direction were taken by the Chinese Communists when, in the summer of 1937, they abandoned the policy of expropriating landlord property and replaced the Chinese Soviet Republic by the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Special District, which then became an integral part of the national territory. Discrimination against landlords ceased, elections were held in which all classes voted equally, and a universal, graduated, consolidated tax was fixed, with the poorest peasants exempt. As a result of previous policies, most peasants already had their own land, rural cooperatives were widespread, and interest rates were low. Profits were not excessive, but local business flourished. All this had been accompanied by the formation of mass organizations, extensive schooling, and the closest cooperation between the army and the people.[8]

This area has not been invaded so far, but from it the Eighth Route Army (formerly the Chinese Red Army) was dispatched by the National Government to help defend the northern provinces. When it entered Shansi province, it found burnt and empty villages, pro-Japanese Peace Maintenance Committees and general demoralization, but its organizers gave direction to existing spontaneous guerilla groups and revived morale and local administration. Popular organizations were established, a guerilla force was formed to attack communications and small Japanese groups, and a local, unarmed Self-Defense Corps was raised to perform such functions as patroling roads, carrying information and helping care for the wounded. The people were instructed and aroused to resistance through schools, plays, speeches, songs, dances and wall newspapers. Economic conditions were improved, but every effort was made to moderate class friction. The army received daily political and cultural education; simple, friendly relations existed between officers and rank-and-file; and all were trained to have

[8] J. Bertram, *Unconquered*, New York, 1939, pp. 125-27.

the highest respect for the rights of the people. As a result of these circumstances, the Eighth Route Army, operating primarily in mobile warfare with the support of guerillas, won many victories and inflicted serious losses on the Japanese.[4]

The military and political view of the war described so far, though early held by diverse elements within and outside the Government, only gradually became the official policy and is still in the process of realization. It was opposed not only by pro-Japanese officials, but, more important, by the gentry and powerful city interests who feared the internal effects of mass mobilization. The latter combination, moreover, probably desired the defense of the large cities at whatever cost (that is, positional rather than mobile warfare) in the hope that their urban interests might be retained, their rural interests saved from invasion, and mass mobilization rendered unnecessary. Because of this inner conflict, the fall of almost every important city has produced a new governmental crisis, but every crisis has produced an advance in the program of popular organization, rural reform and mobile and guerilla warfare.

After Shanghai fell, for example, the Government decided to fight on and now made peace with a small Communist army, isolated in the Yangtze valley, which it had sought to destroy even after the civil war as a whole had ceased. Still more critical was the loss of Nanking, but on December 15, 1937 Chiang Kai-shek declared: "The basis of China's future success in prolonged resistance is not found in Nanking or the big cities, but in the villages all over China and in the fixed determination of the people." This was followed in January 1938 by a mild governmental reorganization, the rejection of German efforts at mediation, the execution of the Shantung war lord Han Fu-chu, the establishment of the New Fourth Army—a guerilla force—in the Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow area, the vigorous development of mass mobilization in southern Shantung under Li Tsung-jen, and official

[4] Bertram, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-20, 217-58, [illegible], 265; Strong, *op. cit.*, 130, 135-36, 144, 157. For figures on Japanese losses, see Chu Teh, "*Pa-lu-chun K'ang-chan-ti I-chou-nien*" (One Year of Battle by the Eighth Route Army) in *Chieh-fang*, No. 43-4, July 1, 1938, pp. 45-6 (Chinese).

approval of the Hopei-Shansi-Chahar Border Government.[5] In this connection it should be noted that the fall of Shanghai and Nanking must have sharply reduced the political influence of the lower Yangtze valley gentry and urban upper class, and that the Government still confined its mass mobilization to the invaded areas and the margin beyond.

Throughout January Chiang Kai-shek held military conferences, whose temper is indicated by his declaration on one occasion: "We must build a new army with new relations between officers and men and between army and people. . . . We must organize not only the army but the whole of the Chinese people."[6] In February Chou En-lai, the Communist general, was appointed vice-chairman of mass mobilization, a conference of peasant co-operatives and banks urged rural reform, the construction of railroads and highways in the interior went forward, and efforts began to increase the food supply—all preparations for an extended war. The Kuomintang Congress that met in late March voted support of guerilla warfare, intensive political training in the army, development of mass organizations, and guarantees of free speech, press and assembly. It decided also to establish a People's Political Council, representing all groups in the national front, to advise the Government.[7]

THE next great crisis came with the fall of Canton and Hankow at the end of October 1938. Wang Ching-wei, who had for years opposed national resistance, spoke openly of "peace," but on November 1 Chiang Kai-shek declared that China's "revolutionary war" would be based henceforth on prolonged, nation-wide resistance, with Chinese initiative in choosing the field of battle. At about this time Pai Chung-hsi allowed the reestablishment of mass organizations in uninvaded Kuangsi province, and Chiang deputed Chou En-lai to open a school in central Hunan,

[5] Bertram, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-9; P. J. Jaffe, "Political Transformation in China" in *Amerasia*, March 1938, pp. 29-30; "Along the Battlefronts in China," *ibid.*, April 1938, p. 109; E. Snow, "Han Ying's 'Lost' Red Army" in *Asia*, April 1939, p. 205; *New York Times* (all references to Late City edition), March 1, 1938, p. 7, col. 1.

[6] Strong, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-12.

[7] P. J. J(affe), "The Kuomintang Congress" in *Amerasia*, May 1938, pp. 131-32.

to train guerilla leaders for the Yangtze valley area. Wang now took advantage of the Changsha fire (for which he may himself have been responsible) to attack Chiang's policies. Finding no significant popular or governmental support, he departed hurriedly on December 18, leaving China more united than ever.[8]

Meanwhile mass mobilization had made especially great progress under the Hopei-Shansi-Chahar Border Government. Completely responsible to the national administration for policy and leadership, it was organized in early January 1938 by a democratic conference of popular and governmental delegates at Fuping in northwestern Hopei.

In Central Hopei, which is one of the Border Government's five subdivisions, and may be taken as an example of its program, extensive agrarian reforms have been initiated. Altogether 15 per cent of the agricultural land has been redistributed through confiscation of the land of traitors, division of public lands, and allotment of land whose owners fled after the invasion. Rents have been cut 25 per cent, eviction of tenants is prohibited, there is a three-year moratorium on all debts, the maximum legal interest rate is 10 per cent annually, and the old burdensome land tax has been reformed on a graduated basis, with over one-fourth of the poorest peasants exempt. In order to prevent Japan from using the area's resources, the cotton crop was cut by 70 per cent in 1938 and wheat grown instead, increasing the food supply. Local handicrafts have been encouraged, to reduce to a minimum purchases from Japanese-controlled territory. It is significant that, despite various agrarian reforms, a number of former wealthy citizens have returned from the towns they fled to, apparently finding the Central Hopei government's policy a comparatively reasonable one.

All this activity was based on mobilization of the people, which followed the general lines already described in Shansi. Similarly, on the military side, a guerilla army was formed together with an unarmed auxiliary People's Self-Defense Corps. Though the guerillas lacked adequate munitions, they captured some from the Japanese and turned out more in their own mobile arsenals. The

[8] H. Hanson, "Fire Brands and Chinese Politics" in *Amerasia*, April 1939. *New York Times* November 2, 1938, p. 12, col. 2

new army came directly from the people, and it is estimated that not over one per cent were former soldiers. There was a clean sweep, also, in administration, where younger men (receiving a top salary of Ch $10 a month) replaced the old bureaucracy. Death was the penalty for the slightest corruption, and new semi-democratic forms of government were initiated. The system had, of course, many shortcomings, and the various reforms were realized only imperfectly, but there were several important results. Japan was unable to benefit from the area politically or economically, the Chinese of Central Hopei were united in effective self-defense, and it was shown that a large Chinese population was capable, under enlightened leadership, of starting along the road toward democratic government.*

Outside Hopei-Shansi-Chahar guerilla governments have not been formed, but guerilla activity is going on in all the invaded territory. Our information is unfortunately fragmentary, but there have recently been several reports about the Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow triangle, where at the beginning of 1938 the New Fourth Army was organized. This force, despite lack of arms and very inadequate financial aid from the Government, numbered 20,000 by July 1938 and by December 70,000. At present, however, its chief purpose is not to harass the enemy, but to mobilize the people politically.

This moderate, immediate goal was adopted to overcome the obstacles presented by the region's essentially flat and unfavorable geographic character, its striking economic backwardness, and the absence of good bases for military training. Japan's advance far into the hinterland constantly cut off old sources of supply and caused considerable administrative confusion, while many of the local landowners were hostile toward the guerillas, although neither economic nor political reforms were proposed. At the beginning, some of the gentry formed Japanese puppet governments, and there were cases of attempts to rule independently through mercenary troops. In view of all these factors, it was essential that

* For material on Central Hopei, see J. C. Miller, "The Chinese Still Rule North China" in *Amerasia*, September 1938, H. Hanson, "The People Behind the Chinese Guerillas" in *Pacific Affairs*, September 1938, and "A British Observer," "The Future Foreshadowed: China's New Democracy," *ibid.*, December 1938.

the army first secure widespread popular support and help to develop the area economically. In this it was seriously handicapped by the National Government's refusal to authorize a guerilla government as in the north. Nevertheless, in mid-May 1939, increased cooperation between the army and the people and great progress in centralizing the guerilla organization were reported.[10]

At the same time the guerillas in Japanese-occupied Manchuria have continued their activities. Almost immediately after the war began, a mass uprising was reported in the northeastern parts, and in April 1938 guerilla plans were discovered to disrupt railways and delay supplies for North China troops. Throughout 1938 widespread sabotage occurred, involving the burning of Manchuria's first aviation plant, naval oil stores at Dairen, the Tsitsihar power plant (twice destroyed), military supply depots in Chinchow, Dairen and Mukden, and a powder works in Mukden. On the other hand, during the past five years Japan has forced large numbers of peasants into 'protected villages,' thus diminishing the guerillas' popular base, while the South Manchuria Railway has formed Chinese 'railway protective squads.' In addition, at the beginning of 1939, the experienced correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*, A. T. Steele, reported that for the first time since 1931 he felt, in visiting Manchuria, that the Japanese position was really stable.[11] It would not be surprising, in view of their long isolation, lack of outside aid, inability to establish a governmental base, inferiority in numbers, and the highly developed communications system of Manchuria, if the guerillas found their activities seriously limited. In all these respects of course, the China situation has been completely different from that of Manchuria since the very beginning.

Despite the facts presented so far, the question remains: how extensive is Japan's control within the invaded areas? Briefly, it is

[10] E. Snow, "Han Ying's 'Lost' Red Army" in *Asia*, April 1939 and "China's New Fourth Army," *Asia*, May 1939; "A Glimpse of Refugees in South Anhwei Province," in *The Far Eastern Mirror* (mimeographed), Hongkong, May 12, 1939; *New York Times*, May 10, 1939, p. [illegible], col. [illegible].

[11] *Amerasia*, September 1938, p. 365; J. R. Stewart, "Protected and Railway Villages in Manchuria," in *Far Eastern Survey*, March 1, 1939; *New York Times*, September 2, 1937, p. [illegible], col. [illegible]; October 14, p. 1, col. 4; October 26, p. 1, col. 1; *Chicago Daily News* (Red Streak edition), January 14, 1939, p. 2, col. 5-6.

slight, for the occupation of the leading Chinese cities and railway lines has not prevented constant guerilla attacks on Japanese communications and armed activity on the borders of all the occupied cities. This applies not simply to places deep in the interior, but to the leading coastal points. The guerillas easily cross communication lines, and their agents buy essential supplies in the large cities. In the summer of 1938 the Intelligence Department of the Fourth United States Marines in Shanghai estimated that Japan controlled no more than four miles on each side of the railroads, rivers and canals. A little later, after spending three and a half months with the northern guerillas, an American marine officer declared that they numbered over 600,000. There are, in addition, large numbers of Chinese regular troops behind the Japanese lines. It is therefore not surprising that in May 1939 Japan was reported as having half a million men in the invaded areas of China.[12]

One reason for this situation was Japan's mistake, during the war's first stage, in considering the Yellow River and Nanking the extreme limits of China and greatly underestimating the country's power and will to resist. As a result of this view and of the desire to keep its main forces intact for other wars, Japan increased its China troops only gradually and never massed an overwhelming force for quick, decisive action. The main body of the Chinese army was always able to escape, until after Hankow all chance of surrounding it vanished. The Japanese, moreover, did not concentrate their main strength sufficiently on one objective, and when they did, as after Taierhchuang, rather than bring more forces from home, they reduced their North China garrison to a minimum, thus allowing the guerillas to consolidate their position further. Therefore, in late June 1938 War Minister Seishiro Itagaki declared that Japan would have to fight "at least ten years" and after the fall of Hankow he added: "The conflict between Japan and Chiang is little affected by the fall of the Wuhan cities and Sino-Japanese hostilities have just started."[13] Nevertheless, Japan still does not have a clear-cut military policy.

[12] *New York Times*, May 6, 1938, p. 4, col. 5; July 9, p. 5, col. 1; August 9, p. 9, col. 3; August 21, I, p. 28, col. 2-3; April 12, 1939, p. 9, col. 1; June 7, p. 8, col. 3.

[13] *New York Times*, June 26, 1938, I, p. 23, col. 4; October 28, p. 14, col. 3.

JAPAN'S measures toward the civilian population have also helped the guerilla and mobile forces. Almost as soon as the war began, Japan was burning down villages, shooting groups of young men, and cutting down crops along the railways, to facilitate mechanized operations and hinder the guerillas. Some villages were burned two, three and even four times as the war progressed. In early April 1939, the Associated Press reported that in Shantung "Japanese burn the village nearest any section of railway that is attacked" and "the Japanese command has published an order that all males between the ages of twelve and forty in such villages be executed on the assumption that they aided the guerillas."[14]

Japan has tried, so far with little success, to form its own Chinese counter-guerilla bands and to win over the local gentry. It has organized puppet governments, but these have little authority in the countryside, and even in the cities their officials live in daily fear of assassination. It has also sought, in opposition to Sun Yat-sen's nationalist "Three Principles of the People" to promote the New People's Principles—a philosophy of subservience supposedly based upon classical ideas.[15] Japan's actual objectives and policy in China and the now powerful development of Chinese nationalism nevertheless tend more and more, although not completely, to limit Japan to military methods.

In view of all these facts, the economic return from the invaded areas has been slight. This is particularly significant because Japan is economically unable either to wait for long-term profits or to rebuild the country now. This has resulted in what is for the most part a policy of quick exploitation. In many cases, for example, factories have been stripped of their machinery and cities of sewer covers, stoves and lamp posts—all for a quantity of scrap iron that can mean little in the waging of the war. In fact, Japan still de-

[14] Bertram, *op. cit.*, pp. [illegible], 156; B. W. Perkins, "The Failure of Civil Control in Occupied China," in *Pacific Affairs*, June 1939, p. 153; *North China Herald*, September 1, 1937, p. [illegible], col. 2; *New York Times*, April 14, 1938, p. 20, col. 2, April [illegible], 1939, p. 9, col. 6.

[15] *New York Times*, August 6, 1938, p. 6, col. 2. For the New People's Principles, see J. C. Miller, "Japan Turns the Clock Back," in *Amerasia*, October 1938 and "A British Observer," "To Have and to Hold," in *Pacific Affairs*, September 1938, pp. 303-9.

pends on foreign sources for cotton, wool, coal, iron and scrap, and gets little more from China than before the war

Taxes have increased greatly in the Japanese-controlled areas; and opium, organized gambling and prostitution have been encouraged for their social effects and revenue Nevertheless Japan is unable to tap the real riches that lie in effective taxation of the whole countryside Last October armed raiding parties were sent to collect taxes in sections of East Hopei, but guerilla activity simply became sharper than before

By discriminating against or excluding foreign goods and by promoting a new paper currency, Japan has greatly increased its sales in China, especially in the lower Yangtze valley The Chinese market has, however, shrunk tremendously, and (in view of Japan's lack of capital) its long term potentialities are far less good than they were before the war In addition, because Japan has found the continent so disappointing in raw materials, it has restricted its own exports to Manchuria and China, since such sales often involve raw materials bought with gold elsewhere Industrial activity has also been slight The Chinese factories that were not destroyed or dismantled have been confiscated completely or a half interest taken, but few capital goods shipments to China have been made. Plans have been announced for munitions industries near large military centers in China, in order to make the army self supporting, but it is too early to form any judgment Finally Japan's own economic position has grown considerably more difficult because of depletion of gold reserves, restrictions on raw material imports vital for the export trade (e g, cotton and wool), the 35 per cent drop in exports in 1938 over 1937, rising prices of essential commodities at home combined with less rapidly rising wages, and the sharp decline of the gold basis of the currency In the future the situation may conceivably change, but so far Japan has got nothing from China that can remotely compare with the costs of the war [16]

[16] For the economic effects of the war for Japan, see P J Jaffe, 'Far Eastern Economic Notes' in *Amerasia*, May 1939 p 140 H Hanson, "Japan's Balance Sheet in China, *ibid* June 1939 N D Hanwell, Economic Disruption in Occupied China in *Far Eastern Survey*, March 15, 1939, pp 63 64 M S Farley, "The Impact of War on Japan's Foreign Trade,' *ibid*, May 24 1939, pp 126 27 *New York Times*, October 23, 1938, I, p 28, col 5, June 18, 1939, I, p 29, col 1 3

It does not follow from what has been said that China is close to victory. On the contrary, the issue of the war is still very much in doubt. Despite all difficulties, Japanese economy still has paths open to it and retains the primary stability involved in acceptance by the people. The present situation cannot continue indefinitely, but it suggests that the military and political significance of Japanese nationalism, as well as the economic power of the country, should not be underestimated.

On the other hand, China's own strength and the possibilities of guerilla warfare (the primary strategy in the present stage of the conflict) should not be exaggerated. Guerillas play a preparatory role: they harry the enemy and make the war costly, they delay until the balance of forces becomes less equal, but they cannot be decisive. Furthermore, should the guerillas be successful, a long campaign (chiefly by mobile and positional troops) will still be required, and even then China's own resistance, though the most important factor, will not produce victory without international support and revolutionary discontent within Japan itself. This is why China's leaders adopted the tactics of protracted war.

So far the Chinese have been in the main successful. They have grown stronger themselves and have achieved their main initial objectives: to involve a large Japanese army in a vast area and to prevent the use of the invaded parts to pay the costs of invasion. Economically, China has developed local mobile industries, begun the reconstruction of the far west from Yunnan to Kansu, and improved basic agricultural relationships and conditions. Politically, the national united front has stood every test of sincerity and determination. The second stage of the war will however be a most bitter trial (for both countries), and new, more difficult problems will constantly arise.

Japan has grown significantly weaker during the past two years and is now following a new strategy, designed to keep up morale at home, to increase the slight return from China, and ultimately to break Chinese unity through increasing international pressure. With the aid and advice of Germany and Italy, it has seized Hainan, Canton and the Spratly Islands and, at the present writing, threatens the foreign concessions in China. Afraid of losing the United States

as a market and source of supply, and having the experience of Changkufeng and the Soviet fisheries dispute as a caution, it is concentrating at the moment on British interests and to a lesser extent on the French. Japan probably hopes thereby to secure at the least additional prestige and at the most a Far Eastern Munich, perhaps involving the closing of China's Burmese and Indochinese sources of supply.

Should this occur, Japan would then intensify the propaganda of a "new order in Asia," anti-Communism, "Asia for the Asiatics" and "reform" of the Kuomintang; use to the full some such figure as Wu Pei-fu or Wang Ching-wei; and wait for a split within China itself. If this break should take place, the military situation would at least be much more favorable for Japan and the prospect would appear of destroying American as well as British and French interests in China. Germany and Italy would perhaps secure returns on the spot and, most important for them, could turn the new international situation to good advantage both in Europe and the Americas.

The results of this strategy do not depend on China alone, but there are many things that China can do to defeat it. It can strengthen its army, extend the guerilla governments, develop general reforms and political organization in the uninvaded areas, continue rebuilding the west as a basis for resistance and counter-attack, and reject all counsels of surrender. China can also have the comfort of knowing that Japan's easiest victories are already past and that its own mass mobilization is not simply the surest approach to military success, but also the best guarantee of the national unity and political and economic democracy that should follow the war.

New York, June 1939

THE CHINESE MONGOL FRONT IN SUIYUAN

EVANS FORDYCE CARLSON

WHERE do the Mongols stand in relation to Japan's attempt to conquer China? What is the nature of the Chinese resistance in Inner Mongolia? These were some of the questions that impelled me to travel to Suiyuan in the spring of 1938.

It was known that Japan had occupied the Peiping-Suiyuan railway. It was known that the most influential of the Mongol princes, Teh Wang, had, albeit with some reluctance, allied himself with Japan. Political and economic penetration of Suiyuan and Chahar had been conducted by the Japanese for years, and the military penetration by Japanese-inspired mercenaries had been initiated months before the Lukouchiao incident. But no important inroads had been made into China from that region. The situation was far from clear.

My journey to Suiyuan was over the ancient highway that extends north from Sian to Yulin. There it connects with caravan routes that spread fan-like over the Ordos desert. Over this route, which rambles across the loess hills to Suiteh, drops into the valley of the Wu Ting river, and follows this verdant valley to the desert oasis of Yulin, had come the legions of Khubilai Khan. Near Yulin, where the river passes southward through the Great Wall, I found the name of Tso Tsung-tang carved in the limestone hillside. Tso had put down the Muhammadan rebellion in Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang in the 1870's. And it was at Yulin that I began to understand something of the current situation in Suiyuan.

The Mongols, it seemed, were more or less "on the fence." They felt that they had a legitimate grievance against China. The Chinese colonization of Suiyuan and Chahar, which had followed the building of the railway, had resulted in the confiscation of many of the grazing lands of the tribes. The autonomy which the Mongols sought had not been allowed. The question of the raising of the heavy duties on goods which passed into China had not been adjusted. On the other hand the Mongols were not pleased with the

prospect of Japanese domination. But Japan had demonstrated strength in the years since 1931, and China had shown only weakness. The princes, traditional leaders of the tribes, were often not above accepting bribes, and many had capitulated to Japanese offers of power and wealth.

My informants of the Mongolian Bureau assured me that China was not without hope, however. The Government was now aware of its previous errors in dealing with the Mongols, and competent agents were negotiating with the various princes. The main hope of China, they said, lay with the Young Mongols. The Young Mongols were progressive, and they were sympathetic with China. Moreover, they were incorruptible. Steps were being taken to mold the Young Mongols into an effective force for resistance.

Yes, China was resisting Japanese military efforts in Suiyuan. The Japanese had occupied the railway to the western terminus at Paotou, and they held the large towns between the railway and the inner loop of the Great Wall in Shansi. But they had not penetrated west of the Yellow River or west of Paotou. Chinese troops in this theater were organized in what was known as the North Route Army, with General Fu Tso-yi, the Governor of Suiyuan, theoretically in command. The weakness of the army lay in the fact that several of the contingents were not in fact subordinate to General Fu. General Ma Chan-shan, for example, felt that his personal prestige, gained by his defense along the Nonni River in Manchuria in 1931, entitled him to receive orders directly from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. He commanded a cavalry army of several divisions. General Ho Chu-kuo, who commanded another cavalry army, was the special representative of General Chiang Ting-wen, the Governor of Shensi. Consequently, General Fu could issue orders only to his own 35th Army, and to that of General Meng P'in-yueh, with any assurance that they would be executed. All these troops were south of the railway, and all except those of General Ma were east of the Yellow River.

With this much of the situation as a background, I moved with a patrol of the 86th Division along the Great Wall in a northeasterly direction to Shen Mu. In this picturesque trading post, a rug manufacturing center before the war, I was met by a cavalry patrol

which had been sent by General Ma Chan-shan. The men wore badges on their sleeves midway between elbow and shoulder which bore the letters T A, indicating that they were members of the T'ing T'sin Army (always at the front). Later I saw badges which were divided by a diagonal line, and with the letters K D in the upper corner and T A below. Inquiry brought the information that the K D stood for Cavalry Division.

We traveled for several days in a northerly direction and finally came to the headquarters of General Ma, located in a comfortable village on the bank of a dry river bed. The wiry general hardly looked his 62 years. He was short in stature and spare of frame, but dynamic and loquacious. He had been living in retirement at Tientsin when the conflict began, he informed me. Immediately volunteering his services to the Generalissimo, he had been sent to Tatung, in Shansi, where he assumed command of a brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division. With this unit he had assisted in resisting the Japanese advance until Paotou fell on the 20th of October. Then he had retired to the south of the Yellow River and commenced the work of forming an army.

The original brigade was made up largely of men from Jehol. General Ma was popular with both Mongols and Manchurians, and he had succeeded in bringing over nearly 4,000 of them from the levies which had been raised and trained by the Japanese. These contingents he incorporated into his army. Around his headquarters it was a common sight to see these men. They were easily distinguishable for they continued to wear their Japanese uniforms.

When the Japanese made their spring drive into Shansi, in 1938, General Ma created a diversion in Suiyuan by attacking Tokoto and Salachi. The attacks were made at night. According to General Ma they were largely instrumental in causing the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Paotch and Ho Kiu, in northwest Shansi. On the 1st of April General Ma crossed to the north side of the Yellow River, cut the railway west of Kueihua, and proceeded to Wu Ch'uan on the Mongolian plateau, fighting several engagements on the way. Air operations against his army made it necessary to move at night. At Wu Ch'uan he turned west

and moved to Wu Yuan, the rich agricultural district west of Paot'ou. Here he replenished supplies before returning to the Ordos country south of Paot'ou.

The purpose of the expedition was threefold To alarm the Japanese and do as much damage to them as possible, to encourage the Monguls to assist in resisting the invasion, and to obtain food for men and animals All of the objectives were fulfilled in part.

While I was at General Ma's headquarters a young Mongol leader named Han Yu-chun came over from the Japanese with four hundred men He was an intimate acquaintance of Prince Teh In the course of our conversation I asked him if there was any possibility that Teh Wang might come over to the Chinese side He replied that Teh was very unhappy and had stated to him that there were only three men in China who could "save" him. They were Chang Hsueh-liang Ho Ying-chin and Ma Chan-shan. It was understandable why Chang and Ma should be mentioned, but the case of Ho Ying-chin was different Teh Wang must have gained a good impression of General Ho when the latter was holding conversations with him in 1934 in his capacity of Chairman of the Peiping branch of the Military Affairs Commission

The most interesting case of a Manchurian who came over from the Japanese was that of Mo Sing-ya Mo had been the commander of the 7th Regiment of the 3d Manchurian Division, and had brought his entire regiment to General Ma about a month before my arrival He was rewarded by being given the command of a cavalry division in the Tung Tsin Army Mo Sing-ya was 28 years old when I saw him He possessed an attractive personality and was obviously born of a cultured family He was not averse to revealing his experiences

After his graduation from the Liaoning Military Academy his first service was as a platoon leader in the 24th Brigade of the Northeastern Army At the time of the Mukden incident he was with his unit in Peiping Returning to Manchuria he fought for two years with the partisan forces before he became convinced that their cause was hopeless until they could receive greater outside support. He decided to enter Japanese employ and attack the

enemy by boring from within. He joined the Ch'a Tung Tui, the military force of Mongols and Manchurians which the Japanese were organizing in eastern Chahar. He wanted to inform the Chinese Government at that time of his motives, but the attitude of China towards the Manchurian situation was not clear, so he finally concluded to keep his own counsel and reveal the facts at a more opportune time.

His previous military training caused him to be immediately employed as an instructor in the officers' training school, though the Japanese watched him closely and regarded him with open suspicion for the first six months. At the end of a year and a half he had gained the confidence of the Japanese advisers and he was made vice-director of the school. He began to carry on subversive political work among the students, a work which was facilitated by the domineering attitude of the Japanese officials. The movement of Japanese troops into Chahar, which occurred at this time, further aided his subversive efforts.

He became captain of the Model Company. In May of 1937 he was made commander of the 7th Regiment (there is no battalion organization in the Manchurian puppet army). In December his regiment was sent to the Suiyuan front between Liangcheng and Fengchen. By this time Mo had reached an agreement with his officers to take the regiment over to the Chinese when an opportunity was presented. On the 20th of April he learned that General Ma had crossed the Yellow River, and that one of his units was near Kueihua. Simultaneously he heard that a Japanese force of 1,000 would arrive within the next 24 hours at Liangcheng. The time to strike had arrived. That night the 10 Japanese "advisers" were killed and the regiment moved northwest into the mountains. Mo remained, with one company, to delay the Japanese troops. At one o'clock in the morning they ambushed the column of trucks which was bringing the troops, and then fled to the hills to rejoin the rest of the regiment. Two days later they made contact with one of General Ma's detachments.

The story which Mo Sing-ya told so simply and without restraint indicates the hopelessness of the Japanese plan to use Man-

churian and Mongol levies. It is even more futile to expect that they can depend on Chinese levies. During subsequent months I learned that 5,000 of the latter, raised for the most part in Hopei province, had gone over to units of the Eighth Route Army.

Deep in the consciousness of continental Orientals is a pride in race and a love of independence which are inimical to the Japanese policy of conquest. Moreover, every Chinese has a profound desire to be revered by his offspring. No child will have any respect for a father who has been a traitor to his country, and there will be no worshiping at the shrine of such a father when he has passed on. With the exception of a few selfish knaves, of whom there are some in every race, there is probably not a single Chinese among those who have seemingly acquiesced in Japanese rule in China who, deep in his heart, is not biding his time and waiting for the opportunity to arise against his unwelcome rulers. He knows that time and space are factors which favor China. Eventually these factors, fortified by the placid hostility of the people, will neutralize the temporary military superiority of the invaders. Man for man the Chinese knows that he is superior to his island neighbor.

One evening General Ma entertained at a Mongol mutton dinner, attended by his staff and those division and brigade commanders who were within easy reach of the headquarters. It was on this occasion that I met "La Tai" Lau. His full name was Lau Chin san, and he was an unpretentious peasant of 52 years of age. His initiative, courage and patriotism had brought distinction both to him and to his native village of La Tai, and the people of the neighborhood had paid him the tribute of spontaneously bestowing on him the name of the village. He wore the uniform of a brigade commander. As General Ma told me his story Lau stood awkwardly before us shifting his weight nervously from one foot to the other, a sheepish smile playing about his honest face.

He had been living the life of a humble peasant at La Tai (near Salachi) when the Japanese invaded the town. The soldiers killed his son and raped his daughter. Instead of accepting the situation with the traditional philosophy of his class he decided to do something about it. One night he came upon four Japanese soldiers asleep with their arms beside them. He killed the four with a knife

and seized their guns. Forming a partisan group of a few relatives he led it in raids against small detachments of the enemy and captured more guns and ammunition. The neighbors rallied to his side and soon he was leading a company. They became increasingly successful and the unit grew in size to a battalion, a regiment and finally a brigade. General Ma heard of his activities and persuaded him to bring his brigade into the Ting Tsin Army.

This is another example of what is taking place in rural China today. There are many Lius throughout the country, and their number is rapidly increasing. The problem of the Central Government is to coordinate these far-flung forces of resistance, and to further stimulate the people by giving them tangible assurance that they are fighting not only for a united China but for a nation in which they will enjoy a larger share of the material and spiritual benefits of life.

In Suiyuan the problem is one of coordination of the forces that are on the ground, of indoctrination of the troops with the idea that the people are their allies and must not be abused, and of wooing the Mongols by according them the justice in the adjustment of their complaints to which they are entitled.

A supreme commander is needed, one who will command the respect of Mongols, Manchurians and Chinese alike. The name which I heard most frequently mentioned with respect and enthusiasm was that of Chang Hsueh-liang, the Young Marshal who executed the Sian coup. Chang is the idol of the Manchurians who are fighting in North China and Inner Mongolia. He is respected by the Mongols, both princes and tribesmen. The leaders of the Kuomintang armies in the north respect his authority. Even the leaders of the Eighth Route Army give him a high mark as a patriot and a leader. One of these days the Young Marshal may be permitted to emerge from his retirement. As supreme commander of the Chinese left flank it would not be surprising to see him turn Suiyuan and Chahar into a major theater of this amazing war.

San Diego, May 1939

CHINA'S NEW LINE OF INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE

NYM WALES

WITH the fall of Hankow and Canton, China's last two industrial centers, the war between Japan and China entered a new stage, no longer basically military but economic in nature. Japan's strategy is based on the belief that by occupying and controlling all main lines of transportation, and the centers of trade in the large cities, China can automatically be dominated economically. The Japanese expect that after a brief period of patriotic sacrifice, the low margin of existence will force the hinterland to become "colonial" to the occupied areas, by a gradual reorientation in favor of Japan. They anticipate that, as in Manchuria, the people will themselves eventually pacify the intervening countryside and suppress the guerillas through the *pao chia* or household responsibility system, because of their need for peace in which to plant and market their crops. If a Chinese farmer cannot harvest his crops, his family starves.

As part of this strategy, Japan has systematically destroyed or taken over all the modern industry of China, which was concentrated, unfortunately, in five or six cities, except a few Chinese or British-owned factories in Hongkong and the International Settlement of Shanghai. In the Shanghai-Wusih area alone, Japan destroyed 70 per cent of China's modern factories, and carted off the scrap iron and usable machinery to Japan. By this method Japan hoped to make the occupied areas helplessly dependent on Japanese manufactured goods. It is true that about 95 per cent of the goods now sold are Japanese. Japan believes that China's disintegrated agricultural economy, overburdened with tens of millions of war refugees, cannot long withstand, even at the price of "colonialization," a vast industrial machine which is ready to revive buying and selling. By military control of the railways, coastal ports and internal rivers, and by a strangle hold on the river-mouths at Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton, Japan expects also

to be able to isolate other foreign trade from the interior, and to monopolize the commodity market at the same time that it uses the arteries of communication to exploit the mines and other resources of China by enslaved labor, and to transport raw materials to Japan's home factories.

China's strategy in self-defense has two phases, in the occupied and the unoccupied areas. Both are based on prolonged resistance in a war of attrition, and neither has an industrial base for economic defense. In the occupied areas, where all effective work behind the Japanese lines is under the direction of the Chinese Communists, the strategy is to organize the people for active partisan warfare and passive anti-Japanese non-cooperation, so that Japan will be unable to consolidate these areas. In the provinces of Shensi, Hopei, Chahar, Shantung and Shansi the Eighth Route Army of some 50,000 troops is scattered in small mobile units, trying to build up a base among the people for permanent resistance. In the meantime they harry the Japanese lines of transport and communication, and prevent any local puppet governments from being established. By such partisan tactics, and by trying to establish local village self-sufficiency, they hope to prevent Japan from exploiting resources, markets or agricultural raw materials, and from realizing any kind of "Sino-Japanese cooperation." In the rich lower Yangtze Valley the New Fourth Army, under the leadership of the Communists, Yeh Ting and Han Ying, is attempting a similar program.

In the unoccupied areas still under the Kuomintang, the main economic defensive has been the "scorched earth" policy of burning and destroying economic bases so that the Japanese army cannot inherit such facilities for its own profit. At one time the Government hoped to be able to rebuild a part of its lost industrial base in the cities of the remote west and southwest, but Japan has bombed even Yunnanfu, Chungking and Kweilin. Today it is clear that only small decentralized village industry is possible.

Fortunately, the Chinese Government saw the necessity of supporting such a project, and in July, 1938, formed a commission for the establishment of industrial cooperatives. An appropriation of Ch. $5,000,000 was made, but because of scarcity of funds only

$1,520,000 of this has been made available so far. A first-rate technical staff went out into the field immediately, and over 1,000 industrial cooperatives have been created since August, as branches of five main headquarters. One hundred of these are in Shensi province, 40 in west Hunan and 20 in Kiangsi. A new center for "mobile industrial units" to spread "guerilla industry" *behind* the Japanese lines is being organized under Chang Nai-chi in Anhuei. Funds of Ch. $50,000 have just been given for this important phase of the work. Another center is planned in Fukien and Kuangtung, for which it is hoped to receive financial support from overseas Chinese. A group of patriotic Cantonese bankers financed the Kiangsi project with a loan of Ch. $200,000, while the Philippine Chinese Women's Relief Association in Manila contributed Ch. $140,000 to start the Fukien unit and to assist in the work generally.

This Chinese Industrial Cooperatives project was sponsored by Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance, and placed directly under the Executive Yuan for speedier action, with headquarters at the Bank of China, Chungking, Szechuan. It was largely due to the foresight and generosity of Madame Chiang herself and the cooperation of Dr. Kung that it was possible to gain momentum without the customary red tape. The technical staff is made up of some of the finest economic experts and engineers in China. The Government was fortunate in being able to secure the services of Mr. Rewi Alley as Chief Technical Advisor. Mr. Alley is a humanitarian and liberal New Zealander of 15 years' experience in China, well known as an expert on cooperatives and on Chinese industry generally. He resigned his position with the Industrial Department of the Shanghai Municipal Council at the request of the Chinese Government, and has done phenomenal work in so short a time. Another foreigner is Mr. J. B. Tayler, also a British cooperatives expert, who is now Technical Advisor of the Paochi District Headquarters in the Northwest, where with his co-worker, Mr. Y. P. Mei, he is developing wool cooperatives. Mr. Tayler dreams of seeing China become a new democratic cooperative commonwealth.

Some Chinese members of the staff are also well-known abroad. America can claim a large part of the credit for the efficient func-

tioning of the technical staff, and specifically that great American institution known as Mr. Henry Ford. A long time ago an American engineer named Bailie selected several poor but bright young men in China to help through American engineering colleges. After working their way through school, they were superbly trained by Henry Ford in the Ford Motor Works. Three of these Ford products are now Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of the Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, and several others have just volunteered for the same work. No. 1 is Mr. Liu Kuang-pei (K.P. Liu), Secretary-General of the C.I.C., former Commissioner of Finance of Kansu and magistrate of the model *hsien* in Anhuei, called Hohsien. Mr. Frank Lem (S.Y. Lem) and Mr. C. F. Wu are Chief and Vice-chief, respectively, of the Technical Section, and resigned highly-paid positions as electrical engineers in the Shanghai Power Company to become pioneers in industrializing the interior of their country. These are three of the best engineers in China, and their initiative, ability to improvise, courage and devotion, are the subject of enthusiastic comment in China today.

Another name well known abroad is that of Mr. James Y. C. Yen, founder of Tinghsien, the mass education center of Hopei, who assists the movement as Technical Advisor in Hunan. Another name, not known abroad but now covering itself with well-earned glory in China, is that of Mr. Liu Kuang-mien, Secretary of the Organization Section. This patriotic young exile from Manchuria, trained under J. B. Tayler, is doing wonders of organization in the face of every possible combination of odds.

Those who have not lived in China during this tragic period may perhaps not feel the dramatic quality of the work this little group of self-sacrificing people is attempting. Only those who have seen the destruction of China's industry, built so painfully on broken bodies of toil, the helpless masses of refugees begging for work to earn their right to keep alive, the tremendous need for building new industrial bases to save the poverty-stricken villages from famine and banditry—can fully realize that this movement is a very bright light on a rather dark horizon. The 1,000 cooperatives are only a beginning, but they are an epic start. The workers in the field report that the project has been greeted by the population

with an enthusiasm commensurate with the need "We have plenty of raw materials, plenty of skilled workers, machinery can be bought, and the market lies wide open before us—not a competitor in sight except the Japanese," they say. "Our main drawback is lack of capital. Every dollar we receive is put to work instantly Everything we produce is sold as soon as available"

ANOTHER need is competent engineers with initiative, willing to volunteer for such difficult work Only about 220 technical experts are now on the staff, and each one is doing a triple quota of work. One of the first things the staff members have had to do is to dash about the countryside salvaging machinery in advance of Japanese occupation This machinery is purchased in the cities doomed to Japanese occupation, or dug up out of the earth, where it had been buried for protection This dangerous work has been done in the middle of enemy attacks C I Wu narrowly escaped death during an air raid in Sian while arranging to evacuate the big testing laboratory (for analyzing minerals, soil, raw materials for factory products, etc) which had been loaned to the cooperatives for a year or so by the Provincial Government of Shensi Frank Lem was shot at by soldiers as a scavenger while salvaging machinery in Hunan for his precious new infant cooperatives there Mr Alley himself was in the line of fire in Hunan and Kiangsi, while purchasing machinery and having it transported away from the cities during Japanese attacks, was very nearly captured, and was bombed several times In June this year, Mr. Alley, who had already had a siege of dysentery, was reported to be recuperating from typhoid, in Kiangsi.

The first industrial cooperatives were created in Shensi, near Sian. Mr Alley and Mr Liu Kuang-mien took a thousand refugees there from Hankow, Honan, Shantung and Hopei Three days after their arrival, on August 23, a group of blacksmiths set up a cooperative foundry The second unit was made up of 30 stocking knitters from Honan, who carried their knitting machines from Sian. Next came a soap-and-candle cooperative of 12 members, and fourth a printing cooperative Within two months 40 cooperatives were working so successfully, that several dog-in-the-manger officials

were said to have remarked "Why, nobody will ever want to work in the big factories again." The cooperatives are self-managing and democratic The chairman and committee of directors are elected by the members, and no one can buy more than 20 per cent of the total shares Wages are decided by vote of the members themselves, and depend on the state of finances Inasmuch as each feels he is working for himself as well as others, a bowl of rice is as satisfactory as the market wage elsewhere The cooperatives have clubs where they educate each other, sing National Salvation songs, and discuss the problems of the day Training schools are vitally important, but it is almost impossible to get funds for this Mr Liu Kuang mien paid for a class of 30 students out of his own salary Their participation in cooperative management has been the first taste of democracy any of these poor people have ever dreamed of -- and the heightening of morale is one of the greatest benefits of the cooperative project

Many of the cooperatives are already self supporting. Mr Liu reports that the soap-and-candle makers started out so well that within two months they had paid back $500 of the $2,000 capital loaned to them The workers themselves went out into the streets beating drums to advertise their wares The C I C everywhere is deluged with volunteers, and the staff reports that any amount of capital could be utilized immediately as a good business proposition Thousands have to be turned away every week because of lack of finance for them to start work The first act of the staff on entering a new village is to put up big posters on the walls and city gates Hundreds of people gather round and discuss the new idea, amazed to find the Government taking so much interest in their welfare Mr Liu Kuang mien tells how his printing cooperative started. An old printer and his seven workers had fled from Hsuchou and were at the ragged end of their resources, when the old man happened to spy one of the C I C posters In some confusion of mind, he went into the office to discuss the fantastic "cooperative" idea. When he was told that he could have $2,000 to start work, he put his grizzled old head down on the table and wept tears of joy.

Mr. Liu's interesting report of the development of the Northwest Headquarters (nicely printed by this very printer), tells a fascinating

story. Inmates of a Buddhist hospital for opium addicts came to him saying they smoked opium because they had no hope of getting any work to do. They asked for money to start a flour mill beside a mountain stream. Now they are out in the healthful sunshine operating it and curing themselves completely. (League of Nations, please note.)

In Paochi a sect of 700 Chen Jesu Chiao (True Christians) organized themselves spontaneously and came to the C.I.C. to tell of their qualifications and their desire to form a new cooperative society. They were given $40,000 and formed cooperatives for weaving, spinning, chemical work, tanning, leather goods and metal-working. Now they are probably the happiest Christian community in China, and most evangelical about the cooperative spirit. Here is chapter and verse for missionary institutions to ponder.

A settlement of Manchurian exiles had been trying to eke out an existence in the hills near Sian, holding their land, schools and houses in common. They needed no argument to stir their imaginations, and found a deserted coal mine nearby, coming to the C.I.C. for $50.00 to operate it. They received far more than their pathetic request, and are now bringing out coal to supply the villages, and hope to the villagers that they need not share the fate of Manchuria. Mr. Liu declares that $1.00 put to work in industrial co-operatives is worth $10.00 in any other kind of production in China today. Prices are terrifically high, owing to the scarcity of goods, and small industries can thrive immediately. Soap, paper, glass, etc. are prohibitive in price. Gasoline costs $28.00 a tin, and a truck sells for Ch. $14,000. The cooperatives' staff is begging for charcoal-burning steam wagons such as were used in England during the War, and for old rubber-tired wheels to put on Chinese carts for use in transportation.

One of the most important duties of the C.I.C. is to make war supplies for the army. More of the wounded die of cold than from their wounds, it is reported. At present, cotton blankets are being bought from India, but the cooperatives hope to make one million wool blankets before next winter to aid the soldiers. Wool is available in the Northwest. Most of it was formerly sold to Japan

through Tientsin. Madame Chiang Kai-shek recently ordered Ch. $100,000 worth of winter clothing from the C.I.C., while the Ministry of Communications wants boats and other transport facilities. Because of its proper appeal and the great necessity of utilizing such a form of organization in China today, this industrial cooperatives movement still has great potentialities, because of the blockade which prevents war supplies and manufactured goods from coming in. Small machinery can still be brought in through Indochina and Burma, and much more could be made in China if the capital necessary to create machine-shops were available. One machine shop costs only Ch. $5,000 to set up, and this is one of the greatest needs of the movement. There are plenty of resources remaining in China to build a new industrial base in the villages, if spontaneously self-managed in such small cooperative units. If the system could be extended on a wide scale, it would provide the best possible base for prolonged resistance, both military and economic.

China has little capital for this project, but limitless labor power, which in turn can create capital and become self-supporting. According to Mr. Alley, there are between 30 and 60 million war refugees in China, of whom about 15 million are destitute. Before the war, there were about three million Chinese industrial workers, of whom some two million were employed in modern factories. Most of these trained workers are available for quickly rebuilding industry, except some 200,000 who have been re-employed in Japanese and British mills in Shanghai. About 60 per cent of the factory workers of China are young girls under the age of 20, now starving and demoralized for lack of food and work. If a certain percentage of relief funds from abroad, now being used for soup-kitchens, could be diverted to productive relief in cooperatives in the interior, many of these unemployed refugees could become self-supporting and in turn create new employment for others. Many missionaries, relief workers, Y.W.C.A. members and others are now interested in such cooperatives as the only feasible method of relief, and on August 22 the National Christian Council bulletin sent out an appeal for support for the industrial cooperatives idea.

The movement aims to establish 30,000 cooperatives as quickly as capital can be obtained, divided into six categories: textiles, food-

stuffs, chemicals, metal work, educational necessities, and miscellaneous items. The textile group includes, cotton spinning, weaving and ginning, silk reeling and weaving, stocking making and tailoring Food industries are biscuit-making, fruit canning, vegetable-growing, condiments, flour, rice-dehusking, candy and tobacco Chemicals include. matches, candles, paper, drugs, soap, pottery, glass, thermos flasks, electric bulbs, dry cells, batteries, medical supplies, etc Metal work comprises metal founding, metal wares, hand torches, hand tools, household utensils, agricultural implements, bicycles, rickshas, motor car and motorcycle parts, and (highly important) munitions and small arms repairs Educational items include printing, textbooks, maps, stationery, pencils, brushes and pens Other items are furniture, bricks, tiles straw plaiting, shoemaking, leather and rubber goods, utilities, boat building, portable power plants, turning power plants, and small steel mills Many of these products are already being turned out successfully

Foreign and private aid for this vital movement, with its important potential economic contribution to China today, has been rather slow in coming, but the Hongkong Shanghai Central Promotion Committee, made up of foreigners and Chinese with Madame Sun Yat sen as Honorary Chairman, is now planning an international campaign to secure contributions from abroad Miss Ida Pruitt, acting Chairman and former head of the Social Service Department of the Peking Union Medical College, will leave in July for a promotion tour to America, where Mr Hubert S. Liang and others have already done preliminary publicity work Mr Alec B Camplin was sent to England in June as a delegate of the Committee. He recently resigned his position as Assistant Chief Works Engineer of the Shanghai Power Company to assist Mr. Rewi Alley in the field as Consulting Engineer

The first important outside support to the Industrial Cooperatives came through Dr. T. V. Soong in September, 1938, in the form of a loan to the Shanghai-Hongkong Committee of Ch $200,000 from the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications in Hongkong. This was used to finance the Southeast Headquarters and Dr. Soong was so pleased with the result that in June, 1939, at his recommendation, these two banks, together with the Bank of Canton, granted a

further loan of Ch. $1,000,000 Overseas Chinese were enthusiastic as soon as they learned of the project, and the Philippine Chinese Women's Relief Association, headed by Mrs. Dee C. Chuan, has contributed a total of Ch $209,106.90, plus U S $1,600 00 for the purchase of two Ford trucks Most of this money has been used in the Southeast Headquarters to start cooperatives in Fukien, Kuangtung, Kiangsi and Anhuei

"Indusco," as the organization is familiarly called, is now a pet project in the Philippines among Americans and Europeans, as well as Filipinos On April 23, the Philippine Association for Industrial Cooperatives was formed in Manila Headed by Mrs Paul V. McNutt, wife of the American High Commissioner, as Honorary President, and with Dr Walter Brooks Foley, minister of the Union Church, as acting President, this Association now has nearly 100 members representing ten nationalities The three most important Chinese community leaders in the Philippines are active on this Association Mr Dee C. Chuan, President of the China Banking Corporation, Mr Alfonso Z. Sy Cip and Mr. Yu Khe thai On June 10 the Association sent its first relief collections of U S $500 00 to the C I C Trustees Board in Hongkong

In addition to the above, a group of Americans in the Philippines some time earlier decided to start an International Industrial Cooperative Center in Anhuei Funds were wired to Mr Alley in Anhuei and this Center is now thriving Contributions to the Philippines Section of this Center now include the following.

Philippine International Unit	Pesos 668 00
Philippine Congress for Democracy and Collective Security Unit sent through China Defense League Hongkong	HK $ 4 500 00
Philippine Chinese Supporting Resistance Committee Unit	Ch $10,000 00
Philippine Chinese Women's Relief Association Unit	Ch $60 000 00 (also listed above)

It was suggested by Mr Alfonso Z. Sy Cip, President of the Philippine Chinese Chamber of Commerce, that a Board of Trustees be formed in Hongkong for efficient administration of outside loans and contributions on the principle of a revolving fund His idea was accepted and this Board is now being formed. Its membership will include Dr. T. V. Soong, Mr S. J Chen (Manager of the Bank of China), Madame Sun Yat-sen, Mr. Rewi Alley and Mr. S. Y.

Lem (representing C. I. C. Headquarters), together with local representatives on each overseas Chinese and foreign promotion committee. This Board is already planning the administration of Dr Soong's $1,000,000 loan recently granted

Overseas Chinese groups in Singapore, Java and Indochina have recently pledged Ch. $500,000 in contributions for "Indusco," and the Philippine Chinese are planning a drive for Ch $500,000

Other important outside assistance to the cooperatives aside from individual contributions, is as follows

Madame Chiang Kai shek for Women and Children	Ch $5[illegible],000.00
International Federation of Trade Unions	Ch 10,000.00
National Christian Council	Ch [illegible],000.00
Associated Mission Treasurers	Ch [illegible]28.21
London Lord Mayor's Fund through the British Ambassador	£ Sterling 10,000

Indusco promotion committees are now functioning in London and Manchester, where the British Cooperatives are arranging a loan of £100,000 through the sale of debentures to their local branches Other committees abroad are in process of formation in New York, Australia, Honolulu and elsewhere

Capital is not so difficult to obtain for industrial enterprises in the "safe areas" in the far interior, but is very scarce indeed for investment in the danger zones near the guerilla operations and close to the war front, where it is most urgently needed The greatest danger facing China today is that the invaders may be able to realize an economic readjustment in their favor, in the areas under occupation, before Japanese economy at home begins to crack up under the strain But if the guerillas in the rear can be armed and supplied with equipment, and if the tremendous labor power of China can be mobilized in new industrial production to provide a base for prolonged resistance, by maintaining China's armed forces and providing a livelihood and commodity market for the people, Japan will not be able to succeed in consolidating its prospective colony And, of course, a lot depends on whether England and America refuse to help Japan by lending capital or continuing to supply the materials of war, while Japan is still in its present vulnerable position.

Manila, June 1939

BRITISH DEFENSE OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC

DONALD COWIE

A CONFERENCE was recently held between New Zealand, Australia and Great Britain to consider "Pacific questions of common concern with special reference to defense questions." The rest of the world was so preoccupied with Europe that little notice was taken of this event, though for two reasons it had considerable significance. It was a new departure in the defense organization of the British Empire, and actually the first effective attempt of Pacific powers to establish a united front against possible aggression.

Until the last few years the balance of power in the Pacific was tilted effectively in favor of the British Empire and the United States. Then Japan, by strengthening its industry and military striking power, successfully flouted the League of Nations by invading Manchuria and China, and gradually tilted the balance in the opposite direction. Japan's advantage, like that of the European aggressors, has been its positive, forward policy. Standing on the defensive, the British Empire and the United States have been constrained, if not to retreat, at least to lose their initiative in the Far East. It would be wrong to describe their position today as perilous, but equally misleading to call it comfortable. They are fully conscious that soon the tide of aggression will reach them, and they will be faced with the alternatives of fighting or running. Great Britain has completed at Singapore what is primarily a defensive base, and has reinforced its Far Eastern garrisons. America has strengthened a similar defensive base at Hawaii, and has planned to fortify certain small islands farther westward. But that is all.

Australia and New Zealand have felt increasingly nervous. These large and well-favored, but sparsely populated and vulnerable British Dominions are completely isolated from their strong friends. The ocean basin of which they form the southernmost edge is dominated by Japan. Their nearest neighbors are the islands of the Netherlands Indian archipelago and Oceania. Their sole

protector and source of economic livelihood is an overburdened country at the other side of the world

Possibly these Dominions have become over anxious; but Japan's own utterances have done much to promote alarm Official spokesmen have stated their country's definite intention of ultimately expanding toward the *Nan yo* (South Seas). In his book *Japan Must Fight Britain*, published in 1936, Captain Ishimaru offered a plan for naval and air attack on Australia The Navy desires to go south, to obtain the heroic employment that has been denied it by the Army's mainland ambitions Naturally Australia and New Zealand have been worried by this As one of New Zealand's fore most publicists has stated

> We are now realizing that the Far East becomes to us the Near North Science annihilates space daily, and our complacency is being rudely disturbed as we learn more and more of the policy and the activities of the naval expansionist school of Japan What counts in raiding excursions is not the mileage between Yokohama and Sydney but that between Palau and New Guinea [1]

But the problems of the Pacific do not proceed from local issues alone The whole world has recently trembled before the rise of Germany and Italy as declared enemies of the democracies and oppressors of the weak The effects of this have ruffled the Pacific There is an ideological and potentially a military alliance between the aggressors and Japan, and the possibility of a European war has caused Australia and New Zealand to make military preparations and examine strategic weaknesses These considerations were responsible for the important recent discussion on defense problems. The conference was convened by Mr Savage, New Zealand's Labor Premier, who deserves special credit in view of the fact that hitherto Australia and New Zealand had carefully refrained from consulting each other on matters of mutual interest

It is unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable, that the close associations between Great Britain and its Dominions should have militated against direct relations between the Dominions themselves. The Dominions have been competitors for British economic preference, and accordingly have been loth to enter into compromising ar-

[1] Frank Milner, in *The Christchurch Press*, New Zealand, Jan 16, 1939

rangements with each other. Indeed, it has always been a curious problem to foreign observers that, although the various units of the British Empire fully realize their mutual inter-dependence, they have refused hitherto all offers of clearly defined military pacts among themselves. Great Britain is officially committed to aid several foreign nations in event of war, but has not entered into similar arrangements with its Dominions, nor have they pledged unequivocally their military support to the Mother Country.

Doubtless the explanation is that there is no need for definite pledges. The nations of the British Commonwealth take it for granted that they would support each other, but unofficial understandings, without positive statements of military liabilities and courses of action to be followed in an emergency, are apt to be dangerous in a world of clear-cut power politics. Expert opinion has recently become insistent on the need for a coordinated plan for mutual defense for the whole British Empire. To admit of such a sensible act of preparation, however, many sectional jealousies and aspirations would have to be resolved—a gigantic task. That is why the Pacific discussions between New Zealand, Australia and Great Britain are such a hopeful sign. Faced by a great danger, Australia and New Zealand have dismissed pride and reached an arrangement among themselves, which Great Britain has gratefully blessed.

THE Conference was held in secret, and a full account of the proceedings has not been issued to the public, but informed authorities indicate that the prime result will be the establishment of a Pacific Defense Council "to effect complete coordination between all New Zealand, Australian and British forces in the South Pacific area." It is stated on reliable authority that the Council will consist of three members each from New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom. Each country will also nominate a military representative. The forces at the disposal of such an authority would include the China Fleet, the Royal Australian Navy and the New Zealand Naval Squadron; the Far Eastern Command of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force; as well as the Dominions armies and the British troops stationed in the Eastern and Pacific colonies.

The Conference deliberated on the fundamental assumption that Great Britain, in event of war, would need all its available strength on the European front and in the Mediterranean. Consideration was therefore given to the necessity of preparing a system of defenses that, under certain circumstances, would be independent of British reinforcements. Another outcome of the Conference may be the establishment of a Pacific Command of the Royal Air Force at Fiji, under the jurisdiction of the Defense Council. Moreover, the Council would take full control of agricultural and industrial resources in the event of war, so that the Pacific nations would be made self supporting in foodstuffs, and would have surpluses available for shipment to Great Britain. The Conference studied the economic and domestic problems of each Pacific country in the light of a possible emergency.

It would be wrong to dismiss these discussions as purely a family affair. They have a still wider interest. The formation of a *bloc* not only to resist but also to restrain aggression in the whole Pacific area has been advocated for many years. A practical if abortive expression of this ideal was the proposal for a Pacific Peace Pact, made by the Prime Minister of Australia in 1937. But such a scheme would always be ineffective unless the wholehearted cooperation of the United States were secured. As the most interested parties, Australia and New Zealand realize the difficulties of securing such cooperation, particularly at present, but they are confident of ultimate success.

Australia's new Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, has a reputation for statesmanlike vision in international affairs. Outlining his policy after he assumed office at the end of April, he declared that the very first objective of his Government would be to cultivate friendly relations with the countries bordering on the Pacific, "and especially with America." It has even been suggested that the United States, together with France and Holland, might be asked to appoint official observers to sit with the New Defense Council.

The French Government, in particular, has been kept fully informed of the decisions reached by the Conference, and it is understood that Australia has already received assurances that any French territory in the Pacific is available for the defense of Australia if

required. These assurances have special application to New Caledonia, which is only 1,000 miles from the Australian coast, and would be an invaluable landing-ground between Brisbane and Fiji. It is believed also that as Australia extends its armaments industry, and is able to supply all its own needs as well as those of British possessions in the Pacific, the French Government may place contracts with Australia. Similarly the cooperation of Holland in a scheme for Pacific defense would be highly desirable. Holland might find it difficult to reconcile its European neutrality with such a departure, but must consider the grave vulnerability of the vast and wealthy Netherlands East Indies. By joining a Pacific *bloc*, Holland would secure automatic protection for this territory.

Much interest was aroused in Canada by the announcement of the Pacific discussions. This Dominion was not asked to take part, because it was considered that the question of defending the South Pacific involved Australia and New Zealand primarily. Nevertheless, the defense of the coast of British Columbia is a matter to which the Canadian Government is now devoting much attention. A major share of the current defense estimates is devoted to this purpose, and many observers consider that it would be of interest to Canada if these plans could be coordinated with the British defense scheme for the southern Ocean.

Finally, a word may be said about the growing ability of Australia and New Zealand to fulfil any defense commitments they may undertake. As a result of rapid rearmament, Australia now has a Navy of five modern cruisers and five destroyers. Two more destroyers are being built, and there is a large fleet of small, coastal defense vessels, with a personnel of about 6,000. Australia's coastal defenses are stronger than they have ever been, and have behind them a well-trained, permanent force of 10,000, with a militia of 120,000. The first line strength of the Air Force will soon be 212 machines, with a personnel of over 3,000. An aircraft industry has just been established to produce 400 warplanes annually, and 1,000 annually in event of emergency. The New Zealand military forces consist of about 12,000 trained men at present, but the Prime Minister, Mr. Savage, recently hinted that these might be increased to 50,000 men in the near future. New Zealand is also expanding its

ir Force rapidly, and may soon begin to manufacture military ircraft.

Australia enlisted 412,953 soldiers and 3,856 sailors during the reat War, a total of 416,809, nearly one twelfth of the population. f these, 331,781 were sent to Europe for active service, and 318,000 uffered some form of casualty. New Zealand sent approximately 00,000 men, and before the end was preparing to contribute many housand more. But the populations of these Dominions have early doubled since then, while their resources have been correspondingly enhanced. Australia and New Zealand, great Pacific owers of the future, have a considerable part to play in the dvancing tide of affairs. Therefore it is to be hoped that the recent iscussions on Pacific defense, with particular reference to Austalia and New Zealand, may lead eventually to a wider policy. The only way to end war is to make it impossible by ranging verwhelming strength against aggressors, as the democratic nations f Europe are discovering at last. If the nations of the Pacific want eace they must unite in its defense.

London, June 1939

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

WHO WANTS SANCTIONS AGAINST JAPAN?

IN THIS very carefully worded leading article in this issue Mrs Schumpeter has had the difficult task of writing in June for publication in September. Writing in America, and trying to be as up to date as possible, she has naturally had to draw mainly on American opinion and on the American aspects of sanctions against Japan. She refers to the Gallup method of polling opinion, which is undoubtedly reliable and which indicates a strong growth of pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese feeling in the United States. Mrs Schumpeter's personal opinion is that this ought to be discounted to a certain extent because the Gallup method is based on a sampling of public opinion, and not simply of expert opinion. Mrs Schumpeter believes that the opinion of the general public is influenced by moral indignation, and that it is influenced more by those experts who, though they have first-hand knowledge, are themselves biased by sentiment and wishful thinking than it is by the soberer experts who face all the realities of the situation. Those who are sober and sound, in Mrs Schumpeter's opinion regretfully conclude that sanctions would not end the war but lead to a bigger war.

We think this is a question of the very greatest importance, and we think it would be valuable to have the widest possible expression of the opinions of readers of PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Obviously, the great majority of those who read PACIFIC AFFAIRS have a more than average interest in the subject. The proportion of those who have travelled across the Pacific, or traded across it, or engaged in special study of one of its problems or one of its countries, who know more than the general public about the history and politics, cultures and economics of the countries most intimately concerned, is relatively high. Furthermore, a sampling of the opinion of readers of PACIFIC AFFAIRS may result in interesting comparisons between similar people in different nations.

We therefore submit the following questionnaire:

1. Do you believe sanctions against Japan would end the war in China?
2. Do you believe sanctions against Japan would lead to further war?
3. Do you believe that sanctions should be international?

4. Do you believe sanctions could be applied by any one nation?
5. If so, what nation?
6. What is your nationality?
7. Do you have first hand knowledge of Japan?
8. Do you have first-hand knowledge of China?
9. What is the subject on which you are best informed? (This may be answered either generally—e.g. "China," "Japan," "Netherlands India," etc., or specifically e.g. "economics," "history," "cultural relations," etc., or both specifically and generally e.g. "anthropology of Alaska.")

Suggestions Answer either all the questions or some of them We hope to have enough answers to justify publishing a tabulation No names will be published with the tabulation of questionnaire results If you prefer to write a letter rather than answer the questionnaire, please do so You may also both fill out the questionnaire and write a letter If you write a letter, please state clearly whether we may

a) not publish either the letter or your name
b) publish the letter, or an extract from it, but without your name
c) publish the letter, or an extract from it, with your name and address

Mrs Schumpeter has admirably expressed her own view—a view widely held by serious people We are not sure that we can adequately express in a few sentences some of the other possible views that might be taken into account, but we think it only fair to suggest that readers may find it stimulating to exercise their critical faculties by inverting some of Mrs. Schumpeter's conclusions For instance, Mrs Schumpeter holds that to intervene between two warring nations with discriminatory sanctions is a kind of challenge, which is likely to bring on the risk of war

This may also be stated inversely Japan, by going to war without declaring war, has already taken the risk of involving itself in war with countries other than China The war necessarily involves curtailing the rights of those who are technically neutrals Whether the infringement of rights is combined with such peculiarly humiliating insults as stripping people in the streets is only a question of degree If Japan finds that this kind of challenge is not met, is it likely to diminish its encroachments or to increase them? If it increases them, will the resulting risk of war be less than the risk taken by imposing sanctions in self defense—and in time?

THE EDITOR

TOBACCO-PLANTING IN THE PHILIPPINES

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

SIR:

We have your letter of February 27 enclosing reply by Mr James S Allen to our letter which was published in PACIFIC AFFAIRS of December, 1938. Mr Allen's letter convinces us that he is not simply a person who, in perfect good faith and on account of ignorance, misrepresents facts. We shall proceed to answer the principal contentions of his letter. Consequently, if you print Mr Allen's letter, we shall be very much obliged if you will also please print this one.

Mr Allen says that he did not charge us with running a cantina at which we exacted usurious rates. This is perfectly true. Neither did we say that he had done so. What we did say, and we repeat, is that he insinuated such a practice, by the manner in which the statement with regard to cantinas and the wages he alleges we paid at Tarlac are combined. From page 61 of your March 1938, number, the following is copied:

The plantation *cantinas*, where prices are twice as high as in the local stores and usurious interest is charged, take most of the laborer's cash wages. In the province of Tarlac, Luzon, the wages of the workers on the sugar fields of the Tabacalera was found to be 30 centavos a day.

The second paragraph of this letter deals with the area of the Hacienda Luisita and he insists that it comprises more than 10,392 hectares. He seems to forget that it would be perfectly ridiculous for us to make such a statement if it were not true, because the area of property in the Philippines is a matter of public record. His contention that we should settle with the Department of Labor, the Provincial Treasurer and the Department of Internal Revenue the discrepancy between the area stated by us and what he alleges was published in a report of the Department of Labor and the Provincial Treasurer, is childish. None of these departments have anything to do with the area of real estate. Why did he not go to the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Tarlac or the General Land Registration Office of Manila, which is the proper source for such information? His statement that we own additional scattered holdings in the Province of Tarlac is malicious and a deliberate misrepresentation of facts and to prove this statement, we are enclosing a certificate from the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Tarlac, showing that all the property we own within said Province is the Hacienda Luisita, the area of which according

to his records is only 10,150 hectares, which is still subject to further deduction.

His third paragraph deals with wages paid on our sugar fields and we challenge him to prove that at any time subsequent to 1910 have we ever paid as low a wage as 30 centavos a day for adult labor. He has to admit our statement to the effect that the wage range in Tarlac is between 50 and 70 centavos a day, but in order to save face he adds that it is for an eleven hour day. This is also a misrepresentation of fact because none of our laborers on the Luisita Estate work 11 hours a day.

Wages at the Tarlac Central range well above 90 pesos a month in many cases, some of our higher Filipino employees receiving as much as 450 pesos a month. What Mr. Allen fails to state is that each and every one of the laborers at the Central and on the Luisita Estate, whether on a daily or a monthly wage, is provided with free house, light and, in some instances, fuel. The farm laborers are also allowed a plot of ground on which to grow vegetables or fruit trees for their own exclusive use and benefit.

The reference to our having raised wages not because of paternalism, is another childish argument. We do not pretend to be paternalistic, but we do sustain that we have always paid a fair wage and never less than that prevalent in each district. The statement made by Mr. Allen that legislation is being considered to establish a one peso minimum wage throughout Philippine industry and large scale agriculture is not a fact, and a recent proposed amendment to the Eight Hour Labor Law specifically excludes agricultural laborers from the provision of this act.

With regard to Mr. Allen's comments on the tobacco situation, the fact that we are the largest single purchaser of tobacco in the Philippines does not substantiate his assertion that we hold a monopoly, especially when, maliciously, he combines this statement with comments on the report by Governor Bulan of Isabela. The language in which his comment is couched suggests to the reader that we and the other tobacco buyers secured by unfair means a control of all the available warehouse space in the Cagayan Valley. The facts are that these warehouses are owned by us and by other competitive buyers, and it is perfectly ridiculous to sustain that the cooperative associations which were formed with the full intention of disrupting our business and forcing us to pay prices higher than we could afford could succeed without owning a single warehouse in the Cagayan Valley. Perhaps Mr. Allen thinks that we should have handed over our warehouses to the cooperative associations free of

any charge, and to this all we have to say is that this would transcend paternalism and be just sheer rank foolishness

We *do not* see why Mr Allen has to make us responsible for a tobacco planter earning only [illegible] centavos a day In the Cagayan Valley most of the planters are independent and farm their own lands and if they are satisfied with this result of their labors, why should we be responsible for them not doing any better? On our three tobacco estates we have 2,000 families producing tobacco on a share basis and they also are allotted a plot of land on which to grow vegetables for their exclusive benefit We have very few cases of tenants leaving our estates and some of them have been with us for generations

In this connection we are enclosing a cutting from the newspaper *La Vanguardia* of March 20, 19[illegible], reporting on Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Tobacco of the Committee of Agriculture of the National Assembly at which Mr [illegible] of the Bureau of Internal Revenue testified with reference to the alleged monopoly of the tobacco export business in the Philippines We are enclosing a translation of the article

The two Centrals to which Mr Allen refers are corporations separate from the [illegible] and while we have a considerable interest in their capital, we do not hold a controlling interest It is true that the Tarlac Central is the [illegible] the Philippine Islands but on account of the basis on which the Sugar Control Act is enforced this Central has a lower quota than [illegible] in the Philippine Islands In so far as Bais is concerned, there [illegible] of larger capacity and which enjoys a greater quota

Finally Mr Allen contends that we did not contradict the main point he is attempting to prove in the article published in your number of March 1938 to the effect that, "The establishment of centrals on Luzon has been accompanied by the concentration of land ownership and the emergence of large landed proprietors closely associated with the central"

Mr Allen is absolutely wrong in this statement and to prove this, we are enclosing a certificate from the Philippine Sugar Administration showing that there are [illegible] Sugar Centrals operating on the Island of Luzon which are supplied with cane sugar by [illegible] plantations or [illegible] planters The discrepancy between planters and plantations is due to the fact that on some plantations there is more than one tenant farming the land that belongs to one owner This data does not include the sharecrop farmers who are not listed separately in the records of the Philippine Sugar Administration because all their cane is delivered under the name of the owner of the land they farm Once again Mr Allen

TABACALERA PRAISED IN A HEARING OF THE ASSEMBLY

(Caption under photographs)

The Public hearing today on tobacco Above a Sub-Committee on Tobacco of the Committee of Agriculture composed (left to right) of Assemblyman Buslon, Lazo (chairman) and Gusasco. Below, an official of Internal Revenue Mr Festin seated facing stand in the center, giving evidence

The Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas is an important factor in the production and the tobacco industry of the nation Thanks to it, the Spanish market has become a consumer of leaf tobacco exported from the Philippines In these or similar terms was developed the evidence given by Mr Festin, an official of Internal Revenue, before the Sub Committee on Tobacco of the Committee of Agriculture of the National Assembly

The cause of this statement by Mr Festin was a question from the board, in relation with the alleged monopoly of the export business of leaf tobacco raised at the public hearing this morning on the export product above mentioned Tomorrow Mr Escamilla, General Secretary of the Manila Tobacco Association, will testify before the Committee He was unable to do so this morning alleging that he needed to obtain further information in order to render a more complete report The Sub-Committee on Tobacco and the public hearings are part of the proceedings of the Committee of Agriculture with reference to proposed Bills submitted to that Committee The chairman, Assemblyman R Montinola, had previously divided the work amongst different Sub-Committees such as those on sugar coconut hemp tobacco unhusked rice, etc At the hearing this morning on tobacco, the Sub-Committee was presided over by V I Lazo chairman and attended by F Buslon and C Gusasco

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

PHILIPPINE SUGAR ADMINISTRATION
MANILA

March 30, 1939

Mr Charles H Davies,
Manager,
Cia Grl de Tabacos de Filipinas
Manila

Sir

Herewith is a list of centrals in Luzon with their corresponding number of plantations and planters If perchance information requested over the phone has been misunderstood, I shall be pleased to furnish you additional information desired

Very respectfully,
(Sgd) D. E. GRAHAM
Assistant Administrator

LUZON CENTRALS WITH CORRESPONDING NUMBER OF PLANTATION AND PLANTERS

Name of Central	Total Number of Plantations as of Oct. 31, 1938	Total Number of Planters as of Oct. 31, 1938
Mount Arayat Sugar Co., Inc.	352	[illegible]
Bataan Sugar Company, Inc.	118	145
Central Luzon Milling Co., Inc.	1,355	1,411
Nueva Ecija Sugar Mills, Inc.	(Temporarily Closed)	
Calamba Sugar Estate	[illegible]	968
Central Azucarera de Calatagan	3	11
Luzon Sugar Company	[illegible]	386
Pampanga Sugar Mills	1,[illegible]	1,420
Central Azucarera Don Pedro	[illegible]	[illegible]
Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co.	[illegible]	[illegible]
Mabalacat Sugar Mills	118	111
Hind Sugar Company	449	452
The Phil. Milling Co.	[illegible]	35
Central Azucarera del Norte	6	[illegible]
Paniqui Sugar Mills, Inc.	[illegible]	[illegible]
Pampanga Sugar Dev. Co., Inc.	[illegible]	998
Central Azucarera de Tarlac	[illegible]	[illegible]
College of Agriculture, U. P.	1	1
Total	9,948	10,812

GUERRILLA WARFARE

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS

SIR:

I have read with great interest Major Dupuy's study on the nature of guerilla warfare and the correspondence published simultaneously in PACIFIC AFFAIRS (June 1939). Since I believe that Major Dupuy as well as E. F. Carlson and H. Hanson have neglected certain aspects of Chinese guerilla warfare, I feel entitled to refer to them, though I cannot claim to be a military expert or to have had any first-hand experience.

Major Dupuy and your correspondents seem to accept the general statement that now "Chinese resistance takes the form of guerilla warfare, a more or less disorganized effort quite distinct from the grand tactics of regularly constituted national armed forces" (p. 138). From this assumption, Major Dupuy concludes quite logically that "the reconstitution of an active front is the significant token for which the trained observer is seeking" (p. 147).

I am under the impression that the basic assumption is not borne out by the facts, with at least four active fronts being maintained on the Chinese side: a front encircling Canton, a front defending Changsha, a front defending the Han River, a front defending Shensi Province against invasion. In other words, guerrilla warfare has not monopolized Chinese military energy but is coupled with the maintenance of active, well organized fronts.

Moreover, the military effectiveness of Chinese guerrilla warfare does not seem to be a matter merely of prognostic analysis—which anyway would have to be based on the correct interpretation of China's military moves—but I think it may well be said to be already a matter of record.

I think it might well be said that the last [illegible] months in the Far East have been characterized by a fundamental change in the organization of the Far Eastern balance of power. It is fairly obvious that if the Japanese army wished to gain full control of China they should have started earlier in the summer of 1937. China, by that time, had become a military power which could no longer be easily conquered. Nevertheless, I think political and military observers would do well not to look so exclusively at Central China. It is remarkable that Major Dupuy, in his enumeration of Chinese fronts of resistance (p. [illegible]), neglects even to mention Shansi province. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that Shansi province really is the backbone of the Chinese defense, as it was originally the center of Chinese guerrilla warfare. Today, Shansi province is the center of Chinese resistance more than ever, and in the Far Eastern balance of power, the successful defense of Shansi up to now has precluded the possibility of any Sino-Japanese deal involving the future fate of North China.

From a military point of view, the defense of Shansi has functioned as a pivotal left wing of the Chinese forces. It has its position, while the right wing and the center had to be withdrawn step by step, until the Chinese line which originally was a line of defense stretching from Shansi in the west to the coast in the east has become a north-south line, with Shansi in the north and the front south of Nanchang and north of Changsha in the south.

This defense of Shansi has been closely linked to the extensive use of guerrilla tactics. Organized and supported by the active front of the Eighth Route Army, the North China guerrilla forces have succeeded in so weakening any Japanese thrust at Shansi that the Japanese forces have not succeeded in piercing the Chinese front. Repeated attempts by the Japanese army to crush Chinese resistance in Shansi have always ended in failure, and it is probably no exaggeration to say that in no other

Chinese province have the Japanese losses in man power and material been so extensive as in Shansi

In brief, given the pivotal importance of the active Shansi front and the vital support by guerillas first organized for its benefit, we should be careful not to underrate the present and future effectiveness of Chinese guerilla warfare, which already in the first 23 months of Sino Japanese warfare has been a decisive element in Chinese resistance

KURT BLOCH
New York, June 1939

"NEUTRALITY" AND PERSONAL OPINION

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS

SIR

As one of a generation of readers who have, so to speak grown up with PACIFIC AFFAIRS, may I add a word to the discussion concerning the policy of the magazine? Ten years ago as a schoolboy in New Zealand I was very familiar with the sunbleached cover of the old PACIFIC AFFAIRS It was usually stacked on the top shelf of the library, along with Geneva brochures and the publications of the English Speaking Union Dust and the spider wove for it a garment of respectability that was seldom stirred by youthful hands its authority was valued in essay or debate, but its luster among my own contemporaries unless I wrong the shades of the past by a remembered judgment was dim No doubt we were the losers by this neglect but it was very general And I think most members of the Institute would agree that it is desirable that the magazine should interest the young student

But I remember vividly with what pleasure I "rediscovered" the magazine in China some three years ago at a time when I had become much more directly interested in Far Eastern and Pacific studies The change was remarkable copies of PACIFIC AFFAIRS were then passed from hand to hand, from library to dormitory, by students in the Peiping university to which I was then attached This new enthusiasm might seem to suggest merely that the Chinese student is more curious, or more industrious, than his counterpart in New Zealand, but I do not think so In fact, I suspect that this change of attitude, in which I shared wholeheartedly, was due in the main to just that more realistic approach to contemporary problems for which you seem to have incurred some re-

proach. The very things which made the magazine so much more stimulating for us, were the things about which people now write you letters of complaint

Yet surely it is the greatest error to suppose that a living subject, something so vast and complex as the past, present and future of the countries and peoples of the Pacific zone, can ever be handled in the abstract, or with the cold detachment of the anatomist Even where the matter is of pure scholarship let us say, Chinese oracle bones—the dry bones may rise again by the breath of the scholar's passion, if he has no opinions of his own, these will be very dry bones indeed So it must be, in those questions of national or international policy that inevitably recur in your pages

The subject will become living, in direct proportion to the extent to which the writer's feeling—or better still, the feeling of the human beings whose circumstances or environment he is seeking to describe—is communicated to the reader I should have thought that this was self evident that there is an element of will in the transcription of the simplest set of facts, without which they will lie about the page as barren of meaning as of life By all means, if the facts are controversial, let us hear all sides of the case but do not let us have any artificial attempt to hold a balance against the truth, however unpalatable it may be to certain groups or individuals

For by such a policy as this, we commit the cardinal sin against history Sooner or later, the truth will prevail If the truth is not yet clearly visible, let us have an honest grappling with the problem, not a professional wrestling bout in which all the punches are pulled Above all, do not let us have any attempt to avoid dispute where the battle is already joined, or close our eyes to events of daily occurrence that must shock decent men everywhere

As a British citizen, I am appalled at the suggestion of Mr Geoffrey Stead, that criticism of British policy or British prestige should not be allowed to appear in PACIFIC AFFAIRS I think such criticism comes most fittingly, perhaps, from a British author, but where it is relevant, I know no argument against it except the threadbare argument of the inveterate defender of the *status quo* And the *status quo* dropped out of sight behind the Pacific horizon a long time ago no discreet censorship of your pages will have power now to retrieve it

To fulfill its proper function, the magazine should be going forward all the time, in a steady attempt not merely to keep pace with the progress of events, but where possible to anticipate them. In my own

opinion, PACIFIC AFFAIRS has done this admirably over the last few years. Certainly it is not meant to be used as a propaganda sheet for anyone, but neither is it a mere catalog. There is nothing more futile, as Mr. Morgan Young points out, than the illusion of "neutral comment," which is no comment at all. For example, no one would deny the usefulness of the careful publication by Chatham House entitled *China and Japan*, which was a notable attempt to apply the principles of anonymity and impartiality to the present struggle in the Far East. But I know of nothing written on the war which makes the events themselves appear more unreal, and the style, reminiscent of official British documents on India, is a dead hand on the living or martyred flesh of millions.

I cannot believe that there are many of your readers who would wish to see the journal of the I.P.R. become a neutral of this gender. We have already a number of stately publications on foreign affairs which are quasi neutral and well nigh unreadable. We have a host of lightweights in the same field, which strive for readability at all costs. But we have few responsible journals in any country which combine scholarship with liveliness, and solid information with the forward view. This is the "middle way" of the liberal tradition, and unless I am mistaken, the liberal tradition has been the mark of scholarship and true education in any age.

JAMES BERTRAM

Djibouti, April 1939

according to whether it is put into practice or not. Accordingly, the intensity of the imperialism of any country waxes and wanes as it shifts its relative position within the group of imperialist countries, and must be judged partly by what it is defending or attacking.

The imperialist career of Japan, as he relates it, begins in irony. It was a burst of American expansionism that "opened" Japan. Extraterritorial privileges had to be ceded to the Western countries, and Japan itself was to a certain degree a victimized country. Yet long before it had even got rid of extraterritoriality Japan began to encroach on the islands that mask the coast of Asia and then on Korea and the mainland. What allowed Japan to extricate itself from a position of disadvantage and to assume a more and more menacing stance was the way in which the grouping of the other powers changed, leaving gaps through which Japan could push forward.

America, for instance, which "opened" Japan, is not so nervously on the defensive yet as Britain and France, but it is obviously on the defensive, and the appeal to the Open Door is part of its tactics of defense. This does not mean that the Open Door which America would like to defend has always stood open. At the turn of the century the Americans had filled up their own continent. They took the Philippines, and it was in the exuberance of the feeling that America might have a great destiny in the Far East that Uncle Sam put his shoulder against the door and started to crowd into China. He never got very far in, but he always thought he might want to some day, and he did not want to find the door locked by previous tenants, so he just kept his foot in it to prevent it from being closed. It is the toes of this foot that are now being trodden on by Japan.

At the time when America first began to define a claim to a future in the Pacific, however, it was not Japan that was the obstacle but Tsarist Russia. Consequently America and Japan had interests in common, but when Japan won the Russo-Japanese war, it took the place of Russia as the country most likely to preempt a position that would bar American access to North China and Manchuria. Japan had won the war largely because both Britain and America preferred to see Russia defeated. The Japanese were quite aware that they were in no position to take a bold independent line in the Taft era of Dollar Diplomacy, when powerful American interests were thinking of great railway and financial enterprises in China and Manchuria. Had the Americans really set to work, Japan might have been made very uncomfortable. The pressing need to build up a position on which America could not encroach had a

curious result In 1907, only two years after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan and Russia agreed to recognize each other's "special interests" and work together (I have here greatly simplified the argument of the book which in spite of its brevity touches on the salient activities of the other countries as well)

The next stage was the world war, followed by Japanese intervention in Siberia, which immensely increased Japanese American antagonisms A further stage had already begun, however, and now began to develop rapidly China, which had until this time been simply the country to which all other countries demanded access, was now capable of a more independent policy During the war it had advanced rapidly in industrial productivity With Russia apparently prostrate, American policy began to turn from the idea of preventing European and Japanese control over the separate regions of China to the idea of improving its own position by supporting China Through the Washington treaties of 1922, accordingly, America helped to extend the time which China needed to "find itself" thus promoting the American interest in future enterprises as a partner in Chinese development

Both Japan and Britain, as the countries with already established claims to vested interests had less to gain from this kind of development than America and China Dr Motylev therefore predicates for this period an increase in both Anglo American and Japanese American rivalry, which was one of the gaps though not of course the only one, through which Japan was able to push toward its "positive" policy first in Manchuria and then in China The gap between Great Britain and America has not yet completely closed At the same time Japan's positive policy, coordinated now with the aggressive policies of Germany and Italy, is making Great Britain one of its chief victims The situation has developed to a point at which in Dr Motylev's concluding words, "the Pacific nexus of contradictions is being converted into the nexus of the second imperialist [world] war "

O L.

New York, June 1939

SURVEY AFTER MUNICH *By Graham Hutton Boston: Little Brown & Co pp 253 $2 50 English edition Danubian Destiny A Survey After Munich London Harrap 7 6*

FROM the Low Countries up the Rhine to the Swiss peaks, along the whole Alpine range to Vienna, round the entire diamond-shaped

mountain rim of what was once Czecho-Slovakia, up to the Baltic and down from the Alps, almost to within sight of the Adriatic, the Third Reich controls the passes, the valleys, the bridgeheads, the heights." Thus Graham Hutton's brilliant analysis describes Danubia. In chapter after chapter of closely knit writing he reveals the strength and weakness of the power which has been advancing step by step from Denmark toward the Dardanelles. Though he hardly mentions the Far East (for an exception see page 230), this volume is of correlative significance to students of the Pacific because of its appraisal of the possible consequences of the swift penetration of a great power into a vast but less modernized region. Mr. Hutton could do a great service by making a similar study of the contemporary Far Eastern situation. A possible disqualification would be his failure to take the implications of present-day U.S.S.R. into his published calculations.

No one has given us so vivid and authentic a strategic and geographic picture of Germany's new eastern European empire. "It is not generally realized that since 1938 there is no country beyond Italy and Germany which can communicate by rail, road, or river with western Europe without crossing a part of Germany or Italy." He believes that it would be an error to think of all Europe beyond Germany as being from now onward already at Germany's disposal. He is skeptical of the long-term stability resulting from Nazi economic acrobatics. The Third Reich, he says, "has *not* stopped *once* in the last five years seriously to organize its gains for future economic development. Instead, so great was the velocity of its onward rush, it consumed every new gain in a few months, stripped and despoiled all its new resources as quickly as it obtained them. This kind of economic freebooting naturally impelled it to seek for ever wider fields." If, however, Great Britain decided to pour capital into Hitler's needy hands for the development of Danubia, in ten years Germany might be able to dictate England's destiny.

Published in March, the book is so up to date that it seems as though it must have gone to press on the last day of February. Writers are rare who give such an effective synthesis of political and economic factors. If Mr. Hutton could make the present book the first in a series of annual "surveys," scholars and publicists would have at hand a guide to understanding of the Führer's new Danubian Empire.

EDWARD C. CARTER
April, 1939

THE RAMPARTS WE WATCH. By George Fielding Eliot. *New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1938. pp. ix + 370.*

ANY military man who wants a large navy and a small army possesses a clarity of thought that demands attention. Major Eliot has it and his book is an important contribution to the study of the defense of the United States. Admiral Mahan wrote in terms of sea power alone. Major Eliot, who may prove to be a not unworthy successor to that classical author, writes in wider terms which coordinate sea power, air-power and land power. This demands both detailed technical knowledge and a student's familiarity with history and geography, a varied equipment which Major Eliot uses accurately and without pretentiousness.

His book will not please those who still hope that humanity can order its affairs and learn to base them on something else than force. It is an example of almost completely realistic thinking. "Force Remains the Final Arbiter of Nations" is the first chapter heading, and the note is sustained throughout the book. "The security of a great nation is not based on sentiment; it is based on what some may think a cold and unfeeling appraisal of selfish interest" (p. [illegible]). Now that the world is back to complete anarchy, philosophical and political, who will differ from him?

On the basis of self-interest and security Major Eliot investigates the policies that must be followed to attain the desired results. He makes an interesting parallel between the United States today and Great Britain before the rise of air power, and deduces that any nation protected by insularity only follows common sense in depending primarily on sea power, which is for it safer, cheaper, more effective and less of a threat to liberty than standing armies. He will not admit, either, that the battleship is outmoded or the airplane supreme. I agree with him. The battleship is the *ultima ratio* and no conceivable quantity of airplanes can take its place. Incidentally he dispels the bogey that overseas nations could do anything effective against America from the air (p. 124).

Major Eliot thinks that it would be just possible for the United States to fight a naval war with Japan—just possible and no more. On the other hand Japan could not fight any kind of war against the United States. He seems to think that any such war is unlikely. Given the worst will in the world, how could the two combatants get at each other? The Pacific is still unconveniently wide. Major Eliot, though no alarmist,

advocates a very complete program of defense for the United States, and exposes the inadequacies of present coastal defenses. He is against another levy *en masse*, such as occurred during the last war, in favor of a very strong battle fleet, adequate air power and a moderate army, mainly for cooperation with the fleet. He is thus no jingoistic "militarist."

Major Eliot's world seems to consist in a friendly western Europe, an incalculable eastern Europe, probably sooner or later hostile, and a fairly definitely hostile Japan. On this he bases his calculations, such as an undivided fleet concentrated in one ocean. He reckons that neither Germany nor Italy, nor both together, could dangerously threaten American security, though they might cause serious annoyance. He also definitely rules out cooperation of any sort against the "axis" powers. But is there not a defect of logic at that point? Major Eliot is thinking in the traditional terms of American isolation, of that private world that the United States so comfortably used to dwell in. But we are in a balance of power world, seven great powers holding our destinies in their hands, very different from a balance of power Europe. While the private world still to some considerable extent exists, yet if the three axis powers were to win a resounding victory over either England-France (which may be considered as one unit), or Russia, the balance would be so seriously disturbed that the United States would have to reconsider its position. May it not be that just as it has built up a defense system 2,000 miles off the west coast, so it will have to think about something of the sort off the east coast, say a defense line from Iceland to the Azores? Even *Ireland* is not much further offshore than Hawaii.

Major Eliot himself says that America could hardly look with equanimity on a Japan powerful enough to take Australia, yet he also says that there is nothing that can be done about the fate overhanging England-France. Either they will get through or they won't! Now, if they do, Germany as a threat disappears again. If they do not, the axis group move out to the Atlantic, take over all overseas dependencies, build a big fleet and are in a position to threaten the United States with a war on two fronts. While such a challenge could be successfully met, the mere possibility of its being some day made indicates that England-France must constitute a large factor in American thinking as to the balance of power, a sort of first line of defense. The United States, which Major Eliot says enjoys the same kind of security as England used to enjoy, is hardly in the position of eighteenth century England but of late nineteenth century England—keeping a position of "splendid" but precarious isolation, and directly affected by the balance of power. Again, England

at its most isolated epoch constantly intervened in Europe to preserve for itself a favorable balance. The mere fact that this cold, keen book can be written indicates that today the United States must begin to think in such terms, too.

The principles of defense that Major Eliot lays down for the United States are exactly those that I should prescribe for Canada, with appropriate adaptations. Canada is a small power and therefore its policy must be defensive. But the United States is the greatest of the world powers and hence must be ready for the offensive. Major Eliot's words are for the offensive but his thinking is defensive, perhaps not too fortunate a combination. If a few years ago it had responded to the destiny history had put upon it, England would not be in such a tight place today. In like manner let the United States beware of shirking its responsibilities.

That Canada is in an entirely different position Major Eliot recognizes in the most effective way—by devoting to it one short paragraph.

A. R. M. Lower

Dalhousie University, March 1939

The United States Among the Nations. A Symposium. *Berkeley: University of California Press. 1937. pp. 184. $1.50. (Cambridge University Press—7s.)*

The seven papers here presented were the first of a series of lectures arranged in 1936 by the University of California Committee on International Relations. Three historians, two political scientists, a newspaper editor, and an economist participated.

Eugene I. McCormac contributes a sketchy history of American foreign policy, confining discussion of the Roosevelt program to the statement that it "seems content to limit its foreign policy to its own national affairs." Failing any analysis of the economic forces operating to prevent the adoption of Wilson's policy at Versailles, the concluding question which Mr. McCormac poses appears more speculative than pertinent: "Should the present turmoil result in another world cataclysm is it not possible that we may look with a more charitable eye on Wilson's *visionary* peace proposals, and deem them to have been more *practicable* than the settlement which he was forced to accept?" The implication is that the political sphere is a completely autonomous realm of action and that if only statesmen possessed vision, charity, and the spirit of goodwill a policy of perpetual peace might be devised.

Herbert I. Priestley summarizes the development of Pan American relations, emphasizing the democratic backgrounds and aspirations of the Latin American countries These he finds have been thwarted by the same interests which support the rebel cause in Spain today "obscurantism, supremacy of privileged classes, absentee landlords, and the socially irresponsible, [who may] win a military decision, but they merely delay the victory of democracy, the right of the impoverished peasant to a civilized living In the end the movement toward liberalization and integration must win, the opposite is social suicide"

Robert J Kerner's discussion of "The United States and Europe Isolation or Cooperation?" emphasizes the duality of recent historical forces—political nationalism and economic interdependence He finds some hope in the American reciprocity agreements and the Tripartite Monetary Agreement Mr Kerner considers the present neutrality policy likely to involve America in a war for the defense of neutral rights A suddenly applied policy of complete political and economic isolation might lead to internal catastrophe and social upheaval "There remains at present one policy it is that of limited and adjustable cooperation, whereby the United States would consult with other nations, and whereby, if we agreed in the designation of the aggressor, we would do nothing to prevent others from settling the quarrel"

The essay on "The United States in World Trade," by Henry F Grady, effectively states the significance and purpose of the present American Administration's tariff policy, with special reference to world peace Its precision, acuteness, and logical structure make it the most distinguished of the series Mr Grady tersely analyzes the influence of modern industrialism on international relations, the interplay of political and economic forces, the history of tariff programs, the development of economic nationalism, and the nature of the trade agreements program Economic planning he considers to be an inescapable consequence of an era of plenty The issue today is "whether that planning shall proceed on the basis of economic nationalism under pressure from economic interests, now well entrenched, who would freeze the *status quo*, limit our technological and economic possibilities, and establish a permanent economic hierarchy of the various class elements in present society in order to retain their favorable position, or whether it shall proceed on the basis of a world economy, making available to mankind the full benefits of natural advantages in production and making possible further advancements in technology in order that all human beings may enjoy a more abundant life"

Other essays are "Military Policy and National Security," by David P. Barrows, who holds that "as long as nations have soldiers, it is the duty and obligation of soldiers to prepare for war"; "The Policy of the United States in the Pacific and the Far East," by Chester H. Rowell, of anecdotal interest, and "The Two Roads: Isolation or Collective Security," by Frank M. Russell, who retains his faith in the League of Nations.

HARRY CONOVER

AMERICAN SHIPPING POLICY. *By Paul Maxwell Zeis*. Princeton: *Princeton University Press*, 1938. *pp.* vii + 254. $3.00.
OUR SHIPS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE. *By the Editors of* Fortune. *New York: Oxford University Press*, 1938. *pp.* 42[illegible]. $2.75.

These two recent contributions to the scanty literature on the problems and policies of the American Merchant Marine supplement each other. Paul Zeis gives a scholarly analysis of the development of United States' shipping policies from the post-Revolution days of the struggle against England's discriminatory Navigation Laws down to the "scientific subsidy policy" of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The September, 1937 issue of *Fortune*, presented in book form and supplemented with more recent data, poses the problems facing the owner and operator of American ships, the Maritime Commission, Labor and the public.

The part played by pressure groups in the formation and administration of shipping legislation is clearly revealed by Zeis. While shipbuilders, shipowners and operators, exporters, labor, the Navy and the public have found common ground for agreement on the desirability of an American merchant marine, the methods of attaining that end have been the subject of long controversies. The conflicting interests of these groups have led to stalemates and compromise laws which have failed in their purpose: the development of a first-rate merchant marine. Shipbuilders have been the most powerful group and from the start succeeded in establishing a monopoly for the construction of American ships in American yards.

Zeis' analysis of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 is very critical. Viewed in light of the failures of previous subsidy legislation there are many difficulties involved in the administration of this latest measure.

"While undoubtedly superior to previous laws, the new subsidy act does not offer a satisfactory solution to the merchant marine problem" (p. 203.) The construction and operating differential method of calculating aid to shippers comes under fire. "The practice of compensating American shipbuilders and operators for their relative inefficiency almost inevitably will have the effect of increasing that inefficiency. Incentive to cut costs and to furnish a better product or service for less money is largely removed since the Government makes up the difference." (p. 204.)

Zeis implies throughout that the solution of the merchant marine problems of the United States lies in outright Government ownership and operation. He convincingly shows that post-war experience with the Emergency Fleet Corporation cannot be considered an example of the failure of such a policy, for "The ships were built by private companies not by the Government; they were operated by private managing operators not by the Government; they were laid up and taken out of service primarily at the instigation of private operators; finally, they were sold at a fraction of their true value as a result of pressure exerted by private companies." He avoids discussion of the complex problems that would be involved in a complete Government ownership and operation policy; while condemning the subsidization of private shipping, he offers no alternative plan that would overcome Government inefficiency, red tape, and politics. In a final chapter on "Today's Policy and Foreign Relations," the commercial and national defence arguments for a merchant marine are found wanting, and the reader is left with the impression that ships are liabilities rather than assets.

Less analytically but more dramatically, the editors of *Fortune* offer a collection of detailed pictures of the various phases of shipping from building to operations, from legislation to personalities, and from owners to seamen. The presentation of the myriad problems faced by those responsible for administering American shipping policy and running American ships gives a vivid picture of the confusion within the industry, but no solutions for the difficulties are offered. Questions remain unanswered, but they challenge the reader's interest and give him an insight into the complexities of shipping by a reportorial rather than historical approach. While more sympathetic to private initiative, *Fortune's* editors do not hesitate to reveal the scandalous activities of shippers who profited at the expense of the taxpayer.

To those interested in the Pacific area, the chapters on Matson and Maritime Unions should be of particular value. Both books, however,

provide an essential background for an understanding of the problems facing the Merchant Marine. The future of American shipping, which is so vital a factor in the life of the Pacific coast, will depend on the success or failure of the present legislation—and neither book paints an encouraging picture

WALTER A RADIUS
San Francisco, January 1939

SILVER MONEY *By Dickson H Leavens Indiana Principia Press 1939 pp 439 + xix $4 00*

THIS presents the background and principal developments in the use of silver as money since the beginning of the nineteenth century A sojourn in Changsha, China from 1909 to 1928 awakened the author's interest in silver, but it was not until his return to the United States that he commenced to study seriously the problem which, eleven years later, led to this voluminous monograph The study opens with a brief historical account of silver and gold before the nineteenth century Mr Leaven's reading of that period leads him to the reflection that the problem is how to fix the exchange ratio between the two metals, while the story of different attempts to solve that question is the story of silver money It is, then, precisely that tale which the author tells, and although there is nothing very original in his record of the ups and downs of the production and marketing of silver as bullion, or of its use as a monetary unit, his telling on the whole, if somewhat verbose, is good

Deep incursions have been made into all the accepted authorities on silver in England, America, India, China and the Far East, and from this hotchpotch the reader will get a very fair idea of the vagaries of silver over a long period of years The progress of the demonetization of silver by the various countries is closely examined, all seem to have arrived at the same conclusion, that silver being unstable in price was unsatisfactory as a standard monetary unit The chapters on India contain nothing new on silver, though they form a useful summary of the many reports issued on Indian currency and finance from 1892 onwards.

Most of what appears on China, too, is ancient history, and although the various parities given are interesting, they form only a broad outline of what used to take place The Eastern banks for very obvious reasons never disclosed the actual basis for their operations in silver and exchange It was always possible of course to get the constant by comparing bullion

contents, or fineness of coins, but what particular constant with charges and interest included the bankers worked on could not be easily ascertained. Then, as to futures, the banker would probably agree that the basis for his quotations was the telegraphic transfer rate of exchange, but if he were asked how the quotation for telegraphic transfers was fixed, he would say that the rate at which he could sell his bills depended on the rate at which he could cover, that is, provide the funds necessary to meet them The multitude of ways in which he might do this, and how finally he used to ship silver, were all very technical factors in the fixing of rates.

However, Mr Leavens has had a long and devious route over which to travel, and his account of exchange and the continuous fall in the price of silver is instructive—the abandonment of the silver standard by China not less so The latter was not, as generally supposed, the cause of the great decline in the value of silver, which began, as shown by the author, in 1929 He argues, rightly enough, that the fall in the price of silver was largely the result of the world wide fall in commodity prices, which caused an adjustment between the commodity price level in terms of silver in China, and the commodity price level in terms of gold (or paper) elsewhere This adjustment took place more readily by a decrease in the price of silver than by a decrease in commodity prices in China

Now we have the spectacle, concerning which Mr Leavens writes very critically, of America's trying to keep up the price of the metal for its own silver producing interests, by the absorption of large amounts from China and elsewhere This silver it is putting in cold storage, as it did with the vast amounts purchased under the Bland and Sherman Acts, but such assistance to silver must come to an end sometime, for it is hardly to be expected that America will be willing to keep silver permanently on relief So the readjustment for America promises to be much more painful than if the price had been allowed to reach an equilibrium without interference

A defect in the book is the author's habit of breaking the sequence of events, the reader will become interested in, say, the silver currency position of India, the rise and fall in the price of silver, or the abolition of the tael, only to be suddenly told that the discussion will be continued in a later chapter He will peruse what intervenes, and then find that he has to perform mental gymnastics in order to pick up the thread of the narrative again

W F Spalding
London, May 1939

DAS NIEDERLANDISCHE KOLONIALREICH *By Irmgard Loeber Leipzig W Goldman Verlag 1939 Weltgeschehen Series. pp. 142* RM 2 85

To promote a better understanding of world politics, a series of volumes has been published in Germany under the general title of *Weltgeschehen* This volume deals with the Netherlands colonial realm In a surprisingly clear survey Irmgard Loeber presents her material in seven chapters dealing with the acquisition of these colonies, the colonial policy of the Netherlands, the indigenous population, economic problems, the opening up of New Guinea, the Netherlands West Indian colonies, and the Netherlands colonial realm in world politics The chapter on administrative methods corroborates what Rupert Emerson has already remarked in his *Malaysia a Study in Direct and Indirect Rule*, namely, that the Netherlands system presents a great variety of forms of government in which the protectorate idea finds expression both in the native states and in the territory under direct rule The third part of the first chapter deals with the multifariousness of the population and the measures adopted to weld the many different elements into one harmonious whole, economic problems being set forth in the next chapter

Here the author gives an excellent picture of European economic mental and social influences on the indigenous social structure and of the danger of uprooting individuals Discussion of the Indies economic problem is preceded by a general survey of what they produce, with a clear summary of the economic defensive measures necessitated by the international developments of recent years, such as restriction

It may seem strange at first sight that such a short work should devote a separate chapter to the opening up of New Guinea, but from the standpoint of world politics it is entirely justified This chapter displays real insight into the international situation and an appreciation of the difficulties of developing a backward country

The chapter on the Netherlands colonial realm in world politics discusses the Netherlands policy of independence and neutrality and its determination to hold its own This discussion even includes the latest military measures issued by the ministry of defense Someone has remarked of this excellent, impersonal study that, a little less pleasantly phrased, it might have been published by the Netherlands Government This is perfectly true Be that as it may, in these days of propaganda and super propaganda it is a pleasure to review such a work

H WESTRA
Utrecht

Atlas van Tropisch Nederland, *uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap in samenwerking met den Topografischen Dienst in Nederlandsch-Indië*. 1938. 31 *pls.*, (*separate*) *index. Obtainable from Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. Gld.* 16. 17 x 13¼ *inches.*

The royal Geographical Society of the Netherlands and the Topographical Service of the Netherlands Indies have jointly published this excellent scientific atlas of the colonial empire of the Netherlands. As early as 1909 the society began the planning of the atlas but not until 1928 was its publication secured, when the Government of the Netherlands Indies offered the cooperation of its Topographical Service.

In the foreword the authors express their intention: "The Society has tried to fulfill the purpose of making an atlas partly for general practical use, and partly in order to give a survey of the outcome of a number of sciences and also of social and economic conditions in so far as these are to be fitted into cartographic representation of the size selected and the scale used."

In contrast to most atlases, this one can be used to the fullest extent by readers who are not familiar with the language of the authors, as complete legends in French, German and English, as well as in Dutch, accompany each map. The table of contents—again in four languages—describes the content of each map, the scale, the year of compilation, and the year of revision, if that became necessary because of the time lag between compilation and printing.

The atlas contains 31 double plates with 31 large and 135 small maps, nearly all of them in full color. A series of topographical maps fulfills the practical purpose of furnishing general geographical orientation. Plates 12b, 13, and 14 show Sumatra on the scale of 1:1,500,000, plates 20, 21, and 22 show Java on the scale of 1:750,000, plate 25 shows Netherlands Borneo on 1:2,500,000, plate 26 Celebes on 1:2,000,000, plates 27, 28, 29a the Lesser Sunda Islands and the Moluccas on 1:2,000,000, plates 29b, 30b, and 31b New Guinea (1:3,000,000), Surinam (1:2,000,000), and the Netherlands Antilles (1:300,000). With the exception of the Netherlands Antilles, the scale chosen corresponds not only to the size of the territory but also to its importance. The relief is shown in hypsometric tints outlined by isohypses. These are, however, combined with shading which destroys in many instances the true picture of elevation. Another minor criticism is that the hypsometric tints and color values vary considerably

In addition to relief, these maps also show place names, lines of communication, and administrative divisions.

Besides these topographical maps there are maps portraying the natural setting: physiography, geology, vulcanology, epicenters of earthquakes, climates, fauna, flora, and soils. For students of the social sciences the anthropogeographical, historical, and economic maps are of special interest. Four maps deal with the early history of the Malay Archipelago, the history of Dutch expansion, and the history of Java. There are maps depicting the population problem of the Netherlands Indies: density and distribution of population, distribution of languages, status of education. Others deal with economic problems such as land tenure, land utilization, distribution of agricultural, mineral, and forest products. Fourteen types of cultural landscapes are shown on plate 8e, while 23a portrays plans of the cities of Batavia, Bandoeng, Jogjakarta, Soerakarta, Semarang, and Soerabaja.

The Dutch possessions in the New World are taken up on the last two plates. In detail and in volume of information, however, these maps do not equal those on the East Indies: a good indication of the enormous difference in the relative value of the Netherlands East and West Indies.

KARL J. PELZER

The Johns Hopkins University, June 193[illegible]

LAND UTILIZATION IN AUSTRALIA. *By S. M. Wadham and G. L. Wood. Published for the Institute of Pacific Relations by the Melbourne University Press in association with the Oxford University Press.* 1939. 21s.

IN PLAN, scope and method this study differs from those on Japan, Korea, China and New Zealand already published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations as much as they differ from each other, but like the others it is a notable piece of work and a distinct contribution to better knowledge and understanding of the facts on which policies must be based or broken. The book begins with a short survey of the existing situation and the development which led up to it. It ends with broad conclusions and a brief discussion of economic and international questions. In between it comprises an account of the natural conditions and the way in which each of the major land industries—wool, wheat, dairying, meat, sugar, fruit, irrigation, forestry—have adapted themselves to the conditions and turned land to use. While the

material is organized primarily by industries, regional differences are well brought out, especially in the sections dealing with wool and wheat, which are the heart of the book

It would be easy but pointless to criticize this book severely on the ground of omissions and deficiencies It is so short, for so vast a subject as the land use of a continent that many relevant topics are only touched on in passing or not covered at all The authors were handicapped by want of data, and it may be said that even the data they collected are not adequately presented A bibliography, better documentation, and tables to present accurately the data given only in charts which are none too easy to read, would have improved the book But for the student who is interested in broad perspectives and penetrating discussion of the objectives and possibilities of policy these defects are unimportant in view of the merits of the work the grasp of the fundamental forces both natural and economic and the clear account of how they operate in the Australian economy as a stage in an evolutionary development and as a part of a world economy whose demand for wool, wheat, meat, butter, and fruit and whose readiness to send emigrants and capital across the sea made the settlement of Australia possible and directed the efforts of the settlers

The Australian Commonwealth is the most important producer and exporter of wool and one of the "big four exporters of wheat How far this was a logical development in virtue of climate and soils, of capital investment and market outlets, and of the relations of prices to costs (among which the costs of clearing the bush rightly receive special attention) is one part of the study, how far present tendencies in the world economy and in the technique of production will maintain or change the situation for the Australian settler is another part The authors clearly bore in mind and followed with some success their own precept—"Seasons, soils and sales form the trinity which must be studied and understood as the basis of either maintaining the present front or of planning advance for the future"

R GALLETTI

THE MENACING SUN *By Mona Gardner New York Harcourt Brace & Co 1939 pp 338 illus $2 50*

INDOCHINA, Siam, Malaya, the East Indies and India," writes Miss Gardner, "all lie on the path of the empire expansion which has

been mapped out for Japan." It was with this thought in mind, we are told, that this American newspaper correspondent traveled homeward through Southern Asia after a residence of 12 years in Japan. And yet we may be excused if we hesitate to accept this information at its face value. For the imperial propensities of Japan play but a trifling role in this trite potpourri of tourist impressions. Entire chapters lack even a vague allusion to Japan, imperial or otherwise, and when such references do appear, they are generally irrelevant to the text and wholly unenlightening.

Especially today, with Japan edging southward below Hainan, there is need for an authoritative discussion of Japanese activities in Southern Asia. Such a discussion should presuppose at least a working knowledge of the region and its inhabitants. We may be pardoned for doubting Miss Gardner's qualifications on this head, for she is surprised, somewhat ingenuously, by the heat of the tropics, by the inertia of the Annamites, by the infiltration of Chinese into Siam, by the importance of rubber in Malaya, by the aridity of Madras. One could go on indefinitely. She belongs to the intuitive school of research, and in this case intuition is not enough.

Had Miss Gardner been willing to let her book go for what it is—random jottings from a traveler's notebook—there would be no cause for complaint. Unfortunately, she has chosen to describe it as a politico-economic study, and this it most assuredly is not. When she confines her attentions to fellow passengers in a railway compartment in French Indo-china, or when she expatiates on the beauties of a rum omelet as prepared in a Cingalese jungle, she is pleasant company. But when, as occasionally happens, she fills the page with reflections on the state of the nation, any nation, she offers the reader a sorry rehash of bazaar rumor and club gossip.

PHILIP LILIENTHAL
New York, May 1939

THE REAL CONFLICT BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN. *By H. F. MacNair. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1938. pp. 105. $2.00.*

THE idea of this work is excellent, for no one can doubt but that "the non-physical factors involved in the present struggle . . . are at least as important as the physical, that the 'psychological' or ideological aspects of the conflict are ages-old in their inception and growth." The more we know about these aspects the better, and we look to the

Professor of Far Eastern History at Chicago to be really illuminating. In one sense we are not disappointed. There is a great deal of very informative quotation. Yet it is hard to praise the book as one would like. Attention is over-concentrated on the two most obvious and, to Western eyes, most glaringly absurd phenomena, namely the spirit of self-glorification in China a hundred years ago and the same spirit soaring to such extravagant heights today in Japan. Too much space has been given to highly spiced quotations which illustrate this, with the result that there is no room for other aspects which in the bulk have very great bearing on the situation. In his final chapter, one of conclusions, the *Professor* makes rather a brilliant recovery. The political consequences of the incompatible ideologies are set forth with admirable pungency and a valiant effort at impartiality.

The two halves of the book do not fit particularly well. Thus, for example, recent Japanese criticism of the Chinese and their national characteristics is given, but no mention is made of Chinese criticism of the Japanese. There are illustrations of the Western-trained patriotic mind in Japan trying to interpret its Japanese tradition, but there is no mention of similar Chinese minds at work on the same lines for China. Yet the work of these latter is highly instructive, both negatively and positively, and is too little known in the West.

The main defect of the work is that there is no attempt to show how the Chinese gradually broke down their inhibitions against Westernism, in other words painfully learned on a new scale the lesson of world citizenship, the lesson which the dominant forces in Japan have on their own showing yet to learn. The Chinese started a century ago with the "Self-Strengthening Movement," the stage beyond which Japan seems hardly to have moved. Then came the "Wushih Scientists" and later Kang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chao (just mentioned in passing by Professor MacNair) with their thrilling voyages of intellectual discovery. Finally there was the "New Tide Movement" (Renaissance) with its subsequent repercussions. In Japan there was nothing of this kind or at any rate very little of this passionate probing into the national consciousness. Take the treatment meted out to Professor Minobe during these last two years. That could not have happened in modern China.

The picture, therefore, has something *seriously wrong* with its lights and shades, a criticism which applies to the sections on early Confucianism. Both in pre-Han and Han times there was in China a dignified recognition of differences in culture among the neighboring peoples. There was a debonair attitude, a breadth of view which, when the time

came, gave Indian Buddhism its opportunity. Professor MacNair ignores this side. In spite of the merits of the book one is tempted on the whole to suppose that the Professor, having a mass of excellent material beside him, was unable to give the time which the greatness of his subject and his function as a historian demanded.

E. R. Hughes
Oxford University, April 1937

Otto Franke, Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches. Band II: Der Konfuzianische Staat I. Der Aufstieg zur Weltmacht. Band III: Anmerkungen, Ergänzungen und Berichtigungen zu Band I und II, Sach- und Namensverzeichnis. *Berlin und Leipzig: Verlag Walter de Gruyter & Co., pp. Bd. II* xii + 610. 1936. RM 36. *Bd. III* xii + 576. 1937. RM 42.

When in 1930 Professor Franke began to publish his massive History of the Chinese Empire (Vol. I leading from China's early history up to the end of the Han dynasty, 220 A.D.), he originally intended to compress the post-Han development into a single volume. Abundance of material changed the plan. Vol. II now covers the time from the third century A.D. up to the end of T'ang (907), while post-T'ang history is to be dealt with in a fourth volume. Vol. III contains notes, supplements and corrections to Vols. I and II. Besides presenting the source material on which the first two volumes were based, it is intended to show "the present state of research" (III, preface). Since the period between 1930 and 1937 was unusually productive in the field of Chinese history, especially in the work of Chinese scholars, Franke may well be congratulated on following this course.

The notes and supplements disclose the same philological care which distinguish the two textual volumes. They refer to Western studies of Chinese history as well as to original sources and Chinese investigations based on them. Facts and problems of China's archeology, astronomy, chronology, of the development of script and thought, of the rise and fall of feudalism, and of the establishment of the "Confucian state" are offered with that thoroughness which, although it never was a monopoly of German scholarship, certainly was characteristic of the best German scientific research, until recently. As far as the notes and text of this voluminous history go, they will be of great help to further studies undertaken along the same lines.

But only as far as they go Franke's work is handicapped by a series of limitations which are of the highest significance These limitations have little to do with the present German rulers and their creed As a matter of fact, Franke clearly indicates his mistrust of a racial interpretation of certain sides of China's history (III, pp 15 ff), and his criticism of Sui Yang Ti's motives in constructing new means of communications (II, pp 323) reads rather like a veiled exposure of the contemporary 'Nordic' autocrat's display of theatrical pomp and luxurious constructions The weakness of Franke's study lies in too narrow a conception of the empire (das Reich), and in a corresponding narrowness of scientific method

Western historiography in its profoundest form and Chinese historiography as a rule have conceived the state as something which can only be understood when its economic, administrative, legal military, and intellectual functions and background are properly defined Now the first volume of Franke's history contains relatively much economic and "cultural" information, because the sources of China's earlier history are largely confined to data of this kind The scientific value of Vol I is therefore relatively high But when the material begins to flow fuller, i e , in the very time of the "empire" itself, then Franke (not exclusively, but predominantly) concentrates his attention on data of a very limited character Sze ma Ch ien, the father of China's standard historiography, put great emphasis on "food and commodities," and "rivers and canals" He devoted to each of these topics a full section of his famous work

Franke also calls agriculture the basis of the state, in his index (III, p 448), but the text of Vol II, which is supposed to show the "empire" in actuality, has little to say about these matters[1] Tu Yu's *T'ung Tien* according to Franke (III, p 223) "depicts the institutions of the state during different dynasties", in doing so it takes as starting point the history of the empire's economic life (land, taxation, population, money, transport, salt, iron), turning then to the development of officialdom and administration, of etiquette, music, the army, the law, etc In the same way Ma Tuan lin opens his encyclopædia with the history of land, taxes and irrigation, thereafter following somewhat Tu Yu's general line, which he modifies and elaborates Compared with this great Chinese tradition, which has been applied to the standard histories of all the great dynasties,

[1] The little attention paid to socio-economic and administrative factors by Franke, especially in his second volume is the more regrettable since he formerly investigated individual phenomena in both fields Franke has been interested in silk worm breeding and rice cultivation on one hand and in [illegible] on the other But his historical conception obviously prevented him from coordinating creatively these elements into a living cultural whole

Franke's treatment of the "empire" is thin and to a great extent anecdotal. What China's leading historians considered to be of vital interest to the understanding of the state—"food and commodities," "rivers and canals," the administrative system and the selection of officials—are much less important in Franke's presentation than the personalities of the court, their character and behavior.

Therefore, according to him, the system of examination was introduced under the Sui simply because an emperor wanted to show off (II, p. 328), and Sui Yang Ti's special passion for boat riding "became the origin of the great system of canals" (II, p. 323). Much more space is devoted to wicked actions of bad emperors, empresses, harem ladies, and—last but not least—eunuchs than to analyses of the antagonistic foundation which carried and moved them. Instead of a real study of the structure of the military organization during the different historical periods, we are given unending reports about movements of armies, defeats and victories which thus remain empty and without any deeper significance. While China's former historians wrote their histories from the standpoint of ruling administrators and statesmen, who in practice knew the functional meaning of the state, this new detailed history is written from the standpoint of a small courtier who perceives the empire predominantly as an agglomeration of the personal anecdotes of a small conspicuous group and of minor wars and adventures told by ex-officers of a lower rank.

In these circumstances an important part of the old source material does not make sense to Franke. He does not pay much attention to a great part of the data which China's historians considered to be of vital importance for the empire. Consequently also, the most interesting works of Chinese modern scholars are neither mentioned nor utilized in the textual volume or the notes and supplements. Wan Kuo-ting's *Agrarian History of China* (Vol. I, 1933), a work considered by Dr. C. M. Chang as the "most scholarly and authoritative" on this basic side of China's political history,[8] remains unknown to the reader of Franke's history. Several Western scholars are quoted as authorities on China's early history, but Kuo Mo-jo, whose *China's Ancient Society* first appeared in 1929 and whose analysis of oracle inscription and bronze texts followed soon afterwards, does not even get a bibliographical note. There was no need for Franke to share in the enthusiasm which Ferguson and other foreign scholars have expressed about Kuo Mo-jo, but Kuo's influence on the development of archeology and social science in China has been

[8] *Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly*, Tientsin, Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 411-14, 1935.

so great that his main works and results ought at least to have been listed. Ku Chieh-kang is mentioned as the editor of a symposium on Chinese ancient history, but about Professor Ku's remarkable contribution to modern textual criticism Franke's supplement has nothing to say. Ku Chieh-kang, like Feng Yu-lan, the author of China's outstanding modern history of Chinese philosophy (Vol. I 1931, Vol. II 1934)[3] is only referred to casually. Their real achievements are completely ignored.

These deficiencies, like Franke's neglect of Max Weber's pioneer analysis of Chinese society, state, and philosophy,[4] are not incidental. Incidental may be his disregard of Richard Wilhelm's translation of the *Ta Tai Li Chi* (III, p. 87) or the gaps in his bibliography of bronze and oracle bone inscriptions (H. G. Creel's *Birth of China*, e.g., contains a much more complete list), but the neglect of so much important source material and of so many prominent modern works is the organic outcome of O. Franke's conception of the state itself. If the state is nothing beyond the experience of a minor court official, then perhaps no special methods of political and social science are needed for its analysis and description. Knowledge of the language remains all that is needed! Any layman who reads a newspaper and takes some interest in political affairs can make his selection of the material and thus write "history." The result is devastating. An enormous amount of philological history has been spent to plough through almost untouched ground, as in Vol. II, and to produce the most barren results.

Franke's second volume (and part two of Vol. III), with their ocean of unconnected facts and anecdote, if taken seriously, discredit Chinese history as well as China's historians. Why respect a history which is not only dull, but—worse—meaningless? Philology itself, if it does not serve any deeper purpose becomes discredited too. Renaissance philology was a means to reveal man's greatness, his real problems, and his needs. By no means must philology be dull, pedantic, and meaningless. It only becomes dull under conditions of which Franke's work is a striking example. Political and social science, when dealing with history or foreign realms, *absolutely requires* the help of philology. It has to study and apply linguistic methods and results carefully. On the other hand

[3] Vol. I translated by Derk Bodde and published as *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, H. Vetch, Peiping, 1937.

[4] All Franke has to say about Weber is a repetition of Rosthorn's criticism that Weber mixed up historical phenomena of different epochs. This certainly is correct, but whoever really takes pains to study Weber's elaborate analysis realizes at once that this criticism does not in the least discredit the pivotal points of Weber's study, which quite predominantly pertains to what Franke calls the time of the "empire."

philology, whenever it takes up historical studies, must utilize the methods of social science (in the broader sense) to be successful. None of us would trust a writer who pretends to give us a scientific description of the horse breeding or the dentistry of a given country, if he had no qualification besides knowledge of the language and, perhaps, a liking for horses and an occasional toothache. The man has to understand the topic itself. What is valid for horses and dentistry should be valid for human beings, human behavior, and human history too. Throughout the field of real history, social science without philology is lame, but philology without social science is blind. The proper union between these two sciences, which already is beginning to take shape, may become a not insignificant element of the rebirth of man's understanding of his own past, present and future.

KARL AUGUST WITTFOGEL
New York, September 1938

AGRARNAYA POLITIKA TSINSKOGO PRAVITELSTVA V SINTSZYANE V KONTSE XVIII VEKA (AGRARIAN POLICY OF THE CH'ING GOVERNMENT IN SINKIANG AT THE END OF THE XVIII CENTURY). *By L. I. Duman. Moscow-Leningrad: Academy of Sciences. 1936. pp. 250.* R. 10.

TIBET at its most mysterious was not so unknown to the general world as Chinese Turkistan, the province of Sinkiang, is today. In the south the great Taklamakan desert is rimmed by the mountain edges of Tibet, India and Afghanistan, and enclosed on the north by the T'ien Shan. Streams from all these mountains flow into the desert, and where mountain meets desert, oases are formed by spreading out the water through irrigation canals. Each oasis is a center of intensive and fertile cultivation. Each is so nearly self-sufficient that its inhabitants think of themselves more as men of Khotan, or Kashgar, or Aksu, than as people having a common nationality. They are Moslems by religion, and they speak an old and pure form of the Turkish language, but most of them are not Central Asian Turks, but rather "Alpine" in physical characteristics.

North of the T'ien Shan or Heavenly Mountains are the districts of Jungaria, Tarbagatai and Ili. Here the contrast of oasis and desert is not so sharp, there are wide grazing steppes, rich mountain meadows, and great forests. The land merges on one side into Mongolia and on the other

into Russian Central Asia The confusion of peoples, languages, and religions is extreme There are settled oasis cultivators who speak Turkish and pastoral nomads who speak Turkish; Mongol nomads, Chinese Moslems and Chinese who are not Moslems, descendants of Manchu garrisons There are more people who speak Manchu in Sinkiang than there are in Manchuria The non Moslem Chinese are a rather small minority, but they were until recently the ruling minority

This is the land that shelters Chinese communication with the Soviet Union What is happening there, and what is going to happen? Moslem revolts, a few years ago, weakened the "colonial" rule of the Chinese, the different national and cultural groups now have more representation in governing themselves Will this result in stability? There is a tendency to assume that the things which might happen to Sinkiang are more important than the things which might happen in Sinkiang that either the Japanese will approach near enough to instigate a "Moslem nationalism," or the Russians will "Bolshevize" the country

Such a view is much too shallow The things that are happening in the lives of the peoples of Sinkiang are far more important The old Chinese rulers of the province, being a minority in a vulnerable position, are constrained to participate in the life of the country, instead of simply administering it and collecting the taxes and trade revenue The Central Government is concerned with more important things than "protecting the Chinese hold over the province", it must carry on the resistance against Japan. For this, obedience without loyalty would be unreliable Consequently, the Central Government cannot hinder the kinds of development which give the peoples of Sinkiang something to defend As for the Russians, they again are so much interested in the survival of China as a whole that it would be childish for them to cut themselves off from the main body of China by "Bolshevizing" its colonial fringe

Therefore the paramount influence in the changes now going on in Sinkiang may be described as the search for efficiency not only in long range communication between China and Russia, but in the development of local resources and above all the creation of a spirit of hope and progress which may convert Sinkiang from a shaky outlying dominion into a firm support at the back of China In such a confused country the "quest for efficiency" cannot be as smooth working as the phrase implies There must be a good deal of fumbling There is no question about the main phenomenon· the penetration of the twentieth century into medieval Central Asia, but there must be wide differences in the effects achieved, and in the rate at which they are achieved, among settled people and

nomads, Moslems and non-Moslems, regions with only agricultural or pastoral resources and regions with mineral and other resources, and so forth.

In the circumstances, the most rational approach to the mystery of Chinese Turkistan is not by comparison of the potency of the Japanese imperial idea with the Russian socialist idea and the Chinese nationalist democratic idea. It is rather by analysis of the past growth and present poise of the different ways in which people live in Sinkiang. In no other way is it possible to estimate the impact of the new forces.

For such purposes, Duman's review of the Manchu conquest of Sinkiang in the eighteenth century is of the greatest value. It was at this time that there was established the stratification which hardened for a century. Though shaken by the Moslem revolts in the second half of the nineteenth century, it did not really begin to break up until five or six years ago. Duman has in the first place collated the Chinese sources in an admirable way. This was not easy to do, for the sources on the whole follow the pattern that was normal in all Chinese official and semi-official writing, but they deal with material which is not of a normal Chinese kind. Hence the student can make the most of them only if he is really conversant both with the conventions of China and with the peculiarities of Central Asia.

For the general reader, the most important part of the book is the historical summary. From about 1745, the once formidable power of the Jungar Mongols was breaking up. The result of this was not simply to disembarrass the Manchus in China of a dangerous political enemy. On the contrary, it generated tribal wars that disturbed an immense territory, not only in Central Asia but in Tibet on one side and Outer Mongolia on the other. Was the main purpose of the Manchus, then, simply to "restore order"? Duman states, quite correctly, that many other questions were involved. Most important of all, in his opinion, was the need to divert attention from within China itself. The Manchu conquest of 1644 had been followed by a considerable distribution of lands, but after a century of peace, there had been a great concentration of land ownership resulting in peasant unrest and the danger of risings. Secondly, there was the desire to open up the Central Asian market. Thirdly, the power of the Jungars was a military danger, and the spread of their activity into Outer Mongolia was alarming.

The analysis could, I think, be improved. I doubt especially the outward drive of Chinese trade. Trade with Turkistan, as with Mongolia, was at times influential in China, but I think it usually acquired this

influence after trading activity had been drawn into the outer regions from the border of China, not after it had thrust itself outward from the center of China. Generally speaking, the movement of such caravan trade goods as brick tea, silk, porcelain and so forth does not seem to have been developed by the producers of the goods, but by middlemen, and these middlemen, again, did not have the kind of influence that induces governments to open markets—they merely took advantage of whatever markets happened to be thrown open by the general trend of conditions.

More important is the need for an analysis of the conditions within Central Asia that made for instability and a Manchu invasion. What Duman describes, but does not adequately explain, is the decay of the Jungar power, founded originally on the control of nomad tribes, but combined later with overlordship over Central Asian oases and over a large part of Tibet. The position of the Jungar khans had become distorted. Their richest tribute came from the oases, their military strength was in the allegiance of a group of Mongol tribes. What appeared to be quarrels over the political succession after the death of Galdan, the great Jungar conqueror, were at the same time disputes over the proper balance to be maintained between the tribes which provided soldiers and the territories which provided revenue. Some of the tribes broke away. This carried war into Outer Mongolia. If the tribal fighting had resulted in a regrouping of tribal power, the position of the Manchus in China would have been damaged. Consequently it was essential for the Manchus to move around behind the Jungars, take over the oases, and make them satellites of the settled economy of China, so that they should not again become bases and sources of revenue for steppe tribes.

From this point on Duman provides an excellent description of the methods by which the Manchu conquest was effected and the devices by which it was maintained. The comparative value of the study is potentially great. The mixed cultures of Sinkiang cover a scale one end of which is very different indeed from the conventions of Chinese economy and society, while the other comes very close to the Chinese norms—a large oasis, for instance, with its intensive, irrigated agriculture and walled cities, is like a miniature China. Detailed studies like this prepare the way for an improved understanding of the past history and present nature of Asia as a whole.

O. L.

New York, June 1939

STONE GATEWAY AND THE FLOWERY MIAO. *By Will H. Hudspeth London The Cargate Press 1937. pp 87. Illus. 11.*

WEDGED mostly in the hill country of the Southwest, there are thousands of tribesmen in China who, since the twilight of days when they themselves were powerful on the Asiatic continent, regularly have been shoved about by stronger neighbors Once prevalent was the superstition that this whole class was comprised under the head of the Miao-tzu, traces of or some connections with whom have been found as far north as Kansu Province and as far south as Hainan Island and the Malay States These aborigines, at various times in history lumped together under the all inclusive categories of San miao, Nan man, Hsi fan Lo-tzu, or I jen, have even been credited by Chinese authority as progenitors of the Hun lo peoples of Korea Today, however, students are inclined to emphasize distinguishing features and to premise separate classification for groups previously considered one, for example, the distinction between the Lo lo and the Miao-tzu The Hua (Flowery) Miao are but one group of the latter, and it is about this group that the Reverend Will H Hudspeth writes

However, Mr Hudspeth, who has spent over a quarter century as a missionary in the China field but who was called from his post on the frontier in 1936, blends another theme with his discussion of the Flowery Miao He is intent also upon demonstrating the laudable work of the Methodist missionaries among them at Chaot ung and Shih Men k'u ("Stone Gateway") since 1904, and upon attracting young persons to the missionary field Intended to be popular in the first place, the book turns out to be somewhat sketchy, and the story of the Hua Miao itself suffers

But even such information as Mr Hudspeth does offer is at best rare and it is for this reason that his somewhat evangelically but also pleasantly written book deserves attention According to his estimate there were some 50,000 of the Flowery Miao in Northeast Yunnan and Northwest Kueichou alone in 1936, whose position, though difficult, showed definite signs of improvement Since his writing of this book the invasion of the Japanese military has brought to the battle front the uplands of Kuangsi, Hunan, Kueichou, Yunnan, Ssuch uan, and Hsik'ang Hence these peoples as well as others of the tribal groups in the Chinese Southwest are now suffering a sudden, harsh, and intense impact with twentieth century warfare, industrialization, and population pressures. Though few observers as yet have commented upon it, the reception of and reaction

these forces on the part of the Miao tzu and their tribal kinsmen is a ent political factor not only for the possible success of Chinese re ance to Japan, but also in the solution of extensive problems asso ted with the peripheral buffer zones of Inner Asia

To this the present book may serve as a hasty background In it the ersity in numbers and types of the Miao tzu, and their general loca 1 in Chinese history and geography are first suggested Some homely tures of the Hua Miao are then offered Their poverty colorful dress, ple promiscuity gluttony, affectionate nature, hospitality, even yellow n and straight black hair, all are rapidly described There are a few ple legends too one of Yang Yah, who by his excellence at archery ghtened the last of the six suns, and another of Nglieh gi ah, the spir k like bird, who still hops "from stone to stone or from rock to k ever looking for his wife" And behind it all is a picture of religious mism, of a people who are a social "shuttle cock," and who are in "Slough of Despond"

Then in 1904, continues Mr Hudspeth, Samuel Pollard and Frank mond of the Chaot ung Methodist Mission in Yunnan came in contact h the Hua Miao, and a remarkable regeneration began Through the istance of a powerful Chinese lord ten acres of land were made over the Church at Stone Gateway in Western Kueichou, and there a ritual and intellectual center was erected Mr Hudspeth entered the rk in 1910, and after the death of Pollard in 1915 succeeded to the lership of the establishment

n 1936 "Miao-land" had nearly 40 organized churches with 18,300 embers and enquirers" and more than 30 schools with 1,400 holars" Although periods of ebb and flow had been expected and l come in the progress of the Methodists in and about Stone Gateway, concrete results have been persistent encouragement for continuance the work But the relative paucity of the Occidental workers in such mising missionary labor has been cause for lamentation on the part Mr Hudspeth His closing pages challenge future religious leaders to isider Kueichou and Yunnan as a worthy field for spiritual uplift

The treatment of the Hua Miao, *inter alia*, is from personal observa 1 and corroborates in most part certain traditional conceptions of the ople A love of colorful display and ornamentation, a devotion to a life agriculture, hunting and fishing, these are the gloss for a gradual ial and moral disintegration which the Methodist Missions have tried check. Catalyzed by the work of the Missions, some of the finer quali of the people have risen to the surface, and in 1936 Mr Hudspeth

could write with pride of the growing number of native student and religious leaders among the Flowery Miao In this regard, therefore, he definitely contends with the traditional Chinese concept that the Miao-tzu is a trouble maker and a natural rebel This, according to the author, is not supported by the type of Miao existing today, rather he is essentially a peaceful, orderly individual who might well do constructive work in society

The allocation of a proper place in the social, economic, and political picture of the country for the Flowery Miao in particular and for the aborigine in general is one of the serious and immediate problems facing present day China As far back as the demise of the Manchu dynasty and even before, this need had been recognized and given a limited but by no means adequate attention Early in his ascent to power Generalissimo Chiang Kai shek expressed and demonstrated his interest in the tribal "problem" Since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 it has received increasing Chinese attention But the present warfare has precipitated a surge of the Chinese multitude into the territory of the aborigines, this has made immediately urgent a thorough and sound knowledge of these peoples and their elevation to a dignified and adequate position in the Chinese community.

Mr Hudspeth's book does not treat of this larger aspect to any considerable degree, and it would have been difficult for him to foresee the celerity with which wartime hostilities would bring the matter to a head But the popularly written 87 pages which he offers help to bring this matter to public attention This, together with the record of the commendable work which he and his colleagues have been doing in Kueichou and Yunnan for the past quarter century and more, is reason enough for publication of *Stone Gateway and the Flowery Miao* But the book does not pretend to be of an academic nature, and it is the scantiest of introductions to the Flowery Miao, not to speak of the aborigines as a whole

The tribal frontiers of China are gradually attracting the attention of scholars, but some one yet must come forward to develop further the preliminary work, on the Miao tzu particularly, that has been done by such as Edkins, Clarke, the late V K Ting and others China is in need of such a person today, and his work would be of both permanent and immediate value.

Martin R. Norins
Berkeley, May 1939

REPORT OF THE FIRST SCIENTIFIC EXPEDITION TO MANCHOUKUO UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF SHIGEYASU TOKUNAGA, JUNE-OCTOBER 1933. SECTION III. GEOGRAPHY OF JEHOL. *By Fumio Tada. In Japanese; Title in English; Abstract in German. Tokyo: Office of the Scientific Expedition to Manchoukuo, Waseda University, 1937. pp. 132. Unpriced.*

THE PRESENT volume records part of the work of an expedition that set out in 1933, when hopes were still high in Japan that Manchukuo would prove to be not only a promised land, but a land whose promises could be cashed. The first section deals with the geomorphology of Jehol, the second with Jehol as a Chinese-Mongolian border region. Jehol includes terrain that belongs to the great Gobi depression, the mountain massif that overlooks the Peiping plain, and the plain of South Manchuria. There are three main rivers, one flowing from the edge of the Gobi past the west and south of Jehol, one through the mountains of southeastern Jehol, and one across the steppes of the north into the Manchurian plain.

In southwest Jehol the population is Chinese, the old forests have been cut off, and the present cycle of land utilization calls for one year of fallow out of three. In the southeast the population is also Chinese, the forests have also been destroyed, but the agriculture follows a three-year cycle of barley, soya beans and maize. In the southwest, settlement is by villages; in the southeast, it is more scattered. In the north, settlement types are mixed. It is here also, beyond the settlements, that the last survival of the old Mongol way of life can be seen. The Mongols of the southeast have taken almost completely to Chinese ways.

There are also mixtures of the pastoral and the agricultural economy, and Professor Tada's detailed observations of some of the social phenomena produced by differing degrees of compromise are of great value and interest. Mixed societies in this part of the world are of an importance it would be hard to overestimate; they have ceaselessly contributed to the political ebb and flow between China and the world beyond the Great Wall. I have never seen so complete a series of illustrations of dwelling types as Professor Tada has here published. These offer a unique approach to problems of history and society, for the dwellings of mankind eloquently reveal both the forces of conservation and those of change in society.

Here are illustrated: the round Mongol tent, walled and roofed with reeds (not woven but bound parallel, as one makes a bamboo blind),

instead of felt, the Mongol light tent on three poles, with two long sides and "panelled" ends,[1] the round mud building built like the round felt tent (sometimes growing out of the plastering of mud on to a decaying felt tent. This, and the mud pseudo-tent made resting a ridge pole on props, two at each end, leaning reeds or kaoliang stalks against the ridge, and plastering them with mud, represent two different kinds of intermediate dwelling, the round one belongs to the Mongol who is becoming settled, the angular one to the Chinese colonist who cannot yet afford to build a true house.

The next stage in transition from Mongol to Chinese life is to set two round tents in line, with a wicker "cage" between them. As felt and mobility are transformed into mud and permanence, the two tents and the "cage" between them are first walled and roofed together and then holes are cut between them, thus creating a crude Chinese *san chien fangtze*, or three-room dwelling. A number of variations of this are shown, not only with photography but with sketches to show design and floor plan.

It is not the fault of Japanese scientists that Japan is not able to develop the resources of Manchukuo in a scientific way. The uneconomic rapacity of war economy forces Japan to plunder from Manchukuo everything that can be plundered, so that only a part of the country's economy can be worked, and that only lamely, in the ways that really create wealth and sustain society. Nevertheless, a great deal of reconnaissance has been done by Japanese scientists. More is now known about the resources of Manchukuo, even though they cannot be rationally developed, but there is a hiatus between what the Japanese scientist can discover and what the Japanese state, half crippled by war, can undertake.

O. L.

New York, June 1939

INSIDE RED CHINA. *By Nym Wales. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company.* 1939. *pp.* xi + 356. $3.00.

It is curious how much of their good reputation abroad the Chinese Communists owe to one man—Edgar Snow, an American correspondent who is not a Communist. Nym Wales, as the wife of Edgar

[1] Compare "The Geographical Factor in Mongol History," *Geographical Journal*, London, 1938.

now, will inevitably have her work compared with that of her famous usband. As a matter of fact this is not the best way in which to ap raise *Inside Red China* Nym Wales differs from Edgar Snow in tem rament, and she saw the Communist territory in Shensi under very ifferent conditions Edgar Snow broke a nine year blockade in getting ito Red territory; he came out not long before the Sian incident that d to the forming of the United Front Nym Wales was in part of the me territory that her husband visited, but about a year later What she w was the second wave of the tide, the beginning of the Japanese in ision, the testing of the Communists by the war they had so long said iat all China would have to fight

She is not impartial She thoroughly approves of the Chinese Com iunists She is one of those foreigners who, living in China and liking ie Chinese, has been acutely hurt by the corruption and callousness of hinese politics and the indifference of politicians to suffering and in istice She feels that the Communists are determined to save not only hina but the Chinese, that they know how to do it, and that it is their itelligence and their patriotism that accounts for the way they have bandoned political advantage and subordinated themselves to the United ront So she writes with gay excitement and eager partisanship

There is this that is important about what she has written along iost of their front the Chinese have drawn back They have not been inihilated and they are in fact fighting better than ever before, but they ave lost a lot of territory The only part of the front that has not given av at all is that held by the Eighth Route Army In fact, the Eighth oute has even gained ground This is not because the Japanese have ot attacked them heavily The Japanese know perfectly well that Shansi both the key to North China and the strategic approach for a conquest the Chinese hinterland They have thrown in division after division attack after attack, but they have not made headway

Nor is the success of the Eighth Route to be explained by claiming at Communists are superhuman and superheroic You have to know our job to be able to hang on to a terrain like Shansi, with wretchedly ferior equipment The Shansi front is where Japan will win or lose ie war—and so far it has been losing Yet because of its poor com unications the Shansi front is the most inadequately reported of all the ittle lines For this reason, the news behind the news is of exceptional nportance, as a guide to what is going on If you know what the Com iunists were like before the United Front—why they joined it, whether ining it has changed them, how they are behaving, the kind of people

they are dealing with and the way they are dealing with them—it helps a lot in understanding the present situation and the future prospects of all China. The continuity that Nym Wales supplies between *Red Star Over China* and the shooting at the Marco Polo Bridge is a chapter in the chronicle of China's struggle to survive that should not be skipped.

O. L.

New York, June 1939

CLIPPERS AND CONSULS, AMERICAN CONSULAR AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH EASTERN ASIA, 1845-1860. *By Eldon Griffin. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc.* 1938. *pp.* xxii + 533. *Illustrated.* $10.00.

DR. GRIFFIN has published a study which is difficult to describe. For it is an intensive study of a period in American Far Eastern relations and at the same time one that is extensive in range of subjects. It has to do with American commerce across the Pacific and the consular service then developing to cope with the miscellaneous problems that arose, yet the study is also a most valuable source on the legislative and executive branches of the American government as these either aided or hindered the growth of enterprise abroad. It is at the same time an extensive description—in prose, lists, charts, facsimiles, reproductions—and an interpretation in which the author does not hesitate to draw firm conclusions. In discussing Congress and Americans in the Orient, for instance, Dr. Griffin concludes that that body was characterized by "optimistic haste, clumsy mistakes and omissions in bills passed . . . and almost consistent penuriousness and suspicion of foreign commitments of important substance."

The Preface describes the study's purpose in these words: "to provide for general readers and specialists a manageable, critical treatment of (1) relevant features and tendencies of the years 1845-1860, especially in the more limited consular and commercial scene in the Orient, (2) the basis and evolution of the American consular system in that region, (3) the general and commercial functions of consular officers there, (4) the diverse problems to which the discharge of these duties gave rise, and (5) the growth of American consular and commercial interests in selected posts of Eastern Asia." The purposes have been realized in such a way that the general reader will find scores of interesting accounts of the dramatic episodes of this formative period, and the spe-

cialist will find all through the large volume an amazing quantity of reference material.

The book's 21 chapters are grouped under four large divisions the first, a description of the period, 1845 1860, the second, an analysis of consular powers and functions, the third, detailed consideration of various types of consular problems, and the fourth, consular and commercial history in the principal treaty ports of China, in Macao and Hongkong, in Japan and, finally, in Eastern Siberia The last 150 odd pages are devoted to appendices and bibliography in which some of Dr Griffin's most interesting material is displayed There are lists of consular officers, of Americans in or concerned with the Orient, of vessels and their owners and cargoes, excerpts from original reports, logs, minutes Perhaps the most extraordinary part of the whole book, however, is the bibliography which under eleven classifications of source material provides an extensive guide to the types of documents available for studying that period of American foreign enterprise Naming the classifications Dr Griffin uses will in itself suggest the comprehensiveness of the work he has completed bibliographies and guides, official sources (consular, diplomatic, naval, congressional, judicial, etc) log books and sea journals, company papers and account books, personal records, biographies, family histories, general writings reference works, publications of learned societies and commercial bodies magazines and newspapers, and, finally, illustrative material, such as models, exhibits and pictures

Dr. Griffin has made available to others the painstaking research and collection of many years of work He has published a whole library of information in this one volume, a library with which the reader can become familiar only as he explores it Would that the author or some other scholar would assemble a similar record for a modern period say 1915 1930, so that by comparing the two we could see in more detail than we do now how American Far Eastern enterprise and the foreign service corps have developed

A review of *Clippers and Consuls* should include mention of the volume's physical appearance, lithoprinting from typewritten sheets has made possible a wide variety of page format with commendable readability at a cost to the consumer which must be considerably below that of orthodox printing.

Frederick V Field

IMPERIAL JAPAN 1926-1938. *By A. Morgan Young. New York William Morrow & Company* 1938 pp 328 $3.50.

MR. YOUNG, as editor of the *Japan Chronicle* and as a resident in Japan for ten of the years covered in this book, has had the unusual opportunity of living through many of the events described in his work Beginning as it does with the reign of the present Emperor, it is a sequel, in a chronological sense, to his *Japan in Recent Times, 1912 1926*, and relates events and movements in a vivid and pleasant style Emphasis is quite naturally placed upon those policies, events, and individuals responsible for the formation of Japan's present imperialistic policies These include the aggressive policy of Baron Tanaka toward China after 1927, the suppression of proletarianism by practically all groups, the short period of ascendency of liberal elements in 1930, the encroachments of the Japanese in Manchuria and North China with the consequent rise in power of the military and the decline of democracy at home

In the first half of the work steps leading to the taking of Manchuria the establishment of Manchukuo, and the question of its recognition by other Powers are amply treated The latter half shows how these developments made inevitable increased military expenditures, the suppression of "dangerous thoughts," and the consequent deterioration of all thought, political unrest at home typified by numerous political murders, and the assumption by Japan of the rôle of "keeping the peace of the Far East" and possessing suzerain rights over China

For a detailed account of events since the outbreak of hostilities in July 1937 and for the various economic factors at work in Japan during this period, the book is of limited value For instance, the present war itself is only briefly treated (pp 295 300) and except for a description of the boom in manufacture concomitant with increased expenditures, occasional references to an increased budget or an unfavorable trade balance, the economic aspects are largely omitted Such omissions are largely compensated for by such things as a colorful description of the trials for those implicated in the assassinations of 1932 and the attempted *coup d'état* of February 26, 1936 The author was in a position to glean information concerning these events which is seldom recorded However to say that the coup of February 26 failed because "a handful of junior officers, who had been ready enough for massacre, shrank from invading the sacred Palace without an older man to lead them" (p. 278) is to over-simplify the matter Although the use of general statements, some of them quite cynical, is extremely effective, such remarks as "The Em-

peror has less initiative than the meanest of his subjects" (p 109) are open to challenge.

In conclusion, however, it must be said that Mr Young has presented in a most readable fashion many of the significant events and movements within Japan since inflation and expansion on the Asiatic mainland have been substituted for sound finances and a conciliatory policy To understand events, therefore, as they are now developing, careful reading of this volume will be of the greatest help

Hugh Borton
Columbia University, June 1939

RECENTLY ISSUED

(Continued from page 244)

La Politique Musulmane et Coloniale des Pays Bas. By Professor G. H. Bousquet, University of Algiers. Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, Paris, pp. 167. 25 fr. The Secretariat has made arrangements for a revised English translation entitled *Dutch Colonial Policy through French Eyes* to be issued shortly.

Politique Extérieure des États Unis. Des Lois de Neutralité à la Conférence de Lima. By Alfred Max. *With a Preface by* André Siegfried. Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, Paris, 1939. pp. 180. 15 fr.

La Politique Française et l'Extrême Orient, 1936-1938. By Roger Lévy. Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, Paris. 1939. English translation to be issued later by the Secretariat.

L'Évolution Économique de l'Indochine Française. By Charles Robequain. Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, Paris. 193[illegible]. pp. [illegible].

Pacific House Bibliographies. Published by the Department of the Pacific Area, Golden Gate International Exposition, San Francisco, 1939, with the cooperation of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.

No. 1. *Our Debt to the Pacific.* pp. [illegible]. 5 cents.
No. 2. *Exploring the Pacific.* pp. [illegible]. [illegible] cents.
No. 3. *America and the Pacific.* pp. 125. 15 cents.

Films of the Pacific Area. Compiled and edited by the Staff of the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. 1939. pp. [illegible]. American Film Center, Inc. and the National Committee of the United States of America on International Intellectual Cooperation. 25¢. Also special Golden Gate International Exposition Edition, constituting Pacific House Bibliographies No. 4. Evaluations of a large number of these films will shortly be available on request from the American Council.

Chinese and Japanese in Hawaii during the Sino-Japanese Conflict. By Edwin G. Burrows. Published by the Hawaii Group, American Council, I.P.R., Honolulu and New York. 1939. pp. 79. [illegible] cents.

Saikin no Beikoku Kyokuto Seisaku (American Far Eastern Policy Today). By Miriam S. Farley. Translated into Japanese and published by the Japanese Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. Tokyo. 1939.

British Policy in the Far East. By G. E. Hubbard. Information Department Paper issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. 1939. 1s.

China and Japan. Information Department Papers No. 21. *Second Edition, revised and enlarged.* 1939. pp. 151. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2s. 6d. Oxford University Press, New York. 75¢.

The Origin and Development of the Knot of Contradictions in the Pacific Area. By V. Motylev (in Russian). State Social-Economic Publishing House, Moscow, 1939. pp. 144. 1.65 roubles.

FORTHCOMING STUDIES

North Pacific Fisheries. With Special Reference to Alaska Salmon. By Homer E. Gregory and Kathleen Barnes. American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. About pp. 300. September.

Emigrant Communities in South China. By Ta Chen. *Edited by* Bruno Lasker. A study of overseas migration and its influence on standards of living and social change in Kwangtung and Fukien. To be published under the auspices of the China Institute of Pacific Relations, September. Kelly & Walsh, Shanghai. English and American editions to be arranged later. pp. xvi + 290.

The South Sea Islands Under Japanese Mandate. By T. Yanaihara. English version of a report already published in Japanese under the auspices of the Japanese Council. About pp. 250. To be published under the auspices of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, September. Kelly & Walsh, Shanghai. English and American publishers to be arranged later.

Fijian Frontier. By Laura Thompson. An investigation of cultural conflict and adjustment in the Lau Islands of Fiji. American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations. October. About pp. 200.

The International Settlement at Shanghai. To be published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by the Oxford University Press, London. September. About pp. 300. 3s. 6d. American edition to appear under the auspices of the American Council.

Industrial Capital and Chinese Peasants. A Study of the Livelihood of Tobacco Cultivators. By Chen Han-seng, *assisted by* Wong Yin-seng, Chang Hsi-chang and Huang Kuo-kao. About pp. 200. To be published under the auspices of the China Institute of Pacific Relations and the Sun Yat-sen Institute for the Advancement of Culture and Education. October. Kelly & Walsh, Shanghai.

Labor Problems in the Pacific Mandates. By John A. Decker. To be published under the auspices of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. About pp. 250. October. Kelly & Walsh, Shanghai.

Maps of the Pacific. An Annotated Bibliography of Maps of the Pacific Area. By Clifford H. MacFadden, Department of Geography, University of Michigan. To be published under the auspices of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. About pp. 200. November. Kelly & Walsh, Shanghai.

Canada and the Foreign News. By Carlton McNaught. A comprehensive analysis of the methods of collection and dissemination of foreign news in the Canadian Press, with considerable emphasis on the Far Eastern News. About pp. 400. To be published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs by the Oxford University Press, Toronto. October.

International Position of Outer Mongolia. A Contribution to Russia's and Japan's Policies in the Far East. By Gerard M. Friters, *with an Introduction by* Owen Lattimore. To be published under the auspices of the Secretariat. Kelly & Walsh, Shanghai. About pp. 300.

L'Utilization du Sol en Indochine Française. By Professor Pierre Gourou, University of Brussels. To be published by the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, Paris. October.

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Books reviewed may be purchased through this office, and will be mailed, post free, at the publishers' list price. Orders should be sent to PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 129 East 52nd Street, New York City.

THE FAR EAST AND THE NEW ORDER IN EUROPE

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

RECENT European changes have accelerated and redirected the underlying forces in the Far East, making it important to understand the interplay of Orient and Occident in the period leading to the crisis of August-September 1939. Perhaps the key question is, Why did Germany consent to the crippling of the Berlin-Tokyo alignment? The answer is to be found in the increasing complexity of the post-Munich world situation, the growing inadequacy of Japan as an instrument for the furtherance of German policy, and the conflict inherent in Germany's Far Eastern position.

Beginning with the 1930s Germany developed close economic relations with China, involving railway loans of Ch. $86 million in 1934-1937, an important barter agreement in 1936 for Chinese raw materials and German manufactures (including munitions), and a general increase in German-Chinese trade as a whole. Cultural relations were close, and a Reichswehr military mission (organized in 1927-1929) was giving instructions to the Chinese army. At the same time, after the National Socialist victory in 1933, German diplomacy required ever greater cooperation with Japan, the expanding power in Asia. This led to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936, a pledge for mutual cooperation against Communism, which was soon revealed as touching the interests of many countries besides Soviet Russia.

With the outbreak of war between China and Japan in the summer of 1937, Germany found it increasingly necessary to decide whether Japan's support in world affairs was more valuable than the Chinese market. The answer was delayed as long as possible. In November 1937 a credit of £2 million was extended to Manchukuo; yet from late October 1937 through January 1938 Germany attempted to mediate a peace. In February 1938, after mediation had failed, Hitler announced that Germany would recognize Man-

chukuo, but this was not actually done until May. In April the significant step was taken of appointing a high Reichswehr officer as Ambassador to Japan, but it was not until the end of May that the German military mission in China was recalled. In June the German Ambassador in China returned home, but German arms trickled into China a while longer. Reluctantly Germany was making its decision—a decision hastened by the approaching Czechoslovakian crisis.

When the showdown did come in Europe, Japan openly pledged its full support to Germany, while the German victory in turn strengthened the pro-Axis forces in Japan and led to further building of the whole anti-Comintern front. In the months that followed Munich, Poland and Hungary recognized Manchukuo; Hungary, Manchukuo and Fascist Spain joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, Japan signed agreements for cultural cooperation with Italy and Germany, Germany and Manchukuo exchanged envoys, and a German-Manchukuo most-favored-nation accord was concluded (broadening an agreement for goods and currency exchange of September 14, 1938). These developments, however, simply masked a situation unsatisfactory to Germany.

Traders' complaints of Japanese restrictions in China mounted steadily. In its 1938 report, the German Chamber of Commerce at Tientsin spoke of "signs that in North China things are developing just as in Manchuria," while early in 1939 the German Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai charged that Japan was throttling Shanghai by cutting it off from the hinterland and that "the efforts of the Japanese are designed not to allow this freedom of movement again or to permit it only after they have themselves secured monopolies and key positions." It is not surprising, therefore, that at a banquet given the Japanese Ambassador to Germany in mid-February 1939, the Chairman of the *Ostasiatische Verein* (leading organization of Far Eastern traders) suggested the need for a German-Japanese "economic pact" rather than a "commercial accord"—an "economic pact" involving certain German concessions in exchange for "the greater use of German labor for the opening up and development of the broad regions whose opening up and development is the object of the Japanese Government." The Japan-

ese Ambassador understood this delicate reference to China and, in replying, expressed regret that Japan had become involved in China through the necessity of destroying Communism, promised that despite inconveniences "better times" would come, and then admitted in so many words: "Germany . . . in order not to create difficulties for its Japanese ally has voluntarily foregone the opportunity for certain gains that it could easily have secured for itself. Let me say that we highly appreciate this good will and are filled with heartfelt gratitude."

The grumblings of the China traders would have had little effect, had not Germany gradually realized that in the new European situation it would need more help from Japan than was involved in buttressing the anti-Communist façade or carrying through mosquito operations on the Anglo-French Far Eastern flank. Germany needed the possibility of real armed aid, for the contingency of a two-front war with Great Britain, France and Soviet Russia. If Japan could not fight or neutralize the Soviets, then German policy toward the U.S.S.R. might have to change. Such a change would meet with the approval of the German army, which had a low opinion of Japan's military prowess and had long advocated improved Soviet relations.

The fact was that Japan could not render the desired aid. By 1939 the war in China was more and more approaching a stalemate, with the prospect that, while Japan grew progressively weaker, China would build up its political, economic and military strength for a future counter-attack. The early stages of Japanese exhaustion could already be observed. Production was levelling off in producers' goods and declining in consumers' goods and agriculture; despite the high dividends of the monopolies and heavy industry, the export and medium-sized home market industries had suffered considerably, prices had risen, cutting the standard of living; the country appeared not far from its maximum financing capacity; and gold stocks were dangerously low. In this situation, which was marked also by Japan's failure to secure any significant economic returns from the invaded areas of China, Germany urged an end to the Far Eastern war. In December 1938 Karl Haushofer, one of the most influential supporters of the German-Japanese align-

ment, advised that "a compromise will be unavoidable, but it becomes more difficult from day to day, the more the battle is waged against the only forces in China that can guarantee a peaceful issue." In August 1939, a writer in Haushofer's *Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik* declared that "as long as the 'Problem—China' has not been solved, Japan will desire and be able to devote only subsidiary energies to other regions."

It would be a mistake to think that, at an early date after Munich, Germany decided to throw Japan aside. On the contrary, Germany attempted to draw Japan ever closer. (On July 28, 1939, the two countries provisionally signed a trade agreement.) What was happening in the first seven and a half months of 1939 was that each of the three leading European powers was working actively to develop an alternative strategy in foreign affairs for use in the event that its main strategy should appear inadequate to meet the coming crisis. Putting the situation in a very simplified form, the main strategies were appeasement (Great Britain), the Axis (Germany), the Peace Front (U.S.S.R.) and the alternative strategies, war, Soviet neutralization, German guarantees against attacking the Soviets. The objectives of policy remained the same: preservation of the British Empire, protection of the U.S.S.R. territorially and advancement of its revolutionary aims.

In this situation, both for internal and international reasons, Japan began to work post-haste for a Far Eastern Munich, hoping to solve an impossible military situation through diplomacy. If Britain could be induced to withdraw support from the Chinese currency or, best of all, if the Burmese and Indo-Chinese supply routes should be closed, then breaks might appear in China's National United Front, and the time would be opportune for a new puppet government under Wang Ching-wei. Following this strategy, Japan occupied Hainan in February and the Spratly Islands in March, demanded increased powers in the Shanghai International Settlement, tried to seize the settlement at Amoy in May, and in June began the blockade of the British and French concessions at Tientsin. Meanwhile, unable to wait for the results, Germany moved along lines intended to advance its aims in Europe and accelerate the Far Eastern situation itself.

The Far East and the New Order in Europe

In May 1939 Germany concluded a new barter agreement with China and an arms delivery accord, thus putting pressure on Japan to end the war and to draw closer to Germany (signature of a military alliance) and at the same time indicating to the U.S.S.R. that Germany was really willing to make concessions to Soviet policy. It is significant that the resignation of Foreign Commissar Litvinov on May 3 also suggested changes in Soviet strategy. On May 11 fighting began on the Outer Mongolian frontier. Japan probably hoped thereby to demonstrate its strength to Germany, to help Germany and itself by putting pressure on Chamberlain against the conclusion of a peace front with the U.S.S.R., to exert pressure upon the U.S.S.R. and to impress Chinese puppets and wavering elements within the Chinese Government. The Japanese landing at Kulangsu (Amoy) on May 12 probably had the same general objectives: impressing Britain, Germany and China.

Within Japan itself a struggle over Axis relations had long been going on, and the various cultural (and even trade) agreements were partly attempts to mask this situation through formal statements of cooperation, partly attempts of the military-fascist group to advance their Axis policy under the cover of compromise with the governmental opposition. Yet Japan never took the final step of concluding an open alliance, for it was all too apparent that economic dependence upon the non-Axis powers (particularly the United States and Great Britain) made this inadvisable. As long as Japan threatened to join the Axis completely, it had a certain bargaining point in discussions with the Western powers; the loss of this bargaining point might be a very serious matter.

In its drive against British interests, with the encouragement of Germany and Italy, Japan did secure certain gains, notably the Arita-Craigie accord of July 24, 1939, under which Britain virtually granted Japan belligerent rights in the occupied areas of China. The Tientsin drive also had the effect of combining to a certain extent the two main conflicting forces in Japanese policy: the tendency toward the Axis and the tendency toward ending the China war through pressure upon England, to be followed by an agreement.

Yet Japan's international position was really becoming less favorable, because of the United States and the U.S.S.R. In May, while Britain hesitated, American marines landed at Amoy. In June the United States declared its interest in the "broader aspects" of the Tientsin dispute. On July 26 Japan was given the required six months notice for the abrogation of the Japanese-American treaty of commerce and navigation of 1911. This opened the possibility of American economic measures against Japan at the end of the year. Furthermore, Britain followed the American lead, and on August 19 the parleys with Japan were suspended.

Japan's relations with Soviet Russia were even worse. In August 1938 the Japanese met a serious military defeat at Changkufeng; early in 1939 Japan was forced to agree to curtailment of its fishing rights in Soviet Far Eastern waters. Trade relations were at low tide. In 1937 and 1938 the U.S.S.R. exported no war materials to Japan, while general trade was as follows. Soviet exports to Japan (rubles): (1936) [illegible], (1937) 11,743,[illegible], (1938, seven months) 354,[illegible]. Soviet imports from Japan: [illegible], 54,375,000, and 11,851,[illegible] respectively. In the Outer Mongolian border fighting, which was far more serious than that at Changkufeng, the U.S.S.R. in general had the better of it. Furthermore, in the summer of 1939 Japan suffered a diplomatic defeat in connection with its concessions on Sakhalin Island. All in all, it was clear that Japan was not capable of beating the Russians either in the diplomatic or military field. In this connection, it is interesting to consider that, although the U.S.S.R. had for some time adopted a firm attitude toward Japan, it was able to act with even greater confidence, once it knew how weak the Berlin-Tokyo Axis really was.

The Soviet attitude was, in turn, not lost on the German Government, nor did the German Government fail to notice that Soviet relations with China were growing closer. On May 31, 1939, in an address to the Supreme Soviet, Foreign Commissar Molotov combined a prediction of the possibility of better relations with Germany with a sharp attack on Japanese policy and a promise of continued support for China. On June 16, a Soviet-Chinese trade treaty was concluded in Moscow, and this was followed by a Soviet credit to China of, it was rumored, 750 million gold rubles (be-

tween U.S. $75 million and $150 million, depending upon the value assigned the ruble). On August 23, the *New York Times* correspondent reported from Chungking that "Russian help for China on a new and more extensive scale has already become increasingly evident in the last few weeks." He declared that Soviet planes, pilots and mechanics had already reached that city and other air bases and that it was "understood" the Chinese air force would soon have 200 or more newly sent Soviet planes as part of the credit arrangement. Soviet technical military experts were also expected to come. It is significant that the U.S.S.R. took these steps at the very time that the trade and non-aggression pacts with Germany were being prepared.

These agreements, announced on August 20 and 21, constituted a defeat of the first magnitude for Japan. The use of anti-Communism as a cloak for expansion suffered a serious setback; the plan of a simultaneous two-front war with the U.S.S.R. lay in ruins. The Japanese Government was apparently unprepared for the suddenness of the changes; at least, it does not seem to have prepared for them diplomatically. It was, of course, aware of German dissatisfaction with the working of the Tokyo alignment, but probably did not realize how flexible Nazi and Soviet tactics could be. One may also surmise that the Japanese army officer who was Ambassador to Germany was cautious in reporting developments that might hinder the creation of a full alliance.

After watching the situation for a few days, the Hiranuma cabinet resigned and was replaced by a government of minor figures. The new Premier, General Abe, himself held the Foreign Ministry, thus indicating the general indecision over policy. On August 29, in a last press statement, Hiranuma said "the Government has abandoned the policy it had been preparing and a new policy based on new days must be established." The following day, Abe promised disposal of the China incident, an independent foreign policy, and cooperation with friendly nations.

Japan's policy toward Germany cooled. The Japanese Ambassador protested mildly in Berlin against the Soviet alignment. Yet his Government acted very cautiously, desiring for internal and international reasons to retain every possible shred of cooperation with

Germany. On August 31, according to a newspaper report, Premier Abe "said it was possible that Germany might continue hostile to communism and that Japan should not decide immediately to give up friendly intercourse with Germany." Similarly, and perhaps with greater sincerity, Japan stayed close to Italy. The fact is that all cards were being played very carefully, since it was at first not clear whether war would break out in Europe and, when it did, no one could say whether England and France meant to prosecute it seriously. It is interesting to note that a Japanese military mission under General Terauchi, sent to attend the Nuremberg Nazi Party Congress, stopped in Italy and then, instead of returning home as was expected, went on to Germany. Since then the mission has visited the German forces on both the eastern and western fronts; on the former, it was received by Chancellor Hitler.

One important result of the new situation was the strengthening of the Soviet position precisely at the moment when Soviet-Japanese relations were at their worst. Beginning with August 20 large Soviet reinforcements were sent to the Outer Mongolian front. Great anxiety developed in Manchukuo official circles, and bodies of troops were sent in from North China and Korea. A Tass agency communique of September 1 declared that on the night of August 28-29 the Japanese-Manchukuoan troops had been expelled from Outer Mongolia. Early in September Japanese sources became silent about the border fighting, while on September 12 General Yoshijiro Umezu became the new commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. In his first press conference he suggested the desirability of settling border disputes with the U.S.S.R. and establishing a boundary commission. On the same day, on orders of the Kwantung Army, all newspaper correspondents (including Japanese) were told to leave Hailar (northwestern Manchukuo) within 24 hours. Finally, on September 15 a Soviet-Japanese armistice was announced: the opposing forces were to hold their existing positions, and a border commission of two representatives from each side was to be established. It was clear, as the *New York Times* reported from Tokyo, that "the Soviets get a boundary agreement on terms they have been asking for the past several years."

Japan backed down because it had been defeated in diplomacy

and war. Besides, it could not overlook the fact that on August 25 eleven Soviet warships, four mine layers, three freighters, three tugs and one dredge reached Vladivostok. On September 1, in presenting his credentials, the new Soviet Ambassador to China offered his Government's "hearty wishes for the complete victory of the Chinese nation in its struggle for national independence." He said also that the U.S.S.R. was convinced that China would be successful, referred to the close political, cultural and economic relations of the two countries, and predicted that the recent commercial treaty would bring closer cooperation.

ON THE other hand, the Soviet-Japanese truce was followed by certain formal improvements in diplomatic relations: the appointment of a Soviet Ambassador to Japan (there had been none since June 1938), the release (according to Domei) of eight Japanese fishing boats held at Vladivostok, and (according to a Tokyo report) the naming of Soviet consuls for Tsuruga (Japan), Seoul (Korea) and Dairen (Manchuria). The truce also led to rumors of a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, to be followed by withdrawal of Soviet aid from China. It is quite likely that the U.S.S.R. would be willing to sign a non-aggression pact, since it has offered one to Japan on a number of occasions since 1931. Such a pact in itself, however, might have serious effects upon Japan in that it would destroy what remains of the anti-Communist propaganda, undermine the ideological basis of the campaign in China, and perhaps cause serious political difficulties at home (reduced prestige of the army, disillusionment with Government policies). A pact would, however, allow the withdrawal from Manchuria of forces taken from North China and Korea, although it is probable that in any case the Manchurian garrison would be kept at its regular strength of several hundred thousand men. Even the reduction of forces would not mean much, if Soviet aid to China continued. In this connection, it is interesting to note a report from Chungking on September 27 that a group of Soviet volunteers (presumably military experts) had arrived there recently via Sinkiang and had been sent to various war zones.

Much discussion has taken place concerning the question of German influence over Soviet-Japanese relations. In this connection, Premier Abe himself declared on September 9 that "Herr von Ribbentrop says that Germany, Japan and the Soviets should go hand in hand." The German motive is obvious: German-Japanese friendship would be preserved, Japan's early extrication from the China war would again make it available as an ally, and Anglo-Japanese rapprochement might be prevented, thus keeping Britain occupied in the Far East. These might be the results for Germany of a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact. German pressure is not, however, required to explain the border truce, when we consider that the August 1939 issue of the *Oriental Economist* of Tokyo declared that the conflict with the U.S.S.R. was a very serious matter and urged "the arrangement of a truce," "the delimitation of the border," and "the creation of a fairly extensive demilitarized zone to eliminate all disputes." In September 1939 the circles holding this point of view were more powerful than in August.

The chief object of Japan's foreign policy today, more than ever, is to end the war in China. This is imperative, if Japan is to avert grave future difficulties in China and at home and be able to draw economic gains from the European war. The forcing of peace in the existing state of Chinese unity would, however, at least require reaching an agreement with the United States and Great Britain, and this in turn would depend upon Japan's willingness to make "concessions." Japan's recent defeats make "reasonableness" on its part more likely, thus increasing the possibility of a Far Eastern Munich. This is true of Britain in particular, since it fears Chinese independence (there would probably be serious repercussions in India) and the increasing power of the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the Orient. To a lesser extent there are circles in the United States that wish to see Japan limited rather than defeated and would be willing to urge a peace settlement on the basis of "financial cooperation of the Western powers in the development of the vast natural resources of China." (*Journal of Commerce*, September 1.)

From Japan's point of view, America is the key to the new situation, since American supplies are now more necessary than ever for waging the war and Britain could hardly attempt a settlement with-

out American approval or acquiescence Therefore, in late August the Japanese Ambassador in Washington began to explore the possibility of arranging for a new trade treaty and creating a rapprochement In this connection, it is of the utmost significance that on September 23 Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, who was once naval attaché in Washington, became Japanese Foreign Minister As far as Britain and France are concerned, Japan has also modified its policy, by withdrawing troops from the Hongkong border, agreeing to a compromise settlement of the Amoy dispute, and assuring Britain that the arming of German merchantmen in Japanese ports would not be permitted On the other hand, suggestions of rapprochement have been accompanied by threats, partly because of the undecided state of Japanese policy, partly because of the conflicting views of policy held by different groups, but perhaps chiefly because threats are viewed as a means of hastening concessions Following this line, Japan sought to have Britain and France withdraw their troops from China, resumed the anti British and anti French demonstration in Peiping, and attacked military measures taken by the United States in the Pacific Just what the British and American reaction will be is not yet clear It appears, for example, that an unpublished American protest considerably toned down the Japanese demands at Shanghai about September 14, and it is known that shortly thereafter 15 long range bombing planes and an aircraft carrier joined American naval vessels assigned to a "neutrality patrol" in Philippine waters On the other hand, the American, British and Italian defense commanders at Shanghai have agreed to study Japanese proposals for a revision of the International Settlement defense plan, while the return of British Ambassador Craigie to Tokyo on September 27 produced rumors of renewed Anglo Japanese discussions.[1]

In connection with the war in China itself, Japan on September 12 made important changes in the military leadership and for the first time established a unified command A Japanese offensive has also begun southwest of Nanchang in the direction of Changsha, which

[1] Since this was written a UP dispatch of October 9 from London (i.e. passed by the censors) has reported French advice to China to conclude peace on the best available terms London Chinese are also reported as admitting that British support of the Chinese currency has practically stopped

connects the Chinese capital at Chungking with the central and southern fronts.[2] In addition, plans have gone forward for the establishment of Wang Ching-wei's puppet government. One report suggests that Japan will give Wang nominal control over his territory, sign peace with him, declare the war at an end except for operations against "bandits," and then seek recognition from the Western powers. This would give the war the formal aspect of a civil conflict rather than an invasion and, if skillfully combined with agreements with the United States and Britain, might undermine the Chinese Central Government. On the other hand, one need not doubt that if Japan could secure a peace satisfactory to itself by abandoning Wang and dealing with Chiang Kai-shek it would do so.

Most of the actions of the Chinese Government, however, indicate continued determination to resist. It appears that the results of Soviet foreign policy have not been considered unfavorable to the Chinese cause. For example, a Chungking dispatch of September 14 to the *New York Times* reported that the leading newspaper, the *Ta Kung Pao*, in an editorial "representative of the prevailing opinion in Government circles" had declared that Russia would not allow Japan to conquer China and that Poland deserved its fate. In mid-September the Supreme National Defense Council met in the capital, to formulate war plans and prepare for a possible Japanese offensive. On September 21, General Li Tsung-jen, who attended, said: "We will not conclude peace with Japan, no matter what happens—not even if all foreign help to China is cut off."

At about the same time, the People's Political Council (an official advisory body) met in Chungking and recommended: further development of mass mobilization, protection of freedom of speech, press and assembly, political and economic development of Szechuan and Sinkiang as bases of resistance, convocation of a National Assembly for the establishment of a constitutional government, and the maintenance of good relations with the United States, Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. It was reported that at the last session of this Council Chiang Kai-shek declared: "China will continue the armed struggle against Japanese aggression until final

[2] Early in October this offensive resulted in a severe Japanese defeat, indicating most sharply Japan's military weakness in China.

victory . . . The aim of the war of liberation is the restoration of the territorial and administrative integrity of China . . . We shall fight against Japan's plans to conquer China and also against the aggressor's utilization of the international situation and his plans to put pressure on foreign powers." Similarly, in an interview on September 1, the Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, called for an end to internal discord, improvement of relations with the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and continuance of "the emancipation war under the slogan, 'For the support of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, for support of the National Government.'"

In contrast to this, it is well known that there are elements in China that secretly desire capitulation or that, because of the fear of mass mobilization and of accepting increased Soviet support (since British and French supplies will probably not be available) would like to see the end of resistance on some compromise basis. It is very difficult to tell at this moment just how recent statements of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Chung-hui, fit into the picture. On September 27, though declaring that China would fight to "final victory," he invited American mediation on the basis of the Nine Power Treaty, suggested that in view of its isolation and difficult economic position Japan stop the war and thus secure the opportunity of profiting from the European conflict, and said China would favor economic cooperation with Japan if given equal treatment by the latter. The reaction of the American State Department was reported as "cool," while a Japanese embassy spokesman in Shanghai declared that Japan would not accept mediation.

It is still too early to estimate the significance of these and other recent developments, to decide which actions are maneuvers and which represent fundamental policy, or to foretell with any confidence which of the many tendencies will become dominant. A basis for the understanding of future developments has, however, been given. In view of the thorough censorship to which foreign news is subjected at the present time and the sharp diplomatic changes that occur every week, it is not possible to go beyond this at the moment.

New York, October 1, 1939

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JAPAN WITHOUT GERMANY

T. A. Bisson

During the past few months a strangely ominous cloud (that is, by contrast to last summer) has risen over the Far Eastern horizon the "moderation" comported into Japan's foreign policy by the new Cabinet under General Nobuyuki Abe Reasons for this sleight-of hand change of front have never been openly and candidly avowed and discussed over the wireless telephone exchanges from Tokyo; they have their embarrassing aspects In dark corners it has been secretly whispered that reasons do exist, and that they are to be ultimately located in two successive shocks minor, from Washington (denunciation of a trade treaty), major, from Moscow (signing of a non aggression pact) Be that as it may, the fact of the change itself cannot be disputed, and since September last it has affected the diplomacy of all the interested Far Eastern powers. Within this brief time it has become a factor of prime significance in the development of events in eastern Asia Assessment of its objectives and possible effects is the more necessary because of the connotations of "moderation" as applied to Japan's foreign policy Historically, the term harks back to the period symbolized by the name of Baron Shidehara when Japan was pursuing a policy of international cooperation, not excluding its relations with China. Today it wears quite a different aspect It suggests that an opportunity has opened up for the various powers to compose their current differences with Japan, and thus contribute to inauguration of a more peaceful era in the Far East

The truce to Soviet Japanese hostilities on Manchukuo's western border effected in mid-September was the first conspicuous result of Japan's newly adopted policy In this case, it was simply a matter of calling off a serious misadventure by the Japanese army, the outcome of which already constituted a minor military disaster. Tokyo realized that the Soviet Union would not give up its help to China —nor alter a policy under which it had virtually stopped trading

with Japan.[1] Further efforts to arrive at a settlement of various Soviet-Japanese differences still outstanding were not excluded, but in such negotiations the Soviet Union's increased strength in the Far East would enable it to dictate terms. Rash predictions of a comprehensive "deal" that would work to China's disadvantage, made at the time the truce was concluded, have already been falsified by events. The adjustments which Japan has been forced to make in its relations with the Soviet Union are signs of weakness, not of strength. And China's position is thereby made more, not less, secure.

At Washington, however, Japan is playing for much larger stakes, and with greater apparent hope of success. When its trade treaty with the United States expires on January 26, Japan fears to lose the support of its economic partner in the war to destroy China's independence. The European conflict, which further restricts sources of supply for war materials, has not served to lessen Tokyo's deep anxiety on this score. More than ever it knows that unless the United States continues its economic backing of the Japanese armies in China, those armies will be defeated. The stakes are not only larger at Washington than at Moscow but would seem relatively easier to win, especially if Japan's diplomats can somehow create a willingness to accept at face value the idea of a change of heart. The force of inertia is on the side of Japan in its approaches to Washington. It seeks no positive act from the United States, but a continuance of the existing situation. It aims merely to see that embargoes on American trade with Japan are not imposed when the commercial treaty expires. It knows that many voices will be raised in the United States to support this aim, even though public opinion may be preponderantly on the other side. To achieve anything more than this—let us say, the negotiation of a new trade treaty to replace the old—Japan would have to demonstrate a real change of policy toward China and toward the interests of third powers in China.

[1] First 7 months of 1939. Japan's exports to the U.S.S.R. = ¥237,591, Japan's imports from U.S.S.R. = ¥569,343. In this same period, Japan's exports to the U.S.A. = ¥261,187,418. Japan's imports from U.S.A. = ¥590,403,588. Official Japanese figures as given by the Finance Department's monthly returns of foreign trade.

And here, of course, is the crux of the new-found "moderation" of Japan's foreign policy. In application, it carefully ignores a phase of Japanese foreign policy that is all-important. Otherwise, if terms are to be defined with any degree of strictness, one would have to regard China as falling within the sphere of Japan's domestic policy—an assumption, incidentally, which is thoroughly consonant with the concept of the "New Order" in East Asia. For the moment let it be admitted that Japan—for good and sufficient reasons—is displaying a more conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet Union and the United States. But what of China? The Japanese Cabinet, with Premier Abe as its spokesman, insists that the subjugation of China remains its foremost objective. New offensives have been launched against interior centers of China. Unrestricted bombings of China's helpless civilian population are still occurring. Efforts to establish Wang Ching-wei as the head of a new Chinese Government dominated from Tokyo are being pushed forward. Drastic infringements on equal commercial opportunity for nationals of third powers in China continue. In all these respects, the obligations and covenants of the Nine Power Treaty are being disregarded. In these respects, also, the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other Western powers are being overridden, even while Japan's diplomats make their "conciliatory" approaches.

Clearly, under such circumstances, "moderation" stops short of full and final effectiveness. What, then, must be said for the policy being pursued by the new Japanese Cabinet? Moderation, under closer scrutiny, turns out to be merely a pleasant name for a tactical diplomatic maneuver. Concessions, in the name of securing a peace that is not peace, are asked for in order that advantage may be taken of a moderation that is non-existent. For moderation, in order to have substance, must mean the restoration of China's right to order its own destinies and to pursue the normal occupations of life undisturbed by invading armies or raiding airplanes. When these terms are met, every effort must be made to guarantee for the Japanese people a full measure of opportunity to satisfy their legitimate economic needs. At that time all Western powers, including the United States, must be prepared to make concessions

to Japan sufficiently extensive to establish its economic security on solid foundations

That time has not yet come For the present, Japan has resorted to a tactical maneuver in a struggle of far reaching proportions that still continues The immediate object is to neutralize the opposition of the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which are able to bring much greater pressure to bear on Japan as the result of recent events In one respect alone Japan sees the possibility of a positive advance With Britain and France engaged on the European battlefront, the way has apparently opened up for an even stronger effort to clear out Anglo-French interests in China and thus to relieve Japan's current difficulties The first moves in this direction, involving demands for a "revision" of the foreign defense sectors in the Shanghai Settlement and for withdrawal of British and French troops from China to preserve "neutrality" in the Far East, were made in September It may be taken for granted that Japan will not only continue this line of action, but will intensify it to the degree that Britain and France become hard pressed on the European front

In order to assess the prospects for Japan's success in such an endeavor, it is necessary to review briefly the events of last summer. For this purpose, the period from May to August should be considered as one sharply defined phase of the Sino-Japanese conflict By May 1939 the Japanese army was faced with the realization that the military campaign in China had definitely bogged down In April China's armies had decisively repulsed two Japanese offensives, one directed against Changsha and the other into the Han River valley northwest of Hankow this latter designed to split off the northern Chinese from Chungking and the central front Large troop reinforcements and heavy additional expenditure would have been required to renew the offensives At the time, the Japanese high command decided not to incur these liabilities Yet something had to be done The second year of the war was drawing to its close, and awkward questions were beginning to be raised in Japan.

Another basic factor entered into the situation at this time Within Japan a severe political struggle, centering on the issue of transforming the loose ties of the anti-Comintern pact into an out-

right military alliance, was taking place. In May the conservatives within the Hiranuma Cabinet succeeded in forcing a negative decision on this issue against the opposition of the army extremists. The latter were unwilling to accept the decision, and resorted to their usual tactics. It is significant that Soviet-Japanese hostilities on the Outer Mongolian-Manchukuo frontier began in May. During the same month, also, demands were raised against the Shanghai Settlement, and Japanese marines were landed on Kulangsu (Amoy). There was a certain tentativeness, however, about this preliminary skirmish against the Western powers. The fact that marines, and not soldiers, were landed at Kulangsu, and that the Foreign Office sent the formal notes regarding Shanghai, indicated that the army extremists were not the direct sponsors of the actions taken. The results, moreover, were highly unsatisfactory. Both at Kulangsu and Shanghai, the United States was directly involved—and took a firm stand in cooperation with France and Britain. On May 18 and 19 American and British notes, firmly rejecting the demands affecting Shanghai, were delivered at Tokyo. The whole diplomatic campaign was brought to a temporary standstill.

At this point the army extremists stepped into the fray, and rapidly transformed the polite bickering of May into a bitter and determined struggle. They recognized the cardinal error of attacking the Western powers on a front which directly engaged the United States. In mid-June they instituted a blockade of the Tientsin Concessions, where it was possible to single out Great Britain for special attack. They were aiming at two broad objectives. By continuing the hostilities against the U.S.S.R. on Manchukuo's borders, and adding to it a bitter struggle with Great Britain, they were creating a situation in which a closer alliance with Germany was an obvious necessity. And, secondly, by driving Britain into a corner, at a moment when the German threat was the major British concern, they hoped to win important concessions in China. Policing issues affecting foreign-administered centers in China were of tertiary importance in this game. Economic issues, involving currency and silver, were of secondary significance. The prime objective was far more ambitious. It involved enlisting British support in coercing China to give up its resistance and come to terms with Japan. The

Japanese army leaders dreamed of a Far Eastern Munich. Their greatest problem—winning the war in China—would thus be solved.

The stakes were high, and the play was desperate—as the reckless "incidents" at the barricades of the Tientsin Concession testified. These were, indeed, new tactics in international diplomacy - not even Nazi Germany had gone to such lengths. At one point, in mid-summer, it appeared that success lay within Japan's grasp. The United States Senate had balked at neutrality revision, and Congressional proposals for an embargo on Japan were laid aside. The Craigie-Arita "formula" was announced at Tokyo on July 24. But then the tide began to turn. On July 26 Secretary Hull served notice of termination of the Japanese-American commercial treaty.[2] In the negotiations at Tokyo, conducted under the Craigie-Arita formula, Great Britain made certain concessions affecting police issues at Tientsin. When economic issues were raised, however, Britain took time out for consultations at Washington and Paris. On August 18 Ambassador Craigie informed Tokyo that, in further discussions of such issues, arrangements would have to be made to take into account the views of "other interested powers." The next moves against Britain were being prepared by the Japanese army at Shanghai and Hongkong, when announcement of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact smashed the whole game. The pressure on Great Britain immediately lifted, China breathed easier, the prospects of a German-Japanese alliance collapsed, conciliatory Japanese overtures were made at Washington, and a truce to Soviet-Japanese hostilities was rapidly concluded. Seldom, if ever, has a course of international policy, such as that pursued by Japan's army extremists last summer, been so effectively disrupted and so speedily laid on the shelf.

And Japan's current policy, returning to the original question regarding the outlook for the Anglo-French positions in China, must be adjusted to meet the disabilities accruing from the fiasco that occurred at the end of August. These disabilities are very heavy, and are not likely to change materially for the better in the near future. Secretary Hull's denunciation of the trade treaty with

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[2] Early in August, it should also be noted, the Soviet Union advanced a $140 million credit to China.

Japan, which might otherwise have been postponed, may be termed one of the by-products of Japan's unrestrained actions at Tientsin. It was a step taken in the interests of the United States. At the time it was adopted, however, it represented a clear warning to Japan that the United States was not unconcerned with the attack being made on Great Britain. The later consultations regarding Japan's economic demands on Britain during the Tokyo negotiations also indicated Anglo-American cooperation. There is no reason to believe that this cooperation will not continue to exist. Today, with the enhanced Japanese dependence on the American market as a result of the war in Europe, Japan would be foolhardy to a degree if it pressed action that would encourage application of a Congressional trade embargo after the treaty expires. Yet any serious pressure on Britain at Shanghai or elsewhere in China will undoubtedly have just this effect. The fact is that French, British and American interests in China stand or fall together. By the same token, it would not be easy for Britain to strike a separate bargain with Japan over the China question. For London, too, must now look upon maintenance of free access to the American market as a cardinal necessity. Even were the present "moderate" Japanese Cabinet prepared to extend generous terms to Britain for a comprehensive Far Eastern "deal" that would offer up China as a sacrifice, the chances are that London would think twice before taking a step that would conceivably arouse the antagonism of the United States.

These reflections are not intended to discount any and all possibility of further Japanese pressure against the positions of the Western democracies in the Far East.[3] They are intended to suggest that the new Japanese Cabinet, less dominated by extremist elements, will probably be more disposed to feel its way ahead rather carefully. The example of the results of an arrogantly reckless policy is too fresh to be cavalierly ignored. Yet the incentives toward such

[3] On the other hand, once having cast the die in Europe, Britain and France are perhaps less subject to blackmail than during the height of the "appeasement" era when they were surrendering position after position without a struggle. Given the least degree of encouragement on the European front, they may well be more inclined to stand up to Japan in the Far East. The military resources of the Dominions and India are now more readily deployable in the Far East than before the European conflict broke out.

action undoubtedly remain. It will be difficult to refrain from taking advantage of French and British weakness in the Far East during the European war. The worst alternative of all for Japan is to be thrown back on the necessity of crushing Chinese resistance by its own unaided military efforts. As previously noted, this alternative was deliberately sidestepped last May, when the effort to defeat China by a flank attack on the Western powers was inaugurated. New military offenses in China require the use of great numbers of troops, and further sap Japan's economic strength. Such a military effort would throttle any possibility of diverting men, materials and capital to the production of export commodities, in order to cash in on the hoped-for war trade boom. If the offensives merely gain more territory, but fail to bring an end to Chinese resistance, Japan's current dilemma still persists and is rendered even more acute. All these factors dictate a continued effort to seek a way out by eliminating all vestiges of Western influence in China, or by arranging a "deal" that will assist Japan toward overcoming Chinese resistance.

As already indicated, the position of the United States in this new situation will be more crucial than ever. The issue of American trade relations with Japan cannot be downed. Failure to act is equivalent to the most decisive action. It means that the United States continues to render economic assistance to Japan which is of the utmost significance.[4] Nor can the American people allow themselves to be hoodwinked into an acceptance of "moderate" proposals of a "peace" offer. Peace in the Far East is not to be achieved by closing one's eyes to an unpleasant situation, still less by compounding a felony. The simple truth is that there can be no peace in the Far East so long as Japan insists on reducing China to a helot state. Along that path lies continued strife, unsettlement, and disorder in East Asia—ultimately involving the United States. If peace be the aim, it must be founded on the bedrock of a free

[4] The issue in the Far East must not be confused with that in Europe. Conditions affecting the vital interests of the United States are wholly different in the two regions. Normally, the different policies necessarily applicable could be handled by Executive action, which would automatically make the differing adjustments required. If Congressional statute must be employed, then there is every reason to apply two different statutes to the two radically different problems.

and independent China. In its sponsorship of the Nine-Power Treaty, the United States has long since recognized this fact as one of the guiding principles of its policy in the Far East. The Chinese people are fighting for their own independence, but also for the best interests of all the democratic, non-aggressor nations. China does not ask for military assistance. It merely asks that these nations, among which the United States now holds a position of decisive power, cease being the armory of its assailant. The time for an answer is long overdue.

New York, September 1939

THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF NETHERLANDS INDIA

G. H. Bousquet

In any consideration of the foreign policy of Netherlands India, the first thought which comes to mind is that the Sino Japanese conflict, a manifestation of Japanese imperialism, threatens both Holland and its colonial empire At present there is no other question of foreign policy to disturb Holland Its relations with England, France and the United States are satisfactory, and their respective possessions offer no problem Nor does the United States, which is considering retirement from the Philippines, plan to extend its influence beyond these islands There is nothing worthy of note in the relations between Netherlands India and Indochina, save the inauguration in September 1938 of a Dutch air service between Batavia and Saigon Some months earlier the same company instituted a service to Australia as well. Relations with Siam are of minor importance and call for no particular comment the residency in Batavia of one branch of the former king's family is of no political significance[1] Besides the Japanese, the only threat to the Dutch colonies might be a German seizure of these rich lands. It could be realized only as the result of a victory enabling Germany to dictate to the world This is not a specifically Indonesian problem.

Thus it follows that the only Indonesian problem of Dutch foreign policy lies in the consequences which the Sino Japanese conflict may have for the Indies *A priori* one might suppose that, from the Dutch point of view, the problem is of this nature Japan is a young, formidable and well-armed power which has never concealed its vast ambitions: all of Asia, including Netherlands India, must be enslaved by Japan. Accordingly, a victory by China is desirable, for it will leave this formidable adversary exhausted and long incapable of resuming its imperialist policy of expansion.

[1] There is even less reason to speak of relations with Portugal, which owns one-half of the island of Timor

Actually, the attitude of the Netherlands, or rather of governme circles in the Indies, is far less definite than this brief survey woul lead one to suppose. The point of view just outlined is not inaccurat but it is incomplete, there is another extremely important facto which must be taken into account. Although a Japanese victor would mean the future aggravation of foreign threats against th Indies, a Chinese victory would, on the other hand, aggravate danger which would threaten the Dutch colonies from within. Mor over, Japan's victory would oblige it to "digest" its conquests ove a fairly long period of time during which many changes migh occur. It is impossible, therefore, to summarize in a brief senten the Dutch attitude toward the Sino-Japanese struggle, and for th same reason it is necessary to examine the problem at greater lengt seeking first its immediate and then its probable consequences.

With regard to the economic aspects of the problem, there little to say about Netherlands Indian commercial relatio with China. Exports to China are not negligible: in 1930 they reache 44 million guilders (plus 51 millions shipped to Hongkong) out of total export of 1,160 millions. In 1936 these figures were respectivel 97, 12.8, and 5[illegible] millions. Imports in 1930 were 18.2 millions fro China and 1[illegible].2 millions from Hongkong out of a total of 8[illegible] millions; in 1936 they were 5[illegible], 4.6 and 2[illegible] millions respectivel Current statistics would show an appreciable decline in each of the figures.

As for Japan, the big question in late years, thanks to the liber Dutch open-door policy, has been the invasion of the Indonesia market by Japanese products. Thus in 1930, Indian imports from th Netherlands rose to 163 millions, while those from Japan reache 92 millions. Imports from the mother country then suffered a stee drop, with a low of 36.4 millions in 1935; whereas Japanese impor remained almost at their former level, that is 81.2 out of a total 276.5 millions, so that they represented about 30 per cent of a imports.

At the same time the trade balance with Japan was most unfavo able to the Netherlands Indies. In 1930 exports totalled about 50 pe cent of imports (46.2 millions against 92); in 1935, about 30 per ce

(24 millions against 81.2). After various negotiations the Dutch Government decided to institute the quota system in an attempt to secure more advantageous treatment of its own products. In 1936 exports to Japan totalled 30.3 millions, in 1937, 42.2 millions; in the first half of 1938, 11.8 millions. The influence of the war is apparent in the last figure. Imports from Japan were respectively 75.2, 124.4 and 30.4 millions. In this case the war was responsible for a 50 per cent decline in imports. Imports from the Netherlands were 47.9, 93.8 and 51.7 millions.

For 1938 the Netherlands' share apparently should be almost double the Japanese, whereas in 1935 it was less than half. Thus, for the time being, Holland is freed of the anxiety which Japanese imports were causing, though this alleviation is due mainly to the war in China. It will be seen that, relatively speaking, the balance is still unfavorable. Japan continues to buy only about one third of what she sells (11.8 millions against 30.4).

WHAT is this danger from within which would threaten Dutch rule in the event of an overwhelming Chinese victory? It is the existence in the Indonesian Archipelago of a Chinese colony which, demographically and economically, is extremely important. In the census of 1930, out of a total of 61 million inhabitants in Netherlands India there were 1.2 million Chinese, half of them in Java[2] and the rest in the outer provinces. Of these 730,000 had been born in the Indies, the others, for the most part men, were immigrants. Certain Chinese families have lived in the Indies for centuries and are of very mixed blood. Many speak only Malay. The Chinese, however, do not mix with the natives, they live quite apart from the rest of the population, and the sentimental bonds which bind them to China are still strong. From the economic aspect the importance of the Chinese is considerable. They are on the average far richer than the miserable native and may be described as middle class, if this word is understood in a very relative sense. The following figures afford some idea of the situation. In 1935, out of

[2] It is worthy of note that more than two thirds of the Indonesian population lives on this overcrowded island which occupies only 48,000 square miles out of a total Netherlands Indian area of 684,000 square miles.

240,000 Europeans (of whom at least three-fourths were really Eurasians), 64,000 paid an income tax. For the Chinese the figures were 36,000 tax payers out of 1,200,000; for the natives, 28,500 out of 59,130,000. The Chinese are chiefly small tradesmen, manufacturers or money-lenders. They are widely represented in the professions, but there is a Chinese laboring class as well.

Legally, with the exception of penal treatment, Chinese are grouped with Europeans, although they were until very recently subjected to all sorts of restrictions. A much more important point is that China does not recognize the Dutch citizenship which a great many Chinese hold by virtue of the principle of *jus soli* which the Netherlands enforce. A Chinese, it would seem, never loses his nationality, and his descendants retain it as well. Of course the authorities reject the demands of the Chinese consulate for a hand in matters concerning Dutch subjects, but China maintains its own legal point of view. In 1936 the *Koloniale Studien* published a special number dealing with the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies, with a foreword in English by the Chinese consul general. The latter wrote: "We have over a million Chinese in the Netherlands Indies, and they form an integral part of the economic life of this country." From the first word of his sentence it can be seen that this official considered the Chinese to belong to China and to form an integral part only of the *economic* life of the Indies.

There are, on the other hand, only a few thousand Japanese in the Indies, and these rarely emigrate. They maintain a few tropical farming enterprises, and there are some Japanese fishermen in the Minahasa district of Celebes. In the towns there are a few photographers, but generally the Japanese are hair-dressers and the like. A few others have made an attempt at colonization in New Guinea, but their numerical importance is insignificant and their economic role very slight.

Thus it is understandable that the authorities are fearful of the disastrous consequences which, in the long run, a clear-cut Chinese victory in the present war would have for Netherlands India. In their eyes, Chinese imperialism is quite as dangerous as Japanese. The powerful Chinese colony in the Indies would constitute the formidable vanguard of an economically and militarily formidable

China; and against its political influence within the country, Singapore and the British Navy would be of no avail The attitude of the Chinese in the Indies is clear: they form an entity and unreservedly support their "native" country, even when, as most often s the case, they are no longer familiar with the Chinese language and have lived in the Indies for many generations. It should be noted in this connection that for a long time, until well into the twentieth century, the Dutch Government systematically refused o teach Dutch to its subjects, whether Chinese or native, so that he former established Anglo-Chinese schools in which Dutch is not taught. Although the great majority of Chinese speak only native dialects, they do not have much in common with the Indonesians intellectually. And since, moreover, the Dutch have systematically avoided spreading European culture among their subjects, the Chinese upper classes quite naturally turn to China. If pan-Sinism should appear in the near future, the Dutch will have an opportunity to appraise the consequences of a policy which has been ungenerous in this respect; the most enlightened among the Dutch already realize the possible consequences, but not he real causes.

Be this as it may, the Chinese are united in their sympathy for China. It is true that this sympathy does not manifest itself in the form of voluntary mass enlistments in the Chinese army. The Chinese are not warlike, and many people in the Indies say that since there is no lack of manpower in a country with hundreds of millions of inhabitants, the support offered by foreign enlistment would be insignificant In fact, in the summer of 1938 the number of volunteers who left for China was estimated at less than 300, among whom there were no real soldiers but rather technicians, chauffeurs, trained nurses and the like. In addition, a certain number of students left to attend the anti-Japanese Universities which are more or less under the influence of Moscow [8] Sympathy with China is manifested especially in the collection of funds for the support of the Chinese cause. These are often public, and many

[8] The Dutch Government is, I believe, worried by the existence of this communist element and especially by the prospect of its eventual return to the Indies. It is contemplating the adoption of whatever measures are necessary to protect its subjects from influences which it deems unhealthy

people regularly contribute a part of their monthly income to agents who collect the funds and turn them over to the Chinese consular authorities. I do not know if all of the contributions actually reach the Chinese Government, but the effort is certainly not to be dismissed lightly. The same practice obtains in Singapore, where I heard local businessmen complaining that although the Chinese there are numerous, industrious and wealthy, they are buying almost nothing these days but are instead sending their available funds to China. This is the most tangible assistance contributed to China by expatriate Chinese.[*]

IN CONSIDERING the attitude of the natives toward the war, we are dealing, of course, with only that very small fraction of the people with some understanding of current events, and more particularly with the upper level of native society, that is, the few, at most some hundreds of thousands, who are capable of forming an opinion. At the present time it is possible to distinguish two currents among the ranks of Indonesian nationalists in Netherlands India. On the one hand, there are the true nationalists who have long enjoyed communist support. Today communism is officially prohibited, communist-inspired movements are vigorously ferreted out by the Dutch. On the other hand, there are numerous groups with neo-Islamic tendencies which are concerned mainly with religious education and do not publicly engage in politics. Of these the reformist Mohammadiyya is the most powerful. The Mohammadiyya is on excellent terms with the Government, but I am by no means convinced that the official favor it enjoys is wholly justified by its policy. There is no doubt that, while abstaining from all anti-Dutch activity, its members have the same goal as the nationalists, namely, the expulsion of the foreigner.

I have not heard of any attempt by the Chinese Government to win over native public opinion. Japan, on the other hand, although it seems to have done nothing openly to gain the favor of Indonesian nationalism, has endeavored to win the good will of all Islam

[*] I shall not discuss the attitude of the Japanese in Netherlands India, for they are too few in number and in any case not much talked about. There is no record of trouble between the Japanese and Chinese elements of the community.

in general and of Indonesian Islam in particular. So far its efforts have borne no apparent fruit, for the Moslems of Netherlands India have been very cautious. The Japanese Government issued numerous invitations to the inauguration of the Tokyo mosque on May 12, 1938, but the Mohammadiyya refused to participate on the pretext that the date was inconvenient. Out of fifty-odd million Moslems, only one finally attended; he was a Sumatran member of the *Sarikat Islam* and quite without authority or influence. The Japanese also try to attract Indonesian students to their universities. There are about 25 such students in Japan, but the Dutch authorities do not appear unduly disturbed thereby. Since on their arrival in Japan the students are utterly ignorant of the language and must devote several years to learning it before beginning their real studies, they do not appear to constitute an imminent danger.

The reactions of native opinion to the conflict and to Japanese propaganda are varied. There is, first of all, a left wing, revolutionary current which, though actually suppressed in the Indies, is represented in the Netherlands by the Indonesian communist deputy, Roustem Effendi. He has declared that the revolutionary group is prepared to support the Government in defending the Indies against Japan. Thus, as far as this group still exists in the colonies, it would be pro-Government and anti-Japanese in the event of a war.

As far as the Moslem nationalist movement is concerned, it would, in my opinion, be very wrong to suppose that it is much less pro-Japanese than the true nationalists are. These Moslems have no reason to compromise themselves, for they find the present situation most advantageous: the Government has adopted what may be called a benevolent neutrality toward them, if indeed it does not openly favor what they desire. This is a noteworthy attitude on the part of a home government which is supported by a Christian majority, Protestant and Catholic, who believe that the Dutch rule the Indies by the grace of God. The Moslem nationalist elements would stand to gain nothing and lose everything if they publicly adopted an anti-Dutch attitude. Yet I believe that at heart they subscribe to the views of the true nationalists.

The true nationalists are frankly pro-Japanese. They are less eager for a Chinese defeat than for a victory by the great Asiatic

Power in the teeth of Europe. The attitude of the political associations, the *Parindra*, *Gerindo* or others, is similar: they are all anti-European, though with that gentleness characteristic of Indonesians, and especially Javanese. In this respect the difference between their attitude and that of the nationalists and Moslems in British India is most striking. European ideology has already influenced the latter Japanese are "fascists" who have invaded "democratic" China And since the inhabitants of India are "democratic" and since Great Britain claims to be so also, it is expedient in the name of democracy to unite with Great Britain, or at least to observe a benevolent neutrality in so far as it opposes Japanese fascism and especially if it should be attacked by Japan

An equally remarkable difference may be observed between the attitude of the Indonesian nationalists and that of the Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians Just as the Japanese demands frightened the Hindus and reconciled them to the British, so in the spring of 1939 North Africa was closely bound to France Native and French opinion were in complete accord, and this was the more remarkable because up to the middle of 1938 the French had experienced serious difficulties there, especially in Tunisia What Japanese aggression did not succeed in accomplishing in Netherlands India, German policy and Italian aggression in Albania have effected in French North Africa Without putting too much stock in official statements, of which I am rather skeptical, it can be said that the rapturous enthusiasm which greeted Premier Daladier in Tunisia, just a few weeks after the local unrest had ended, was shared by every ethnical group in the country—Arabs, Jews, Maltese, French, and I would almost add Italians There can be no doubt that the calm determination of the 16 million inhabitants of North Africa to remain at the side of France was due to Italy's demands, as insolent as they were ridiculous (to which France owes a great debt of gratitude). But it was also due to French domestic policy in North Africa.

It appears that the nationalists in North Africa have a far clearer conception of the realities of the situation than do the Indonesian nationalists; yet it is certain that in this domain France has enjoyed considerable political success, quite as much indeed as the British

have in India. The psychological position of the Dutch in Netherlands India is decidedly inferior.[8] Indonesian nationalists of almost every degree desire a Japanese victory. I am convinced that if Japan were today to attack Netherlands India, few nationalists would line up behind the Dutch Government. Whether or not this attitude is wise and just, it is general. Its most obvious explanation is the nature of the political relations between the Dutch Government and the nationalist element. For many years these relations have been extremely strained and unproductive of results. The nationalists have in large part adhered to a policy of non-cooperation, although of late a change in their attitude has been apparent. As for the Government, its policy toward these elements consists mainly, if not wholly, in increasing police interference, investigations, prosecutions, jail sentences, internments without trial and the like.

Under these conditions, Indonesian nationalists are at an earlier ideological stage than are the people of British India. A Japanese victory would be the victory of an Asiatic power over European powers, and they profess to believe that it could have no disastrous consequences for the cause of Indonesian nationalism. It is regrettable that they do not possess greater vision and that the Netherlands have not succeeded, in the face of the eventual Japanese threat, in creating an ideology favorable to their interests. Such is the situation, and I may add that, in my opinion, it is not the consequence of nationalist "blindness" or "perverseness" alone.

Quite a different reason, subordinate perhaps but nevertheless noteworthy, is economic and owes nothing to Dutch policy. The Chinese is not always popular in the Indies. He is often a business or professional man who actively competes with the middle class Indonesian and impedes his progress. He is often also a foreign money lender and exploiter of the natives. On the other hand, there are few Japanese in the archipelago, and these compete with no

[8] I must insist on this point and have accordingly elaborated upon it at greater length than in my article in *Politique Étrangère* (February [illegible]), for I have been reproached with this view in an anonymous article in the *Algemeen Handelsblad*, February 22, 1939. I doubt if the author of this article has been, as I have, in British India and North Africa and has had an opportunity to realize that the mentality in those countries is unlike that in Netherlands India. He writes that my allegations are "unfair and not very kind." They may not be kind, but they are true.

one. What is more, the invasion of the Indonesian market by Japanese goods has actually permitted Indonesian shopkeepers to increase their sales; and many workers find positions which Japanese cannot occupy whereas the Chinese businessman seeks and finds Chinese helpers. In British India, however, the Chinese is not a competitor; there Japanese competition is feared. What is the use of setting up defenses against Manchester if only for Japan's benefit? Since there is no native industrial class in Indonesia as in British India, there exists no corresponding anti-Japanese element. The economic considerations strengthen those of a political character.

There is no doubt that at present the Netherlands Government desires the mutual exhaustion of China and Japan. It fears an easy victory which would inflate Japanese ambitions enormously and would encourage Indonesian nationalism. And in the long run it fears a Chinese victory which would give the Chinese within its colonies a preponderant political position. In other words, like the dwarf Mime in Wagner's *King*, it regards the two opponents as equally odious and desires their common extermination. *Siegfried und Fafner, Fafner und Siegfried*—so far as the Dutch Government is concerned it is all one. I may add that it should be all one to Europe in general. But the wishes of the Dutch Government are not manifest. Its policy is consistently one of caution and neutrality: it does not prevent Chinese resident in the Indies from going to China or Japanese from going to Japan, it permits public collections for either of the two rival nations (although only Chinese funds are in fact solicited) as long as they have a humanitarian aim such as relief for Chinese sufferers, it authorized the organization of a great benefit in May 1938 for Chinese student victims of the war, and, if requested, it would authorize a similar affair for the Japanese. Private collections are not forbidden, even for other purposes. This policy of neutrality is extended to the press. Native and Chinese newspapers receive strict instructions and are forbidden to express too heated opinions about the war.

The same caution is apparent in the diplomatic attitude of the Netherlands in the Far East. Actually this policy is determined

not in Netherlands India, but at The Hague. On this point I can offer merely impressions, but one fact may be noted—the voluntary, systematic and complete seclusion in which the governor general lives with respect to the consular representatives of great foreign countries. It would doubtless be inadvisable for this official to pursue his own foreign policy independently, but it seems to me that this Far Eastern representative of Holland should have some definite contacts with the consul generals. Things are not and cannot be viewed in the same light at The Hague as they are in Java. I am convinced that such contacts could be of the greatest advantage to the Netherlands and that the exchange of points of view between these consular representatives and the highest Dutch colonial authority would be profitable to all concerned. Yet this exchange never takes place. It is my strong belief that the Netherlands are not anxious to contract alliances with any great powers (France, Great Britain or the United States) for the defense of their colonies.*

THE CAUTIOUSNESS of Dutch policy does not exclude a certain determination in military affairs. For many years the Netherlands deluded themselves with the hope that the great powers, and more especially Britain, would in their own interests take it upon themselves to defend the Indies against an aggressor nation, which could hardly be any country but Japan. Accordingly, the defenses of the Indies were completely neglected. Personally I believe that if Japan had fallen upon the Dutch colonies during the Italo-Ethiopian War, when the British fleet was concentrated at Alexandria, it could have gained control of them with far less danger and expense than it can accomplish its Chinese undertaking. The opportunity has passed. On the one hand the democratic powers are awakening from their inertia, and on the other the Netherlands are making an effort to improve their colonial defense, which suffered a budget reduction after the economic crisis. The total appropriation, which was 140 million guilders in 1929 (76 millions for the Army), was reduced to about 50 millions in 1933.

* There was considerable talk in the spring of 1938 about the governor of Australia's trip to the Indies, but if his visit had any diplomatic significance whatever, which is unlikely, it is a certainty that the advances were made by the guest and not by his host.

In this respect the difference between French military policy on the one side and British and Dutch on the other is remarkable. If, instead of the British, the French had conquered British India, there is no doubt that they would today have an army of at least ten million men in India with which they could have conquered the world. It follows, therefore, that, in winning his victories, Clive rendered a greater service to the cause of the world peace than has the most ardent pacifist. The Netherlands maintain a native army which represents a tiny fraction of the population—a few tens of thousands of men, almost all Christians (Menadonese and Amboynese) or Muhammadan Javanese. A strange feature in the eyes of a Frenchman is that the Dutch have never attempted to recruit soldiers in the regions which were most difficult to subjugate. To my mind, one of the claims to glory of French colonization, viewed from the standpoint of political psychology, has been its success in recruiting soldiers in regions only recently subdued. The behavior of the Moroccan tribes in the Great War was typical of this. The Dutch today would not dare to recruit a single company in Atjeh, which was conquered 35 years ago—that is, even before the very first attempt at French occupation of Morocco. I have frequently told Dutchmen that the French would doubtless have raised an army of volunteers in Atjeh exclusively, but on this point, as on so many others, the colonial conceptions of the two countries are in hopeless disagreement. What is more, if in the past the Dutch had pursued a policy of decentralization instead of consolidating all opposing forces, they could have instituted compulsory military service, which would have been of great service to them at this time. But there is no point in thinking of that now.

I am skeptical of the ability of the Netherlands to defend themselves, or rather of the ability of the Dutch unaided to defend their colonies against an attack. How can a territory comparable to that lying between France and Afghanistan, and Italy and Sweden, be defended by 50,000 men and a few warships and airplanes? Defense is the more difficult since, in my opinion, the people as a whole would remain passive in case of an attack. I do not believe that they would rise in revolt against the Dutch (and they would be wrong if they did), but I do think that they would sit quietly

by if an attack were launched.[7] Nevertheless, the Dutch are well advised to appear resolved to defend their colonies. The better established their defense system, the more willingly will assistance probably be offered them.

It would, I think, be definitely to the interest of the great colonial powers, France in particular, to come eventually to the assistance of the Netherlands if the Dutch overseas possessions were attacked. It would, of course, be much less serious for France to see Japan or Germany established in Batavia than Germany in Vienna and Prague, yet two irremediable errors do not excuse others. If, however, such a situation were to arise, whatever might be France's interest in opposing it, France would have less to lose than would the Netherlands themselves. In other words, France and Britain have in their hands an extremely powerful means of compelling the Netherlands to follow whatever policy they may think proper, for from the colonial point of view Holland is wholly at their mercy and exists only because they desire its existence. But nowadays, when the totalitarian nations are showing so few scruples, it is unnecessary, in my opinion, for the great nations desirous of maintaining the *status quo* to bear the entire expense while countries like the Netherlands reap the benefit. The Netherlands are wealthy, extremely so, and the Indies are one of the chief sources of their wealth. Before taking any action, the least surety which France should demand is a promise that Holland, in order to preserve its empire and to escape ruin, would in one way or another reimburse its ally. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was in large part thanks to mercenaries that Holland gained its independence. What it cannot do today by military means it can and must do by financial contribution.

While I was in the Indies an English journalist suggested that the Dutch should be called upon to share the expenses of the Singapore defenses. This proposal was greeted with a storm of indignation in the local press, but I must say, with the poet François Coppée, "To me that did not seem ridiculous in the least," and would ad-

[7] Discretion does not permit me to divulge the sources of my information, but I offer my scientific integrity in support of this statement.

vise the Dutch to read the fable of the dog that watched c
master's meal.*

It is incorrect, however, to conclude without further di
that an alliance between Holland and France and England
essarily desirable. To be sure, if the position of the Neth
were similar to that, let us say, of Portugal, it would be
impose such an alliance at once. The Portuguese colonies a
as indefensible by the mother country alone as are the Dut
nies. Both are quite at the mercy of France and Britai
comparison, however, can be carried no further, for the
position on the international chessboard is far more dangero
that of Portugal, which is not menaced by any danger in
Just as the Dutch colonies cannot be defended against Ja
the mother country lacks any defense against Germany. I
that in the event of war Germany would occupy three-qua
Netherlands territory within a day or two, and as for the re
is, the Provinces of North and South Holland and the Z
Islands), opening of the dykes would not preserve the ex
dense population of that region from frightful bombardm
is possible, therefore, to ask with all seriousness whether it
be to the advantage of France and Britain to have a Europe
so exposed to occupation by German troops. A neutral H
would probably be more advantageous for their purposes.

In any case, it is essential that in their own interests the
adhere to a Far Eastern policy which accords with Fren
British policy. So far, indeed, there has been no trouble
regard. What is more, the expense of defending Netherland
with the British and French fleets must, as we have point
be borne by the Netherlands. Since France and Britain a
position to demand from Holland almost anything of a n
nature in the colonial field, this demand appears singularly
Besides, if the scheme of ceding colonial territories to Germ
to Italy should prevail, it seems unnecessary to add that,
opinion, such a transfer should be accompanied by compen
of a colonial nature to the advantage of France and Brita

* Another very useful subject for meditation would be the fall of the
Republic.

the disadvantage of Belgium, Portugal and Holland There would be no reason why the large nations alone should have to lose as a result of such territorial shifts

Today, unfortunately, these schemes appear to have been thrown into the discard; and to my way of thinking the right path has been chosen resistance, resistance by all colonial powers great and small The small nations must fully realize, however, that the Franco-British army, fleet and air force constitute their sole defense against the total and irretrievable loss of all of their colonial possessions

In 1926, with the success of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army at Wuchang and Hankow, opposition to the so-called unequal treaties was increased. The capture of the British Concession at Hankow by the Chinese army on January 4, 1927 resulted in the Chen-O'Malley Agreement of February 19, by which the Concession was retroceded to China, becoming the "Third Special District" of Hankow on March 15 of the same year. The retrocession of the Kiukiang British Concession followed, and in 1929 came the recovery by China through treaty agreements of both the Chinkiang British and the Tientsin Belgian Concessions. In 1930 China secured the return of the Amoy British Concession, making ten in all, which, in conjunction with the abrogation by the British of their lease at Weihaiwei in January of that year, indicated that China had come a long way. The following tells the story

FOREIGN CONCESSIONS RECOVERED BY CHINA

Concession	Year of Recovery	Present Name	Remarks
Tientsin German	1917	First Special District	In consequence of Great War
Hankow German	1917	First Special District	In consequence of Great War
Tientsin Austrian	1917	Second Special District	In consequence of Great War
Tientsin Russian	1924	Third Special District	Russian Revolution
Hankow Russian	1924	Second Special District	Russian Revolution
Hankow British	1927	Third Special District	By occupation
Kiukiang British	1927	Special District	By treaty
Chinkiang British	1929		By treaty
Tientsin Belgian	1929		By treaty
Amoy British	1930		By treaty

However, before this had come about, and while various groups in the Nationalist forces were still jockeying for control, there occurred an incident which, despite the political motives involved, indicated very clearly the general dislike of the Chinese for the foreigner. This was the so-called Nanking Outrage of March 24, 1926 when the Nationalist Troops of the Wuhan Government entered Nanking and systematically looted and fired the homes and buildings of foreigners, including the Consulates. They were finally rescued under the protection of a barrage laid down by British and American warships on the Yangtze. In the China Year Book for 1928 appears a detailed account of these outrages as described by American missionaries. This statement, signed by leading members

of all denominations operating in that area—some of whom, incidentally, are now foremost in espousing the Chinese cause—speaks not only of the looting of foreign homes, consular offices, schools, hospitals and places of business, but also of foreign homes and schools; of deliberate murder, of the shooting on two different occasions and the serious wounding of a young American woman; of shooting at and attempting to kill foreign men, women and children; of the attempted rape of American women; and of other shocking indignities to foreign women too indecent to be published

The subsequent failure of the Nationalist Government to punish General Cheng Chien, who had been in charge of the troops, was unfortunate in that it left the impression that, while the incident was deplored by the authorities, it was more because it was diplomatically dangerous than anything else The International Settlement at Shanghai had also been in danger of sharing the fate of the British Concession at Hankow and Nanking, until the arrival of a force of 18,000 British troops

WITH the establishment of the Nanking Nationalist Government in 1927 steps were taken by the Chinese apparently with the idea of regaining control of Shanghai as the most important of the concessions Shanghai was placed under the direct control of the Government, with an enlarged area to include neighboring districts. The International Settlement and the French Concession in Shanghai were given the names of the First and Second Special Districts respectively and combined with the Chinese city under the name of "Greater Shanghai" It would appear from the plans of Chang Chun, who was appointed Mayor of Greater Shanghai in April of 1929, that the Chinese Government intended to divert business and prosperity as much as possible from the Settlement and the Concession to the Chinese section of Shanghai, through the development of new and more extensive facilities These plans created a certain amount of tension between foreign interests and the Chinese Government, and the Settlement, mindful of what had previously occurred at Hankow, Shanghai and Nanking, became increasingly alarmed with the encamping of the Chinese 19th Route Army in the Shanghai region

The 1932 affair at Shanghai brought new dangers to the International Settlement and, as was stated by the American and British Consuls General at Shanghai to correspondents, it was feared that if the Japanese forces could not drive off the Chinese, the International Settlement and French Concession would be faced with the possibility of invasion and capture. When the Shanghai Truce Agreement was subsequently formulated, one of its stipulations established a demilitarized zone where only Chinese police, described by the Chinese as "special constabulary," were to function. Observance of this Agreement was to be supervised by a Joint Commission. This was the situation until early in 1936 when General Wu Teh-chen, who had been both mayor of Greater Shanghai and garrison commander of the Shanghai Woosung area, was relieved of the latter post and General Yang Hu was given the position. Obviously this meant the establishment of a military command within the demilitarized zone and placed this area outside the mayor's jurisdiction. Hence, it was not until June 23 that Japan lodged a protest against this new development. The Joint Commission did not take this very important matter under consideration, but evaded it by claiming that it did not come within its jurisdiction.

It seems only fair to point out that had the Joint Commission at this time acted in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement and in a manner justified by the powers vested in it, later developments and possibly the present hostilities might not have come into being. That it did not do so would appear to have placed the responsibility squarely on its doorstep, and makes the present protests of the various foreign interests somewhat inconsistent, to say the least. Again, the dispatch of two Chinese regular Divisions—the 87th and 88th—into the demilitarized zone and their occupation of the northern boundary of the Settlement was an undeniable breach of this 1932 Agreement. But here again the protests of the Japanese authorities were ignored and the subsequent and obviously inevitable outbreak, under the conditions cited, put an end to any further attempts to carry out the terms of the Truce.

There appears to be little question but that when and if the Kuomintang is in a position to make it, a demand will be made

for the retrocession of the remaining foreign concessions and settlements in China. There seems to be considerable general ignorance as to the extent of these. The Powers have economic and trade interests at Tientsin, Tsingtao, Hankow, Amoy, and Canton. Specifically, according to the *China Year Book* (1938).

REMAINING FOREIGN CONCESSIONS IN CHINA

Shanghai	French
Amoy	Japanese American
Canton	British French
Hankow	French Japanese
Soochow	Japanese
Tientsin	British French Japanese Italian
Newchwang	British

The question to be decided therefore is as to the extent of the expressed sympathy of the Powers for China How far would it go toward the surrender of these concessions and the removal of the implied stigma that China is incapable of establishing a sufficiently stable government to guarantee the protection of their nationals? To the observer it would appear that the Powers are in somewhat of a quandary. It is not that they like the idea of China for the Chinese so much as it is the fear of Japanese competition Yet it does not seem very probable that if China wins out in the present conflict, their stay will be more secure—in fact, it would appear less so A Nationalistic China, thus incited, would not hesitate to assert its rights to the concessions and settlements, and there would appear to be little the Powers could do about it It would seem that the days of the concessionaire in China are numbered.

New York, May 1939

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PUPPET GOVERNMENTS

FRANZ MICHAEL

It has been said over and over again that the Japanese invasion of China represents a drastic violation of the Nine Power Pact of 1922 and also of the Paris Peace Pact of 1928 This has been officially recognized by the Powers at the conference of Brussels and through various official declarations and protests to Japan The League of Nations has asked its members to consider individually material support for China But nothing much has come of these rather academic statements. After all, the Japanese invasion of China was not the only such case of violation Governments and public opinion have become resigned to the fact that our present-day treaty system is breakable The apparently utopian system of collective security has collapsed We soberly recognize the fact that, at least for the time being, only that part of the international law system is likely to survive which is backed not only by ideals but by the very practical interests of powers able and willing to defend them

Another deplorable aspect of the invasion of China has been the utter disregard of civilian life, honor and property by the invading army. Japan has broken the international laws and customs of war on land as developed during the last century and codified in The Hague peace conferences of 1899 and 1907

Japan denies the violations. Art I of the Paris Peace Pact contains the formal renunciation of war Japan has thus far insisted on calling its fighting in China not a war but an incident. It can thus escape the provision of Art I under a formal but obviously hollow interpretation. In Art II the signatories, who include Japan and China, promise never to seek any settlement or solution of a dispute except by pacific means. The means used by Japan in China can certainly not be called pacific; but according to an official exchange of notes when the pact was signed, the right of self defense was understood to be reserved The decision as to what represented self defense

was left with the power concerned. The United States note of June 23, 1928 spoke in this connection of the right of a state "to defend its territory from attack or invasion." Great Britain made a further reservation extending its self defense to the protection of "certain regions of the world, the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest" for its "peace and security." Thus it created a precedent for the wide interpretation of self defense. Japan pretends to act in China in self defense

Under the Nine Power Pact the signatory powers agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China and to establish and maintain the principle of equal opportunity. They promised not to take any advantage of disturbed conditions in China In case of trouble, a consultation of the signatories was provided for

Japan's invasion of China has in itself beyond a doubt been a violation of these stipulations The immediate cause of the first fighting was the incident at Lukouchiao Japanese troops held maneuvers in Chinese territory at a spot where no treaty gave them any right to be. The disappearance of a soldier, who later turned up again, was taken as pretext to demand the search of a little Chinese town in the middle of the night Chinese refusal led to the bombardment of the town and thus to the actual fighting This was taken as an occasion to bring forward certain demands on the Chinese local and central Governments They included a change of administration in North China, permanent withdrawal of Chinese troops from the important railway connection at Lukouchiao with the aim of isolating the North from the rest of China, cessation of anti-Nipponism, suppression of Communist and Nationalist Chinese organizations. At the same time an ultimatum was delivered in Nanking asking for no interference in the North and withdrawal of Central Government troops from the province of Hopei Japan's real aim was at that time the establishment of an autonomous North China under its own control. This aim, which it had attempted to secure in negotiations before, was in itself a clear violation of the Nine Power Pact, but Japan claimed that it was necessary to protect its own interests. The Chinese Government agreed to negotiate on a basis of equality and under the condition that Chinese territorial

integrity would remain intact. In the meantime both sides had concentrated troops, and the major fighting began with a Japanese attack on Nanyuan.

In the beginning Japan wanted at least not to alarm third powers too much, and therefore took the stand that it had no territorial aims and was only defending its rightful interests in China. However, the farther its armies advanced the more clearly Japan showed its intentions. In November 1938 it put its cards on the table and proclaimed the establishment of a "new order which will insure the permanent stability of East Asia" and which would be "based upon genuine international justice throughout East Asia." That this meant the formal repudiation of the Nine Power Pact was implied in the simultaneous speech of Premier Konoye. He stated that

> China has hitherto been victimized by the imperialistic ambitions of other foreign powers, with her peace and independence constantly menaced. Japan realized the necessity of fundamentally revising such a situation, and desires that a new peace, based on justice, be established in East Asia.

The Japanese attitude was made even more evident in the phrase

> It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Government, that in the face of a new situation, fast developing in East Asia, any attempt to apply to conditions of today and tomorrow inapplicable ideas and principles of the past neither would contribute towards the establishment of real peace in East Asia, nor solve immediate issues.

The latter statement is quoted from the answer of the Japanese Government to the formal American protest against rough treatment of American treaty rights in occupied China. This brings us to the point where the "China incident" ceases to be a conflict between China and Japan alone. Japan's actions are now directed against the other interested powers, chiefly England, France and the United States. Out of the intervention in China has developed an attack on the treaty rights of third powers and on the principle of equal opportunity. In the diplomatic struggle which ensued Japan has been carefully trying to uphold a formal legal façade. The most important and indispensable move in this connection has been the establishment of puppet governments in occupied China.

The Significance of Puppet Governments

To UNDERSTAND the importance of puppet governments as a method of destroying foreign rights that stand in the way of Japan's expansion, it is necessary to consider what Japan could do without them. The Japanese contention (during the Tokyo negotiations with the British, for instance) is that the "China incident" was brought about solely by the justified defense of Japanese interests. Japan resorted to military action only in order to reestablish and protect its rights, by forcing the Chinese Government to accept "cooperation." (This wording is more plausible than "the chastising of the outrageous Chinese." The latter phrase, used by the Japanese Premier at the beginning of the conflict, speaks for itself.)

If this Japanese contention of justified intervention be taken at face value, it is possible to discuss the alleged rights and the "defensive" acts which follow from it. Japan's interests in China existed side by side with those of other foreign nations. As long as Japan did not exceed its position of equality there need not have been a clash; but Japan did act, though no other nation felt it necessary to do so, and has occupied a large part of China. Such an occupation carries with it a special position and special rights, which it is interesting to define according to the usages of international law.

International law distinguishes between military occupation in the case of war and apart from war. The first question arising therefore is whether there is a state of war between China and Japan or not. On the answer to this question depend such problems as the position of neutrals, the possibility of blockade, and the application of the American neutrality law. There is no doubt that the Japanese intervention together with the Chinese resistance have resulted in a conflict which from the military point of view is in no way different from any other major war.

However, no war has been declared. Opinions diverge as to when, in such a case, a state of war is legally existent. It is demanded by international custom and agreement (third Hague convention, 1907) that a declaration of war shall precede hostilities; but such a declaration is no certain mark of distinction. There have been wars without declaration (recently Abyssinia and to-day the invasion of Poland. Compare also Fenwick, international law, p. 453). Military intervention, resulting in fighting, on the other hand, does not

necessarily mean war. (Compare the Italian occupation of Albania and the recent fighting between Hungary and Slovakia.) The difference between intervention and war is, according to one opinion, to be found in the aim of the attacking power. It has been argued that in war the final aims depend on the course of the war, while intervention is said to be undertaken for a limited and fixed purpose (Heyland, in *Handbuch des Völkerrechts*, Bd 2, Abt. 7, page 15) However, marginal cases show that these definitions do not help A war can have from the beginning a very limited and definite goal, and intervention can be vague when it begins and lead, as it develops, to wider and wider implications As war allows a greater scope than intervention, we have to turn for a distinction between war and intervention to the intention of the countries at war As long as both parties do not claim the full liberties of war there would be no sense if legal theory of interested third parties were to assume a state of war for them.

In the case of Japan and China the parties have so far neither declared war nor claimed its full consequences Japan has for instance not used the possibilities of a wartime blockade, for fear of embargoes or other retaliatory measures by America and England China was afraid of a Japanese blockade and also of the possibility that the United States neutrality law might operate to its disadvantage For a long time during the fighting the diplomatic representatives of the two countries were not even recalled. For the time being at least there is therefore no legal state of war between China and Japan And this sham situation is not even condemnable; for *a fortiori* the laws of war are still always applicable in such a case The parties cannot escape them They can only limit the legal scope of their actions further

This is the situation in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Not having declared war, and not claiming a state of war to exist, Japan is in its actions limited by the original pretext of intervention: the protection and reestablishment of its legal rights and interests and the enforcement of Chinese cooperation for that purpose. All this holds true of course only under the assumption that the invasion was justified, an assumption which is necessary in order to present the Japanese argument. Japan has further the rights which general practice

connects with military occupation in peace time, allowing for instance all acts necessary for the protection of the occupying power. (Robin, "Occupation militaire en dehors du cas de guerre.") The Japanese army has decreed for instance that all attacks or menaces against its security in China are to be dealt with by Japanese military courts. Foreigners, although having the status of extraterritoriality when living in China, were not exempted.

Behind these limited possibilities stand the humanitarian restrictions of general international law and the special regulations for war. Military occupation in case of war is dealt with in the international conventions on the laws and customs of war on land, concluded at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. Both conventions were ratified by Japan. Only the former, I believe, was ratified by China, but this does not make any difference, because the regulations with regard to occupation are literally of the same tenor in both conventions. Art. 4 of the convention of 1907 states that "the convention of 1899 remains in force as between the powers which signed it, and which do not also ratify the present convention."

The conventions demand, as the condition for the granting of their liberties, an actual control of the occupied territory, which in the case of the Japanese-occupied territory in China is partly contested. They contain rules about the protection of family honor and rights, of the lives and private property of the civilian population, the strict prohibition of pillage, regulations for taxation, contributions and requisitions, all of great importance. But of wider implication still is Art. 43:

> L'autorité du pouvoir légal ayant passé entre les mains de l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui en vue de rétablir et d'assurer, autant qu'il est possible, l'ordre et la vie publics en respectant, sauf empêchement absolu, les lois en vigueur dans le pays.

Together with the other regulations this means the codification of a fact which had become generally recognized in international law. The occupant cannot deal at liberty with occupied territory. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the difference between *occupatio bellica* and *occupatio imperii* has been definitely established. It is not the sovereignty, but only the authority of the legal

power, that passes over into the hands of the occupant. It is a temporary authority, which allows certain interferences, but no change in the whole status of the occupied territory. It must be admitted that the limitation "sauf empêchement absolu" leaves a considerable discretion to the occupying power, with which rests even the decision as to what represents such "empêchement." But even this freedom concerns only the question as to how far the organization and the laws of the territory have to be respected. The status of the territory remains outside of the scope of occupation, and can be changed only under a peace treaty or a corresponding new legal settlement. The occupying power replaces the sovereign government in its normal activities, but it cannot effect permanent changes, even in economic relations with its own country It can safeguard its military actions and the occupying army; but it cannot change the permanent relationship of other states with regard to this part of the territory of the hostile nation It can do everything to protect its interests; but it cannot build anew for the time after the conflict.

Even with the most liberal interpretation of these rules and the Japanese interests to be protected, the margin has not been wide enough for Japanese aims. These aims, even those that are admitted, trespass considerably on the rights which Japan could legitimately have claimed, if the occupation had been legitimate The "New Order," "economic cooperation" and the "yen bloc," which give in fact political domination and economic monopoly to Japan, require a permanent change not only in China, but also in the relations between China and other foreign powers. Aside from the attitude of the foreign powers affected, such a change could not be brought about without the cooperation of the sovereign Chinese Government To force upon the Chinese Government such an attitude would logically be one of the war aims of Japan.

But the trouble is that Japan cannot and does not want to wait so long Through the success of the Chinese tactics the Japanese have been forced into a long war, a war of economic and financial reserves. They therefore need to use the monopolistic economic exploitation of the occupied territory not only for the future but immediately, as a means of carrying on the war itself. Japan is therefore trying to exploit this territory and at the same time to restrict

the foreign interests therein. For this double purpose, control through occupation is not sufficient under international law.

THEREFORE, JAPAN has found an indirect way: the creation of new "puppet" governments. Its own occupation does not entitle it to the measures which it thinks necessary; the legal Chinese sovereign Government cannot be forced to accept them. The obvious thing to do therefore is create a new sovereignty which can be charged to deal with this side of the Japanese advance. It is true that this means also a change in the status of the occupied territory, of a kind not contemplated or allowed for under international law. The establishment of puppet governments is as illegal as the annexation of territory before the conclusion of peace or other treaty settlement of a conflict.

There have, however, been historical instances of the attempted creation of such "independent" governments, for reasons similar to those which govern Japan's action. To use a straw man is as practical in international as it is in civil or criminal law. There is the example of Manchukuo, and there was the German attempt to create an independent Ukrainian state at the end of the World War. Germany issued special money and concluded a commercial treaty exploiting Ukrainian resources for Germany's needs. This was done before the conclusion of peace between Germany and the whole of Russia. It was regarded as illegal by the allied powers, as was also the German creation of an allied Poland out of Russian territory shortly before.

Another example can be found in the "separatist" movement in the Rhineland. After the war the Rhineland was occupied by allied troops. The occupation was based on the peace treaty. France tried to use the situation for the establishment of an independent Rhine State. The attempt violated not only the peace treaty, but also the general rules quoted above. The double violation was emphasized in German official protests and in the opinions of British Crown-jurists. The French Government pretended "neutrality" regarding the movement. It maintained that the separation and independence of occupied territory from the mother state was possible as long as the occupying army did not interfere with the "will of the popula-

tion." The farce of this French "neutrality" was as clear to body as is today the Japanese responsibility—which is not ev nied—for the new Chinese governments. Moreover, to grant e possibility of a "neutral" attitude seems impossible in a te where all power of control has gone over from the sovere the occupant

However, the puppet government as a method of vi the international status of a territory is perhaps less shock public opinion than outright annexation. Puppet governmer therefore more easily be used to develop and extend the opp ties offered by occupation They may become an important p in international relations In the case of China they allow not only to uphold the fiction that it does not seek any ter advantage but also to change the status of the territory befo end of the war Most important in this connection is their u special instrument against the rights of third powers

That this was the chief reason for the inauguration of th anese sponsored new governments is clear from a review o activities When in December 1937 the Provisional Governm Peiping (later Peking) was founded, one of its first acts take over the Customs The English Customs officer in C service in Tientsin handled the Customs over without delay land hoped to secure thus continued payments on the foreig secured by the Customs revenue The importance of this fi consideration was revealed by the head of the Japanese speci tary mission in China, General Kita, in an interview in J 1938 General Kita spoke of the newly coming "Central G ment" in China He declared that financially it would comma Customs and the Salt Gabell (both foreign-organized and administered by foreigners) and would thus have a sound The interview is another proof of Japan's responsibility f puppet governments

On March 10, 1938 one of the most important steps in this tion was taken, when the Federal Reserve Bank of the Prov Government in Peiping was inaugurated, sponsoring a ne rency. The exchange control of the bank enabled it to contr port and export It was thus the chief instrument for monopo

North China business for Japan. At the same time a revision of the Customs regulations, in favor of goods specially delivered by Japan, was another highly important step taken toward the same end. None of these measures could have been undertaken by the occupying army on the basis of its own "rights."

An autonomous Inner Mongolian Government allowed the establishment of wool and other monopolies for Japan. On March 28 a new "Renovated Government" was inaugurated in Nanking. Soon after there began negotiations for the merging of the two governments in Peiping and Nanking. So far only a temporary "Joint Committee" has been established. In May 1938 a temporary agreement between England and Japan provided for the deposition of Customs revenues, surrendered by the English inspector general, in the Yokohama Specie Bank. These revenues are thus placed within the reach of the Nanking Renovated Government, while the foreign loan quotas are remitted to the inspector general.

The new governments in Peiping and Nanking have since been used for the exploitation of the country. With their support the establishment of Sino-Japanese companies has been possible. The most important examples are the North China Development Co. and the Central China Development Co., and monopolies like the North China Tobacco Co. In the war itself Chinese troops have been enlisted by these governments to help the Japanese campaign. Their military value may be doubtful. But the attempt to employ them shows the opportunities opened to Japan by the establishment of these governments.

During the months following the proclamation of the "New Order" the anti-foreign attitude of the new Chinese governments in the service of their masters became more and more outspoken. The new mayor of Greater Shanghai on March 12, 1939 made five demands on the Shanghai Municipal Council. Other attempts followed to drag the settlements and concessions into "de facto co-operation." By every means a pretense has been made of reviving the old Chinese fight against foreign rights in China, but for new Japanese purposes. This has been accomplished by an ever-increasing propaganda campaign. The Nanking Renovated Government went so far as to proclaim a "silent war" against the "hostile"

Shanghai settlement and British and French ships, in the course of which it stationed its own troops and militia around the Settlement borders.

All means have been used to induce the foreign Settlements, under threats of "appropriate steps," to adopt "rational" and "legal" relations. The new governments claim to have *de facto* administration rights over the Chinese territory surrounding Settlements and Concessions, and therefore also the sovereignty over the Settlement territory. This presumption has not failed to make an impression in Shanghai; but it must be denied, even if the new governments be recognized in the territory they control. Essentially, the territorial standing of the Settlements and Concessions is that they are a part of the territory of China as a whole, and not merely a part of that Chinese territory to which they are adjacent. This is of utmost importance for their neutrality stand. The question of the continuance of the Settlements, and of the law courts established there by the Chinese National Government, depends on this principle.

New registrations, restrictions, permissions are ordered by the new governments, who thus control all economic activity. Recently England has been more and more singled out for attack. Anti-foreign and especially anti-British demonstrations have been organized In certain towns all British citizens have been driven out. An official boycott of British goods has begun. Japan has attempted to replace with its own nominees the Chinese partner in the international Open Door agreement.

It is sufficient to indicate these general trends They could be supported by a great many further accounts of the actions of the new governments. Japan has so far not even formally recognized the new governments. It probably wants to reserve freedom of action in all possible further developments. Japan has nevertheless clearly been the originator of the "governments" whose wires it pulls. Official Japanese statements referring to the formation of the new governments express "rejoicing" and "congratulations." Japan has promised an "ever-ready assistance to the council by crushing the Chiang regime." In notes to other powers the Japanese Government has declared itself "in favor" of the actions of the new

governments and of a "cooperative attitude." The Japanese have not even tried to keep very secret the fact of their negotiations with the persons whom they have chosen as heads of these organizations. The Japanese Government has claimed more than once to be highly interested in their protection. When Chinese traitors in Japanese pay have been assassinated, Japan has demanded strong measures for the suppression of terror gangs in the Settlements and Concessions; although such questions of police precaution are strictly and legally no business of Japan's. To find the men to take jobs under the new government, Japan has made use of its great net of agents, as in Manchukuo; agents who have received open praise in detailed articles of Japanese magazines in the English language. And as in Manchukuo, the true character of these governments becomes clearer if one looks at the type of men who form the majority of the Chinese figureheads and notes the great number of Japanese officials and advisers employed to supervise them

In other words, the new governments are in fact not very different from special branches of the Japanese Government in China. The temporary passing over of the legal power from the Chinese National Government to the Japanese army of occupation does not give the latter sovereign rights Japan has therefore created, in order to assert the rights it needs, fictitiously independent branches of its own government.

There is, however, a problem in this *embarras de richesses* of political power. The real masters are the Japanese Special Service Bureau and the Military Police, who both try to uphold their influence. The two groups seem occasionally not to be on good terms with each other; and it is not easy for the Chinese puppet officials to cater to the right men in this changing game of Japanese power politics. The two "Kingmakers," General Doihara and General Kita (now replaced) are said to be themselves in different camps The result is a confusion under which nobody suffers more than the inhabitants of the territory. They have to fill the pockets of all their competing masters, including the Chinese puppets. Sometimes the guerillas also demand a share.

Recently the Tientsin issue has brought Japanese policy to the point of a final challenge. Pressure has been brought upon Great

Britain to change its policy towards "cooperation"; to support the Federal Reserve Bank notes and withdraw assistance to the Chinese national currency; and to hand over the silver deposits in British banks in the British Concession at Tientsin belonging to the Chinese national banks. These demands are the logical second step from the creation of the new Chinese nominal governments to the replacement of the Nine Power Pact by the "New Order." So far Japan has not succeeded in bringing about any change through pressure The formula accepted in the negotiations in Tokyo in July of this year in which Great Britain recognized the existence of military operations in China and the special necessities of the Japanese army for its protection and the maintenance of order in the controlled regions does not alter the situation legally It is in its wording simply a statement of fact It does not, for instance express any opinion with regard to the legality of the Japanese invasion The effect of the European war remains to be seen. The reported Japanese demand for withdrawal of British and French troops from Shanghai has no legal background at all

Even if it could be assumed that the plainly illegal Japanese invasion of China were in fact legal, it is clear that the Japanese attempt to take advantage of the occupation of Chinese territory in order to set up puppet governments is contrary to international law The whole artificial legal construction is hollow Japan is trying to consolidate, without having won its undeclared war against China, a position which depends on the outcome of the war and on the strong or weak attitude taken by third powers. If it can succeed in thus harvesting the fruits of victory without even having won the victory, the result will be a clear Japanese predominance in East Asia and the end of the Nine Power Pact, the Open Door, and the system that has prevailed since the Washington Conference The consequences for the whole world, and especially for the United States, would be unpredictable.

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THE SINO-JAPANESE CURRENCY WAR

D. K. Lieu

Ordinarily a currency war takes the form of a depreciation race. That is to say, Country A depreciates its currency in order to gain some advantage over Country B in the matter of foreign trade, and then Country B retaliates by making its currency even cheaper than that of Country A. In this way, each country hopes to increase its exports and decrease its imports.

The present Sino-Japanese currency war is, however, of an entirely different nature. It is the aim of the Japanese to circulate a kind of paper money in those areas of China which are under their occupation, in order to supersede the Chinese legal tender. Through control over the currency, Japan expected to complete its economic domination over these areas. Besides, as it did not mean to support the notes with foreign exchange or any other thing of value, it would be an inexpensive way of financing the campaign in China. Neither Japan nor China tried to devalue its own currency, as a means of waging the currency war. On the contrary, both wanted to maintain the value of their monetary units. This sort of currency war is in many respects unique in the history of economic warfare.

Unfortunately for Japan, however, the Chinese legal tender notes have exhibited a remarkable tenacity in remaining in circulation in spite of the repeated Japanese attacks on them. Not only has their circulation widened in the unoccupied areas, but even in those under Japanese occupation they have not been driven out of circulation by the various kinds of notes issued by Japan or the Japanese sponsored regimes. The Chinese people everywhere still prefer the legal tender notes, although heavy penalties are exacted from those who use them in some of the occupied areas, especially in North China. Why is this so, and what are the various measures which the Chinese and Japanese Governments have taken in connection with this currency war?

At the beginning, the Bank of Chosen (Korea) in Tientsin, ap-

parently under the instructions of the Japanese Government or the Japanese army (under the peculiar political system and tradition of Japan, the army is free to do many things without the approval of the Government), began in the fall of 1937 to force Japanese yen notes into circulation. The amount issued was at first 20 million yen, which increased to about 30 million towards the end of the year It was thought that North China could easily be converted into another Manchukuo, and the circulation of these yen notes would bring it into the fold of the yen bloc. However, the Chinese populace did not welcome these notes, and they fell to a discount in the market much lower than their par value, which was about one yen to 96½ cents in Chinese currency, would justify.

Meanwhile, Japan had already exercised exchange control. China, contrary to established precedents, did not throughout the first eight months of the war suspend the operations of its exchange equalization fund, but foreign exchange was bought and sold as freely as if nothing had taken place. Hence, during that period, the exchange rate of the Chinese dollar was maintained at 1*s*. 2½*d* as it had been before the war. To prevent any undue depletion of foreign exchange resources, withdrawals of bank deposits were limited to five per cent each week, and the maximum amount that might be withdrawn during any week was limited to $150, except where funds were needed for payment of salaries and wages. As it thus became very difficult for any one to obtain large amounts of legal tender notes for the purchase of foreign exchange, the pressure on the exchange market was comparatively light during the period From July, 1937, to March 10, 1938, there were only some unimportant skirmishes in the currency war.

On the latter date, which marked the beginning of the second stage of the currency war, the so-called Federal Reserve Bank established by the Japanese-sponsored regime in Peiping, began to issue its own notes. These could not be used to buy foreign exchange, as Japan was not willing to spare any of its foreign exchange resources for the purpose, but they could be exchanged for Japanese yen notes, and were therefore linked to the latter. As they were issued by a nominally Chinese bank, they were expected to be more acceptable to the Chinese public, and to drive the Chinese legal

tender out of circulation in North China. Hence, on June 10, just three months after the issue of the F.R.B. notes, the Peiping regime issued an order prohibiting the circulation of Chinese legal tender notes in the occupied areas in North China. However, this order failed to produce the desired effect, as the Chinese people in the occupied areas still preferred the old legal tender. As the latter were accepted by Chinese and foreign banks in China for the purchase of foreign exchange, although within certain limitations, as will be explained later, they commanded a higher value than the F.R.B. notes and prevented them from getting into circulation. As a report in the leading English-language financial journal in Shanghai put it, these latter notes were sent back to the bank as soon as they were issued, until the bank's reserve consisted of nothing but its own notes.

Finding that these notes were not well accepted by the local population, the Peiping regime launched another attack on the Chinese legal tender currency. In August 1938 it issued another order fixing the value of the legal tender notes bearing the names of the Banks of China and of Communications in Tientsin at 90 per cent of that of the F.R.B. notes. In February 1939 the value was further reduced to 60 per cent. Next month, on the anniversary of the issue of the F.R.B. notes, it was again ordered that the legal tender notes should not be allowed to circulate in the occupied area in North China. This time, however, knowing its own weakness, the Peiping regime limited the enforcement of the order to Peiping, Tientsin, Tsingtao, and eight other cities under its control, instead of the whole occupied area. In spite of all these efforts, the legal tender notes remained in circulation. In April 1939, after a whole year's effort on the part of the Peiping regime to discredit the legal tender notes, they commanded in the area under its control a premium of approximately 50 per cent over the F.R.B. notes.

Meanwhile, the Japanese wanted to buy Chinese agricultural products from the country districts in North China which they had not been able to occupy, where Chinese guerillas exercised full control. Through these guerillas the Chinese Government prohibited the circulation of F.R.B. and Japanese yen notes. The local population also rejected them. Hence even the Japanese themselves preferred

the legal tender to the F.R.B. notes, which was another explanation of the failure of the scheme.

Although the Chinese National Government knew full well that the F.R.B. notes would not be able to drive its legal tender out of circulation, yet the Japanese might exchange F.R.B. notes for legal tender in the market, even at the prevailing discount rate, and then use the legal tender to buy foreign exchange from the Chinese Government banks. This would amount to a transfer of Chinese foreign exchange resources to Japanese hands. Consequently, on the very day on which the F.R.B. began to issue its own notes, the Chinese Government put into effect a scheme of foreign exchange control. All those who needed foreign exchange, Chinese and foreigners alike, had to apply through their banks to the Bank of China, and the applications were to be passed upon by a committee appointed by the Chinese Government. Although the Government was generous enough to supply exchange even to the Japanese banks in China, within certain limits, a large scale raid on Chinese exchange resources by Japan and its puppets was thus impossible.

The Chinese Government was able to control the sale of exchange in this way because some time previously it had already obtained control, as far as export bills were concerned. All exporters had been ordered to sell their bills to the Chinese Government banks, and the Maritime Customs would not allow any goods to be exported unless this was done. In this way, the foreign exchange obtained in payment for Chinese exports was concentrated in the hands of the Government banks. In addition, the Government had a large foreign reserve acquired through the sale of its silver stock, which had been nationalized when the new currency system was put into effect in 1935.

When the Government banks began to limit the supply of foreign exchange to the market, a black market naturally emerged, as it always does in any country where exchange control is exercised. Some people still had certain small amounts of foreign exchange, because they received remittances from abroad, and the foreign banks in China were also in a position to supply some exchange. When those who needed foreign exchange could not obtain it from the Chinese Government banks, they naturally turned to these

sources, and paid higher rates. The Government banks, when they supplied exchange at all, still sold it at the official rate of 1*s.* 2½*d.*, but the heavy demand on the other sources depressed the black market rate until it fell in June 1938 to somewhere around 8½ pence. In spite of this depreciation of the exchange rate the legal tender money still, as has been mentioned above, commanded a premium of about 50 per cent over the F.R.B. notes. The Japanese yen had also a black market rate in Shanghai and Hongkong, which was lower than that of the Chinese dollar. The black market rate of the latter remained more or less stable between June 1938 and June 1939.

A PECULIAR sort of activity was indulged in by some speculators soon after the F.R.B. began to issue its notes. By some inexplicable mode of reasoning on the part of the promoters of that bank, these notes were declared to be at par with both the Japanese yen and the Chinese dollar. Now the official rate of the yen was 1*s.* 2*d.*, and that of the dollar, 1*s.* 2½*d.* If the F.R.B. notes were to be at par with both, it meant the absurd assumption that 1*s.* 2*d.* was equivalent to 1*s.* 2½*d.* What the bank meant to do was perhaps to depress the value of the Chinese dollar at the very start, but as it failed in attaining that object, and the F.R.B. notes could not be presented to the bank for redemption in Chinese legal tender, but had to be exchanged at a discount for the latter in the open market, some clever people began to find a way of making money out of the situation. They bought up large amounts of the F.R.B. notes at the discounted rates, and presented them for redemption at the bank in yen notes. As they could not sell these yen notes to the Japanese banks in North China, they shipped them to Shanghai and obtained legal tender notes for them there. Then the legal tender notes were again shipped to Tientsin, where they were used to buy more F.R.B. notes, and these were again exchanged for yen notes at the F.R. Bank. From each complete transaction of this kind, a profit of about 7 per cent was made.

Such transactions produced two results. In the first place, the F.R.B. notes were sent back to the bank as soon as they appeared in the market, so that the bank was really issuing yen notes instead

of its own paper money. But the yen notes did not remain in circulation either, for they went to the vaults of the Japanese banks in Shanghai to which they were later sold. Secondly, because of this large influx of yen notes from North China to Shanghai, the Japanese banks in Shanghai were compelled to depress the value of their own currency in order to discourage such practices. Hence yen notes in Shanghai were also at a discount when exchanged for Chinese currency. In the early part of 1939 the discount was as high as 17 per cent.

Now it must be remembered that yen notes were still officially maintained at 1*s.* 2*d.* in Japan, although in Shanghai they were worth less than the Chinese dollar which stood at about 8½*d.* Consequently travelers found it profitable to buy yen notes in Shanghai before they went to Japan, and after they had defrayed all their expenses in that country, if they were able to sell the remaining notes for foreign currencies there, they often got back more than what they had before starting. Those who intended to travel on Japanese ships from Japan to America also came to Shanghai first in order to pay the fare in depreciated yen. As a result, the Japanese Government was forced to limit the amount of yen notes which any traveler might bring into or out of the country, and the connection between yen notes in China and in Japan was practically severed.

On the other hand, the Chinese Government not only maintained the official exchange rate of 1*s.* 2½*d.* in all transactions with importers and exporters, but also tried to keep the open market rate fairly stable at around 8½*d.* This was done through the operation of a small equalization fund, which, though never officially confirmed, was said to have amounted to five million pounds sterling. Finding this experiment successful, the Government announced on March 9, 1939 the formal establishment of a new equalization fund of ten million pounds, half of which was contributed by the Chinese Government banks and half by the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. This strengthened the confidence of both Chinese and foreigners in the legal tender currency, and its exchange rate was maintained at a stable level. Thus the Chinese Government actually shouldered the

double responsibility, during a period of strenuous struggle for national existence, of maintaining both the official rate and the market rate of foreign exchange. The task was especially difficult because most of the treaty ports which had been the trade and financial centers of the country had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

In March 1939 began the third stage of the currency war. Not satisfied with the experiment of the F.R.B. in North China, the Japanese established the Hwa Hsin Commercial Bank in Shanghai and issued notes which were to be redeemable in Chinese dollars instead of Japanese yen. This meant that the Japanese had realized that the F.R.B. notes, instead of serving as a weapon to break up the Chinese currency system, had done just the reverse. It was the Japanese yen and the F.R.B. notes themselves that suffered in the war, not the Chinese dollar. The new idea was therefore to link the Hwa Hsin notes to the Chinese dollar, so that if they should also depreciate there would be no effect on the Japanese yen. If, on the other hand, they should be able to circulate in large quantities in the market, any effect of inflation would be borne by the Chinese currency as a whole. The Hwa Hsin Bank, like the F.R.B., purported to give the Chinese people a "sound" currency, but since foreign exchange could not be obtained with these notes at the bank itself, they could be issued to any amount until they saturated the market. The slow rate at which they were first issued was necessary to make them acceptable to the public. Once the people became used to these notes, a policy of inflation could be pursued.

Some foreigners in Shanghai seem to have a more favorable opinion of the Hwa Hsin notes than of those issued by the F.R.B., because they approve the apparently "conservative" Hwa Hsin policy. But taking the Chinese currency system as a whole, the issue of a new series of notes, by whatever agency, does more harm than good. It increases the quantity of circulation media in the market, and promotes inflation. Since the war began, it has been the policy of the Chinese Government to limit the circulation of its legal tender notes to avoid inflationary effects. Although the exchange rate has gone down, because of an unfavorable trade balance, it has little to do with the quantity of notes in circulation, which has not been much increased. In fact, a semi-official figure

gives the total issue at present at 2,200 million, an increase of only 500 million dollars during the two years of war—a rate of increase even lower than before the war. The issue of the Hwa Hsin notes is, in the circumstances, both unnecessary and harmful to the Chinese currency system.

It might be argued that, since the Hwa Hsin notes are redeemable in Chinese legal tender, their issue could not increase the total quantity of money in circulation, as for every dollar of these notes issued, a dollar of the legal tender currency must be kept in the bank as reserve. This might be the case at the beginning; but if the population were to accept these notes freely, and not present them for redemption, a 100 per cent reserve in legal tender would not be necessary, and large quantities might be issued to suit the convenience of Japan.

The Chinese Government took certain measures to meet this new Japanese attack. Again a limit was placed on the withdrawal of bank deposits in Shanghai, which was to serve a three-fold purpose. First, the quantity of legal tender notes in circulation there was thus limited, a sort of deflationary policy as an antidote to the Japanese scheme of inflation. Second, the difficulty of obtaining legal tender notes lightened the pressure on the exchange market there, since exchange could only be bought with legal tender. Third, the Hwa Hsin Bank found it more difficult to obtain legal tender notes against which it might increase its own note issue. As has already been explained, this bank at first adopted a conservative policy in note issue, and took care not to issue too much lest it should not be able to redeem the notes in legal tender. When the supply of the latter was limited, the bank was naturally compelled to limit its own issue too. As the value of a currency is affected by the quantity in circulation relative to the requirements of trade, this deflationary policy of the Chinese Government tended to enhance the value of the legal tender notes.

The second limitation on bank withdrawals was slightly different from the first, which had been put in effect in August 1937. In the earlier case, the limitation applied to deposits prior to August 14, when warfare broke out in Shanghai, but new deposits after that date were not subject to such limitation. Checks might still

be drawn against these earlier deposits, but they were not cashed in legal tender notes, and they could therefore only pass from one endorser to another, until they were again deposited in some bank. Thus the so-called Wei Wah currency came into existence. These checks were accepted by business men, but at a discount as compared with cash payments. As more and more cash was drawn out of the banks within the limitations of the Government regulations, these "frozen deposits" were gradually liquidated until on June 30, 1939 only 22 million dollars of them remained in the Shanghai banks. In other cities, where bank deposits had not been very large before the war, they had presumably been liquidated entirely.

In the present case, however, the limitation of withdrawals was confined to Shanghai alone, and the amount withdrawable was limited to $500 per week. Also, it applied to deposits made after the war. Although statistics are not available as to the exact amount of deposits so affected, it must run up to ten figures, as pre-war deposits had accumulated in Shanghai. The effect of this measure, taken in the latter part of June 1939 several weeks after the Hwa Hsin Bank began to issue its notes in Shanghai, was therefore very far reaching.

At about the same time, it was realized that the open market operations of the new equalization fund had apparently encouraged imports to such an extent that a large import surplus was shown in the Customs figures. Meanwhile, the Japanese were tightening their control of exports through the occupied ports. The Chinese Government was therefore made to pay for the imports, most of which had gone to the occupied areas, while it could not obtain the foreign exchange from the exports which originated there. Besides, although the open market operations of the equalization fund strengthened the people's confidence in the legal tender currency, it also made possible a flight of capital, and gave the Japanese a chance to obtain foreign exchange from the fund. So, in the early part of June, 1939 the Chinese Government decided to change its policy, and the operations of the fund were suspended.

So far as the Hwa Hsin notes were concerned, they had not yet been issued in very large quantities, and their effect on the Chinese

currency was still insignificant. The center of struggle in this third stage of the currency war consisted mainly in the fight for the acquisition of foreign exchange on the part of both combatants. The Japanese tried to control as much as possible of Chinese exports, with which they might either obtain foreign exchange directly, by selling them to other countries, or save their own foreign exchange resources by substituting Chinese products for those of other nations in their imports. Since for the Japanese purchase of Chinese products no foreign exchange was necessary, it was certainly to Japan's advantage to do so. However, these Chinese products were mainly raw materials, which did not come from the cities under Japanese occupation, but from the country districts where Chinese guerrillas were active. The Chinese counter-move was planned with this in mind.

From the very beginning, the Chinese guerrillas as well as the regular army had taken pains not to allow the products of the regions under their control to get into the areas controlled by Japan. It was at first rather difficult, since the inhabitants of these regions had to make their living by selling their products, and the market had usually been the treaty ports, where these products were either processed or exported to foreign countries. Gradually the people were taught to produce other things which could be consumed locally, or sold in other regions under Chinese control. If the products had usually been for export, and there were available facilities for transporting them to the free ports not under Japanese occupation, the Chinese Government did its best to have them so exported. Large quantities of tea, tung oil and other products in Central and South China were so exported, and the exchange obtained went to the Chinese Government banks. As it was not possible to export the cotton of North China by the same expedients, cultivation was discouraged and a foreign traveler in the cotton districts there found that production had been reduced by about one half.

Another possible way for Japan to obtain foreign exchange from China is to increase its exports to China. Under ordinary conditions, these exports would have to be paid by China in Japanese yen; but during the present war, these exports could not help Japan's exchange position. For, so far as North China is concerned,

the Chinese importers need only to exchange their legal tender notes into F.R.B. notes in the market, and then obtain with them Japanese yen notes from the bank. Since the F.R.B. notes are at a discount, the importers can get the Japanese goods at cheap prices with Chinese currency, and Japan's exchange position is hardly improved. The establishment of the F.R.B., with its notes redeemable in yen, has proved to be a boomerang to Japan's export trade. Even in Shanghai, there is a large quantity of depreciated yen notes available, and Japanese imports into China can be paid for with them. So long as Japan cannot obtain foreign exchange with the legal tender notes, a heavy demand for Japanese goods in the Chinese market is of little benefit.

For these reasons, Japan has adopted a policy which would otherwise appear to be contradictory to its own trade interests. It has prohibited the export of goods to China, and the prohibition has only been partially lifted for goods which it cannot sell very well elsewhere. Even the importation of bean oil and bean cakes from Manchuria to China Proper once came under similar restrictions, for Japan could get foreign exchange with these commodities if they were sold to other countries. Later it was decided that these products might be exported to Shanghai, but must be paid for in sterling. Since the Chinese Government had stopped supplying foreign exchange to the Shanghai market, Japan had to scramble with other importers for whatever exchange was available there.

The issue of several kinds of currency in China under Japanese sponsorship, on entirely different bases, has already given rise to many complicated problems, some of which have been discussed above. These have proved difficult for Japan to solve, and it is reported in the newspapers that Japan is now trying to adjust the various issues. But there is an additional problem in connection with the fight for foreign exchange. At first sight there seems to be no apparent contradiction between the schemes of note issue and the fight for exchange resources, but a contradiction does arise when both policies are pushed to their logical conclusions. If we were to suppose that Japan could succeed in ousting Chinese legal tender notes from the occupied areas, so that only Japanese sponsored currency had any circulation there, it would not be able to derive

much foreign exchange from trade control in China. It might gain nothing at all, and it is even probable that it would have to bear the burden of the unfavorable trade balance in these areas.

For, as far as the cities in these areas are concerned, they have little to export, and even that little depends on an adequate supply of raw materials from the country districts. On the other hand, they import large quantities of foreign goods. If the economic relations between these cities and the country districts should be entirely severed, the foreign trade position of the cities would certainly be unfavorable. The Chinese Government is trying to accomplish this result through the activities of the guerrillas in the country districts, and the disappearance of the Chinese legal tender notes from the occupied cities would facilitate its accomplishment. Japan now pays for the products of these districts with the legal tender notes. When they disappear, it will have nothing to make payment with, as China is and has been able to prohibit the circulation of Japanese-sponsored currencies in these districts. The farmers are also unwilling to accept them for payment, and Japan will have to employ a large army to collect agricultural products from individual farmers at the point of the bayonet.

With the occupied cities so segregated from the country districts, Japan will obtain little from its control of Chinese exports. But the imports into these cities still have to be paid for, in foreign exchange. Since the Chinese Government has already stopped supplying foreign exchange for the purpose, the burden will from now on fall on Japan. The logical step for Japan is to limit imports and even with very strict limitation, it is doubtful if it can create any export surplus. Japan may now demand payment in sterling in Shanghai for Manchurian bean imports, but there is now little sterling exchange in Shanghai for the purpose. The trend of foreign trade at Shanghai is already heading in this direction, although Chinese legal tender currency has not yet disappeared from circulation there.

To sum up, it may be pointed out that during the first stage of the currency war Japan gained little ground, while China hardly paid any attention to the attack. The value of the Chinese currency was maintained at the old level through unlimited operations of

the equalization fund. In the second stage, although the exchange rate of China's currency had fallen, it was stabilized at a lower level, and still held the confidence of the people and circulated freely in every part of the country, including the regions occupied by the Japanese army. On the other hand, the F.R.B. and Japanese notes were not able to circulate as well, and their value depreciated more than that of the legal tender notes of China. In the third stage, the appearance of the Hwa Hsin notes has up to the present moment produced as little effect on the Chinese currency as the F.R.B. notes. The center of the struggle has shifted to a fight for foreign exchange resources. As Japan has only been able to maintain effective control over a number of cities in China, while the country districts are still in Chinese hands, its control over Chinese exports can be broken at the source of supply. China is doing its best to cut off this supply to the occupied cities, and the greater the currency confusion which Japan is trying to create in these cities, the more difficult will it be for Japan to obtain Chinese agricultural products for export.

While the exchange rate of the Chinese dollar has further dropped in the third stage of the currency war, it is apparently reaching a new level where it may again remain stable for some time. Meanwhile, the trade balance at the free ports has for many months been favorable to China. As the Government has begun to limit imports into these ports, the export surplus will naturally increase. At the occupied ports, Japan will, as has been explained above, soon find it to its own advantage to control the import trade also. According to the Customs figures, imports at these ports have already decreased since the Chinese Government stopped the operations of the equalization fund. With an improvement in the trade position, the exchange rate will improve too.

Moreover, the Chinese Government has instituted price control in the interior provinces, and the price level in many of these provinces is lower than that in Shanghai. With effective price, trade and exchange control in the interior, the deterioration in the exchange rate in Shanghai, even if it should continue, would not affect very much the Chinese population in these provinces. On the other hand, the trade of other countries with China will suffer from the trade control instituted by both combatants. China had, throughout the first

two stages of the currency war, refrained from limiting foreign imports out of consideration for the interests of the friendly Powers. But the new developments in the third stage have made it imperative to take this step. It is not done out of China's own free will, but China is forced to do so by the repeated Japanese attacks on its currency system. Thus the Sino-Japanese currency war is a sword which not only cuts both ways, but also strikes at the vital trade interests of all nations concerned.

Kunming, China, September 1939

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

SANCTIONS AGAINST JAPAN?

In spite of the outbreak of war in Europe, which has drawn the attention of most people away from Asia for the time being, letters in answer to our questionnaire on the advisability and practicability of sanctions against Japan have begun to come in None have yet been received from Europe; but it is to be expected that people will gradually become aware that no settlement of the war in Europe is possible which does not take into account the issues which are being fought out between Japan and China We urge readers once more to send us their opinions

A Canadian King's Counsel writes Professor Schumpeter's article "is exactly the kind of article on Japan which should be published in PACIFIC AFFAIRS . . The article is a very able, discriminating and exact statement of one view of this most important question . I am not convinced that the conclusions of the writer are altogether sound, and I hope that in your next number there will be an article taking a different view, by some person equally competent This is the kind of contribution that will help us all to have a clearer understanding of the issues and of what we can and ought to do about them"

A professor of international law in an American university believes that economic measures taken by the United States alone would not end the war in China and might stir up Japan to "reprisals" *For international* sanctions, he thinks, a system of international government is necessary He does not believe in the use of force by the United States alone, but thinks that the solution might be "for the United States to take the lead in reconstituting a system of international government" This commentator is an American who had spent a few months in China and Japan and maintains correspondence with friends in each country

A former American officer, who has traveled especially widely in China, writes: "It is difficult to gain an accurate perspective of the degree to which the United States will be affected by the 'New Order in Eastern Asia,' as it is envisaged by the Japanese, unless one has been in contact with officers of the military and naval clique who are its proponents. . . . The 'divine mission' concept contemplates the extension of the Japanese brand of culture to the four corners of the world

"It should also be clearly understood that economic sanctions are a form of warfare, just as war itself is a more violent form of political struggle Therefore when sanctions are applied they must be backed by a reputation or power . . . and there should exist the intention to use that power if the object of the sanctions resorts to the use of force in retaliation

"The decision rests largely on the answers to three questions: 1) Is the end to be gained worth the risk of war? 2) Can the application of sanctions reasonably be expected to attain the desired end? 3) Is the nation against which sanctions are contemplated capable of waging war in retaliation?"

With regard to the first of these questions, this writer points out that "it is patent that the Japanese military naval clique possesses an insatiable appetite for power The leaders of this clique do not hesitate to assert that their ambitions for territorial conquest are not confined to the boundaries of Asia . . . At some point it becomes necessary for those nations whose interests are threatened to take steps to curb the predatory ambitions of the aggressor The time to apply the brakes is not when the aggressor is in a position to challenge the power of sanctions, but while he is still impelled, by a disparity in military strength, to bow to expressions of disapproval which are short of war It is the considered opinion of the majority of the military and journalistic observers in the Far East with whom I have talked, that sanctions would stop Japan now."

This writer believes that Japan is impotent to retaliate against sanctions "Japan now has committed to the mainland of Eastern Asia approximately 50 army divisions, or over a million men Probably another 20 divisions are under arms in Japan Yet Japan has made no essential gains in China since the capitulation of Hankow in October, 1938

"I agree with Professor Schumpeter that the public has in the past been given a partial and unbalanced picture of the situation in the Far East. If the public were thoroughly educated as to the objectives of Japan . . . I believe that the American people would have demanded that punitive action be taken long ere this"

On the other hand, this correspondent differentiates between the military and naval clique and the Japanese people The Chinese, he points out, make this distinction He believes that if the clique is thoroughly discredited it might be subordinated to the civil will, thereby contributing to a return of sanity to the nation He concludes: "While it is humane and just to consider the effect of economic sanctions on

the Japanese people, it should be remembered that the Chinese people are also entitled to just as humane treatment. The immediate purpose of sanctions is to stop the war in China by depriving the Japanese military of the means of waging war." The ultimate result would be "to discredit the egotistical and power hungry military naval clique When the Japanese people have learned that aggression does not pay, but that nations are disposed to aid Japan to solve its economic and social problems in a peaceful and orderly manner, America should lead the way in achieving such a solution "

An independent New York business man, who has first hand knowledge of Japan but not of China, answers our questionnaire (see PACIFIC AFFAIRS for September) as follows

1 He believes that sanctions against Japan would end the war in China.

2. He believes that sanctions against Japan would not lead to further war

3 He believes that sanctions should be international

4. He believes, however, that sanctions could be successfully applied by one nation, for example the United States

This correspondent also points out, in an accompanying letter, that sanctions must not be separated from other aspects of policy or lack of policy It is necessary to provide countries like Japan and Germany with an alternative to war as a way to prosperity.

Finally, we quote from a letter from a British army officer with many years of experience in Asia This letter was not written in comment on Dr. Schumpeter's article, but some of its remarks are pertinent. The writer does not believe that Japan will "break down," financially or economically He does believe, however, that Great Britain and America, by "withholding exports," could place Japan "in a parlous condition" In fact, an ultimatum from Great Britain and America "would probably not only save foreign interests but relieve pressure on China "

Among replies received just as we go to press is one from a Canadian who believes that sanctions against Japan would end the war in China and would not cause further war While sanctions should be international if possible, American sanctions alone would be sufficient This answer is interesting because it came from someone who had seen the PACIFIC AFFAIRS questionnaire copied elsewhere.

Another answer, in the same tenor, from an American with long first-hand experience of the Far East, including contacts with Japanese in Shantung, Manchuria and Shanghai, encloses an interesting refer-

ence to an American skilled mechanic who has been engaged to go to Japan The American factory in which this man worked is being transferred to Japan in entirety. He will train Japanese to do the work he used to do His own son, formerly employed in the same factory, is now unemployed. When he returns to America, will he himself be unemployed, while the transferred American factory works at full pressure to conquer China for the Japanese?

To the Editor of PACIFIC AFFAIRS

SIR

Having read Mrs Schumpeter's article and your comment on its contents and reasoning, I frankly feel I should not like to be polled concerning the problem of sanctions against Japan However, I feel very strongly that the article deserves a purely professional criticism, though, of course, I may be counted among the "people" and be discarded as an "expert"

1) There are people who expect "experts" to formulate their policies There are "experts" who wish to formulate policies. I feel that both of them are wrong Experts are needed to advise on policies which have been decided upon by others—in a democracy, by "The People" Experts may have to point out the inconsistency of such policies with fact or reason Unless such inconsistency exists, experts should be satisfied with giving their advice not as to what should be done, but what could be done, and how

It is, of course, the easiest course for the expert to advise simply to do nothing Such an easy exit, however, requires legitimation just as much as any other advice I cannot help feeling that Mrs Schumpeter has failed to establish her case for doing nothing, though much of her criticism of the embargo advocates seemed justified, sound and even insufficient at the time of its publication

2) Mrs Schumpeter's argument is centered upon the Japanese supply of raw materials and equipment She proposes a group of five points which ought to be considered At least two of them, I think, need not trouble anyone advocating an embargo on exports to Japan

a) As to the amount of production in Japan and Japanese controlled territory, any production which can be mobilized there, will be mobilized regardless of cost at present, before imports are paid for and ordered. Insofar as any foreign supplies are

drawn upon, they are needed only to supplement domestic production and production in dependent territory. Therefore, the extent of such production need not be considered for the embargo argument.

b) The amounts of essential materials stored in Japan might determine the time which it would take for sanctions to become effective. In no other way could they impair the arguments of the embargo adherents.[1]

On the other hand, I think Mrs Schumpeter, writing in June, has missed an opportunity in omitting to point out that many commodities which Japan now buys in the United States could, despite an embargo, have been bought just as well elsewhere—at that time especially in Hamburg—at a price probably higher, though not prohibitive. E.g., her considerations concerning American oil sanctions against Japan wrongly left out of consideration that Japan could have bought for cash whatever oil it wanted in Hamburg, before the British blockade began. Therefore, oil sanctions could *not* have been applied effectively against Japan.

Now, however, it would seem that, for the duration of the war in Europe, the situation has changed, and oil sanctions might become effective if attempted. Mrs Schumpeter's argument that the Anglo-Dutch oil combine would feel obliged to supply Japan with oil against the wishes of its management, "because of the vulnerability of Netherlands India,"[2] would not seem valid. Although we may imagine a Japanese attack on the Dutch islands in the Pacific, we can scarcely expect such an attack to yield oil, as it would probably lead to the destruction of the oil wells which are said to be prepared for just such an emergency. Moreover, Dutch defensive power in the Pacific is probably underrated.

If oil sanctions were attempted, I cannot see how Japan could utilize resources of its own, not yet tapped. Coal shortage in Japan and Manchukuo—now combined with the additional load placed on Japan's coal supply by the drought of 1939, which reduced Japan's production

[1] Anyone discussing the stock of essential commodities held in Japan, however, could scarcely fail to realize that according to the Japanese warehouse statistics, stocks of goods in general, with the exception of cotton piece goods, seem to have considerably declined.

[2] With regard to aluminum, Mrs. Schumpeter understates her case. Most of Japan's aluminum production is not dependent on bauxite from Netherlands India, as Japan—and Manchukuo—tend generally to use domestic raw materials inferior to bauxite *for the production of highly protected all-Japanese aluminum.*

of hydro-electric power—greatly reduced whatever expectations were held in Japan with regard the production of oil and gasoline from coal

3) Before the outbreak of war in Europe, I should thus have been inclined not only to share but actually to add to some of Mrs. Schumpeter's economic arguments against an American export embargo on war supplies for Japan. On the other hand, many of her specific points, even at that time, were far from convincing.

Mrs Schumpeter's table of Japanese exports of ores and metals, metal manufactures, scientific instruments, etc., machinery and parts (p 254) is given in values of millions of yen Careful checking of these figures, however, would have shown that the *quantities* exported in 1938 were rather less than in 1937, because of the rise in Japanese export prices[3] This rise in prices has led to the loss of most of Japan's export business to countries outside the yen bloc No such rise has taken place in the prices of Japanese imports The decrease in the "net imports" of 1938, as against 1937, is solely due to the item "ores and metals" and largely the result of lower import prices, on the one hand, and reduced import quantities—causing conditions of an acute metal shortage in Japan—on the other hand

As for the manufactured products of the tabulation, aggregate net manufactured exports dwindled from 87 million yen in 1936 to 46 million yen in 1938, with net imports of machinery increasing from 10 million yen in 1936 to 80 million yen in 1938

Mrs Schumpeter refers to the increase of Japan's productive capacity for so-called peace time needs Actually, this increase of "productivity" is so unproductive in terms of peace time conditions that it could be justified only for a very long war period Mrs Schumpeter herself points out that *future* war with the Soviet Union was alleged to be the cause for uneconomic developments, but why not war with the British, French and Dutch Empires, or war with the United States?

The figures quoted by Mrs Schumpeter actually show that Japan is generally unable to provide for its normal needs of technical equipment In 1937 and 1938, under the stress of war,[4] Japan's dependence

[3] Cf "Inflation and Prices in the Yen Bloc," *Far Eastern Survey* August 2, 1939 pp. 183 ff

[4] Even railway rolling stock cannot now be supplied in sufficient quantity from Japanese establishments for the railways of Japan, Manchuria and China, while formerly Japan was an exporter of rolling stock Japan's narrowest bottleneck in the production of technical equipment is the lack of skilled workers whose wages have risen very high The shortage antedates the Sino-Japanese hostilities Cf Hallett Abend, *Saturday Evening Post*, August 19, 1939, and *Asia*, July 1939, p 375

on foreign supplies of such equipment has rapidly grown, while stagnation, if not actual decrease of exports, shows its inability to provide for its present needs, including those of Manchukuo and occupied China. Mrs. Schumpeter's conclusion, "it is obvious that Japan is now in a position to produce most of the machinery it uses," conveys a meaning which certainly could not be derived from the facts

As matters stand today, after the outbreak of war in Europe, Japan's dependence on the United States has sharply increased The most successful competitor of American manufacturers in the Japanese- and Manchurian—markets has been Germany, whose nationals were granted preferential treatment and were supplied with Government credit facilities for their expanding business with Japan Already, orders originally intended for Germany have been diverted to the United States

As we have to deal with an acute situation, Mrs Schumpeter's reference to potential Japanese supplies complicates the argument, without adding to it As it is, we have to deal not with potential supplies which, in principle, i.e., technologically, are nearly unlimited anywhere —but with actual supplies which could be used within a short time

In discussing available Japanese supplies, however, facts impairing Japan's productive capacity and its utilization must not be overlooked There is now, e g, an acute shortage of ammonium sulphate in Japan, resulting in small imports of nitrate of soda from Chile and in large imports of beancakes from Manchuria as substitute fertilizers As a result, beancake and soy bean prices in Manchuria have risen to such heights—Dairen prices rising beyond London parity—that the Manchukuo Government has felt compelled to take measures against this price development Production of sulphate of ammonia in Japan suffered from an insufficient power supply while production in Manchuria had to be sharply reduced for lack of water and coal in Dairen.

This coal shortage, which extends all over the Japanese sphere of influence, is generally underrated by Mrs Schumpeter[5] This is especially noticeable in her discussion of Japanese oil supplies. Actually, the production of Manchurian shale oil seems to exceed now 120,000 tons annually As to oil from coal,[6] however, little seems to have been achieved

[5] For a while, even the supply of coal for the porcelain kilns (an export industry), was highly irregular Only in July 1939, it was asserted, had this shortage been overcome

[6] In Manchukuo, one enterprise was originally expected to produce [illegible] tons of oil from coal in 1939, present hopeful expectations look forward to a [illegible] production of at most 60,000 tons by three enterprises, with no reliable information on the actual start of production thus far

beyond building plants—not all of them able to turn out oil—and announcing plans. With a deficiency of coal in general, Japan or Manchukuo cannot be expected to supply any considerable amounts of oil from coal

Mrs Schumpeter's scrap iron argument suffers from what I should call "technological" distortion Scrap is consumed for the making of steel Steel is produced for the making of steel products Scrap "produced" as a "by product" in the making of steel products from steel—about 20 per cent of the ingot steel used in the rolling mills—is of a category different from such scrap as returns from "old iron" into the production of steel as a raw material, the "by product" scrap being the result of the use of "old iron" scrap and pig iron in the making of steel As such by product scrap totalled about one million tons in 1936, the proper comparison as to Japan's original "old iron" scrap supply would, therefore, be between 0 8 million tons domestic and 1 5 million tons foreign supply of scrap, part of the former "domestic" supply being due to ship-breaking operations performed on old vessels imported by Japan for the production of "original" scrap. Assuming for argument's sake the foreign scrap supply had failed in 1936, Japan would have been forced either to buy more expensive pig iron instead, or to curtail steel production Steel production curtailment would, then, have amounted to 120 per cent of the foreign scrap supply—including the by product scrap derived from foreign "old iron" scrap in the making of steel products—i e, about 1 8 million tons of steel, or nearly one-third of Japan's steel production To this extent, Japan's steel industry was dependent on foreign scrap iron supplies

The two basic raw materials of steel production are scrap iron and pig iron In 1936, Japan depended on foreign pig iron to the extent of about 23 per cent of its total supply Combining Japan's dependence on foreign scrap and pig iron, it would seem that in 1936 Japan's steel production depended on foreign raw material to the extent of about 45 per cent Moreover, as to pig iron, Japan's dependence on foreign supplies was actually—and probably still is—increasing, with Manchurian exports of pig iron steadily declining, as follows

Manchurian Pig Iron Exports

Year	Tons
1934	440,000
1935	433,000
1936	309,000
1937	252,000
1938 less than	200,000

Japanese pig iron production in turn depends on foreign iron ore imports, as Manchukuo does not export iron ores to Japan,[7] and Japanese and Korean production of iron ores is fairly insignificant. Biggest supplier of iron ore at present is British Malaya, probably at a rate of about 2.5 to 3 million tons annually. About one-third of Japan's pig iron production, if not more, is dependent on these iron ore supplies which are accessible only because of special accommodation for the importation of Japanese mining labor—the formerly employed Chinese miners having struck—into British Malaya, an accommodation which might be revoked by the British authorities at will.[8]

Combining Japan's dependence on foreign scrap iron, pig iron and iron ores, it would seem that its steel production depends on foreign raw material to the extent of probably no less than 60 per cent of total raw material supplies.

This actual situation can scarcely be said to have been adequately covered by the assertion that "in time . . . Japan will have ample supplies of domestic scrap" and "foreign imports play a minor role in pig iron." This, I take it, is what most people would be inclined to call "wishful thinking."[9]

4) There are abroad obviously two lines of argument for sanctions against Japan, one moral and one politico-economic. On the moral issue, there is agreement among the vast majority of the American people. What experts can do is not to show that the majority of the American people are "biased by sentiment and wishful thinking," but carefully to weigh the facts, and to give their well-considered opinion as to what could possibly be done successfully, with what losses—as the realization of moral attitudes usually involves losses—and what possible risks.

The latter argument evidently would also have to consider the risk of war. However, a simple statement that this risk exists, is scarcely

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[7] Mrs. Schumpeter's wording in this respect is regrettably opaque.

[8] The Australian embargo on iron ore exports has demonstrated that even such an incisive action could be taken without any serious ill-effects on the relations between Australia and Japan.

[9] Wishful thinking, of course, just now plays an important role in Japanese economic literature, and the student is liable to be impressed. However, plan and performance have thus far so greatly differed that Japanese planning should not be taken too seriously. The grave shortcomings in coal, oil and gold production in Manchuria, not to mention the floods in China, are sufficient evidence of widespread inefficiency wherever the Japanese bureaucrat or general has really achieved the powerful position which he covets everywhere in the Japanese Empire and its dependencies.

satisfactory, if it comes from an expert, as it may well be said that the risk of war is always faced by any existing state and government. Ever since the China Incident and because of it, the risk of war has grown appreciably less, at least for its duration, as Japan has been forced to reduce its naval building to a practically negligible rate. All the other naval powers have in the meanwhile greatly increased their naval building—mainly because of Japan's own naval policy—and Japan is now rapidly losing its rank as a naval world power.

Furthermore, in considering the risk of war, it must not be forgotten that now, for every soldier deployed in China, Japan seems to need about 2 tons of transport shipping, with the result of a shipping shortage in Japan's coastal waters.[10] For every soldier employed against the more distant Western powers' dependencies in the Pacific area, Japan would need about 3 or 4 times the shipping needed for soldiers fighting in China. Given the present size of Japan's mercantile fleet, it seems a rather safe guess that no new military long-distance expedition is likely as long as the China campaign is on.

Moreover, war or mere naval action unaccompanied by expeditionary forces in these regions might possibly destroy resources now at Japan's disposal for cash, and markets now still open, which would yield no rapid returns after a destructive conquest. Instead, war would probably interfere with such alternative supplies as might replace embargoed supplies, because of the inevitable disturbance of the ocean routes in the war area. While, of course, nobody "can be sure what the Japanese Army and Navy would do," it seems fairly sure that their answer would not be war, unless, indeed, they wished to rival Samson's final feat among the Philistines.

5) As to the means to be employed, the expert should clearly not restrict himself to choosing among those most loudly advocated, he should try to suggest reasonable choices.

An American embargo on scrap iron exports in general would be justifiable on grounds of "conservation," beneficial to the American steel industry, and harmful to the scrap merchants and to the production, i.e., collection, of scrap. It need not be discriminatory against Japan at all, though it would certainly increase the cost of Japanese steel production. Under the conditions of war in Europe, substitute supplies of foreign pig iron might be difficult to procure.

When Mrs. Schumpeter wrote, mere American action restricting other American exports to Japan, would have been of relatively minor im-

[10] *Ann.*, July 1939, p. 373 ff.

portance; though, of course, from the moral point of view, this might not have been considered a valid counter argument Now, the situation seems to have changed, as most potential competitors are straining their resources for the European war Thus, involuntary international co operation with any American move may now be expected, even from such unexpected quarters as Nazi Germany

6) On the other hand, the expert would have to point out that the economic reasoning underlying the boycott movement in the United States is, to some extent, sounder than the embargo argument, insofar as it aims generally to reduce Japan's purchasing power at its source A formal general boycott of Japanese goods by the Government of the United States may, however, well be ruled out of the realm of practical possibilities There remain definite weapons of ordinary commercial policy against Japan

First, the United States would clearly be justified in depriving Japan of the benefits which it now enjoys as a most favored nation, from tariff reductions granted to other nations,[11] especially as the United States is refused most favored nation treatment everywhere in the Japanese sphere of influence, definite preference having thus far been granted German goods [12] In addition, there has been discriminatory preferential treatment of Manchurian pig iron, Chinese cotton, etc , all of which violates the American principle of equality in commercial policy If this charge of discrimination were pressed further, the President would under the Tariff Act be authorized to levy very high punitive duties not only on Japanese goods but also on all goods imported in Japanese vessels.

Secondly, the so-called "link system" and the open subsidization of exports to free exchange countries, including the United States, from the proceeds of exports to the "yen bloc" countries with their higher price levels offer grounds for the imposition of countervailing duties

A third possibility in this realm of "boycotting" Japan would be the imposition of a revenue duty on raw silk A 50 per cent ad valorem duty on raw silk would yield more than U S $50 million annually at present raw silk prices, which would not be a negligible contribution to the United States Treasury Such a revenue duty would largely not be paid by the American consumer of raw silk, but by the Japanese producer who has to sell a fixed quantity of raw silk in the American market, the Treasury revenue declining with the fall in silk prices

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[11] Cf *Far Eastern Survey*, December 7, 1938, p 282 f

[12] Cf. *Far Eastern Survey*, October 26, 1938, p 241 ff

Such a duty would, moreover, grant protection to the fairly "young industry" of nylon. It would evidently be a suitable means to make Japan pay for part of the cost of increased naval building necessitated by its own naval policy.

7) The combined effect of the scrap iron embargo and these boycott measures taken singly by the United States, without the enactment of any discriminatory extraordinary legislation, could easily be a total net reduction—including additions to Japan's foreign exchange outlay—of Japan's annual recurrent foreign exchange resources by about U. S. $50 million annually.

Additional embargo measures which would be given effectiveness by the outbreak of war in Europe, would considerably add to the financial bill and be pretty serious technologically.

Such measures would not stop Japanese aggression in China at once and by themselves. They would, however, result in an appreciable economic weakening of Japan. As such weakening would combine with other diplomatic, military, economic and physical factors which are nibbling at the base of Japan's fighting power, it might possibly tip the balance in favor of reason and peace in a future nearer than if no such American action were taken.

The scrap iron embargo and the "boycott" measures outlined under 6), would clearly not imply the risk of war seriously. Moreover, economic action combining real effectiveness, reasonable moderation and unequivocal resoluteness would probably not fail to impress the Japanese mind, which seems inclined to underrate popular moral indignation and diplomatic protests unless expressed in deeds.

KURT BLOCH

New York, September 1939

NETHERLANDS INDIA: A STUDY OF PLURAL ECONOMY. *By J. S. Furnivall. London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. pp. 502. 25 sh.*

THE SUB-TITLE of this important study is somewhat misleading. The work is not narrowly confined to a study of plural economy, or what the Dutch more generally call "dual economy." It is indeed of very broad scope. It constitutes a history of Dutch East Indian policy and administration from the beginning to the present time. In fact the study is so largely historical that persons interested in the most recent developments in Netherlands India will be disappointed. The story is carried only to 1933 or 1934 and most of the statistics employed do not go beyond 1930. For example, the administrative reorganization of the Outer Territories receives only a brief reference as a plan still under discussion.

Mr. Furnivall in this work gives every evidence of having mastered the tremendous amount of Dutch literature on the history of Dutch rule in the East Indies. He knows the complicated Dutch political history of the last century, a subject very difficult for foreigners to understand. As a general history of Dutch colonial policy and administration his work is excellent, though as such it has some strong rivals even in English. Its chief merit, and also its chief interest, lies in the numerous observations in which Dutch practices and policies are compared with those of the British in India and Burma. Mr. Furnivall's background as a former colonial official gives these observations a very great actuality and therefore a peculiar value.

In the concluding chapter the character and problems of a plural economy such as found in Netherlands India are examined. Mr. Furnivall points out that a plural society is found in all of the tropical dependencies and in lesser degree even in some western states, as, for example, Canada. The most obvious feature of a plural society, he concludes, is the absence of a common will, "except, possibly, in matters of supreme importance, such as resistance to aggression from outside." "In a plural society," he continues, "the community tends to be organized for production rather than for social life, social demand is sectionalized, and within each section of the community the social demand becomes disorganized and ineffective, so that in each section the members are debarred from leading the full life of a citizen in a homogeneous com-

effective contact with Moslem orthodoxy. Of recent years mode
Islam has made headway.

M Bousquet distinguishes the superficial modernism, the conserv
Arab influence, the earlier Islam, mystical and tinged with heresy,
the pre Moslem basis of Hindu culture and Indonesian animism.
then examines the newer tendencies, devoting special attention to
great movements Sarikat Islam, primarily political, and Muhammadi
primarily religious This clears the way for a discussion of D
Moslem policy Among internal problems he treats of the relig
organization, the education system, and the application of Muh
madan Law, among the external problems are pilgrimage and
influence In all these matters the chief instrument of policy is
Bureau for Native Affairs, which makes a scientific study of social
among the people, and especially of the reactions of Islam in the na
world Thus, within little more than 50 pages, M Bousquet achiev
masterly survey of Islam in the Dutch East It is a work which Br
students of colonial affairs should read with profit, though, as
gested below, with caution

Dutch Moslem policy derives from the great scholar Snouck H
gronje. Its main elements are religious tolerance, benevolent neutr
toward ethical reforms, and the repression of political religious m
ments It was Snouck Hurgronje who fashioned the Bureau of Na
Affairs But M Bousquet regards the Bureau as pedantic and unpract
and holds that the Government has neglected Snouck Hurgronje's w
ings of the Muhammadan danger As Muhammadans, the people
well content with Dutch Moslem policy, and with good cause, for
Government fosters Islam as a counter to Nationalism But
Muhammadiyya has political reactions, and M Bousquet considers
Dutch policy blind, or incomprehensible

Thus he found it impossible to disentangle Dutch Moslem p
from their colonial policy in general, and was compelled—as he
malgré lui—to extend his survey over the wider field Unfortunately
acquaintance with the French colonial system does not extend to In
china, and he therefore compares the Dutch East with Mediterran
Africa To the visitor from British India, Saigon, with its opera ho
its orchestra, its statues, boulevards and cafés, is a Paris *outre-mer*;
as a French colonial remarked, "ce n'est pas encore Paris." Batavia, l
wise, is not yet The Hague; it is not even Algiers. Moreover, as a scho
M. Bousquet does not perhaps recognize, so clearly as would a trop
administrator in daily contact with a different people, the extent

which logic must do courtesy to common life. Thus, in the wider field of his survey, his work in Algiers was perhaps a hindrance rather than a help.

A brief sketch of the Nationalist movement leads to discussions of the material results of Dutch colonization, of recent political reforms and of cultural reactions, these are summed up in a general consideration of the Dutch colonial spirit M Bousquet finds a contradiction between Dutch policy and practice In theory the Dutch repress Nationalism, but in fact they strengthen its forces, in theory they direct their system of education toward fortifying the people against foreign influences, but in fact the system is wholly alien For the material achievements of the Dutch he has nothing but praise, for their cultural achievements, little but reproach.

In political organization, basing himself not quite justly on Dr Colijn, he recommends the maxim *Divide, ut impera* He thinks that the Dutch should break up Indonesia into small autonomous provinces, but it is doubtful whether he appreciates the practical difficulties of this in view of past history and present economics In administration he reprobates the Dutch policy of prevention and the use of "gentle pressure" The motto of Dutch rule is emphatically prevention, but it is in the sense of the Prayerbook rather than of modern usage With this is associated "gentle pressure" in a degree almost incredible to those who have not seen it, yet in an artificial community, gentle pressure has its value as a substitute for social conscience In general policy he advocates more idealism and less materialism, more fervor and less phlegm He examines Dutch colonial policy with reference to nationalist aims and to the principles of political assimilation and of cultural association, but he does less justice to the idea of a quasi-federal association of communities, which permeates Dutch colonial practice and is strongly advocated by colonial statesmen. This idea carries with it the principle of conserving native culture, which M. Bousquet can explain only on material grounds as representing the Dutch idea of "milk from contented cows." That, after all, is common sense But Dutch *common sense* gave him a chill, even in the tropics, and he prefers the French manner toward subject peoples, a manner which is warm, cordial, "et qui *parfois* (author's italics) part vraiment du cœur." For France, he says, colonization is above all a conquest spiritual and moral, he sees no trace of this idea among the Dutch. But, after all, God, when creating man in his own image, did not reject olive, brown and ebony He found it good, but M. Bousquet seems to think it a mistake. God should have been

content with Frenchmen; to which we others may remark "c'est là la utopie latine."

T. J. FURNIVALL
Cambridge, England, August 1939

JAPANS SEEMACHT. *By Gustav Jensen. Berlin: Verlag Karl Siegismund.* 1938. *pp.* 379. *RM* 12.00.

THIS politico-historical study of Japan's naval power has a preface dated June, 1937. Accordingly, references to the Sino-Japanese hostilities are lacking, and the serious character of Sino-Japanese tension in the period preceding the hostilities is greatly understated. The author interprets Japan's stand for naval parity as part of Japan's struggle against "Anglo-Saxon (Anglo-Jewish) World Power." Surprisingly enough, Japan's complete dependence on goods supplied and on markets controlled by the Anglo-Saxon nations is scarcely mentioned. The utter futility of Japan's striving for naval parity in an armaments race against such competitors as the United States and the British Empire is not even hinted at.

Reading of the book is difficult, because of constant mistakes in grammar, not to mention the bulging modern German style of the writing. By using dramatic categories: Dangerous Japan 1919-1922, Japan Fettered by Treaties 1922-1932, Japan Struggling for Freedom 1932-1936, Free Japan 1937, the author tries to hide his lack of penetrating analysis and real knowledge concerning the precarious strategic position of Japan in naval strategy.

While he hints at disagreement between the basic policies of the Japanese Army and Navy, he has not deemed it worth his while to analyze the facts underlying their different policies. The level of scholarship may be illustrated by Jensen's treatment of the Anglo-Japanese understanding of 1911. On p. 160, he contends that Great Britain probably assured Japan of ultimate possession of German Kiaochow in agreements which have remained unknown to the present day, and refers to a 1923 study by Franke who, he says, proves this assumption as nearly certain. On p. 161, probability and near-certainty have been replaced by full certainty, no other proof being given but the same source!

On p. 221, Japan's Prime Minister Hara is accused of having cowardly evaded the decision on existence or non-existence of the Japanese nation. On p. 227, Hara is described as the ablest and most energetic statesman

of Japan. While Japan's Siberian expedition is dealt with *in extenso*, the final evacuation of Siberia by Japanese troops is not even mentioned. The book seems to deserve attention only as one more exhibit proving the utter destruction of sincere scholarship and research in the Third Reich.

KURT BLOCH
New York, August 1939

CHINA FACES THE STORM. *By Ronald Rees. London: Edinburgh House Press. 1938. pp. 158. Paper, 2 sh.*
CHINA THROUGH A COLLEGE WINDOW. *By William G. Sewell. New York: Friendship Press. 1937. pp. 183. $1.00.*

WITH its sub-title, "The Christian Church in China Today," the dual character of the first-named study is sufficiently indicated. Those who cannot in their own minds identify the good of the Chinese people with that of the Church had better read something else. The book sees current affairs in China through a cruciform aperture that leaves as much out of the landscape as it reveals. By contrast, Mr. Sewell's window, though it opens upon a sheltered campus, permits of a much freer view. He enables us to watch at least a small segment of Chinese life without interposing too much of the pattern of a foreign social philosophy.

Mr. Rees' book was written just before the outbreak of the undeclared war and is related to more recent events by an introduction and an epilogue from another pen. His purpose, as that of so much of missionary literature, is to give an optimistic forecast of the salvation to be expected from the emergence of Christian leadership in China. This wishful thought, as a matter of fact, receives more substance than it has had in the past, from the utterances and actions of the Generalissimo and of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek in recent years.

The platitudinous writing that comes from China on moral issues occasionally gives glimpses of a genuine concern with problems which an earlier generation would not even have understood—much less have tried to grapple with. But Mr. Rees takes altogether too much for granted when he assumes that the opening of new opportunities for men and women trained in Christian institutions will greatly affect the more essential problems before the Chinese people. In fact, the problems which he discusses are generally those of the possessing classes and of

individuals who seek salvation for themselves. Even though that search has led many of them into a deeper preoccupation with the lot of the less fortunate, a true moral regeneration is hardly imaginable within the frame of the Chinese social order as it was when this book was written

Mr Sewell's essay is the more pleasing and convincing because it deals much more simply with matters he knows from intimate experience It so happens that the students in the small college where he teaches are recruited from a wider range of social status than is usual, and the relatively modest claims he makes for the values of foreign participation in Chinese higher education are justified by the evidence which he supplies The Christian readers to whom these books address themselves probably would rather contribute to some small institution that employs teachers like Mr Sewell than to the gelatinous mission boards which speak of 200 million Chinese (those under twenty five) as "receptive material" and discuss strategies for insinuating church work into thousands of Chinese homes

Bruno Lasker
San Francisco, April 1939

An Experiment in the Registration of Vital Statistics in China *By Professor C M Chiao, Warren S Thompson, D T Chen Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems Oxford, Ohio* 1938 *pp* 115 $1 00

This attempt at population registration was undertaken jointly by the University of Nanking and the Scripps Foundation, at the suggestion of Professor Buck, and forms a useful complement to the valuable material on Chinese population accumulated by the University of Nanking in connection with its work on Chinese agricultural economics [1]

The report is the result of intensive field work in gathering data on the actual population and the movement of population over four years The work was confined to a comparatively small area which was thought sufficiently representative and as large as could be covered by a trained supervisor assisted by local helpers so familiar with their neighborhood that they could not fail to know when births, deaths and marriages occurred

[1] John Lossing Buck *Land Utilization in China*, Shanghai, 1937 The chapter on Population was prepared by Chi Ming Chiao and Frank W Notestein.

The area chosen—the district of Hsiao Chi, Kiangsu province, about half way between Nanking and Shanghai—covers 150 square miles. The population of nearly 22,000 is distributed in 231 villages, including 4 market towns. The supervisor, Mr Chen, himself a native of this district, had to visit each village at least once a month, checking the information either on the spot or by questioning the people of a neighboring village and "making friends with all sorts of people—midwives, church members, Taoists, quack doctors, sorceresses and others" Lack of interest on the part of the population, fear of taxation and military service, as well as superstition, made the task of the reporters particularly arduous An analysis of the statistics presented suggests that in spite of their efforts, some of the fluctuations indicated by the figures are probably due to deficiencies in the registration.

In view of the diversity of local conditions and the violent changes which probably occur from one year to another in a population of several hundred millions living for the most part near or even below the minimum margin of subsistence, the results of such a localized enquiry could obviously not be more than a drop in the ocean but as the report rightly states "such endeavors contribute to the knowledge of how to go about the registration of vital statistics in China" Only those conversant with the uncritical character of so many studies on Chinese population can realize the outstanding pedagogical importance of such a meticulous analysis. Some of the Chinese statistics and studies on population are, to Western minds, simply bewildering China enjoyed a high civilization when Europe had hardly witnessed its dawn, and there have been counts of population in China for over 4,000 years We are, nevertheless, at a loss to know whether the population is nearer the 350 million mark, as suggested by Professor Wilcox, or the 450 million mark [2]

The way in which some of the studies are made, passing over thousands of years and scores of millions, is tantamount to examining the Milky Way with an opera glass The authors of the present report prefer to make a scientific scrutiny of a tiny particle under a microscope

Briefly, the main topics analyzed are size of family and economic

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[2] A Chinese author says, in a recent work, "Nous pouvons dire d'une manière presque sûre que le nombre des habitants de 1928 oscillerait entre 310 et 550 millions"!

Another example a few years ago, we learned that new documents had been discovered allowing at last of a better interpretation of the census material discovered some years earlier They did not concern any of those quasi-mythological censuses dating back 4,000 years, as one might have expected, but a census taken in 1909-1911!

status, structure of population as regards sex, age, civil status, education, occupations; nuptiality in relation to age; birth and death rates, differential fertility and mortality and, finally, migrations.

The following figures suggest a distinct, although rather erratic, increase of population:

	Birth Rate	Death Rate	Excess or Deficit
1931/'32	48.3	41.8	5.5
1932/'33	44.1	36.1	8.0
1933/'34	40.0	52.0	−12.0
1934/'35	48.0	23.8	24.2
Average 1931–1935	45.1	38.7	6.4

These rates are considerably higher than those found in many Chinese studies. They are also somewhat higher than those arrived at in Professor Buck's enquiry. As registration in the present case was probably more complete than in the others, this difference is not surprising, however, the rates are likely to be still below reality.

The conclusions of the authors, which are set out by Warren S. Thompson in the long appendix, "The Outlook for the Improvement of Standards of Living in China," are rather gloomy and decidedly Malthusian. It is obvious that medical progress may stave off mortality, but the problems at stake are of tremendous importance, since any reduction in mortality may result in the necessity of securing a means of livelihood for many more millions.

GRZEGORZ FRUMKIN
Geneva

CHINA AT BAY. *By Wilfred L. Chester. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd.* 1938. *pp.* 214. *Paper.*

INTENDED for the lay reader, this "series of discursive studies" does not profess to be a record of events. It contains loosely strung descriptions, some of them fairly circumstantial, of selected situations, and discussions of the social and political by-products of Japanese aggression in China. It abounds in charges against the invaders that have already been made by many other writers, and by some of them with more authentic evidence.

B. L.

La Chine Capitaliste. *By Maurice Cachin. Paris: Gallimard. pp. 303. 30 fr.*

This is a study in the series "Problèmes et Documents" published by the Nouvelle Revue Française. Cachin tries to cover the recent history of China and Japan, the reasons for the Sino-Japanese hostilities, and their history till shortly after the fall of Nanking. It concludes with the prophecy that "the present Sino-Japanese war . . . was bound to reinforce national sentiment in China and to strengthen her economic unity, even if Japan were to succeed in annihilating the 'phantom government' of Nanking, the aspirations of which are engraved in the minds, if not in the hearts of the Chinese people."

The central thesis of the book is that the rising capitalistic bourgeoisie of present-day China was backing the rise of Chinese nationalism, following the inevitable logic of history interpreted along what have come to be considered Marxian lines. The present Sino-Japanese conflict is, then, interpreted as a conflict between the clashing economic interests of the Chinese and Japanese bourgeoisies. This viewpoint pervades the whole book and offers the backdrop of a dramatic description of the events leading up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war.

Unfortunately, there is not sufficient material to justify the broad thesis of the author. E.g., it is definitely incorrect to describe T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung as "representing the 'clan' of the Chinese bankers and industrialists of Kiangsu and Chekiang." The former is a rather independent personality who actually, in 1935, ousted the real Chekiang representative, Li Ming, from the Bank of China, in a rather ruthless way. The latter is a rather greedy campfollower of the Kuomintang, who represents nothing but himself and his family. Nor should the Kuomintang be described as a party organization controlled by Chinese bourgeoisie, for it really has been very much an organization prevailingly of military and civilian officials, as clearly shown by its membership statistics, with the bourgeois influence rather slight.

The weakness of bourgeois capitalism, and the strength of the entrenched party and military bureaucracy are thus consistently understated. E.g., the achievement of Government control over the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, and three of the most important private banks in 1935-36, is passed over in silence.

As in other instances, the sweeping Marxian generalization which precedes factual analysis, instead of following from its results, leads to little positive results, though to vast misinterpretations. Thus, e.g., the

importance and the meaning of the New Life Movement are greatly overrated, the missionary Western influence on its tenets overlooked just as much as the very strong associations with classical Chinese traditions. On the other hand, Mr. Cachin gives a well-rounded history of recent events in China and Japan, with a rather rich documentation from speeches, notes, etc.

KURT BLOCH

New York, August 1939

INDIA'S NATIONAL INCOME 1925-1929. *By V. K. R. V. Rao. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.* 1939. *pp.* 173. 6 *s.*

PROFESSOR RAO has become known as one of the most active younger men in the teaching and practice of Indian economics. He was awarded a Ph.D. by the University of Cambridge for some able researches on Indian national income which, together with a considerable amount of other information, are printed in this book. A sequel containing more recent information is expected shortly. Professor Rao's final conclusion is that, measuring Indian national income by the technique used in other countries, British India has an average national income of 78 rupees per head per year. Much of this, of course, consists of crops produced and consumed by peasant families without being the subject of money transactions. Professor Rao has included all such output in his figure of national income.

Some may seek to excuse this terribly low figure by pointing out that wholesale food prices are very low in comparison with retail prices in white communities, and that this very low income does not necessarily mean a low standard of living. Professor Rao counters this by examining the average food consumption of the Indian family, which he finds to be abundant in cereals only. The diet is terribly deficient in proteins and fats; milk and meat are in exiguous supply and highly priced. A redeeming feature is the considerable acreage devoted to the production of fruits and vegetables, without which the diet would be still more deficient.

Re-expressed in terms of European or American prices, the Indian standard of living appears to correspond approximately to an income of $200 per year per bread-winner.* That is to say the average Indian bread-winner has about as much to eat and wear as he could purchase,

* Reviewer's estimate. Professor Rao is not responsible for this figure.

retail prices, for a cash income of $200 a year in the U.S.A. In ex-
iuation of this situation, about all that can be said is that India now
joys a definitely higher standard of living than China.

Professor Rao makes a most valuable survey of the trend of real in-
ime per head in India since 1868. It is not generally known that the
rst estimate of Indian national income, which has proved to have been
iade on fairly sound lines, was made at that date by Dr Dadabhai
Iaoroji, "The Grand Old Man of India" It is indeed, very fittingly, out
f the Dadabhai Naoroji Memorial Prize Fund Professor Rao's book is
ublished. Since that date the subject has been studied intermittently and
n different bases of calculation. Reducing the earlier figures to a similar
asis of calculation and correcting for changes in the price level, Professor
Rao shows that real national income per head rose from 14 rupees in
1868 to 55 rupees in 1895, and 78 rupees in 1921, since which date it
has been virtually stationary

Low, therefore, as is the present standard of living in India, it appears
to be an improvement on that of 70 years ago, and the apologist for
British rule in India will find considerable justification in the substantial
increase of real income per head between 1868 and 1921 But how to
account for the virtual stagnation since the latter date in spite of rapidly
increasing industrialization?

The disciple of Malthus may be tempted to point out that since 1921
Indian population has been increasing at a rate of over 3 millions per
annum, in a country where population density is already excessive,
whereas between 1895 and 1921, as a result of a series of famines and
the influence pandemic, the population increase was very small

The Indian national income for the period under investigation is esti
mated at 20,680,000 rupees, of which agriculture and live stock produc
tion contribute 16,520,000 Although industry and commerce now employ
nearly 30 per cent of India's working population, they appear to make
a contribution per head little greater than that of the rural community

To the general reader Professor Rao's work (unlike most statistical
works) can be strongly recommended, not only for the clarity with which
the economic and statistical conclusions are set out, but for the inter
esting light which it throws upon many aspects of Indian rural life To
the statistician, Professor Rao's technique will be fascinating The varied
paths by which he stalks the quarry of milk yield and the output of
live-stock products; his adventures in the course of a questionnaire to
industrial managers; his troubles with Government accounts, the in-
genuity and resourcefulness with which he has woven a statistical fabric

from the short threads supplied by a disconnected series of village studies, all these make it a book quite indispensable to statisticians faced with similar problems.

Colin Clark
Director, Bureau of Industry, Brisbane, July 1939

Siam, das Land der Tai. *By Wilhelm Credner. Stuttgart J Engelhorns Nachf 1935 pp xvi + 422.*

Dr Wilhelm Credner, under the auspices of the Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft, made five extended field trips to the various sections of Siam during the years from 1927 to 1929 A collection of geological specimens made at that time has been deposited with the Geologischen Institut of the University of Kiel, and a collection of soil samples at the Institut fur Bodenkunde und Agrikulturchemie of the University of Gottingen The first chapters of this book are the result of carefuly collected data on land formations, varieties of rock, soil, fauna, flora, weather variations, and anthropological types

The geological profiles of various sections of the country are presented in charts and maps The content and distribution of the various formations are suggested in the discussions of tin, wolfram, gold, copper, iron, zinc, precious stones, salt, coal, and petroleum Mountains, plains, and rivers are accurately located and adequately described There are full discussions of climate, rainfall, and soil Chemical analyses of the various kinds of soil are included, with some mention of their potential availability for different kinds of agriculture Study of the soils is followed by a charting by districts of the distribution of the flora indigenous to Siam A brief survey of the fauna is also included

The anthropological section of the book describes first the wilder mountain tribes, and then the Siamese, Malay, and Chinese who live in the villages and towns. A hundred and thirty pages are devoted to detailed consideration of agriculture, trade, and industry. These discussions begin with one on the raising of rice, the most important business of the nation, and go on to the lesser crops such as spices, palms, tobacco, and tea Further sections deal with the raising of rubber, animal husbandry, sticklac, the fisheries, forest products, and the mining of tin and of precious stones.

The social section of the book, dealing with the system of government, is chiefly valuable as constituting the last survey of the country by a

foreigner prior to the Revolution of 1932 The bibliography is excellent and forms a survey of material available for the study of Siam Three hundred and thirty two items are noted and classified according to subject.

The author is a competent geographer, and the chief contribution of the book is to be found, therefore, in those chapters dealing with geography and allied subjects. Dr Robert Pendleton, Expert Soil Technologist of the United States Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, used it as a guide book on his initial surveys of the country in 1936 37, and found it extremely valuable It is the best work available in this field and as such it is to be hoped that it will soon be available in an English edition The author is particularly felicitous in clarifying technical descriptions with charts and diagrams Altogether there are 142 of these maps, tables, charts, diagrams, and pictures, which vastly enhance the text, and help the reader visualize the material presented

KENNETH PERRY LANDON

THE WHEAT ECONOMY *By G E Britnell Toronto University of Toronto Press and Canadian Institute of International Affairs* 1939 *Editor's preface by H A Innis pp xvi* + 259 *Can* $2 50

THIS is a welcome book—orderly, informative, compact, and well and heavily documented, partly from unpublished materials It is "part of an extended project carried out by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations on standards of living in Canada, and constitutes a report on the international research programme of the I P R" (Editor's preface p vii)

The title, while by no means inappropriate, fails to indicate the focus of emphasis upon standards of living of the agricultural population of Saskatchewan. This emphasis appears more clearly in the structure of the book The first four chapters (The Geographical Background, Railways and Population, The Distributing Structure and The Wheat Economy) are background and cover only a third of the text, the last four chapters (Income and Expenditure, Provincial and Municipal Institutions, Standards of Living, and Rehabilitation) are backbone and comprise two-thirds of the discussion.

In these last four chapters, Professor Britnell unheatedly etches a gloomy but convincing picture of a community with widely variable income, already heavily indebted in 1929, subjected in the following

years to the crushing impact of unprecedently low prices and calamitous yields of wheat, its dominant source of income and only possible important source. Reductions of costs failed by far to offset reductions of gross incomes, so that standards of living, including educational and medical services, could not fail to fall drastically while indebtedness increased. "By the autumn of 1937 the completeness of the crop failure in that year had placed two-thirds of the rural population on the relief rolls and 290 of the 302 rural municipalities of the province had sought assistance from the government" (p. 97) The author makes clear the formidable difficulties, in an area predominantly rural, thus encountered by provincial and local governments He is careful to indicate, however, that adversities were different in severity as between geographical regions and as between farm families in a given locality.

The author offers, as he says, "no simple solution" He reviews, on the whole unfavorably, subsidized resettlement in the more humid, wooded north He points out that possible alternative uses of prairie wheat land must be considered, but seems to expect relatively little of intensification of agriculture, improved methods of fallow farming, irrigation, or consolidation of holdings and reduction of population; and he perceives difficulties in creating either physical or financial reserves in fat years His major suggestion appears to be that "only assumption by the Dominion government of the financial burden of a large part of the costs of education, hospitalization, mothers' allowances, etc. (in addition to old age pensions and relief expenditures), coupled with provision for a flexible system of emergency grants to meet immediate and pressing needs as they arise from year-to-year fluctuations in net income, can give [a] measure of security to the vulnerable and exposed sections of the Canadian economy" (pp. 240-41). He thinks—rightly, in the reviewer's opinion—that the farmers of Saskatchewan must for some years continue to depend mainly upon wheat, must anticipate continued variability of income; and, even with "normal" crops and incomes, will probably not attain their pre-depression level of living standards.

The book would perhaps have gained by more extended discussion of guaranteed wheat prices to producers and of "conscious adjustment of Canadian wheat acreage to the probable demands of an export market" (p 219). Some of the statistical data could advantageously have been presented in graphic rather than tabular form.

M. K. Bennett
Food Research Institute,
Stanford University, August 1939

MEN MUST ACT *By Lewis Mumford New York Harcourt, Brace & Co.* 1939 *pp.* 176 $1 50

FORTHRIGHT in his political as well as his aesthetic judgments, Mr. Mumford demands a vigorous American policy of defense against fascism—so vigorous, indeed, that its full acceptance might give substance to the German charge of encirclement and to the Japanese claim that, in their foreign actions, the so-called democracies behave in anything but a democratic fashion The strength of the little book lies in its deflation of the isolationist theory No foreign policy is adequate that "denies ourselves any opportunity to influence the rest of the world, but . . does not prevent the rest of the world from influencing us"

In the few months since this book appeared, American opinion in favor of a more forceful combat of fascism has steadily grown The man in the street has come to recognize that nothing is to be gained from drifting, and that America must now break the rule of banditry in other parts of the world if the western hemisphere is to be safe from it in the future

Mr. Mumford's book and similar writings enjoy popularity because they do not stress the sacrifices of immediate national interests that must be made to ensure a larger interest More especially, while there has been much exaggeration in the isolationist camp of the danger that a defensive economic strategy would involve the United States in war, the advocates of that strategy do not sufficiently reveal the "danger" that cooperation with other democracies now will almost certainly involve this country in a permanent alliance with other nations A police system, in the modern sense, cannot be built overnight and for a particular occasion It has to be based on a permanent administrative structure, so that just grievances will be eliminated and conflicts be resolved before they take on dangerous proportions

Mr. Mumford's case would be less popular, perhaps, but certainly stronger if he were to cut through the false sentiment of the average man's devotion to slogans concerning "foreign entanglements" and the like, if he were to advocate a return, instead, to the real philosophy of George Washington and his contemporaries as regards the part which the United States should play in the world Democracy, as Mr Mumford demands, must become creative "Men must act," to be sure; but if they are citizens and not bandits they must first think

BRUNO LASKER
San Francisco, May 1939

HISTORY OF PRAIRIE LAND SETTLEMENT. *By A. S. Morton, a* "DOMINION LANDS" POLICY, *by Chester Martin. (Canadian Fr tiers of Settlement, vol. II.) Toronto.* 1938 *pp.* xviii + 571.

THE SETTLEMENT of Western Canada presents materials to historian that might well be the result of a scientific experiment It v a great movement of population that took place within a relatively sh period of time, and within a clearly marked and adequately control geographical area. The territory involved was more than two hundi million acres of surveyed land, the population grew from a few tho sand to more than two millions, and the production of wheat increas from nothing to a peak in one exceptional year of 566 million bushe This immense development was accomplished within the 60 years fro 1870 to 1930 It was under the general control of a single governm authority, the Canadian federal government, and the bodies whi cooperated and helped in the formation of policy, such as railway co panies, land companies and provincial governments, were relatively fe in number Records, for the most part official, are ample and well ke and the historian has a wealth of material at his disposal The opp tunity to examine and analyze this material has been put to excelle use in the series of volumes under the general title "Canadian Fronti of Settlement" of which these two studies, published as one volum form an important part

Professor Morton, the author of the first of the two studies, has liv for many years in Western Canada, and has observed much of t settlement he describes His book is a straightforward chronologi account of the growth of population in Western Canada, giving d emphasis to important economic and technical factors which controll that development A market for agricultural products, transportati facilities capable of carrying bulky goods, and methods of cultivati suited to the short growing period and dry climate of the west were nece sary requirements before settlement could proceed beyond the meagre e ploratory beginnings of the fur trading days Professor Morton traces t spread of settlement along the line of the railways in the first moveme of population. When crop failures threatened to discourage the secon wave of settlers, types of wheat and methods of agriculture were devis that overcame the handicaps of climate. Once these initial difficult had been overcome, a great wheat producing area was rapidly develope complete with social and political institutions as well as the intrica economic machinery necessary for placing the staple crops on the mark

of the world Drought and depression within the past decade have brought to an end this great cycle of expansion The people of Western Canada have now to deal with problems of consolidation arising from a change in world conditions, a change which no one foresaw during the process of settlement that Professor Morton has described

Throughout the period covered by these two studies the lands of Western Canada were administered by the federal government, though land was regularly a matter of provincial control in Canada Professor Martin, who has written the second of these books, began his study of prairie lands when he assisted the provincial government of Manitoba in preparing its case for the return of its land and natural resources to provincial management, a transfer which was made in 1930 Again the study benefits from the fact that it covers a completed movement, for by 1930 the supply of cultivable land remaining under public control appeared virtually to be at an end

The policies under which the federal government administered the prairie lands were designed, in the words of the act of parliament which retained them for federal control, "for the purposes of the Dominion" These purposes were varied, and in some cases appeared contradictory The Dominion had committed itself to the construction of a trans continental railway, and one purpose to be served was the provision of a railway subsidy The other important object of policy was the encouragement of settlement through the distribution of free homesteads Both policies were taken over ready made from the United States, though, as Professor Martin shows, the conditions that led to their adoption differed greatly in the two countries Other objectives, such as a payment in land to the Hudson Bay Company for the surrender of its charter, and the endowment of schools, were also included with the Dominion's "purposes."

The immense grant that was made to the Canadian Pacific Railway Company appears to have been justified by the fact that the company was thus enabled to finance construction and complete the road in time to offset a national emergency. Added to this in defense of the grant to the railway was the company's policy in disposing of its lands as rapidly as possible in a manner that fostered settlement Less defensible were the further railway grants, made to the so called "colonization" railways. Many of these railway companies, which secured control of a vast area of the public domain, were formed for the purpose of speculation in land grants and construction contracts rather than for practical railroading.

The homestead policy is more difficult to evaluate. While it was in effect, all parties, including the railways and land companies which were trying to sell land, agreed to the wisdom of adopting it. Yet it seems to have achieved few of its objectives. Much homestead land fell into the hands of speculators, and the real settlers of humble means, for whom the homesteads were designed, seem to have had great difficulty holding on to them. Professor Martin's conclusion is that, since 41 per cent of those who entered on homestead lands never secured a patent, "the total wastage not only of cultivable acreage but of human material must have been truly appalling."

Of all the various methods by which land in the prairie regions was alienated, that which Professor Martin finds most profitable and efficient was the category of school lands. In this case the federal government was administering an estate consisting of reserved sections of land, the proceeds from the sale of which were earmarked for the endowment of provincial schools. These lands were regularly sold at a good price, they caused little discontent amongst the actual settlers who usually objected to the presence of reserved lands, and they produced a handsome revenue.

The authors of these two studies have examined their subjects with painstaking thoroughness, and no detail of settlement and land distribution has escaped their attention. At the same time they have kept in view the broader movements in world affairs that influence the growth of population, and they have appraised with genuine insight the mass of factual material that they have gathered together.

R. G. Riddell
Toronto

British Imperialism and Australia, 1783-1833. *By Brian Fitzpatrick, with an introduction by the Hon. H. V. Evatt. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.* 1939. *pp.* 396. 18 *s.*

This is more than an account of early settlement in Australia, though it gives an illuminating description of the infancy of the colony. The title of the book, it will be noted, is British Imperialism *and* Australia. Nearly as much space is devoted to a study of the basic social, economic and political trends in England as to the movements of events in Australia. The reason for this dual emphasis is that imperialism begins at home, and it is impossible to understand the form which overseas settlement took, or the policies which were sought to be ap-

plied, without understanding the forces operating in the mother country which prompted and planned the expansion. Mr Fitzpatrick shows how during this period all official policy relating to Australia was devised for the relief of English problems, what was done was intended not especially for the needs of the colonists, but primarily as an attempted solution to the grave domestic questions raised by the American, the French and the industrial revolutions Colonial policy is here seen as an outward extension of domestic policy, and not, as in so many other histories, as something detached from its social context

Mr. Fitzpatrick extracts a simple and intelligible story from his careful examination of original sources. The American Revolution blocked the former outlet for convict transports in the American colonies, a new outlet, for the relief of gaols and hulks overcrowded by a barbarous penal code, had to be found New South Wales was selected Here, it was hoped, could be built a colony based on agriculture and small land holders, the settlers *comprising, not only transportees who had served* their term, but also some of the excess agricultural population of England produced by the land enclosures For nearly forty years of the fifty dealt with by this book, this was the official policy which successive governors sought to implement In the end the policy was a total failure Instead of being a country of small holders working agricultural land, Australia became the prize of British capitalists developing the sheep industry on a large scale The reasons for this major change of colonial plan, which were in part native to Australia and in part due to developments within the British economic system, are unfolded by Mr Fitzpatrick in a fascinating manner He shows how the pastoral colony emerged from the early agricultural one in response to basic social and economic factors.

The book is well documented, has a number of interesting appendices elaborating particular points, and is written in a lively style throughout It is refreshingly free from the over-emphasis on political events which has been the weakness of so much English historical writing Although it covers a small part of the life of a single British colony, it is of general interest to anyone wishing to know more of the nature of economic imperialism. It keeps suggesting to the reader general principles of economic expansion of which there are numerous examples in the world of today; in this sense it is a contemporary book

F. R. Scott

McGill University, Montreal, July 1939

WORLD ECONOMY IN TRANSITION. *By Eugene Staley New York Council on Foreign Relations.* 1939. *pp.* xi + 340. $3.00.

It is a common and tantalizing experience to find that the basic economic policies which can be defended nationally on their merits are politically so impractical that they must be relegated to a remote utopia. Professor Staley has undoubtedly undergone this experience and has attempted to escape from the irritating dilemma by explaining the situation which has given rise to it, discussing the general principles which ought to condition policy, and then considering the practical suggestions which can be made for improving policies today The general plan of the book, as set out in the preface, comprises five parts Technology versus Politics, The Best Use of World Resources, Laissez Faire and Planning, The Challenge of War, and Problems of Policy in a Mixed System

A prime source of our present difficulties lies in the incompatibility of technological developments which tend to create a "planetary" economy with political developments which resist this tendency Economic welfare requires the best use of the world's resources and therefore demands the victory of technology In the long run technology may be destined to triumph, but we, who have to live our lives in the period of strife, can escape catastrophe only by discovering some *modus vivendi* capable of maintaining a precarious peace between the two conflicting tendencies If "Laissez faire" and "Planning" appear as alternatives, it is because we do not realize that, in practice, the choice offered to us is between a mockery of laissez faire and a mockery of planning It is, therefore, peculiarly important to determine the conditions under which a mixed system, with elements of planning imposed on freedom of initiative, can operate successfully. The menace of war makes it difficult to decide on what is the wisest policy for any one nation Although it is a truism that defense is more important than opulence, the cost of defense is, under the conditions brought about by modern technology, fatal to welfare, and self-preservation demands that it should be reduced, and if possible eliminated, by cooperative defense.

In making his practical suggestions Professor Staley permits himself the minimum of optimism necessary for a happy ending: "The fact that the nation state must be accepted as the main unit of economic policy, even on problems that are world-wide, need not prevent constructive action." (p. 227). He makes the further bold postulate that "measures of political cooperation will be put into effect by means of which nations

that want peace may be relieved of at least part of the overwhelming necessity they now feel for war preparedness" (p. 228)

On this basis Professor Staley anticipates an international economic system with three "sectors", a market sector, "consisting of economic transactions carried on by private enterprises," an intergovernmental sector, "including the transactions of the planned or controlled economies of the world among themselves and transactions between public corporations set up in countries of mixed economy," and a sector of international public or quasi public authorities (p. 231) The development of these ideas forms the most novel and significant part of the book

To this sketch of a possible world a final chapter is added in which the special position of the United States is discussed It could stand *autarky* better than other countries, but "the notion that insulation from the world would contribute to economic stability in the United States is false The boom and crash of 1929 and the recession of 1937 38 were certainly two economic events that gave the rest of the world more cause to complain of unstable influences from the United States than *vice versa*" (p. 321) But Professor Staley does not discuss the political difficulties in the way of bringing the United States to follow what he considers a policy of far sighted self interest, if the short run advantage of powerful groups must be sacrificed

Such great praise is accorded to the "Hull method of attacking trade barriers" which "makes possible careful attention to both the immediate and the long-run consequences for every industry affected" and which, "when honestly and intelligently applied as it certainly has been by the United States . . . permits at least an approach to a just balancing of probable permanent gains against probable transition costs," (p. 251) that it becomes almost a *suppresio veri* not to inform foreign readers that part of the intelligent application of the policy consists in limiting reductions to 50 per cent of the rather high American tariff rates

Professor Staley has produced a book which, within self imposed limits that are frankly announced, if somewhat curiously framed, is practical and realistic It deserves to be widely read, for it serves two valuable purposes: it brings home to everyone the immense difficulty of ensuring human welfare in the world today; and it makes clear the degree of success which can be expected if the necessary minimum of political achievement is practicable.

H. F. ANGUS

RECENTLY ISSUED

(Continued from page 356)

International Affairs. 1939. Melbourne University Press. Aus. 10s, plus 2d postage. London Oxford University Press.

The Wheat Economy: The Saskatchewan Farmer and His Standard of Living. By G. E. Britnell *Preface by* H A Innis. Issued under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs University of Toronto Press pp xvi + 259 Can $2.50

The Japanese Canadians By Charles H Young, H R Y Reid and W. A. Carrothers *Edited by* H A Innis, Head of the Department of Political Economics, University of Toronto Published under the auspices of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene in Canada, and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs 1938 University of Toronto Press. pp xxx + 295. Can $2.25, plus 15¢ postage.

Emigrant Communities in South China By Ta Chen *Edited by* Bruno Lasker A study of overseas migration and its influence on standards of living and social change in Kwangtung and Fukien Issued under the auspices of the China Institute of Pacific Relations pp xvi 290 Shanghai. Kelly & Walsh. English and American editions to be arranged later

La Politique Musulmane et Coloniale des Pays Bas By Professor G H. Bousquet, University of Algiers. Paris Centre d Etudes de Politique Etrangère pp 167 25 fr The Secretariat has made arrangements for a revised English translation entitled *Dutch Colonial Policy Through French Eyes*, to be issued shortly

Politique Extérieure des Etats Unis Des Lois de Neutralité à Conférence de Lima By Alfred Max *With a Preface by* André Siegfried Paris Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère 1939 pp 180 15 fr

La Politique Française et l'Extrême Orient, 1936-1938 By Roger Lévy Paris Centre d Etudes de Politique Etrangère 1939 English translation to be issued later by the Secretariat

L'Evolution Economique de l'Indochine Française By Charles Robequain. Paris Centre d Etudes de Politique Etrangere 1939 pp. 397

Foreign Concessions at Shanghai and Tientsin Prepared by members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Issued under the auspices of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations London Oxford University Press About pp 150 American edition to appear under the auspices of the American Council

Chinese and Japanese in Hawaii during the Sino-Japanese Conflict By Edwin G Burrows Published by the Hawaii Group, American, I.P.R Honolulu and New York 1939 pp 79 50¢

Saikin no Beikoku Kyokuto Seisaku (American Far Eastern Policy Today) *By* Miriam S Farley Translated into Japanese and published by the Japanese Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Tokyo 1939

British Policy in the Far East. By G E. Hubbard Information Department Papers No 24 London. Royal Institute of International Affairs 1939. pp. 56 1s.

China and Japan Information Department Papers No. 21 *Second Edition, revised and enlarged* London. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1939 pp. 151. 2s. 6d; New York: Oxford University Press. 75¢.

The Origin and Development of the Knot of Contradictions in the Pacific Area. By I Motylev (In Russian.) Moscow State Social Economic Publishing House 1930 pp. 144 1.65 roubles.

FORTHCOMING STUDIES

The South Sea Islands Under Japanese Mandate By T Yanaihara English version of a report already published in Japanese under the auspices of the Japanese Council About pp 250. To be published under the auspices of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations. Shanghai Kelly & Walsh, English and American publishers to be arranged later

Fijian Frontier By Laura Thompson An investigation of cultural conflict and adjustment in the Lau Islands of Fiji American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations About pp. 200

Industrial Capital and Chinese Peasants A Study of the Livelihood of Tobacco Cultivators By Chen Han seng *assisted by* Wong Yin seng Chang Hsi chang and Huang Kuo kao To be published under the auspices of the China Institute of Pacific Relations and the Sun Yat sen Institute for the Advancement of Culture and Education Shanghai Kelly & Walsh About pp 100

Labor Problems in the Pacific Mandates By John A Decker To be published under the auspices of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations Shanghai Kelly & Walsh About pp 250

Maps of the Pacific An Annotated Bibliography of Maps of the Pacific Area By Clifford H MacFadden Department of Geography, University of Michigan *With an introduction by* Robert B Hall To be published under the auspices of the Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations Shanghai Kelly & Walsh About pp 200

The International Position of Outer Mongolia A Contribution to Russia's and Japan's Policies in the Far East By Gerard M Friters *Introduction by* Owen Lattimore To be published under the auspices of the Secretariat Shanghai Kelly & Walsh About pp 300.

L Utilisation du Sol en Indochine Française By Professor Pierre Gourou, University of Brussels To be published by the Centre d Etudes de Politique Etrangere, Paris

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